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OPSOMMING 
Trusts word vir ‘n groot verskeidenheid doeleindes gebruik, nie net in Suid-Afrika nie, maar 
ook in die buiteland. Net soos baie ander entiteite funksioneer trusts baie keer nie net in een 
jurisdiksie nie. Trusts word dus ook blootgestel aan internasionale dubbelbelasting. Soos die 
meeste ander state, sluit Suid-Afrika dubbelbelastingooreenkomste om die effek van 
internasionale dubbelbelasting te beperk. Die meeste van hierdie ooreenkomste is gebaseer 
op die OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (die OECD MTC). 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse trust het ‘n unieke aard. Dit is nie gebaseer op die konsep van verdeelde 
eiendomsreg waarop die meeste gemeenregtelike trusts gebasseer is nie, maar tog is dit ook 
nie ‘n regspersoon nie. Die vraag wat hierdie navorsing probeer beantwoord is hoe Suid-
Afrika sekere bepalings van die OECD MTC sal interpreteer en toepas op trusts. Alhoewel die 
Suid-Afrikaanse posisie ondersoek word, word dit deurgaans vergelyk met die posisie in die 
Verenigde Koningkryk, Kanada en Nederland. 
Die proefskrif begin met ‘n analise van die trustreg in elk van die betrokke state en word 
gevolg deur ‘n oorsig van die belastingstelsel wat trusts (en die partye daartoe) belas in elk 
van die state. Die status van dubbelbelastingooreenkomste en hul interpretasie word 
ondersoek voordat sekere kritiese bepalings van die OECD MTC geanaliseer word om vas te 
stel hoe Suid-Afrika hierdie bepalings sal toepas op trusts. Daar word dus ondersoek of ‘n 
trust beskou sal word as ‘n persoon, of dit ‘n inwoner en ‘n uiteindelik geregtigde kan wees 
vir doeleindes van die OECD MTC. Voorts word moontlike oplossings vir 
toerekeningskonflikte in die toepassing van dubbelbelastingooreenkomste op trusts, 
ondersoek. 
Die proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat in Suid-Afrika die trust beskou sal word as ‘n 
persoon vir doeleindes van die OECD MTC. Verder sal sommige tipes trusts gesien word as 
inwoners en as uiteindelik geregtigdes vir doeleindes van die OECD MTC. Die oplossing 
voorgestel in die OECD se Verslag oor Vennootskappe behoort toegepas te word om 
toerekeningskonflikte op te los. 
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ABSTRACT 
Trusts are used for a variety of purposes, both in South Africa and abroad. Like so many 
other entities, trusts often do not function only in one jurisdiction and may therefore be 
exposed to international double taxation. South Africa, like most other states, enters into bi-
lateral double taxation treaties, to limit the effects of international double taxation. Most of 
these treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (the 
OECD MTC). 
The South African trust is a unique creature. It is not based on the dual ownership concept 
on which most common law trusts are based, yet, it is not a juristic person either. The 
question that this research aims to address is how South Africa will interpret and apply 
certain provisions of the OECD MTC to trusts. Although the South African position is 
investigated, it is compared to the positions of the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
Netherlands. 
The dissertation starts with an analysis of the trust law in each of the relevant states, 
followed by an overview of the taxation regime governing trusts (and the parties thereto) in 
each state. The status of double taxation treaties and their interpretation are examined 
before certain critical provisions of the OECD MTC are analysed to determine how South 
Africa will apply these provisions to trusts. Hence it is explored whether a trust will be 
regarded as a person, whether it may be a resident and a beneficial owner for purposes of 
the OECD MTC. Furthermore, possible solutions for conflicts of attribution in the application 
of double tax conventions to trusts are investigated. 
The dissertation concludes that South Africa will regard a trust as a person for purposes of 
the OECD MTC. Moreover, some types of trusts may be viewed as residents and as beneficial 
owners for purposes of the OECD MTC. The solution proposed in the OECD’s Partnership 
Report should be applied to resolve conflicts of attribution involving trusts. 
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1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Trusts and their uses 
Trusts are widely used in legal and commercial practice, not only in South Africa, but across 
the world.1 Trusts are used for a wide variety of purposes, which range from the more 
traditional uses, such as the protection of assets or the housing of charities, to more 
contemporary uses, such as the use of trusts as investment platforms, in black economic 
empowerment structures (in South Africa) or corporate group reorganisations.2 
Like so many other entities, trusts often do not function only in one jurisdiction. 
Globalisation has led not only to the escalation of cross-border transactions, but also to an 
increase in the mobility of individuals, resulting in the internationalisation of their 
investments. Trusts are therefore being used more and more in international transactions.3 
One of the difficulties encountered when dealing with trusts in an international setting, is 
finding an internationally accepted definition of what a trust is.4 This difficulty is explained 
by the fact that “the trust is first and foremost a creature of a national legal system”.5 To 
address this point, this dissertation will examine its topics from the viewpoint of the 
domestic law of South Africa and three other jurisdictions (the United Kingdom, Canada and 
the Netherlands). Although the point will be discussed later in greater detail,6 it is important 
to note at this stage that South Africa has developed a unique trust law that is quite unlike 
the law governing the traditional common law trust. 
1.1.2 Double taxation and the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
The problem of international double taxation is often encountered when an entity operates 
internationally or when international transactions are entered into. International double 
taxation occurs when the same taxpayer is taxed on the same taxable income by two or 
more states, or the same taxable income is taxed by two or more states in the hands of 
different taxpayers.7 Double taxation deters international trade and therefore states often 
                                                          
1 Cadesky in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 1. Exactly how important trusts are in the life of citizens (both 
corporate and individual) in jurisdictions that recognise trusts, is illustrated by Gaillard, who stated that the 
trust was more important to English life than tea and more important to Americans than baseball (Gillard was 
referred to by Lyons in Topical Analysis para 3.1). Adapting this metaphor for South African purposes, it may be 
said that the trust is more important to South Africans than a braai (barbeque).  
2 See, eg, Cadesky in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 1, Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South 
Africa vii; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 2.01; Moffat et al Trusts Law 33–34 and Cameron 
et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 14–17, who all list uses of trusts. 
3 Lyons in Topical Analysis para 1; Cadesky in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 1; Danon Switzerland's Direct 
and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to US, Canadian and New 
Zealand Trust Taxation 1. 
4 The definition in the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition art 2 of course 
provides an example of an “international” definition. For more detail regarding this definition, see ch 2.3.2.1. 
5 Lyons in Topical Analysis para 2.1. 
6 See ch 2.2.1 and ch 2.2.4. 
7 Double taxation may be divided into two kinds, namely juridical double taxation and economic double 
taxation. This distinction is discussed in ch 7.4.1. 
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employ measures to counter this problem.8 One of the measures that a state may use to 
mitigate international double taxation is to enter into a double taxation treaty (DTT)9 with 
another state.10 A DTT is an agreement between two or more countries for the avoidance of 
double taxation of income and capital.11 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) has drafted a 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (the OECD MTC),12 which has, as its main 
purpose, “to clarify, standardise, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are 
engaged in commercial, industrial, financial, or any other activities in other countries 
through the application by all countries of common solutions to identical cases of double 
taxation”.13 Although the OECD MTC is not an international treaty and the members of the 
OECD are not bound to use it when negotiating DTTs, the OECD MTC is very influential and 
the vast majority of DTTs entered into uses the OECD MTC as basis.14 
In accordance with its own constitution and public international law, each state may impose 
its own tax law. DTTs patterned on the OECD MTC recognise this, but then operate to restrict 
a contracting state’s tax claim.15 The OECD MTC therefore contains a number of rules 
(known as “distributive rules”) which apply to particular items of income and which allocate 
the taxing rights in respect of these items between the two states. The OECD MTC contains 
31 provisions in total, which include provisions regarding the scope of the Convention (for 
example article 1, which deals with personal scope), definitions (for example article 4, which 
deals with residence) and provisions that eliminate double taxation (for example article 23). 
1.2 The main research question 
The question that this dissertation aims to address is how a court would interpret and apply 
certain critical provisions of a DTT, patterned on the OECD MTC and to which South Africa is 
a party, to a trust. 
Since the trust governed by South African law is a unique creature, the application of the 
OECD Model to it will differ from its application to other entities such as companies and 
trusts found in other jurisdictions. 
                                                          
8 OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 1; Baker Double Taxation 
Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para B.09; Kobetsky 
International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 13. 
9 The term “double taxation treaty” is used in this dissertation, but it is submitted that this term is synonymous 
with “double taxation convention” and “double taxation agreement”. The term is sometimes shortened to 
refer only to “treaty”. 
10 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para B.09–B.10; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 43–44. 
11 Larking IBFD International Tax Glossary 411.  
12 For a more detailed discussion of the OECD as organisation and the OECD MTC, see ch 4.2. 
13 OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 2. 
14 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
paras A.07 and A.11; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 157–
159; OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital paras 12–15. 
15 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 26. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
1.3 Examples 
Some of the issues that arise from the research question may be highlighted through a 
number of examples. 
1.3.1 Assume that an inter vivos trust instrument is signed in South Africa between the 
settlor and the trustees. Assume further that the settlor and trustees agree that 
South African law will apply to their agreement. The trustees are all Canadian 
residents. They fulfil their duties as trustees in Canada and all trustee meetings take 
place in Canada. The trust receives income from a South African source. Assume, 
first, that the trust is either a vesting trust or a discretionary trust that distributes all 
of its income to its beneficiaries during the relevant year and that all of the 
beneficiaries are resident in Canada. Assume then that the beneficiaries are resident 
in South Africa (and not in Canada). As an alternative, assume that the trust is a 
discretionary trust that accumulates its income and as a further alternative, assume 
that the trusts’s settlor is resident in the Netherlands. 
1.3.2 Assume that a trust is resident in South Africa in terms of South African domestic law 
and in terms of the relevant DTT. The trust receives income from Canada and is a 
vesting trust or a discretionary trust that distributes all of its income to its South 
African resident beneficiary during the relevant year. The example is varied by 
assuming that the trust is a discretionary trust that accumulates all its income during 
the relevant year. 
1.3.3 Assume that the trustee of a vesting trust (and the trust itself) is resident in the 
United Kingdom. The trust receives income from a South African source, which the 
trustee mandates to the beneficiary. Assume first that the beneficiary is resident in 
the United Kingdom and, as an alternative, assume that the beneficiary is resident in 
Canada. 
Examples of the issues that arise are whether the trusts in each of these examples will be 
regarded as “persons” for purposes of the relevant DTTs. In the first example the place 
where the trust is resident (for domestic and DTT purposes) will have to be determined. Can 
a trust be the beneficial owner of income? How will the treaty apply if one state taxes the 
trust and another the beneficiary? Furthermore, different types of trusts are mentioned in 
these examples. Will the type of trust influence whether the trust will be regarded as a 
resident or a beneficial owner, or whether income will be attributed to it? 
These are the type of questions which this dissertation sets out to address. These examples 
will be reverted to in the last chapter of this dissertation and will be used to illustrate how 
the principles set forth in this dissertation will be applied. 
1.4 Methodology 
The research in this dissertation is conducted by analysing the applicable legislation, case 
law, academic literature, the Commentary on the OECD MTC and other OECD Reports and 
materials. 
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As alluded to earlier, this dissertation also involves comparative research. Although the focus 
of the dissertation is on the South African position, it is compared to the position in three 
other states, namely the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands. Each of these states 
was chosen for specific reasons: 
(a) The United Kingdom was chosen, firstly, because the common law trust originated in 
England and, of course, still exists and is widely used today. Also, the South African 
trust has its historical roots in England. Furthermore, the Scottish trust is also found in 
the United Kingdom. As will become apparent later in this dissertation, there are 
remarkable similarities between the Scottish trust and the South African trust, both of 
which are based on civilian principles.16 Moreover, there is a strong tradition in South 
African case law of looking to English cases for guidance in formulating South African 
tax principles. Some of the cases in the United Kingdom on the meaning of a number 
of the terms in the OECD MTC may therefore be valuable authority in establishing the 
South African position.17 
(b) Canada18 was chosen because it has a well-developed law of trusts involving both 
trusts established in terms of civilian principles (in Québec)19 and common law trusts 
(in the rest of Canada). Furthermore, Canada has a vast network of tax treaties which 
generally follows the OECD MTC. Moreover, Canadian case law, legislation or DTTs may 
provide guidance for the position that South Africa might take on points that are still 
uncertain. 
(c) Although the Netherlands does not have an institution like the trust as such, it is a 
useful jurisdiction for comparative purposes because of its vast network of DTTs and 
its wealth of material on that topic. Of particular interest is how a system, which is 
unfamiliar with trusts, but which is bound to recognise trusts, regards them for 
purposes of DTTs. 
Furthermore, these jurisdictions were chosen because, along with South Africa, they 
represent the three systems20 most commonly used by states to tax trusts. 
In this dissertation, the chapters on trust law21 and the taxation of trusts22 are arranged by 
jurisdiction. Thus, the different topics of trust and tax law that are addressed are discussed 
                                                          
16 See ch 2.7. 
17 The United Kingdom and Canada were also chosen because in both these jurisdictions not only common law 
trusts exist, but also trusts based on civilian principles. The Scottish trust and Québec trust, like the South 
African trust, are based on civilian principles. When the research for this dissertation commenced, it was hoped 
that the treatment of Scottish and Québec trusts by the United Kingdom and Canada respectively would 
provide guidance to South Africa on how to apply the relevant provisions of the OECD MTC to its trusts. As it 
turned out, there was virtually no literature available which specifically addressed the application of the OECD 
MTC to Scottish and Québec trusts. 
18 One could ask why Canada was chosen, instead of its North American neighbour, the United States of 
America (USA), one of the major economies in the world. Because of the federal system in the USA, each state 
has a different set of laws governing entities like trusts. One would therefore have to choose a specific state for 
comparative purposes, which would introduce an element of arbitrariness and would make the comparative 
exercise somewhat artificial. 
19 See fn 17. 
20 See ch 3.1. 
21 Ch 2. 
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under the heading for each particular jurisdiction. The purpose of this methodology is to 
provide the full picture in respect of each jurisdiction. The remainder of the chapters23 (save 
for the conclusion24) are arranged differently. In these chapters, the relevant provisions of 
the OECD MTC are analysed and discussed. Thus, the relevant criteria set out in the 
provisions of the OECD MTC, matters regarding their interpretation and the views of courts 
and academic authors are discussed in a systematic way, referring to each of the chosen 
states, where applicable. The reason for the change in methodology is to allow for a 
discussion of some general points under each provision or criterion. The conclusion to each 
of these chapters will contain a per state discussion of the relevant points addressed in the 
chapter, in order to provide an overview of each relevant state. 
1.5 Scope of the dissertation 
There are many challenges and unanswered questions that should be addressed when 
examining the application of the OECD MTC to trusts. For a number of reasons, this 
dissertation cannot address all of these points. The first reason deals with the nature of the 
trust. Trusts are extremely versatile entities, used for many purposes worldwide. They are 
also very flexible and the powers and obligations that trustees might have, span an 
exceptionally wide range.25 To address all of these possibilities in this dissertation would be 
impossible. More practically, this dissertation must be kept within certain acceptable limits 
and therefore its scope must be limited. Moreover, the dissertation is written from a South 
African perspective and the focus will fall on the South African position throughout. 
Reference will be made to the chosen jurisdictions in order to show how they have 
addressed certain issues with a view to providing guidance on how the South African 
position may be interpreted, addressed or improved. 
This dissertation will address only certain critical provisions in the OECD MTC. Provisions that 
deal with the applicability of the OECD MTC to trusts were chosen, because if a trust (or 
trustee) cannot bring itself within these requirements, it cannot rely on a DTT based on the 
OECD MTC. It is acknowledged that there are many more provisions of the OECD MTC, the 
application to trusts of which are problematic and deserves further research. For example, 
the question of whether a trustee or beneficiary of a trust can be a permanent 
establishment of the trust comes to mind.26 This and other questions regarding the 
application of the other provisions of the OECD MTC to trusts, fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, in respect of those provisions that are addressed in this 
dissertation, the alternative provisions contained in the Commentary are not addressed.27 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 Ch 3. 
23 Ch 4 to ch 8. 
24 Ch 9. 
25 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 343–344. 
26 As stated in this paragraph, business trusts will not be addressed in this dissertation. Hence, the view was 
taken that the application of articles 5 and 7 of the OECD MTC (which deals with permanent establishments 
and business profits respectively) was not one of the critical provisions that should be addressed. 
27 Eg, the Commentary to article 4(3) provides for an alternative provision which refers to the mutual 
agreement procedure to determine where an entity will be resident for treaty purposes in the case of dual 
residence. 
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Not all types of trusts can be addressed in this dissertation.28 The focus of this dissertation 
falls on trusts in the narrow sense,29 that are expressly created and that primarily hold assets 
that generate income. Therefore, special types of trusts, some of which are regulated by 
specific legislation, such as unit trusts (also known as collective investment schemes or 
trusts), mutual fund trusts, pension schemes and employee share trusts, are not addressed. 
Furthermore, charitable trusts fall outside the scope of the dissertation. Trusts to which a 
special tax regime applies, for example trusts in favour of minors, are also not addressed and 
neither are business or commercial trusts. 
Moreover, this dissertation discusses only income tax. Capital gains tax is not addressed. In 
addition, other taxes, such as estate or death duty, value-added tax and the like, are 
excluded. Even though income tax is addressed, the dissertation will not discuss whether an 
amount is of a capital or income nature and it is assumed that it is of an income nature, 
unless specifically stated otherwise. Furthermore the taxation of remuneration of a trustee 
is not examined. 
The effects of exchange differences are ignored in this dissertation and so too are any 
exchange control measures. 
During his 2013 Budget Speech, the South African Minister of Finance, announced that the 
taxation of trusts will be reviewed in order to control abuse.30 Although the Budget Review 
documentation31 provided some clues as to what the reforms might entail, it was clear that 
the review process was still in its early stages and that the reforms were still being shaped. 
Since the Budget Speech, National Treasury has indicated that the changes regarding the 
taxation of trusts have not been finalised. No discussion document or draft legislation has 
been issued and the hope has been expressed that the Davis Tax Committee32 will consider 
                                                          
28 Further types of trusts that are excluded from the scope of this dissertation are referred to in ch 2, where 
they (and the reasons for their exclusion) are briefly mentioned under each jurisdiction. 
29 A distinction may be drawn between trusts in the wide sense and trusts in the strict or narrow sense. A trust 
in the wide sense exists “whenever someone is bound to hold or administer property on behalf of another or 
for some impersonal object and not for his or her own benefit”. Curators of persons suffering from intellectual 
incapacity and agents are examples of trusts in the wide sense. By contrast, a trust in the narrow sense exists 
“when the creator or founder of the trust has handed over or is bound to hand over to another the control of 
property which, or the proceeds of which, is to be administered or disposed of by the other (the trustee or 
administrator) for the benefit of some person other than the trustee as beneficiary, or for some impersonal 
object” (Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 4). 
30 Minister of Finance "Budget Speach" 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf> (accessed on 
18/02/2014). 
31 Minister of Finance "Budget Review" 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/review/chapter%204.pdf> (accessed on 
18/02/2014). 
32 The Minister of Finance announced during his 2013 Budget Speech that the South African tax policy 
framework would be reviewed. A committee under the chairmanship of Judge Dennis Davis was formed to 
conduct the review process. See The Davis Tax Committee "Introduction" 
<http://www.taxcom.org.za/index.html> (accessed on 18/02/2014). 
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the taxation of trusts as part of their mandate.33 Since these reforms are clearly in a very 
early phase, they are not discussed in this dissertation. 
1.6 Brief overview of the existing literature regarding the application of the OECD MTC 
to trusts 
The seminal work on the treatment of trusts under the OECD MTC is the article by Avery 
Jones.34 Baker’s acclaimed text book35 points to a number of questions that arise in relation 
to trusts and the OECD MTC and addresses some of the points examined in this dissertation. 
Danon’s dissertation on Switzerland’s direct and international taxation of private express 
trusts contains a number of chapters on the treatment of trusts under Swiss DTTs with three 
other jurisdictions.36 In an article dealing with Australian and New Zealand trusts, Prebble 
offers a discussion of the residence of trusts as well as the beneficial ownership 
requirement.37 A chapter in a Canadian study also provides a brief overview of the problems 
encountered in the application of the OECD MTC to trusts.38 Furthermore, a chapter on 
trusts and the OECD MTC was written by Koele, in which issues such as residence and 
beneficial ownership are addressed.39 Wheeler has made a number of contributions which 
refer to different problems regarding the application of the OECD MTC to trusts, most 
notably on the attribution of income.40 
Many of these contributions served as extremely useful bases from which to conduct the 
research undertaken in this dissertation. They provided valuable guidance in many instances, 
as will appear from the many references to them in this dissertation. However, none of 
these contributions includes South Africa in its scope and therefore the position of the South 
African trust remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, several of these contributions were 
published some time ago41 and many developments have taken place since their publication. 
A number of these contributions also provide only an overview of some of the issues 
involved in the application of the OECD MTC to trusts and a more in-depth examination of 
these issues is therefore required. 
                                                          
33 Croome "The Future Taxation of Trusts" 
<http://www.ensafrica.com/Uploads/Images/news/2_August_2013_-_The_Legal_Times_-
_The_future_taxation_of_trusts_.pdf> (accessed on 18/02/2014). 
34 Avery Jones (1989) 2 BTR 41 and Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 . 
35 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
paras 1B.17–1B.28. See also Baker in Trusts and International Tax Treaties ch 16, in which he suggests some 
principles and a possible approach to the application of DTTs to trusts. 
36 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to 
US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation part IV ch 1 to ch 3. 
37 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research. See also Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75. 
38 Carrothers in Trusts and International Tax Treaties ch 12. 
39 Koele in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions ch 7. 
40 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477, Wheeler in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Conflicts in the Attribution of 
Income to a Person; Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax 
Law; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247. 
41 Eg, Avery Jones and Koele’s contributions were published more than twenty years ago and Prebble and 
Danon’s contributions ten years ago. 
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In South Africa, the two textbooks by Olivier and Honiball contain a chapter and a portion of 
a chapter, respectively, on the application of DTTs to trusts.42 Although these two 
contributions certainly constitute pioneering work, a more comprehensive and detailed 
investigation of the relevant aspects of the application of the OECD MTC to trusts is 
undertaken in this dissertation. 
The aim of this dissertation is to increase the existing knowledge regarding the 
interpretation and application of the OECD MTC in South Africa, specifically in relation to 
trusts. 
1.7 Overview of the content of the dissertation 
The dissertation starts off with a discussion of the definition, nature and key features of a 
trust in each jurisdiction. The nature of a trust impacts not only on how it (or the parties 
thereto) will be taxed, but also on the way in which it will be treated in terms of each state’s 
DTTs. It is therefore crucial to examine the trust law of each jurisdiction, a task that is 
undertaken in chapter 2. 
In the next chapter, an overview will be given of the way in which each state taxes trusts 
(and the parties thereto). The chapter will provide the required background for the 
discussion of the application of certain provisions of the OECD MTC to trusts in later 
chapters. 
Chapter 4 addresses the interpretation and status of DTTs in each of the jurisdictions. These 
aspects influence the manner in which each state applies its DTTs to trusts and it is therefore 
crucial that they be investigated and be borne in mind throughout the rest of the 
dissertation. 
In order for a trust (or trustee) to rely on a DTT based on the OECD MTC, it must be shown 
that it is not only a person, but also a resident of one or both of the contracting states. The 
question whether a trust (or trustee) is a person, is addressed in chapter 5, while the 
residence of a trust is examined in chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 analyses how income is attributed to a trust (or trustee) in each of the 
jurisdictions and provides examples of how a conflict of attribution will be dealt with 
between the chosen jurisdictions. 
Beneficial ownership is addressed in chapter 8. The main question posed in this chapter is 
whether a trust (or the trustee) can be regarded as the beneficial owner of income. 
Chapter 9 constitutes the conclusion to this dissertation. The chapter collates the findings 
and recommendations of the dissertation and endeavours to answer the research question 
set out above. The conclusions of the dissertation are also applied to the examples referred 
to earlier. 
  
                                                          
42 Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa ch 12 and Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a 
South African Perspective ch 5 para 5. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss certain aspects of trust law in each of the chosen jurisdictions. In 
order to provide the required background, a brief history of trusts in each jurisdiction will be 
provided. Thereafter the definitions, nature and key features of a trust in each of the 
jurisdictions will be discussed. Also, the requirements of a valid trust as well as certain 
aspects regarding the administration of a trust will be dealt with. The treatment of trusts in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (the OECD MTC) will be dealt with briefly and, lastly, certain 
conclusions will be reached. 
2.2 South Africa 
2.2.1 A brief history 
The trust first made its appearance in South Africa in the early nineteenth century when 
British settlers and officials used the word “trust” in wills, deeds of gift, antenuptual 
contracts and land transfers. The trust that they used was, of course, the English trust.43 The 
first reported case in which a trust is mentioned was decided in 1833.44 Certain statutes 
made during the nineteenth century in the Cape and in Natal also used the mechanism of a 
trust and that of trustees.45 It has been said that the trust “became a familiar feature of legal 
and commercial practice at the Cape and … throughout what was to become modern-day 
South Africa”.46 It was only about a century later that the Appellate Division for the first time 
pronounced on the validity of the trust. In Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee47 the court 
held that the English law of trusts did not form part of South African law, but that 
testamentary dispositions couched in the form of trusts could be given effect to.48 The court 
found that the idea of a trust was so firmly rooted in practice in South Africa, that it would 
be impossible to eradicate it or to seek to abolish it.49 Other judgements have confirmed the 
point that the English law of trusts did not form part of South African law and that South 
Africa had evolved (and is in the process of still developing) its own unique trust law, based 
on South African legal principles.50 
Legislation also played a role, albeit a very modest one, in the development of South African 
trust law.51 As is evident from the above, no legislation was involved in the reception of the 
                                                          
43 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 548; Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 21, Oguttu Curbing 
Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 310. 
44 Olivier et al Trustreg en Praktyk 1–17.  Coetzee lists a number of cases following this date in which trusts 
were mentioned or approved (Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se 
Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 76-781). 
45 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 21.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en 
Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 74-75. 
46 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 13. 
47 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491. 
48 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 499. 
49 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 508. Confirmed in Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A) 
290.  
50 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 859; Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A). 
51 Coetzee provides examples of legislation in which trusts were or are acknowleged (Coetzee 'n Kritiese 
Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 75).  
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trust into South African law,52 but the Trust Moneys Protection Act53 was the first act 
relevant to trusts in the strict sense and is noted for its requirements regarding the provision 
of security by trustees.54 The Trust Property Control Act55 has made a significant impact on 
the development of trust law in South Africa, although it was never intended that the Trust 
Property Control Act be regarded as a codification of trust law.56 Its aim was to deal with 
certain problems that had never been resolved by the courts.57 
2.2.2 Legal basis for the reception of the trust 
Although the trust was widely used, uncertainty existed regarding the basis upon which the 
trust was recognised in South African law. In Estate Kemp the court found the 
fideicommissum to be the basis on which testamentary trusts formed part of South African 
law.58 However, in Braun v Blann and Botha the Appellate Division held that it is both 
historically and jurisprudentially wrong to identify the trust with the fideicommissum and to 
equate a trustee to a fiduciary.59 
Regarding inter vivos trusts, the majority of the court in Crookes NO v Watson60 held that a 
trust is created by means of a stipulatio alteri. In other words, a contract is entered into 
between the trust settlor61 (the stipulans) and the trustee (the promittens) for the benefit of 
the trust beneficiary (the third party).62 The court held that the acceptance by the trustees of 
the donation and the trust does not amount to an acceptance by them on behalf of the 
beneficiaries. Their acceptance could merely be construed as an agreement to carry out the 
provisions of the trust deed.63 On execution of the agreement between the trust settlor and 
the trustee, the beneficiary obtains no right. The agreement constitutes an offer of a 
donation by the settlor to the beneficiary, through the acceptance of which the beneficiary 
obtains a jus perfectum against the trustees. Up to the stage of acceptance by the 
beneficiary, there is no vinculum juris between the beneficiary and the settlor or trustees.64 
Steyn JA, who formed part of the majority held, in his judgement that a trust is brought into 
operation by the contract between the settlor and the trustees.65 The decision in Crookes v 
                                                          
52 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 50. 
53 Trust Moneys Protection Act 34 of 1934. 
54 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 21. 
55 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
56 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 21; Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case 
of South African Companies and Trusts 320.  
57 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 50. 
58 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 499. 
59 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 866.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en 
Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 90-98. 
60 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A).  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van 
Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 99-112 for a discussion of this case. 
61 In South Africa, a settlor is usually referred to as the “founder”. As the term “settlor” is used in all the other 
jurisdictions, save for Scotland, which uses the term “truster”, and in the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on their Recognition, this term will be used throughout the dissertation to maintain consistency, 
even in those jurisdictions which uses other terms. 
62 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 18.  
63 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A) 284. 
64 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A) 286. 
65 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A) 305. 
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Watson was followed in Hofer v Kevitt.66 Cameron et al make the point that an inter vivos 
trust is usually created by way of a contract that contains a stipulation in favour of the 
beneficiary and that the creation and revocation of trusts are therefore regulated by the law 
of contract. However, trusts are not merely contracts.67 Other aspects regarding trusts, such 
as the fact that a trustee holds an office, or the fiduciary relationship between the trustees 
and beneficiaries are not covered by the law of contract. A distinction must therefore be 
made between the creation of an inter vivos trust and the trust itself.68 
2.2.3 Definitions 
Numerous definitions of a trust exist. Cameron et al define a trust as “a legal institution in 
which a person, the trustee, subject to public supervision, holds or administers property 
separately from his or her own, for the benefit of another person or persons or for the 
furtherance of a charitable or other purpose”.69 
In the Trust Property Control Act70 a trust is defined as follows: 
“’trust’ means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one 
person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed – 
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or 
disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of 
the person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the 
achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed 
under the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed 
of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the 
person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the 
achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by 
any person as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the 
Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No 66 of 1965).” 
In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker & Others71 Cameron JA described a 
trust as: 
“… an accumulation of assets and liabilities. These constitute the trust estate, which is 
a separate entity. But though separate, the accumulation of rights and obligations 
comprising the trust estate does not have legal personality. It vests in the trustees, and 
                                                          
66 Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
67 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 35; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 19.  For a contrary view see Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van 
Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 113. 
68 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 19. 
69 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 1.  For a discussion of a number of these definitions, see 
Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 127-135.  
70 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1. 
71 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 10. 
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must be administered by them  –  and it is only through the trustees, specified as in the 
trust instrument, that the trust can act.” 
The Income Tax Act72 defines a trust as meaning “any trust fund consisting of cash or other 
assets which are administered and controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
where such person is appointed under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a 
deceased person”. 73 
Clearly the definition of “trust” in the Income Tax Act is much wider than any of the 
definitions offered in the sources on trust law cited above.74 A “trust” for purposes of the 
Income Tax Act would include, for example, any trust fund administered by a person in a 
fiduciary capacity, where such person was appointed by agreement. Thus, certain agency 
relationships would, for example, be covered by the definition of “trust” in the Income Tax 
Act, but would not be regarded as trusts for trust law purposes.75 It is submitted that a trust 
fund which falls within the definition of “trust” in the Income Tax Act will be taxed as such, 
even though it will not be classified as a trust for purposes of trust law. 
Having reached this conclusion, the question arises how offshore trusts will be treated. In 
other words, certain offshore trusts will not be regarded as “trusts” for trust law purposes in 
South Africa, but they will constitute trusts for purposes of the Income Tax Act. Will they be 
taxed as trusts? A further question that is linked to the first is whether a trust, recognised as 
such under the trust law of the relevant country, will be regarded as a trust in South Africa 
for tax purposes, simply because it is a trust in the other relevant country. It is submitted 
that the answer in all cases will depend on whether the specific entity meets the criteria of 
the definition in the Income Tax Act. Even if an entity may be classified as a trust in a certain 
country, whether it will be taxed as a trust in South Africa, will depend on whether it falls 
within the definition set out in the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, an offshore entity which 
may not be regarded as a trust for South African trust law purposes, which falls within the 
definition of trust in the Income Tax Act, will be taxed as a trust.76 It is submitted that a court 
will follow the methodology set out in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Greenacre77 
where a marriage settlement was made by a person domiciled in South Africa, but the terms 
                                                          
72 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
73 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. The same section also contains a definition of the term “company”. Some 
offshore trusts, eg certain collective investment vehicles or charitable trusts, may qualify as companies (as 
defined). Since these types of trusts fall outside the scope of this research, the point will not be addressed any 
further. If an offshore trust is a juristic person, it may also qualify as a company (as defined). Since trusts are 
not regarded as juristic persons in any of the jurisdictions discussed in this research, the point will also not be 
discussed in any greater detail.  
74 For a discussion regarding the interpretational difficulties associated with the definition in the Income Tax 
Act, see Du Plessis (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 322 324. Furthermore, De Koker and Williams note that the Income Tax 
Act’s definition does not refer to trusts created by statute or court order (De Koker and Williams Silke on South 
African Income Tax para 12.14).  
75 See ch 2.2.4. 
76 Support for this point may be found in Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 65. Jooste 
questions whether offshore trusts, which do not have any beneficiaries (but have a particular purpose set out 
in the trust instrument – a purpose that may bear little resemblance to its true purpose) will qualify as a trust in 
terms of the definition, as it is not clear whether the trustees of such a trust have fiduciary duties, an essential 
requirement for a trust in terms of the definition in the Income Tax Act (Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 205–
206).  
77 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Greenacre 1936 NPD 225; 8 SATC 196. 
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of the settlement were governed by the law of England. The person who made the 
settlement subsequently passed away and the question before the Natal Provincial Division 
was whether the settlement could be regarded as a donatio inter vivos for purposes of the 
Death Duties Act. The court held that it could consider the law of England in order to 
determine whether the fulfilment by the deceased of the obligations of a marriage 
settlement amounted to a donatio inter vivos under the law of England. Once it had 
determined the rights and obligations of the marriage settlement in terms of the law of 
England, it could then consider whether the marriage settlement constituted a donatio inter 
vivos for purposes of the Death Duties Act. It is, therefore, submitted that a court would 
consider the trust law of the offshore jurisdiction in order to determine the rights and 
obligations between the parties and thereafter determine whether these rights fall within 
the definition of “trust” in the Income Tax Act. 
2.2.4 Legal nature and key features 
No trust can exist without the settlor handing over control of the trust property or having 
bound himself or herself to hand over control of the trust property.78 Usually the handing 
over of control of the trust property means that ownership of the trust assets is transferred 
by the settlor to the trustee. The settlor may be a co-trustee and therefore co-owner of the 
trust property.79 Furthermore, there can be no objection to the settlor being the only trustee 
(as long as he is not also the only beneficiary).80 In South African law it is also possible for a 
settlor to transfer ownership of trust property directly to the beneficiary.81 The trustee will 
then simply administer the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee, 
therefore, controls the trust property, of which the beneficiary is the owner.82 Such a trust is 
known as a “bewind” trust and is rarely used in practice.83 For this reason a discussion of the 
“bewind” trust falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
The ownership of trust property may provide further insight into the nature of the trust. 
South Africa has what is known as a mixed legal system, meaning that although the basis of 
South African law is Roman-Dutch law (that is, based on civilian principles), English law has 
influenced it considerably.84 South Africa follows civilian principles in relation to property 
law and, therefore, recognises the unitary concept of ownership; in other words, there is 
only one kind of ownership which cannot be divided.85 Dual ownership, known in the English 
law, therefore, does not form part of South African law. In English law the split between 
legal and equitable ownership is often regarded as the definitive aspect of a trust, with the 
                                                          
78 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 9. 
79 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 
6. 
80 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6. 
81 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1 para (b) of the definition of “trust”. 
82 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 4. 
83 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 9; De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 77; Du Toit 
South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 4. 
84 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 43. 
85 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 44. 
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trustee holding “legal ownership” of the trust property and the beneficiary “beneficial 
ownership”.86 
With regards to the ownership of trust property, the courts in South Africa have held that 
the legal ownership of the property lies in the hands of the trustees, who have no beneficial 
interest in it. They are, however, bound to hold and apply the trust property for the benefit 
of a person(s) or for some other purpose.87 South African courts have explicitly decided that 
the notion of dual ownership known in the English law does not form part of South African 
law.88 The trustee is the owner of the trust assets and the beneficiaries merely have personal 
rights against the trustee. Therefore the unitary concept of ownership remains intact.89 
However, a beneficiary is often said to have the “beneficial ownership” of, or the “beneficial 
interest” in the trust property, whilst the trustee is said to be the “legal owner” of the trust 
property.90 While this terminology may be useful to explain the legal relationship between 
the trustee and beneficiary, it might, unfortunately, create confusion with its different use in 
the context of English law. 
One of the reasons for the dual ownership of trustee and beneficiary in English law is the 
protection of the trust beneficiary.91 For example, a beneficiary is protected against the 
insolvency of the trustee, because the beneficiary’s equitable ownership in the trust 
property prevents it from forming part of the trustee’s patrimony.92 In South African law, the 
resort to dual ownership is unnecessary as the Trust Property Control Act provides that: 
“Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so 
far as he as the trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property.”93 
The Trust Property Control Act furthermore places a duty on the trustee to make trust 
property identifiable as such.94 
Hence, in the case of insolvency of the trustee, the beneficiaries are protected as the 
trustee’s creditors have no rights to the trust assets. Similarly, a beneficiary has no claim 
against the trustee’s private estate (save in the case of breach of trust).95 The Trust Property 
Control Act thus recognises that two different estates are created: one for the trustee’s 
                                                          
86 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 550; De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 64; Sonneveldt in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss 
between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions? 1.  
87 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 508; Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 859; 
Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 312. 
88 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 859. 
89 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 48; De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 76. 
90 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 859–860; Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd 
2007 2 SA 570 (SCA) 576; Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 579. According to Olivier et al 
these expressions are senseless (Olivier et al Trustreg en Praktyk 1–10). 
91 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557; De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 67.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek 
na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 57. 
92 De Waal in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 560. 
93 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12. 
94 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 11. 
95 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 562. 
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personal assets and one for the trust assets held by the trustee in his or her capacity as 
such.96 
According to Cameron et al, the Trust Property Control Act therefore confirms that the trust 
is a separate entity, although it is not a juristic person.97 A beneficiary has a “protected” right 
in personam against the trustee, as the beneficiary does not have to compete with the 
trustee’s private creditors for the trust assets.98 
Some theorists have argued that the trust property is owned by the trust estate itself, which 
would mean that the trust was a juristic person.99 South African courts have, however, 
rejected such a contention on numerous occasions, confirming that a trust is not a juristic 
person and does not have juristic personality, except as provided for in statute.100 There are, 
however, many instances where trusts are treated as juristic persons.101 For example, for 
purposes of insolvency, the trust assets are regarded as distinct from the trustees’ personal 
assets;102 a bequest to an existing inter vivos trust is valid and will be regarded as a bequest 
to the trustees for purposes of the trust.103 Notably, a trust is treated as though it were a 
juristic person for income tax purposes.104 The Companies Act105 includes a trust in its 
definition of juristic person. The reasons for treating the trust as a juristic person are 
diverse.106 
South African courts have held that both testamentary and inter vivos trusts should be 
regarded as sui generis institutions.107 However, such a characterisation of trusts has been 
criticised as being confusing and unsound from a theoretical and dogmatic point of view. It is 
argued that theoretical soundness is desirable to preserve the integrity of the trust.108 
                                                          
96 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 9. 
97 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 11. 
98 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 559. 
99 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 9; Olivier et al Trustreg en Praktyk 2–32. 
100 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 3 SA 833 (A); Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A); Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 
77 (SCA); Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA). Judgments to the contrary, eg Knoop NNO v Birkenstock 
Properties (Pty) Ltd Unreported judgment of the Free State High Court, 4 June 2009, Case No. : 7095/2008, are 
clearly wrong and should be rejected. 
101 De Waal (1993) 56 THRHR 1 8; Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 10; Du Toit South African 
Trust Law: Principles and Practice 25. 
102 The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12, provides that trust property shall not form part of the 
personal estate of the trustee except in so far as he as trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property. Trust 
assets, therefore, do not form part of an insolvent trustee’s estate. In Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Summerly and Another NNO 1984 1 SA 160 (W) it was held that a trust is a “debtor” and can be 
sequestrated. 
103 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 71. 
104 The Income Tax Act, s 1, definition of “person”. 
105 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
106 De Waal (1993) 56 THRHR 1 9. 
107 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) 859; Mariola v Kaye-Eddie NO 1995 2 SA 728 (W) 731; Rosner 
v Lydia Swanepoel Trust 1998 2 SA 123 (W) 126; Cupido v Kings Lodge Hotel 1999 4 SA 257 (E) 263; Scania 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2003 1 SA 457 (T) 464; Desai-Chilwan NO v Ross 2003 2 SA 644 (C) 647. 
108 De Waal (1993) 56 THRHR 1 9; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 18. 
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As stated in Cameron et al’s definition, a trust is a legal institution and subject to public 
supervision.109 A trustee of a trust therefore holds an office, which is a feature that 
distinguishes a trust from many other private law institutions.110 Importantly, a trustee is not 
an agent of, specifically, the settlor, the beneficiaries or the trust itself;111 nor is the trustee a 
nominee of the beneficiaries.112 The public element brought about by the fact that the 
trustee holds an office, is illustrated by the role that the court plays in the administration 
and execution of trusts. For example, a court may, under certain circumstances, appoint or 
remove a trustee.113 Moreover, the Trust Property Control Act provides that the Master of 
the High Court has certain supervisory powers over trustees.114 
One of the characteristics of the position of trustee is that it gives rise to a fiduciary duty. A 
trustee’s fiduciary duty has been described as “a single, multifaceted duty comprised of a 
number of component duties”.115 The facet relevant in any given situation will depend on 
the relationship between the parties and the facts of each case. According to Du Toit, the 
principal components of a trustee’s fiduciary duty are the duty of care, the duty of 
impartiality, the duty off accountability and the duty of independence. However, he 
emphasises that the ambit of a fiduciary duty is not cast in stone and that more duties may 
be added.116 Cameron et al highlight three “main principles” which govern the 
administration of trusts, namely that the trustee must give effect to the trust instrument, 
that the trustee must act with the “care diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected 
of a person who manages the affairs of another”,117 and that the trustee has the duty to 
exercise an independent discretion.118 Olivier et al describe the trustee’s fiduciary duty as 
one in which the highest degree of faithfulness and loyalty is required in fulfilling his or her 
duties for the benefit of the beneficiaries. They continue that a trustee must act as a bonus 
paterfamilias and that he should act honourably and without the motive to favour himself or 
herself and in accordance with the requirements of good faith.119 
An aspect of trust law that was emphasised by the court in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker120 is the importance of separating ownership (or control) and 
enjoyment. The court highlighted the principle that trustees exercise control over the trust 
assets, not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of others, namely the beneficiaries. It is 
for this reason that a person cannot be both the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary of a 
trust. Such an identity of interests is impermissible and no valid trust would come into 
existence. In Nel v Metequity Ltd121 the question of separation of ownership and control was 
                                                          
109 See also Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 34.  
110 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 566. 
111 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 73; Hoosen and Others NNO v Deedat 1999 4 SA 425 
(SCA) 431. 
112 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 69. 
113 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 566. 
114 Eg, written trusts must be registered with the Master (s 4), the Master must authorise a trustee to act as 
such (s 6) and the Master may, under certain circumstances, appoint a trustee and co-trustee (s 7). 
115 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 81 
116 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 81–83. 
117 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(1). 
118 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 262. 
119 Olivier et al Trustreg en Praktyk 1–9. 
120 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 19. 
121 Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 3 SA 34 (SCA). 
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again considered by the court. In that case the trustees of the trust were Metequity Ltd and 
Investec Business Services Ltd. The only beneficiary of the trust was Metequity Ltd. The trust 
deed provided that for as long as Investec Business Services Ltd was a trustee, it alone would 
exercise and carry out the powers and duties of the trustees. The two trustees were wholly 
owned subsidiaries of Metboard Ltd. They acted as nominees of Metboard Ltd and had no 
functions other than those in terms of the trust deed and other similar trust deeds. It was 
contended that the trust was not a valid trust in that there was an identity of interests 
between the trustees and the beneficiary. The court held: 
“[T]he fact that trustees and beneficiaries have identical interests insofar as the object 
of the trust is concerned is not the identity of interests in the same person, purporting 
to act in different capacities which, as was stated by Cameron JA in Land and 
Agricultural Bank, is inimical to the trust idea. Identical interests will invariably exist in 
relation to the fulfilment of the trust objects. The beneficiaries' interest in the trust is 
that effect be given to the trust deed and it is the obligation of the trustees to do so. 
As Goldblatt J stated [in the judgement of the court a quo], the separate personalities 
of the corporate trustees, even where one is also a beneficiary, preclude an inimical 
identity from arising.”122 
Beneficiaries under a trust are entitled to certain rights. According to Cameron et al, the 
beneficiary’s basic right is that the trust must be properly administered so that he or she can 
enjoy the benefits to which he or she is entitled or potentially entitled. Beneficiaries may 
have either vested or contingent rights.123 A beneficiary is said to have a vested right if he or 
she has an unconditional personal right against the trustees for the delivery of income or 
capital to which he or she is entitled.124 If a beneficiary has a vested right, that does not 
mean that the beneficiary owns the trust assets.125 Indeed, the trustees remain the owners 
of the assets. Neither does it necessarily mean that the beneficiaries will immediately 
become entitled to the trust income or capital. The income could be accumulated or 
capitalised for the future enjoyment of the beneficiaries, whilst already vested in them.126 A 
                                                          
122 Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 3 SA 34 (SCA) 38. In a second argument it was contended that the trustees’ 
corporate veils should be lifted and that the two trustees should be treated as one, but this argument was 
dismissed by the court since there was no improper conduct in the establishment or use of the corporate 
trustees or in the conduct of their affairs. 
123 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 556. 
124 The words ‘vested right’ have more than one meaning. In Jewish Colonial Trust v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 
163, Watermeyer JA explained the different meanings as follows (at 175): “When it is said that a right is vested 
in a person, what is usually meant is that such person is the owner of that right – that he has all rights of 
ownership in such right including the right of enjoyment. … But the word is also used in another sense, to draw 
a distinction between what is certain and what is conditional; a vested right as distinguished from a contingent 
or conditional right.” In Estate Dempers v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1977 3 SA 410 (A) the court was called 
upon to decide whether a provision similar to the current s 7(5) of the Income Tax Act applied only in cases 
where beneficiaries had vested rights. The court referred (at 425) to the latter meaning attached to the term in 
the Jewish Colonial Trust case, ie that a vested right is a certain, unconditional and immediately acquired right, 
which is contrasted to a contingent right which is conditional and uncertain. See also Van der Merwe (2000) 12 
SA Merc LJ 319 319 and Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and 
Trusts 317. 
125 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 557; Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South 
African Perspective 119. 
126Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 119; Anonymous (1992) 41 The Taxpayer 
228 228. 
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trust in which the beneficiaries have vested rights is known as a vested or vesting trust.127 A 
discretionary trust, on the other hand, is a trust in which the beneficiaries’ rights are 
conditional and uncertain. The condition to which the beneficiaries’ rights are subject, is the 
exercise by the trustees of their discretion.128 In such a case, the trustees typically have the 
discretion to determine not only which beneficiaries (if any) are to receive an amount from 
the trust, but also the amount of the distribution.129 
2.2.5 Requirements for the formation of a valid trust 
According to Cameron et al there are five requirements for the formation of a valid trust:130 
(a) The settlor must intend to create a trust. In the case of an inter vivos trust, the 
intention to create a trust must be shared by the settlor and the trustee(s). An inter 
vivos trust is one created during the lifetime of the settlor and is usually created by 
way of an agreement between the settlor and the trustees.131 There is no need to 
comply with any formalities in order to form an inter vivos trust (unless formalities are 
prescribed for the relevant contract by which the trust is formed). An inter vivos trust 
may therefore take the form of an oral agreement. Such an oral trust will not be 
regarded as a trust for purposes of the Trust Property Control Act132 and will be 
governed by the common law.133 An inter vivos trust may be contrasted to a 
testamentary trust which is created in the will of the testator. The will must comply 
with all the requirements for a valid will. 
(b) The settlor’s intention must be expressed in a mode appropriate to create an 
obligation. 
The relevant obligation is either the obligation on the trustee to administer the trust 
property for the trust object, or the obligation on the settlor to do what is needed so 
that the property is administered by the trustee.134 In the case where a trustee has not 
been appointed, has not accepted office, or has been appointed, but has not yet taken 
control of the trust property, the relevant obligation is the one on the settlor to enable 
                                                          
127 Some writers prefer the term “vesting trust” (eg Clegg and Stretch Income Tax in South Africa para 5A.7.3.1), 
while others prefer the term “vested trust” (eg Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 
25B). Some writers seem to use the words interchangeably (eg Olivier (2002) TSAR 220 222). It is submitted 
that the two terms are indeed interchangeable. 
128 There could, of course, be situations in which there is no discretionary trust, but beneficiaries’ rights are 
conditional, ie where some other condition is imposed.  
129 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 348. See also Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: 
The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 317–319. 
130 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 117; Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case 
of South African Companies and Trusts 313.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van 
Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 135-143. 
131 There are other instruments through which trusts may be formed (Cameron et al Honoré’s South African 
Law of Trusts 137), but since the contract and the will are the forms most commonly used, the scope of this 
research will be limited to these forms.  
132 The Trust Property Control Act defines a trust in s 1, inter alia, as “an arrangement … by virtue of a trust 
instrument …”. A “trust instrument” is, in turn, defined as “a written agreement or a testamentary writing or a 
court order according to which a trust was created”. See also Deedat v The Master 1995 2 SA 337 (A) 384. 
133 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 8. 
134 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 138. 
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the trustee to administer the trust property. For example, the settlor may be obliged 
to transfer property to the trustees.135 
(c) The trust property must be defined with reasonable certainty. 
(d) The trust object must be defined with reasonable certainty. 
(e) The trust object must be lawful. 
In Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol,136 the court confirmed that these were the 
requirements for the formation of a valid trust. According to Du Toit there are two further 
“elements” which are auxiliary to the five requirements listed above. Although these 
elements are not requirements for the formation of a valid trust, a failure to comply with 
these elements may lead to the conclusion that no valid trust was formed or that a trust 
must fail. These elements are: 
(a) If the settlor makes over trust property to the trust, the settlor must divest himself or 
herself of control over the trust property in favour of the trustee and the trustee 
should function free from any control by the settlor.137 
(b) There must be a separation between control over the trust property by the trustee and 
enjoyment of the benefits associated with the trust by the beneficiaries.138 
For Cameron et al, “element” (a) mentioned by Du Toit forms part of requirement (a), 
namely the intention to create a trust. If the settlor fails to confer the required 
independence on the trustee, or does not have the intention to vest property in the trustee, 
the intention to create a trust may be absent.139 
One of the factors not essential to the formation of a trust is official authority. In other 
words, even though most trusts are governed by the Trust Property Control Act, trusts are 
not formed by virtue of this statute.140 The Trust Property Control Act does require 
lodgement of the trust instrument with the Master.141 It also provides for authorisation by 
the Master of the trustees, who are not allowed to act in their capacity as such without this 
authorisation. Acts performed by trustees before the required authorisation is obtained, will 
be invalid.142 The Trust Property Control Act also provides that the Master will not authorise 
the trustees to act unless they provide security to the Master’s satisfaction.143 However, that 
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does not mean that a trust is formed via the lodgement of the trust deed or authorisation by 
the Master or that the trust does not exist if these acts are not performed. 
2.2.6 Administration of a trust 
Once it is established that a valid trust has been formed, certain consequences follow. One 
relates to the administration of the trust. Regarding the internal administration of the trust, 
the trust instrument usually provides when, where and how meetings of trustees should be 
held, and the procedures to be followed at these meetings.144 It has also been suggested 
that if there is more than one trustee, a chairperson should be appointed.145 In the absence 
of provisions dealing with the issue, meetings should be held at the place and on intervals as 
the chairperson may direct, but a meeting should be held at least once a year, or more if the 
standard of conduct expected of trustees146 requires it.147 
Cameron et al argue that trustees must act jointly regarding internal administration.148 What 
is trite, though, is that in dealings with outsiders all the trustees must act jointly in order to 
bind the trust (in the absence of contrary provisions in the trust deed).149 Indeed, in Land 
and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker Cameron JA described the duty to act jointly 
as ”forming the basis of trust law in this country”.150 Outsiders dealing with a trust should 
therefore assume that all the trustees of a trust must act jointly when contracting on behalf 
of the trust, unless the trust instrument contains provisions to the contrary.151 Hence and to 
enable the trust to function effectively, the trust deed often provides for the appointment of 
an executive or managing trustee who takes care of running the trust’s affairs.152 This 
trustee can be authorised in terms of an explicit provision in the trust instrument or in terms 
of express or implied authorisation granted to this trustee by the other trustees in 
accordance with the trust deed.153 
Similarly, trustees may delegate some of their functions, such as the everyday administration 
of the trust, to others, for example, an outside company.154 Trustees are also allowed to 
consult experts.155 Trustees are not permitted to abdicate their responsibilities, though, and 
such abdication may lead to the invalidity of the act.156 Trustees therefore are the only ones 
who can make the decisions regarding the achievement of the trust object and remains 
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responsible for such achievement, even if they have handed over certain (lesser) duties to 
others. Fundamental decisions regarding the trust should therefore be taken by the trustees, 
but implementation may be delegated to others.157 Trustees, however, retain the duty to 
supervise the work of any person to whom a task was delegated.158 In Hoosen and Others 
NNO v Deedat159 one of the trustees suffered a stroke which left him sound of mind, but 
incapable of attending meetings of the trustees and performing related duties as trustee. He 
therefore granted a special power of attorney to his daughter-in-law to represent him at 
meetings of the trustees, thereby transferring all his rights, duties and powers (including the 
power to vote at meetings as she pleased) to his daughter-in-law. The court had to decide 
whether the trustee was entitled in law to delegate his duties qua trustee in terms of the 
power of attorney to his daughter-in-law. The court held that the trust deed did not provide, 
either expressly or impliedly, that such a delegation could take place. According to the court 
this accorded with the principle that fundamental decisions relating to the trust had to be 
taken by the trustees. Hence the delegation to the daughter-in-law was legally 
impermissible. 
Where the trustees are subject to an unacceptable degree of control by the settlor, it may 
well indicate that the settlor never had the intention to create a trust in the first place, 
resulting in the invalidity of the trust.160 
2.3 United Kingdom 
2.3.1 A brief history 
2.3.1.1 General 
After the union of the Scottish and English parliaments in 1707, Scotland retained its own 
laws and legal system, subject to amendment by new legislation from Westminster. All 
United Kingdom legislation applies to Scotland, unless the contrary is expressly stated.161 The 
Scottish parliament does have the power to make legislation in all Scottish matters except 
certain reserved areas which remain the exclusive preserve of the United Kingdom 
parliament. For example, the power to make legislation regarding fiscal matters is in the 
hands of the United Kingdom parliament and such legislation will, unless stated specifically, 
also apply to Scotland.162 
2.3.1.2 England 
The trust originated in England in medieval times and was called the “use”. The use 
developed against the backdrop of the common law system of landholding, which was based 
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on the feudal system.163 The king was the owner of all land and he could grant an interest or 
an estate over land to one of his subjects, typically a knight.164 They could then grant the 
legal right to possess land to a tenant, who was bound to render “incidents” to the knight, in 
return for some form of protection from the knight. The chain comprising two-way 
relationships of tenure could consist of only one link, or many.165 According to Moffat, the 
use was employed by tenants as follows: 
“A tenant P would convey his land to a group of trustees (say Q, R and S) ‘to the use of’ 
himself as beneficiary, then to such uses as he should subsequently appoint. By his 
‘last will’… or by prior instructions, he would indicate such uses.”166 
The use served a number of purposes: feudal incidents could be avoided; the range of 
dispositions available to a tenant became much greater than before; secret conveyancing of 
land became possible; and, for a brief period, it was possible to transfer land to one’s own 
use in order to defeat the claims of creditors.167 Another purpose of the use became 
apparent during the crusades, when a knight would transfer his interest or estate over land 
to a trusted friend, to hold until he returned.168 If the friend failed to retransfer the interest 
or estate over land, the knight had no remedy at common law, because the friend was 
regarded as the owner.169 All the knight could do, was petition the King to force the friend, in 
equity, to return the knight’s interest. The King referred these petitions to the Chancellor, 
who first advised the King, but later made orders on his own authority. Similarly, Franciscan 
friars, who were prohibited by an oath of poverty from owning land, saw to it that land was 
transferred to a knight to hold it for the use of the Order of Franciscan Friars. If the knight 
kept the benefits to himself, the Order would petition the King for an order against the 
errant knight.170 The Chancellor not only recognised the legal estates in land, but also forced 
“the legal estate owner to use his legal ownership for the benefit of the beneficiaries, 
who in equity were supposed to benefit exclusively from the land vested in the legal 
estate owner. The beneficiaries could thus have equitable estates corresponding to the 
types of legal estate.”171 
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Thus the interest of the beneficiary was recognised as a proprietary interest which could be 
enforced against anyone except a third party without notice, who acquired the property for 
value.172 
In 1535 the Statute of Uses was enacted. In terms of this statute, the beneficiary of the trust 
(the cestui que use), and not the trustee (the feoffee to use), would obtain legal title, thus 
converting the beneficiary’s equitable rights into legal title.173 The main purpose of the 
Statute of Uses was to increase feudal incidents for the King.174 One of the exceptions to the 
Statute of Uses was a use upon a use (for example land was conveyed to A to hold to the use 
of B to the use of C), where the Chancery Division was eventually prepared to enforce the 
second use (B to the use of C) in equity.175 The enforced use became known as the trust, to 
distinguish it from the first use.176 The characteristic of the use, namely divided ownership, 
became a feature of the trust.177 
2.3.1.3 Scotland 
The development of the trust institution in Scotland was not significantly influenced by 
English law. Although more substantial influence from England followed after 1840, the 
Scottish trust had already been firmly established by that time.178 Importantly, the division 
of legal and equitable ownership found in English law was never received in Scotland.179 
The exact origin of the Scottish trust seems uncertain.180 According to Forsyth, who wrote 
the first book on trusts in Scotland in 1944, the Scottish trust derives from the Roman law 
fideicommissum.181 The term “trust” was only used by the seventeenth century in Scotland, 
but this is neither here nor there as the institution may have existed earlier on without the 
name “trust”.182 Stair discusses the trust in his Institutions of the Law of Scotland,183 which 
was first published in 1681. He characterises a trust as a combination of mandate and 
deposit, which strengthens the point that the trust existed prior to the seventeenth century 
and that it was not simply an institution taken over from England in that period.184 Examples 
of the use of trust-like institutions can also be found prior to the seventeenth century.185 
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Stair also compares the trust to the fideicommissum, and the conclusion reached by Gretton 
is that the fideicommissum was one of the sources of the trust, but the extent of its role is 
hard to determine.186 
Legislation such as The Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921, the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1961 and the 
Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 also played a role in the development 
of trust law in Scotland.187 
2.3.2 Definitions 
2.3.2.1 England 
Underhill and Hayton define a trust as follows: 
“A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (called a trustee) to deal with 
property (called trust property) owned by him as a separate fund, distinct from his 
own private property, for the benefit of persons (called beneficiaries or, in old cases 
cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce 
the obligation. … Any act or neglect on the part of a trustee which is not authorized or 
executed by the terms of the trust instrument, or by law, is called a breach of trust.”188 
Mowbray et al provide the following description: 
“[The word trust] refers to the duty of aggregate accumulation of obligations that 
rest upon a person described as trustee. The responsibilities are in relation to 
property held by him, or under his control. That property he will be compelled by a 
court in its equitable jurisdiction to administer in the manner lawfully prescribed by 
the trust instrument, or where there be no specific provision, written or oral, or to 
the extent that such provision is invalid or lacking, in accordance with equitable 
principles. As a consequence the administration will be in such a manner that the 
consequential benefits and advantages accrue, not to the trustee, but to the persons 
called cestuis que trust, or beneficiaries, if there be any; if not, for some purpose 
which the law will recognise and enforce. A trustee may be a beneficiary, in which 
case advantages will accrue in his favour to the extent of his beneficial interest.”189 
According to Hayton 
“[t]here is no statutory definition of the trust which can be used as a major premise 
from which rules relating to the trust can be deduced.”190 
The courts have, therefore, expounded the rules of trust law and a description of these rules 
will convey a general idea of what a trust is.191 It must, however, be borne in mind that the 
United Kingdom is a signatory to the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on 
                                                          
186 Gretton in Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective 518. 
187 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 318. 
188 Hutton Tolley's UK Taxation of Trusts 9, quoting Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees 17ed 2. 
189 Mowbray et al Lewin on Trusts 4. 
190 Hayton The Law of Trusts 6. 
191 Hayton The Law of Trusts 6. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
their Recognition (“The Hague Convention on Trusts”). The definition of “trust” in The Hague 
Convention on Trusts therefore forms part of statutory law in the United Kingdom.192 This 
definition reads as follows: 
“For the purposes of this Convention, the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships 
created – inter vivos or on death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have been 
placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified 
purpose. 
A trust has the following characteristics – 
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not part of the trustee’s own 
estate; 
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of 
another person on behalf of the trustee; 
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to 
manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the 
trust and the special duties imposed upon him by law. 
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the 
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the existence of a trust.”193 
The Income Tax Act 2007 defines the term “settled property” as follows: 
“’Settled property’ means any property held in trust other than property excluded by 
subsection (3).”194 
Subsection 3 excludes property if: 
(a) it is held by a person as nominee for another person; 
(b) it is held by a person as trustee for another person who is absolutely entitled to the 
property as against the trustee; or 
(c) it is held by a person as trustee for another person who would be absolutely entitled to 
the property as against the trustee if that other person were not an infant or otherwise 
lacking legal capacity. 
A person is absolutely entitled to property as against a trustee if the person has the exclusive 
right to direct how the property is to be dealt with (subject to the trustees' right to use the 
property for the payment of duty, taxes, costs or other outgoings). References to a person 
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who is or would be so entitled, include references to two or more persons who are or would 
be jointly absolutely entitled as against the trustee.195 
Furthermore, the Income Tax Act provides that the trustees of a settlement are together 
treated as if they were a single person (distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the 
settlement from time to time).196 
2.3.2.2 Scotland 
A trust has been defined as “an interest created by the transfer of property to a trustee, in 
order that he may carry out the settlor’s direction respecting its management and 
disposal”.197 
Another definition which has been offered by academic writers is the following: 
“A trust then is a legal relationship in which property is vested in one person, the 
trustee, who is under a fiduciary obligation to apply the property to some extent for 
the benefit of another person, the beneficiary, the obligation being a qualification of 
the trustee’s proprietary right and preferable to all claims of the trustee or his 
creditors.”198 
It should also be borne in mind that The Recognition of Trusts Act (1987) also applies to 
Scotland, which means that the definition of “trust” in The Hague Convention on Trusts 
equally applies in Scotland. 
The Income Tax Act 2007199 provides as follows: 
“(1) This section applies if – 
(a) income arises to trustees under a trust having effect under the law of 
Scotland, 
(b) the trustees are UK resident, and 
(c) a beneficiary under the trust (“B”) would have an equitable right in 
possession to the income if the trust had effect under the law of England 
and Wales. 
(2) B is treated for income tax purposes as having an equitable right in possession to 
the income (even though B has no such right under the law of Scotland).” 
2.3.3 Legal nature and key features 
2.3.3.1 England 
In English law a trust is not a juristic person and is therefore not capable of owning property. 
The trust property is owned by the trustee,200 or if more than one trustee, by them as joint 
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tenants.201 The trust property, however, comprises a separate fund, which is available only 
to the beneficiaries and not to the trustee’s personal creditors or heirs.202 Trustees also have 
a duty to separate trust assets from their personal assets.203 
Trustees have fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries, which entail that they cannot use 
their position for their own benefit. Instead the trust property must be used for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries.204 A trustee’s fiduciary duties further entail that he or she must act in 
good faith. Trustees must avoid conflicts between their own self-interest and their fiduciary 
duty205 and they must not profit out of this trust. It goes without saying that trustees must at 
all times adhere to the provisions of the trust.206 
The settlor forms the trust,207 but after its formation usually falls out of the picture, although 
he or she may reserve certain powers for himself or herself.208 It is therefore the trustees 
who stand in a relationship with the beneficiaries and only the latter who may enforce their 
rights against the former.209 The settlor may be a trustee or even a sole trustee, and a 
beneficiary, but a valid trust will not exist if the settlor is the sole trustee and sole 
beneficiary, as a person cannot have rights against himself or herself.210 
As in other jurisdictions, trusts may be formed during the lifetime of the settlor (an inter 
vivos trust) or on his or her death (a testamentary trust).211 Where a beneficiary has a fixed 
entitlement to certain income or capital from the trustees, the trust will be a fixed trust.212 
The fixed trust must be contrasted to a discretionary trust, in which beneficiaries only obtain 
rights to income or capital when the trustees exercise their discretion in favour of a specific 
beneficiary.213 In addition, distributive powers of appointment of income or capital are 
usually found in a trust deed.214 One of the differences between a discretionary trust and a 
power of appointment is that the trustees are obliged to exercise their discretion, whereas 
the donee of the power is not obliged to exercise such power.215 Subject to restrictions on 
accumulation, trustees may also be given the power (or a trust) to accumulate income, 
which then becomes part of the trust capital, unless the trustee exercises the power to 
distribute the income to the beneficiaries instead.216 
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Although there are certain similarities between a trust and an agency, there are also marked 
differences.217 For example, a person cannot be an agent for a non-existent principal, while 
trusts for the benefit of persons not yet born are valid. Furthermore, at common law, a 
principal only has a personal claim against the agent in case of the agent’s insolvency,218 
whereas, in the case of a trustee, a separate trust fund is created to which a trustee’s 
creditors cannot lay claim.219 A trustee is therefore not an agent of either the settlor or the 
beneficiaries, but acts as principal.220 A trust is also something different from a contract.221 
It is possible for a settlor to declare himself or herself trustee of his or her own property.222 
Although it is clear that the trustee is the owner of the trust assets, the nature of a 
beneficiary’s interest has evolved over time. Initially a beneficiary’s interest entailed the 
right to require the trustee to perform under the trust or to make good any losses (that is, a 
personal right), but later developments broadened the scope of the beneficiary’s interest so 
that it became enforceable against third parties (excluding bona fide purchasers for value 
without notice). Thus the beneficiary’s interest acquired a “proprietary hue”.223 In the case 
of a fixed trust the beneficiary’s interest is easily given a proprietary character, the 
beneficiary being the equitable owner and the trustee the legal owner.224 In the case of a 
discretionary trust, describing a beneficiary’s interest as proprietary becomes more 
problematic, since the beneficiary has no right to demand anything from the trustees and in 
case of insolvency, nothing passes to the trustee.225 In Gartside v IRC226 the court held that 
“No doubt in a certain sense a beneficiary under a discretionary trust has an ‘interest’: 
the nature of it may, sufficiently for the purpose, be spelt out by saying that he has a 
right to be considered as a potential recipient of benefit by the trustees and a right to 
have his interest protected by a court of equity … But that does not mean that he has 
an interest which is capable of being taxed by reference to its extent in the trust fund’s 
income …” 
The court therefore rejected the notion that beneficiaries of a discretionary trust, as a class, 
possess the whole of the equitable interest in the trust fund.227 As mentioned in Gartside, 
the beneficiary under a discretionary trust does have some sort of interest, in the sense that 
it may be assigned, he or she has the right to be considered as a potential recipient of a 
benefit and, under the rule in Saunders v Vautier,228 he or she has a right, with other 
beneficiaries, to bring the trust to an end. Furthermore beneficiaries may prevent the 
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misallocation or mismanagement of the trust.229 According to some authors, it is therefore 
uncertain precisely where the equitable interest lies with regard to discretionary trusts.230 
Mowbray et al explain the position as follows: A beneficiary has a proprietary right or 
interest in the broader sense of the term, since he may enforce the trust against anyone 
(except a bona fide purchaser for value without notice). Some beneficiaries are equitable 
owners of trust assets, namely if the assets are sufficiently ascertained and the beneficiary is 
the only one interested. Others have equitable proprietary interests in the trust, such as two 
or more capital beneficiaries concurrently interested. A discretionary beneficiary has no 
equitable interest in the narrow sense and no equitable ownership, but since he or she may 
enforce his or her right to be considered by the trustees against the trustees and third 
parties, he or she has a proprietary interest in the wider sense.231 
2.3.3.2 Scotland 
As in South Africa, Scottish private law is “mixed”,232 but its property law is based on a 
civilian framework.233 The divide between legal ownership and equitable ownership is, 
therefore, unknown in Scottish law. The trustee is the owner of the trust property,234 but 
must use the trust property not for his or her own benefit, but for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries.235 A trustee is therefore a “fiduciary”, that is, someone who must act in the 
interest of another. However, what distinguishes a trustee from other fiduciaries, such as 
agents, is that the trustee is the owner of the trust assets.236 In a trust, the trustee has two 
patrimonies (estates),237 one being the trustee’s personal patrimony and the other being the 
special patrimony of the trust.238 The trustee has a duty to keep the two patrimonies 
segregated, so that it is at all times certain to which of his or her two patrimonies an asset 
belongs.239 The trustee’s personal creditors cannot claim against the trustee’s special 
patrimony. Likewise, the trust creditors cannot touch the trustee’s personal patrimony.240 
According to Gretton, this feature of the Scottish trust means that the trust is a distinctive 
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Systems 23; Reid in Principles of European Trust Law 68. 
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institution and not an arrangement that can simply be achieved by way of a contract.241 In 
Scottish law, the trust is a separate institution, but not a juristic person.242 According to Reid, 
trusts “behave” like juristic persons in many respects, because they have an existence 
independent of a person. A trustee incurs obligations, not in his or her personal capacity, but 
in the capacity of trustee. If the trustee ceases to be a trustee, he does not hold the relevant 
obligation anymore. Trustees are also subject to regulation by the courts.243 
The beneficiary is not the owner of the trust property.244 He or she has a personal right 
against the trustee.245 This right is often referred to as the “beneficial interest”246 and forms 
part of the beneficiary’s patrimony.247 Although the beneficiary’s right has often been 
described as a jus crediti, this does not paint the full picture, as a beneficiary’s right is more 
than a mere contractual right. A beneficiary can vindicate trust property on the 
sequestration of the trustee and can secure the recovery of property from third parties 
under certain circumstances.248 According to Wilson and Duncan the decision in Inland 
Revenue v Clark’s Trs249 determined that a beneficiary’s interest consists of the following 
four rights of action: 
“(i) a right by personal action, usually of declarator or accounting, to compel the 
trustees to administer the trust according to its term; (ii) a right to interdict the 
trustees from breach of trust; (iii) a right to recover damages from the trustees for 
breach of trust; (vi) a right to petition the court to change the administration of the 
trust by replacing the trustees by new trustees or a judicial factor.”250 
Regarding beneficiaries’ rights, a distinction must be drawn between discretionary and other 
trusts. In a discretionary trust, for purposes of trust law, the trustees are given a degree of 
discretion regarding the extent to which certain beneficiaries will benefit.251 Thus the 
beneficiary’s rights will depend on the trustees’ decisions.252 The term “vested”, in the sense 
of a beneficial right having vested, can have more than one meaning253 and a great deal of 
uncertainty surrounds the term.254 It seems, however, that a vested right is a right like any 
other patrimonial right. Such a right does not necessarily mean that the holder of the right is 
also the owner of the underlying asset. A right seems to be unvested if it is subject to a 
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condition and the condition was not satisfied.255 Writing on a mortis causa settlement, Lord 
Colonsay held that in order to determine whether a right is vested or not, the intentions of 
the testator are decisive.256 Case law has developed default rules to ascertain the testator’s 
intention.257 If the beneficiary’s right is vested, it is passed on by testate or intestate 
succession.258 
A beneficiary’s interest may be assigned to a third party, even if it is a mere non-vested right. 
In order to complete the assignee’s rights, the trustees must be given notice of the 
assignation.259 
Trustees have certain duties. One of them is the duty which limits the power to accumulate 
income.260 These rules, contained in statute,261 are complex and only the basic rule will be 
stated, namely that the trustees may accumulate income only for the first 21 years of the 
trust’s existence. Once this period has lapsed, income has to be distributed to the 
beneficiaries.262 
The trustees have further duties, known as fiduciary duties. This entails that the trustees 
must adhere to the provisions of the trust deed and to the law. Trustees must not authorise 
transactions in their own interests, unless the trust deed authorises them to do so or the 
duty is waived by the beneficiaries.263 Thus, trustees may not buy from, sell to, borrow from, 
or lend to the trust, as these transactions will cause their interests to conflict with their 
duties as trustees.264 In executing their duties, trustees must only consider the beneficiaries’ 
interests.265 
In order for a trust to take effect, the trust property must be vested in the trustees. Delivery 
of the trust property is therefore necessary in order to create a trust.266 Case law has dealt 
with this subject extensively, but the rules that can be distilled, are complex and will not be 
discussed in detail in this research.267 
A valid trust will come into existence where the settlor is the sole trustee.268 Such a trust is 
known as a “truster/trustee” or a “truster-as-trustee” trust. Gretton and Steven point out 
that no transfer is possible in such a trust, since a transfer involves two people.269 Wilson 
and Duncan, on the other hand, cite authority and case law that require that there be a 
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physical act equivalent to a transfer.270 Gretton and Steven concede that the rules relating to 
this type of trust are uncertain, but one requirement seems to be that the declaration of 
trust must be intimated to at least one beneficiary.271 However, if the settlor is the sole 
trustee and sole beneficiary, the trust will be extinguished.272 Usually a beneficiary may be 
appointed as a trustee, but in the case of an alimentary liferent there is authority to the 
effect that at least one trustee should be independent. 
2.3.4 Requirements for the formation of a valid trust 
2.3.4.1 England 
Most trusts created in England are created by the settlor expressly transferring property to 
the trustees to hold on declared trust.273 However, English law also recognises resulting 
trusts and constructive trusts. A resulting trust arises to give effect to presumed intention in 
certain circumstances.274 For example, a resulting trust may arise where an express trust fails 
and the beneficial interest in the trust assets then results to the trust settlor. A resulting 
trust may also arise where property is transferred to a person, but equity presumes that 
person to hold the property on trust for the transferor.275 A constructive trust, on the other 
hand, is a trust imposed by law, irrespective of the intention of the parties.276 The 
classification of trusts into these categories and the law regarding these types of trusts are 
uncertain and still in the process of development.277 Trusts may also be created by statute, 
for example in the case of bankruptcy and co-ownership of land.278 However, these types of 
trusts will not be discussed in this research and references to English law trusts will be 
confined to so-called “express” trusts. 
Until the property has been subjected to the terms of the trust, there can be no trust.279 This 
means that property must be transferred by the settlor to the trustees and the formalities 
required for such transfer must be observed.280 For example, a trustee only becomes the 
owner of full legal title in registered land or shares in a private company on registration.281 
Upon transfer of the property to the trustee the trust is completed or constituted, thereby 
transforming the beneficiary’s previously unenforceable hope into a property right.282 What 
is required of the settlor to constitute a trust is that the trustee must have done everything 
under his or her control necessary to constitute complete title with no further assistance 
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required by the settlor or equity.283 If a settlor declares himself or herself trustee of his or 
her property, no formalities are required, since there is no transfer. Thus a declaration of 
trust will suffice to constitute a trust.284 If, however, the property involved is land (and 
whether or not the property is to be transferred to trustees), the trust must be evidenced in 
writing and signed by the settlor in order for it to be enforced.285 It should also be noted that 
only the settlor (or his or her authorised agent) can constitute a trust of the settlor’s 
property.286 
In general, though, no formalities are required for the declaration of an inter vivos trust. 
Indeed, trusts need not be created by writing,287 although most trust deeds are in writing. 
Neither do trustees have to be appointed on creation, although they usually are.288 
However, the formalities for the transfer of trust property must be complied with and trusts 
of land must be reduced to writing.289 Further formalities must be met if an equitable 
interest is made the subject of a trust.290 If a trust is created by way of a will (a testamentary 
trust) the formalities for a valid will must be adhered to.291 A testamentary trust will be 
completely constituted once the will is admitted to probate.292 
In order to create a valid trust, certain requirements must be met. These are: 
(a) There must be certainty of the intention to create a trust.293 The intention of the 
settlor will be looked at to determine whether a trust has been created.294 Thus, even 
if the intention to create a trust is expressed clearly, but the real intention is not to 
create a trust, no trust will be formed. Equally, if informal language is used indicating 
the settlor’s wish for trust-like consequences, a trust will be formed.295 A general 
intention to benefit another is not adequate, though. What is required, is a specific 
intention to benefit by way of a trust.296 
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(b) There must be certainty of the subject matter of the trust.297 The particular property 
which is to be held in trust must therefore be identified,298 as well as the quantum of 
each beneficiary’s interest in the trust.299 The latter rule is subject to certain remedies, 
including that a discretion may be conferred on the trustees to decide which 
beneficiaries will receive and how much they will receive.300 
(c) There must be certainty of the objects of the trust.301 The beneficiaries must be 
certain.302 In the absence of certainty regarding the beneficiaries of the trust, a 
resulting trust will be created in favour of the settlor or his or her estate.303 
(d) The trust must be administratively workable,304 in other words, the terms of the trust 
instrument (or admissible extrinsic evidence) has to provide clear criteria which would 
enable a court to act judicially upon them.305 
(e) The beneficiary principle must be adhered to.306 This principle entails that there must 
be beneficiaries with locus standi to enforce the trust (exceptions being made for 
certain anomalous cases).307 Thus, according to Hayton “[i]t follows that a trust may be 
created for the benefit of persons but not for a purpose unless that purpose be 
charitable, for a purpose cannot sue, but if it be charitable the Attorney General may 
sue to enforce it.”308 
Furthermore, trusts will be void if they are formed for an illegal purpose or contrary to public 
policy.309 English law also has certain rules against perpetuity or accumulations. In terms of 
the rule against purpose trusts of excessive duration, a trust will be invalid if the trust 
property is to be applied indefinitely for a non-charitable purpose. In terms of common law, 
the trust would be valid if a person would become absolutely entitled to the trust property 
at the end of the perpetuity period of 21 years or within 21 years from the death of a person 
living when the trust is created.310 The rule against remoteness of vesting, found in the 
common law, was amended by legislation.311 This rule is, however, complex and a discussion 
of its detail falls outside the scope of this research. In terms of the rule against 
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accumulations, income can be accumulated and added to capital for one of six possible 
periods set out in the Law of Property Act312 and the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act.313 
2.3.4.2 Scotland 
The vast majority of trusts are created deliberately314 and may be either inter vivos, in other 
words a trust set up while the settlor315 is alive, or a testamentary trust, which is set up by 
the settlor’s will on his or her death.316 In the case of a testamentary trust, the trustees are 
nominated and the trust assets identified in the will.317 Testamentary trusts must be in 
writing, because wills must be in writing.318 Although registration is not a requirement for a 
valid testamentary trust, most trusts are registered because the wills are registered.319 The 
trust is, off course, created only on the death of the settlor.320 
In the case of inter vivos trusts, two elements are of importance: the declaration of trust and 
the vesting of property in the trustee. Both elements are required so that the trust does not 
come into existence until the property is transferred to the trustees.321 The first element, the 
declaration of trust, typically involves a deed of trust signed by the settlor and delivered to 
the trustee.322 The trust purposes,323 beneficiaries and trust property are identified in the 
trust deed and although it is often registered in the Books of Council and Session,324 this is 
not a legal requirement. According to Gretton and Steven, if the purposes of a trust “are too 
indeterminate or too obscure, to be interpreted, the trust will be void ‘by reason of 
uncertainty’”.325 Furthermore, a trust’s purpose may not be contrary to public policy.326 
Usually trust property mentioned in the trust deed is nominal and other assets are 
transferred later to the trust.327 
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No special words are used to create a trust.328 Writing is not a requirement for a valid inter 
vivos trust.329 In terms of the rule against perpetuities, a trust becomes a bare trust330 for a 
beneficiary if the beneficiary was unborn when the trust was formed.331 
The appointment of a trustee does not take effect until the trustee has accepted his or her 
nomination.332 If none of the trustees accept their nomination, the trust will not usually fail 
as the settlor, or the court, in appropriate circumstances, may nominate alternative 
trustees.333 
2.3.5 Administration of a trust 
2.3.5.1 England 
The general powers of administration of a trust are placed in the hands of the trustees.334 In 
terms of the common law, trustees must act jointly, unless the trust instrument provides 
otherwise.335 
Everyone of the trustees must act personally, save to the extent that a trustee may delegate 
to other trustees or agents in terms of the Trustee Act.336 In terms of the Trustee Act 
trustees may authorise any person to exercise any or all of their delegable functions as their 
agent. The trustees' delegable functions consist of any function other than (a) any function 
relating to whether or in what way any assets of the trust should be distributed; (b) any 
power to decide whether any fees or other payment due to be made out of the trust funds 
should be made out of income or capital; (c) any power to appoint a person to be a trustee 
of the trust; or (d) any power conferred by any other enactment or the trust instrument 
which permits the trustees to delegate any of their functions or to appoint a person to act as 
a nominee or custodian.337 The trustees may not permit an agent to appoint a substitute, to 
act in circumstances capable of giving rise to a conflict of interest, or restrict the agent’s 
liability to the trustees or any beneficiary.338 Special rules apply when an agent is authorised 
to act as asset manager for the trustees, such as that the agreement must be in writing and 
that trustees must prepare a written policy statement which gives guidance to the agent as 
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to how his or her functions must be performed.339 While the agent acts for the trust, the 
trustees must keep under review the arrangements under which the agent acts and how 
those arrangements are being put into effect. They must also consider whether there is a 
need to exercise any power of intervention that they have and exercise such a power if 
necessary. “Power of intervention" includes a power to give directions and to revoke the 
authorisation or appointment.340 The provisions of the Trustee Act set out above may be 
restricted or excluded by the trust instrument.341 
The Trustee Act342 provides that an individual trustee may delegate the execution or exercise 
of all or any of the trusts, powers and discretions vested in him or her as trustee.343 The 
delegation must be given in terms of a written power of attorney and may continue for a 
maximum of twelve months.344 The trustee, however, remains liable for the acts of the 
person to whom he has delegated. A trustee may also delegate his or her discretion in terms 
of the trust deed.345 
2.3.5.2 Scotland 
The general principles regarding trust administration are that trustees must perform their 
duties personally and, where there is more than one trustee, must act as a body, on the 
basis that each individual takes responsibility for every step of the administration of the 
trust. Due to practical considerations, these principles have been relaxed in certain 
respects.346 
The trust deed may lay down certain rules for the conduct of the trust’s administration, but 
in the absence of rules in the trust deed certain default rules will apply. Thus, these default 
rules determine that a quorum of trustees must be present in order for a valid meeting to be 
held and that the majority of trustees are a quorum.347 Furthermore, decisions are made by 
majority vote,348 but the majority must be the majority of all the trustees and not just those 
present at the meeting.349 In cases where trustees are appointed on a basis of joint tenure or 
if they are designated sine qua non, all of these trustees must participate, or at least concur, 
in all acts of the administration of the trust.350 All trustees must be “consulted” and a failure 
to consult may lead to an invalid decision.351 All that is required for “consultation” to take 
                                                          
339 Trustee Act (2000) s 15. 
340 Trustee Act (2000) s 22. 
341 Trustee Act (2000) s 26. For a general discussion on the delegation of trustees’ duties, see Hudson Equity 
and Trusts 480–485. 
342 Trustee Act (1925) which was amended by the Trustee Delegation Act 1999. 
343 Trustee Act (1925) s 25. 
344 The power of attorney must be attested to by a witness (Hayton The Law of Trusts 156). 
345 Moffat et al Trusts Law 528. 
346 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 362. The authors do not list the practical considerations, 
but one can think of the practical difficulties involved in having the day to day affairs of a trust dealt with by all 
the trustees, especially where there are many trustees involved, as an example of these practical 
considerations. 
347 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 365; Trusts (Scotland) Act (1921) s 3(c). 
348 Garden and Mackintosh Trusts and Estates in Scotland 2009/2010 5; Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and 
Executors 362. 
349 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 343. 
350 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 362. 
351 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 359. These arrangements are rare in practice. 
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place, is for the trustees to be notified of a meeting that is to take place and that fair notice 
be given,352 but even this is unnecessary if it would be pointless or impossible to do so.353 
Wilson and Duncan insist, however, that in impractical or impossible cases, consultation by 
written or telephonic communication must take place.354 
If trustees dispose of trust property, a dissenting trustee has a duty to sign the documents 
required for the disposition to take place, but it is uncertain whether, as a matter of 
conveyancing law, the signature of the majority is adequate.355 
Regarding the rights of third parties, the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 provides as follows: 
“Any deed bearing to be granted by the trustees under any trust, and in fact executed 
by a quorum of such trustees in favour of any person other than a beneficiary or a co-
trustee under the trust where such person has dealt onerously and in good faith shall 
not be void or challengeable on the ground that any trustee or trustees under the trust 
was or were not consulted in the matter, or was or were not present at any meeting of 
trustees where the same was considered, or did not consent to or concur in the 
granting of the deed, or on the ground of any other omission or irregularity of 
procedure on the part of the trustees or any of them in relation to the granting of the 
deed.”356 
Trustees may appoint factors and law agents and pay them suitable remuneration, unless 
such power is at variance with the terms of the trust deed or purpose of the trust.357 In 
addition and at common law, trustees have the power to appoint agents. If this power is 
exercised properly, it is not regarded as a delegation of functions which trustees are obliged 
to perform personally. The power may be exercised if a person of reasonable prudence 
dealing with his or her own affairs would consider the employment of an agent 
appropriate.358 
2.4 Canada 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The French were the first to colonise what is now known as Canada, but were followed by 
the British. In the clashes between these two nations, the British eventually prevailed.359 
Today, Canada is a constitutional monarchy, which recognises the Queen of England as the 
head of the state, although this recognition is largely symbolic. Under the Constitution Act 
1867, a federal government was created with various provincial governments, each having 
certain legislative powers. For example, the federal government has unlimited powers of 
taxation, but provinces are allowed to levy direct taxation on income earned in the province, 
                                                          
352 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 363. 
353 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 344. 
354 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 363. 
355 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 344. 
356 Trusts (Scotland) Act (1921) s 7. 
357 Trusts (Scotland) Act (1921) s 4(f). 
358 Wilson and Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 367. 
359 Tjaden (2005) AALL Spectrum 10.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van 
Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 198-201. 
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as well as worldwide income earned by residents of the particular province.360 Futhermore, 
the law of trusts falls under the jurisdiction of each province.361 Nowadays Canada has ten 
provinces and three territories. Because of Canada’s history, private law in the province of 
Québec is based on the French civil law tradition and therefore differs from the other 
provinces, which draw on the English common law.362 Québec may therefore be described as 
a mixed jurisdiction, applying “civil law” for provincial matters, but applying statutory and 
“common” law for federal matters.363 In the following paragraphs a distinction will therefore 
be made between what is called “the rest of Canada” and “Québec”. 
2.4.2 A brief history 
2.4.2.1 The rest of Canada 
The British who settled in Canada brought the common law, and therefore also the trust 
concept, with them. By the time the trust was used in Canada by the settlers in the early 
nineteenth century, though, it was virtually a finished product.364 In that sense the history of 
the trust in England is also the history of the trust in Canada. 
2.4.2.2 Québec 
British settlers in Canada introduced the trust concept to Canada and there is little doubt 
that the original model of the trust in Québec was the English trust.365 Although the first Civil 
Code366 did not recognise trusts, trusts were used in practice and therefore legislation was 
soon enacted to rectify the omission. Although no contemporary documentation exists, the 
enactment of the legislation may have been brought about by a decision of the Privy Council 
to the effect that a trust did not form part of the law of Lower Canada.367 Thus the first Civil 
Code was amended to incorporate the trust into Québec law. Since that time the relevant 
provisions of the first Civil Code was replaced by a number of sections in the Civil Code of 
Québec.368 
                                                          
360 Arnold in Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 23; Anonymous Canadian Master Tax Guide 
para 755. 
361 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 13.III 2. 
362 Tjaden "Researching Canadian Law" 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Canada1.htm#_The_Canadian_Legal_System> (accessed on 
08/04/2011).  
363 Tjaden (2005) AALL Spectrum 10. 
364 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 1.III 1. 
365 Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 73.  See also Coetzee 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en 
Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 202-206 for a discussion of the 
development of the trust in Québec. 
366 Civil Code of Lower Canada  
367 Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 74. Arts 1256 to 1298 of the Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 
64, which has been in force since 1994. 
368 Arts 1256 to 1298 of the Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64, which has been in force since 1994. 
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2.4.3 Definitions 
2.4.3.1 The rest of Canada 
Authors agree that it is a difficult task to define a trust and that most definitions emphasise a 
particular aspect of a trust. Most Canadian texts adopt the definitions offered by authors on 
English law,369 such as the definitions of Underhill and Hayton, Lewin and Keeton and 
Sheridan.370 
The federal Canadian Government is a signatory to The Hague Convention on Trusts and a 
number of provinces371 have adopted legislation to bring the Convention in force.372 The 
definition in the Hague Convention on Trusts will therefore also be of importance in 
Canadian law. 
The Income Tax Act373 does not contain a comprehensive definition of what a trust is.374 
Instead it provides that: 
“In this Act, a reference to a trust or estate (in this subdivision referred to as a “trust”) 
shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be read to include a reference to the 
trustee, executor, administrator, liquidator of a succession, heir or other legal 
representative having ownership or control of the trust property, but, except for the 
purposes of this subsection, subsection (1.1), subparagraph (b)(v) of the definition 
“disposition” in subsection 248(1) and paragraph (k) of that definition, a trust is 
deemed not to include an arrangement under which the trust can reasonably be 
considered to act as agent for all the beneficiaries under the trust with respect to all 
dealings with all of the trust’s property unless the trust is described in any of 
paragraphs (a) to (e.1) of the definition “trust” in subsection 108(1).”375 
It has been contended that, in order to establish whether a trust exists for tax purposes, the 
trust law requirements for a valid trust376must be met.377 Where, however, a trust is 
governed by foreign law, the rights and obligations created by the foreign law must be taken 
into account in determining whether the relationship is regarded as a trust for income tax 
purposes.378 In Peter Sommerer v Her Majesty the Queen, the Tax Court of Canada had to 
decide whether an Austrian Private Foundation was a trust for purposes of the Income Tax 
                                                          
369 See 2.3.2.1 above. 
370 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 1.II 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 13. 
371 British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince 
Edward Island and Nova Scotia. Québec has not adopted the Convention, but relies on the conflict of laws rules 
as well as arts 3107 and 3108 of the Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 to resolve disputes (Brown in Topical 
Analysis para 1.3). 
372 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 29.I 4; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 52. 
373 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1. 
374 Brown (2001–2002) 21 ETPJ 1 3. 
375 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(1). A testamentary trust is defined in s 108(1). 
376 See ch 2.4.5.1. 
377 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to 
US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 80. 
378 Brown in Topical Analysis para 1.4.1. 
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Act. The court held that it was required to determine the essential elements of a trust in 
terms of Canadian private law and compare it to the elements of the foreign arrangement to 
determine whether it can be treated as a trust under Canadian law.379 
2.4.3.2 Québec 
The Civil Code of Québec does not contain a section which per se defines a trust. It does, 
however, describe the trust by providing that: 
“A trust results from an act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from his 
patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a 
particular purpose and which a trustee undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and 
administer.”380 
and 
“The trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust, constitutes a 
patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee 
or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right.”381 
These articles are discussed in greater detail below.382 
In terms of the federal Income Tax Act,383 certain trusts that are governed by Québec law, 
are specifically regarded as trusts for income tax purposes. The relevant provision, as far as 
is relevant for present purposes, reads as follows: 
“For the purposes of this Act, if property is subject to an institution or arrangement 
that is described by this subsection and that is governed by the laws of the Province of 
Québec, the following rules apply in respect of the property: 
(a) if at any time property is subject to a usufruct, right of use or habitation, or 
substitution, 
(i) the usufruct, right of use or habitation, or substitution, as the case may be, is 
deemed to be at that time 
(A) a trust, and 
(B) where the usufruct, right of use or habitation, or substitution, as the case may be, 
is created by will, a trust created by will, 
(ii) … and 
(iii) …; 
(b) an arrangement (other than a partnership, a qualifying arrangement or an 
arrangement 
                                                          
379 Peter Sommerer v Her Majesty the Queen 2011 TCC 212 para 60. In this case, the court did not decide 
whether the Austrian Private Foundation was a trust. It held that relationship between the founder of the 
Private Foundation, the Private Foundation itself and the beneficiaries of the Private Foundation constituted a 
trust (see para 82). This finding was criticized on appeal, although the court did not express a final opinion on 
this point (Her Majesty the Queen v Peter Sommerer 2012 FCA 207 paras 38–43).  
380 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1260. 
381 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1261. 
382 See ch 2.4.4. 
383 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 248(3). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
that is a trust determined without reference to this paragraph) is deemed to be a trust 
and property subject to rights and obligations under the arrangement is, if the 
arrangement is deemed by this paragraph to be a trust, deemed to be held in trust and 
not otherwise, where the arrangement 
(i) is established before October 31, 2003 by or under a written contract that 
(A) is governed by the laws of the Province of Québec, and 
(B) provides that, for the purposes of this Act, the arrangement shall be considered to 
be a trust, and 
(ii) creates rights and obligations that are substantially similar to the rights and 
obligations under a trust (determined without reference to this subsection); 
(c) if the arrangement is a qualifying arrangement, 
(i) the arrangement is deemed to be a trust, 
(ii) any property contributed at any time to the arrangement by an annuitant, a holder 
or a subscriber of the arrangement, as the case may be, is deemed to have been 
transferred, at that time, to the trust by the contributor, and 
(iii) property subject to rights and obligations under the arrangement is deemed to be 
held in trust and not otherwise; 
(d) a person who has a right (whether immediate or future and whether absolute or 
contingent) 
to receive all or part of the income or capital in respect of property that is referred to 
in paragraph (a) or (b) is deemed to be beneficially interested in the trust; and 
(e) …“ 
Under Québec tax law,384 a trust is not defined either, but it provides that 
“a trust, wherever it is created, or a succession, in this Title referred to as a ’trust’, also 
includes the trustee or other legal representative having ownership or control of the 
trust property.” 
2.4.4 Legal nature and key features 
2.4.4.1 The rest of Canada 
Waters names three essential features of the trust in Canada. The first is that the trustee and 
beneficiary stand in a fiduciary relationship with each other. The trustees hold the title to 
and manage the trust property, but not for their own benefit. It is the beneficiaries who are 
entitled to the enjoyment of the trust property. Trustees therefore have a duty to act in the 
best interests of the beneficiaries.385 The trustee’s fiduciary duty means that he has the duty 
to account to the beneficiary for all that he does with the trust property and in his or her 
capacity as trustee. Hence the trustee must avoid a conflict of interest and must perform his 
or her duties personally (subject to certain exceptions).386 Trustees also have a duty to act 
honestly, prudently and diligently and may not make unauthorised profits.387 
                                                          
384 Taxation Act RSQ 1–3 s 646. Testamentary trusts are defined in s 677. 
385 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 1.IV 1–3; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, 
Commentary and Materials 14.  
386 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3.I 1. 
387 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 72. 
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Agents also stand in a fiduciary relationship with others to some degree.388 There are, 
however, important differences between an agent and a trustee. For example, an agent acts 
on instructions from his or her principal. A trustee is not an agent of the settlor, or the 
beneficiaries.389 The trustee performs an office.390 Furthermore, an agent merely has 
possession of the property and contracts on behalf of the principal. A trustee, on the other 
hand, is the legal owner of the property.391 
The second essential feature of the trust is that of the dual ownership of the trustee and the 
beneficiary. The trustee holds the legal interest in the trust property, while the beneficiary 
holds the equitable interest in the trust property.392 Regarding the nature of the 
beneficiary’s interest, it may be said that the beneficiary has both proprietary and personal 
rights. For example, the beneficiary has a personal right against the trustee for the proper 
administration of the trust. On the other hand, the proprietary aspect of the beneficiary’s 
right includes the right to demand that the trust comes to an end and that the property be 
distributed to him or her (or them if they are in agreement) provided that the 
beneficiary(ies) is sui juris.393 Furthermore, a beneficiary has a right to trace the trust 
property. Thus, depending on the situation, the proprietary aspects of a beneficiary’s rights 
may dominate.394 The nature of a discretionary beneficiary’s right is discussed below. 
The third essential feature is said to flow from the second, namely that the trustee holds the 
trust property in a separate estate from his or her personal estate. The implication is that 
the trustee’s private creditors cannot lay claim to the trust assets, which are held in a 
separate estate by the trustee.395 
A discretionary trust is one in which the trustees have a duty to distribute income or capital 
between the beneficiaries as the trustees deem fit.396 A trust must be distinguished from a 
power, for example, the power of appointment. The power of appointment is a power given 
to a person to determine who the recipients of certain property are to be. In the case of a 
trust, the trustees are obliged to deal with the property as set out in the trust instrument. 
For example, in the case of a discretionary trust, the trustees are obliged to distribute the 
income or capital, but have a discretion regarding the amount a beneficiary will receive. In 
the case of a power of appointment, the holder of the power is entitled, but not obliged, to 
exercise the power.397 It may be said that the class of beneficiaries as a whole have a 
                                                          
388 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3.I 3; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 87. 
389 There is authority for the proposition that in cases where the beneficiaries control the trustees, the 
relationship is one of agency, rather than trust. The extent of the beneficiaries’ control is, however, unclear. If 
the settlor retains a certain amount of control over the trustees, it may be one of the factors which indicate 
that the parties did not intend to create a trust, but rather an agency relationship. Once again the degree of 
control is unclear (Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3.III 4–5). 
390 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3.III 1. 
391 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3.III 3; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 88. 
392 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 1.IV 2. 
393 Under the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115. 
394 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 27. 
395 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 1.IV. 3. 
396 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 2.IX 1. 
397 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 3 VII 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 16. 
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proprietary interest in the trust property; an individual discretionary beneficiary does not 
have such an interest, as the trustees might not exercise their discretion in his or her 
favour.398 Thus, until a beneficiary under a discretionary trust has property distributed to 
him or her, the beneficiary cannot be said to have an interest in the trust property. However, 
a discretionary beneficiary arguably has a quasi-property interest, since the beneficiary may 
trace property in the hands of third persons (other than bona fide purchasers for value 
without notice). Since the proprietary interest must rest somewhere, one may conclude that 
the interest resides in the beneficiaries.399 
A trust is not a juristic person.400 For purposes of the federal Income Tax Act,401 though, a 
trust is regarded as a taxpayer and therefore taxed as an individual. 
2.4.4.2 Québec 
In terms of the Civil Code of Québec, a trust is a separate and autonomous patrimony to 
which neither the trustee, settlor nor beneficiary has any real right.402 Article 1261 of the 
Québec Civil Code provides that the “trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred 
in trust, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the 
settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right.” According to 
Cantin Cumyn, this means that a trust is a separate entity, which although it is not classified 
as a juristic person, operates in the same way.403 She has argued that the trust is a sujet de 
droit, a subject of law or of rights (and obligations), which differs from a juristic person and 
can be classified as an intermediate entity (that is, between a juristic person and a person 
without juristic personality).404 The trust may therefore be regarded as the owner of the 
trust assets405 and may enter into contracts and incur debts.406 Waters agrees that the 
provisions of the Civil Code make it impossible to argue that the trust is a juristic person. He 
mentions two other possibilities, namely Cantin Cumyn’s sujet de droit argument and the 
argument that the trustee has two separate patrimonies and that the trustee is the owner of 
the trust assets in his or her trust patrimony. Waters seems to dismiss the latter possibility 
and instead argues that the relevant article in the Civil Code means that the trust patrimony 
does not belong to anyone, in other words, the trust assets have no owner.407 It seems as if 
this issue has not yet been resolved by any court decisions or legislation. 
                                                          
398 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 15. 
399 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 32. 
400 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 13.II 3. 
401 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2). 
402 Trustee Delegation Act 1999, art 1261. 
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406 Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 76. 
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Even before the enactment of the current provisions regarding trusts in the Civil Code, the 
courts have held that the notion of dual ownership did not form part of the law of 
Québec.408 
The settlor has the duty to transfer the assets to the trust.409 He may, however, reserve the 
right to receive the fruits and revenues or even, where such is the case, the capital of the 
trust, or share in the benefits it procures.410 According to Cantin Cumyn, this provision 
means that although the settlor may be a beneficiary, he or she may not be the sole 
beneficiary of the trust. A settlor may act as a trustee of the trust, but not the sole trustee, 
provided that the other trustee is not a beneficiary. Similarly, a beneficiary may act as a 
trustee, but he or she must act jointly with a person who is neither the settlor, nor a 
beneficiary.411 According to Waters, a trust in which the settlor retains considerable control 
over the trust assets is not allowed as it is understood as being inconsistent with a genuine 
intention to create a trust.412 
Since the trustee is not the owner of the trust property, one may ask what his or her role is. 
The Civil Code provides that he or she is charged with seeing to the appropriation of the 
property and the administration of the trust patrimony.413 
The beneficiary has no real rights in respect of the trust property414 and his or her right has 
been recognised as that of a creditor. A beneficiary’s claim is satisfied from the trust 
patrimony and not from the trustee’s personal patrimony. The latter is immune to claims 
from creditors.415 
Together with the settlor, the beneficiaries have a supervisory role over the trustee.416 For 
example, they may take action against the trustee to compel him or her to perform his or 
her obligations or to perform any act which is necessary in the interest of the trust, to enjoin 
him or her to abstain from any action harmful to the trust or to have him or her removed.417 
Trustees have duties which may be described as fiduciary,418 such as the duty to act with 
prudence and diligence and also to act honestly and faithfully in the best interest of the 
beneficiary.419 The trustee must avoid a conflict of interest and may not exercise his or her 
powers in his or her own interest or that of a third person.420 Neither may a trustee use trust 
property or information he or she obtains by reason of his or her trusteeship for his or her 
                                                          
408 Royal Trust Co v Tucker [1982] 1 SCR 250. 
409 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1260. 
410 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1280. 
411 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1275. 
412 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 3. 
413 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1265; De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 80. 
414 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1260. 
415 Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 78; Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1319; Waters 
Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 5. 
416 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1287. 
417 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1290. 
418 De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 81. 
419 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1309.  
420 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1310. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
benefit, except with the consent of the beneficiary or unless it results from the law or the act 
constituting the trust.421 
2.4.5 Requirements for the formation of a valid trust 
2.4.5.1 The rest of Canada 
Both inter vivos and testamentary trusts are found in Canada.422 Most trusts are formed 
expressly by the settlor.423 
A trust is usually constituted when the three requirements for a valid trust are met and the 
property has been transferred to the trustees.424 Therefore, if the three requirements are 
present, but the property has not been transferred yet and the trustees or beneficiaries 
cannot oblige the settlor to transfer the property, no valid trust has come into existence.425 
In the case of an inter vivos trust, property may be transferred to the trustees by the settlor, 
in which case the specific form that the transfer must take in order to be effective, will be 
determined by the type of property. On the other hand, the trustee may declare himself or 
herself a trustee of the property, in which case no transfer of property is needed.426 A 
testamentary trust takes effect upon the testator’s death.427 
The three requirements for a valid trust are:428 
(a) The words used to create the trust must be imperative, in other words, the settlor 
must use language which clearly indicates that a trust must be formed. However, it is 
unnecessary to use any technical words. What must be clear, though, is the settlor’s 
intention, that is, the intention to create a trust.429 The intention to form an inter vivos 
trust may be expressed in writing or orally.430 In the case of a testamentary trust, 
which forms part of the settlor’s will, writing must be used.431 Regarding formalities, 
some provinces still apply the Statute of Frauds432 or legislation with a similar effect.433 
                                                          
421 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1314. 
422 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 2.IX 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 14. 
423 Resulting, constructive and implied trusts are also found in Canadian law and so too are statutory trusts 
(Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 17 and 20), but these will not be 
further explored in this research. 
424 To this Oosterhoff (Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 162) adds that 
the parties to the trust must be capacitated. 
425 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 2.III 1. If valuable consideration was given by the beneficiary for 
the trust, the settlor can be compelled to perform under the normal rules of the law of contract. (Waters 
Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 6.I 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and 
Materials 17.) 
426 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 6.IV 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 16, 219. 
427 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 17.I 1. 
428 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 5.I 1. 
429 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 167. 
430 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 5.II 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 16. 
431 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 5.II 2. Secret and half-secret trusts are enforced in Canada, 
provided certain requirements are met (Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 7.IV 1). 
432 Statute of Frauds 1677. 
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The result of this legislation is that, generally speaking, trusts of land or of interests in 
land must be evidenced in writing. The grant or assignment of an equitable interest in 
trusts must also be in writing, irrespective of the nature of the trust property.434 
(b) The trust property (or subject matter of the trust) must be certain, meaning that the 
property which is to be held in trust must be clearly described, so that it can be 
ascertained definitively. Futhermore, the shares in the property to which each of the 
beneficiaries are entitled, must also be clear.435 
(c) The objects of the trust must be certain. Thus the beneficiaries of the trust must be 
certain. A trust for a non-charitable purpose (that is, a trust not for the benefit of 
persons, but for a specific purpose) is void, subject to certain exceptions.436 
Furthermore, a trust will be invalid if its terms are contrary to public policy, or if it 
contravenes common law or any statute.437 Canadian law also contains a perpetuity rule and 
a rule against perpetual duration.438 
2.4.5.2 Québec 
Only express trusts are recognised in Québec. Trusts may be formed inter vivos by way of a 
gift or an onerous contract,439 or by will.440 The trust is formed if the settlor transfers 
property from his or her patrimony to the trust. The trustee undertakes, by his or her 
acceptance, to hold and administer the trust property for the purpose appropriated by the 
settlor.441 Thus the trust is constituted only upon the acceptance of the trustee or of one of 
the trustees, if there are several.442 In the case of a testamentary trust, the effects of the 
trustee's acceptance are retroactive to the date of death.443 
Usually trusts are constituted gratuitously and therefore have to meet the formal 
requirements of a gift or a will. The exception to this rule is business trusts, which are 
constituted by an onerous contract. If the general rules applicable to contracts are met, no 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
433 The Statute of Frauds 1677 is in force in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and the territories (see 
2.4.1). The Statute of Frauds has been legislatively adopted in Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Prince 
Edward Islands have adopted the Statute of Frauds, but without the relevant parts applicable to trusts. British 
Columbia has repealed the Statute of Frauds and has enacted legislation which alters the relevant rules. 
Manitoba has repealed the Statute of Frauds. (Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 7.II 1). 
434 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 7.I 1. 
435 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 5.III 1; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 171. 
436 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 5.IV 4; Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary 
and Materials 179. 
437 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 2.IV 1. 
438 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 8.IV. 
439 “Onerous contract” means “bilateral exchange” (Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 2). 
440 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1262, which also provides for a trust to be formed by operation of 
law. It has been suggested that a trust cannot be formed by unilateral declaration in terms of Quebéc law. 
(Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 3). 
441 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1260. 
442 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 3. 
443 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1264. 
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further formalities are required.444 However, for all trusts the transfer of the property to the 
trust must also be valid.445 
2.4.6 Administration of a trust 
2.4.6.1 The rest of Canada 
All the trustees must act jointly, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.446 In other 
words, their decisions must be unanimous and if one trustee does not agree with the others, 
a deadlock arises. One way of breaking the deadlock is to approach the court for direction, 
although this remedy may be of limited use as the courts are hesitant to interfere with the 
trustees’ exercising of their duties.447 A trustee may delegate his or her duties to other 
trustees under the same circumstances as those required for delegation to others.448 
The general rule is, therefore, that trustees must act personally and may not delegate their 
functions to others.449 However, under certain circumstances, the trustees are entitled to 
delegate their functions, although they will remain responsible for making all decisions. 
These circumstances are: 
(a) if the trust instrument or statute expressly permits it; 
(b) if the duties are not required to be performed personally; 
(c) where there is no other possible way for the trustee to perform, that is, it is necessary; 
and 
(d) it is common business practice to do so.450 
Waters also acknowledges that trustees may delegate their functions, but formulate the 
circumstances under which they may do so as follows: 
“[W]henever the power, discretion, or duty assigned to the trustee requires that a 
policy decision be made, the trustee must make it himself. A policy decision is one 
which, if dispositive, determines how much and at what time a beneficiary takes; if 
administrative, it directly affects the likelihood of the trust’s object or purpose being 
achieved.”451 
Trustees may never delegate all of their duties as it would amount to an abdication of 
responsibility.452 However, legislation in certain provinces enables a trustee, who is going to 
                                                          
444 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 4. 
445 Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 77. 
446 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 18.I 4. 
447 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 935. 
448 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 18.I 4. 
449 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 18.I 1. 
450 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 950. 
451 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 18.I 2. 
452 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 950. 
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be absent from the province, to delegate all of his or her functions.453 Some states also 
enacted legislation to enable trustees to employ certain agents, for example solicitors or 
bank managers.454 
2.4.6.2 Québec 
The trustee has full administration of the trust property.455 He therefore has the control and 
the exclusive administration of the trust patrimony, and the titles relating to the property of 
which it is composed are drawn up in his or her name. The trustee can exercise all the rights 
pertaining to the patrimony and may take any proper measure to secure its appropriation.456 
If there is more than one trustee, a majority of them may act, unless they are required by 
law to act jointly or in a determined proportion.457 It may be that the trustees cannot act by 
majority, because of an impediment or the systematic opposition of some of them. In such a 
case the others may act for conservatory acts, or a trustee may even act alone (with 
authorisation from the court) when immediate action is required. If the situation persists 
and impairs the administration, the court may intervene to resolve the situation.458 
Trustees are solidarily liable for their administration, unless their duties have been divided 
by law, the act or the court and the division has been respected, in which case each trustee 
is liable for his or her own administration only.459 
A trustee may delegate his or her duties or be represented by a third person for specific acts, 
but may not generally delegate the conduct of the administration or the exercise of a 
discretionary power, except to his or her co-trustees. A trustee is accountable for the person 
selected by him or her if, inter alia, he or she was not authorised to make the selection. If 
the trustee was so authorised, he is accountable only for the care with which he selected the 
person and gave the instructions.460 
2.5 The Netherlands 
2.5.1 Introduction 
The Dutch legal system is based on the civilian system of law and makes use of a civil 
code.461 The English law trust is not traditionally found in Dutch law. The reasons for absence 
of the English trust in civil law jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, have been stated to be: 
“first, a unitary conception of ownership, inconsistent with duplication or division of 
rights in rem in the same thing; second, the supplementary notion, elaborated in the 
German doctrine, that public registration of rights in rem involves taxative codification 
                                                          
453 British Columbia, but only for absence on war service (Trustee Act RSBC 1996 ch 464 s 14); Manitoba 
(Trustee Act CCSM ch T160 s 36); New Brunswick (Trustees Act RSNB 1973 ch T–15 s 6). 
454 Ontario Trustee Act RSO 1990 ch T23, s 20. 
455 Cantin Cumyn in Re-imagining the Trust 22. 
456 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1278. 
457 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1332. 
458 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1333. 
459 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1334. 
460 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1337. 
461 The new Dutch Civil Code came into force in 1992. 
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of such rights, a numerus clausus; and third, the appearance of a variety of devices, 
serving in a degree the same purposes as trusts and calculated for practical reasons to 
escape the procrustean bed prepared for the evolution of property law by the 
imperious logic of these conceptions.”462 
Futhermore, the Civil Code makes it clear that trusts may not be created under Dutch law.463 
The above quote refers to devices which serve the same purposes as a trust. In the 
Netherlands there are a number of devices which would fit that description. Two are briefly 
described here, namely the bewind and the fiducia cum amico.464 
The bewind is a form of fiduciary administration, but it may only be used in certain limited 
family-related situations.465 The bewindvoerder manages the assets for the benefit of a 
beneficiary, but it is the beneficiary and not the bewindvoerder who is the owner of the 
assets.466 Thus the bewind differs from the trust in the sense that in a trust the trustee is the 
owner of the trust assets. In a bewind the beneficiary is protected in the case of the 
insolvency of the bewindvoerder, as the assets do not form part of the latter’s estate.467 
In a fiducia cum amico the assets are transferred to a manager, who becomes the owner of 
the assets. The manager has the duty to manage and dispose of the assets for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries only have personal rights against the manager and are 
therefore exposed in the case of the managers’ insolvency.468 A nominee account469 is a 
special application of the fiducia cum amico and is explained as follows: 
“If A transfers money to B’s bank account, designated to be held by B for A’s benefit, 
such money will not be regarded as owned by B upon B’s insolvency but is available 
only for A and not for B’s creditors.”470 
Neither of these devices are proper trusts and they are often described as trust-like 
institutions.471 
                                                          
462 Sonneveldt in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions? 14, quoting Bolgár 
(1953) 2 American Journal of Camparative Law 208 210. 
463 Civil Code art 84 s 3 of Book 3; Van Erp (2011) 15 Edin LR 479 479. 
464 Others include the stichting, the mandate, the mutual fund and the security trustee (Kortmann and 
Verhagen in Principles of European Trust Law 202). 
465 Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law 143; Kortmann and Verhagen in Principles of European Trust Law 200. 
466 De Waal in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1092. 
467 Kortmann and Verhagen in Principles of European Trust Law 199. 
468 Kortmann and Verhagen in Principles of European Trust Law 197. 
469 Kortmann and Verhagen in Principles of European Trust Law 198. Certification is described by the same 
authors as another specific application of the fiducia cum amico. 
470 Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law 142. 
471 De Waal in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1091.  
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2.5.2 The Hague Convention on Trusts 
The Netherlands acceded to The Hague Convention on Trusts and at the same time enacted 
legislation, known as the “Wet Conflictenrecht Trust”,472 which came into force on 1 
February 1996. 
Article 11 of The Hague Convention on Trusts provides: 
“A trust created in accordance with the law specified by the preceding Chapter shall be 
recognised as a trust. 
Such recognition shall imply, as a minimum, that the trust property constitutes a 
separate fund, that the trustee may sue and be sued in his capacity as trustee, and that 
he may appear or act in this capacity before a notary or any person acting in an official 
capacity. 
In so far as the law applicable to the trust requires or provides, such recognition shall 
imply, in particular – 
a) that personal creditors of the trustee shall have no recourse against the trust assets; 
b) that the trust assets shall not form part of the trustee's estate upon his insolvency 
or bankruptcy; 
c) that the trust assets shall not form part of the matrimonial property of the trustee or 
his spouse nor part of the trustee's estate upon his death; 
d) that the trust assets may be recovered when the trustee, in breach of trust, has 
mingled trust assets with his own property or has alienated trust assets. However, the 
rights and obligations of any third party holder of the assets shall remain subject to the 
law determined by the choice of law rules of the forum.” 
In terms of article 15 of The Hague Convention on Trusts the mandatory rules of the national 
law (that is, Dutch law in this case) regarding, inter alia, the transfer of title to property and 
security interests in property and the protection of creditors in matters of insolvency, will 
still apply despite the Convention. In terms of Dutch law all the assets of a debtor is available 
to his or her creditors. Hence, trust assets owned by a trustee would be available to his or 
her personal creditors in terms of Dutch law and, therefore, the trust property would not be 
recognised as a separate fund. In order to avoid this problem, the Wet Conflictenrecht 
Trust473 provides that the rules of Dutch law regarding the transfer of property, security 
interests or protection of creditors upon insolvency do not prevent recognition of the trust 
in terms of article 11 of The Hague Convention on Trusts. Furthermore, the Wet 
Conflictenrecht Trust also prevents Dutch law474 from precluding the transfer of assets to a 
separate trust fund.475 Thus a Dutch person may be a trustee of a trust created in terms of 
foreign law, in respect of property situated both in and outside of the Netherlands. The 
                                                          
472 Wet Conflictenrecht Trust Dutch Staatsblad 1995, 505 and 1996, 18. 
473 Wet Conflictenrecht Trust Dutch Staatsblad 1995, 505 and 1996, 18 art 4. 
474 Civil Code art 84(3) of Book 3. 
475 Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law 144; Hayton in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 58; Hayton (1997) 
128 WPNR 542 543; Verhagen in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 89. 
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property may be transferred to him or her and will constitute a separate fund from his or her 
personal patrimony.476 
There are numerous issues regarding the recognition of trusts which have not yet been 
settled yet in terms of Dutch law. Examples of these are: whether in respect of property 
situated in the Netherlands, the trust must be entered in (public) registers;477 how creditors 
dealing with trustees must be treated in the light of article 11 of The Hague Convention on 
Trusts;478 and what happens to trust assets when a trustee dies.479 Most writers agree that 
these issues would be best addressed by way of legislation.480 
2.6 OECD MTC 
The OECD MTC and its Commentary make no mention of trusts.481 
Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC provides: 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any 
term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the 
meaning that it has at the time under the laws of that State for the purposes of the 
taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of 
that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that state.” 
Since the term “trust” is not defined in the OECD MTC, countries may be tempted, in 
interpreting article 3(2), to apply their domestic law definition of what a trust is. However, 
the domestic law meaning of a term can only be applied by virtue of article 3(2) if the term is 
used somewhere in the treaty.482 Since the term trust is not used anywhere in the OECD 
MTC, article 3(2) cannot be applied. Whether and how the OECD MTC is to be applied to 
trusts will be discussed in the further chapters of this research. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The history of each of the jurisdictions discussed above is unique, as may be expected. No 
doubt the English trust preceded the trusts in all the other jurisdictions and in a sense all of 
these jurisdictions were influenced by English trust law. However, the extent of the influence 
differs greatly: in Canada the influence of English trust law is the greatest, since the largest 
                                                          
476Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law 145; Hayton in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 58. 
477 Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law 146. 
478 Hayton in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 62. 
479 Hayton in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 63. 
480 Hayton in Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements 64; Koppenol-Laforce and 
Kottenhagen in Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative Law 152; Hayton 
(1997) 128 WPNR 542 545. 
481 The only references to trusts in the OECD MTC and the Commentary are found in reservations by member 
countries. Eg, the United Kingdom mentions trusts in its reservation to art 21 (para 15 of the commentary to art 
21) and Australia and New Zealand refer to trusts in their reservation to art 7 (para 76 of the commentary to 
art 7).  
482 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para 3C.11; OECD Commentary on art 3(2), para 11. 
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part of Canada adopted English law as its own and by the time of such adoption, the trust 
had been a well-developed entity. An exception to this is the province of Québec. Although 
the English trust was used very early in Québec, legislation was soon introduced to govern 
the law of trusts in this province where the law of property is based on civilian principles. 
Thus Québec trust law is governed by statute and has developed separately from trust law in 
the rest of Canada. South Africa, similarly, initially adopted the English law trust, but the 
courts subsequently developed its own trust law, creating a unique South African entity. 
Legislation played virtually no role in this development. Although there are many similarities 
between South African and Scottish trust law, their histories could not be more different. 
Although the origin of Scottish trust law is anything but certain, it is clear that the English 
trust did not form the basis of the Scottish trust. However, English trust law did influence the 
already existing Scottish trust during a later phase. The Netherlands does not have a proper 
trust as part of its law, but as a signatory to The Hague Convention on Trusts is obliged to 
recognise trusts formed in terms of the laws of other jurisdictions. 
Unsurprisingly, jurisdictions differ in the way in which they define a trust. Some countries, 
like South Africa, have a statutory definition, although this definition is not exhaustive. The 
Civil Code of Quebéc does not contain an actual definition of a trust, but more a description 
of a trust. In England, Scotland and the rest of Canada, The Hague Convention on Trusts is 
applicable and therefore the definition in that Convention is a common denominator, but in 
each of those jurisdictions no other statutory definition, which could serve as a 
comprehensive definition, was found. In these jurisdictions a description of the trust’s main 
features, rather than a definition, seems to be preferred. It is submitted that the only 
definition which could be relevant for the Netherlands is the one contained in The Hague 
Convention on Trusts. South Africa is the only jurisdiction which specifically defines a trust 
for income tax purposes. In other jurisdictions the term remains undefined in the relevant 
income tax legislation, which leads to the conclusion that trust law must be applied to 
determine whether an entity is a trust for income tax purposes. 
Regarding the ownership of trust assets, it is axiomatic that in all the jurisdictions discussed 
above (except Québec) the trustees are the owners of the trust assets. In England and the 
rest of Canada the concept of dual ownership exists and trustees have the “legal ownership” 
over the trust property. Beneficiaries in fixed trusts have “equitable ownership” or 
“beneficial ownership”. Describing the interests of beneficiaries in a discretionary trust as 
proprietary is more problematic. Authors therefore suggest that discretionary beneficiaries’ 
interest be described as a proprietary interest in the wider sense or “quasi-property 
interest”. In South Africa and Scotland, the concept of dual ownership does not form part of 
the law. Beneficiaries in both these jurisdictions therefore have only personal rights against 
the trustees and no form of ownership. In Québec, the concept of dual ownership is also 
foreign. The relevant legislation provides that the property transferred in trust constitutes a 
patrimony by appropriation, distinct from the settlor, the beneficiary or the trustee. 
Opinions seem to differ on whether the trust assets are owned by the trust itself or by no-
one, but the legislation is explicit that the trustees and the beneficiaries have no ownership 
rights in the trust assets. 
In South Africa, England, Scotland and the rest of Canada, the trust assets form a separate 
estate (also called a fund or a patrimony) in the hands of the trustees and are immune to the 
trustees’ personal creditors. Trustees are also under a duty to keep trust assets separate 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
from their own assets. In Québec the beneficiaries’ claims are settled from the trust 
patrimony and not from the trustees’ personal patrimonies. 
In none of the above jurisdictions is the trust regarded as a juristic person. In South Africa, 
Scotland and Québec it is, however, acknowledged that the trust is treated as a juristic 
person under certain circumstances. For South African income tax and Canadian federal 
income tax purposes, the trust is regarded as a taxable entity. In the United Kingdom, the 
trustees are regarded as a single person for income tax purposes, distinct from the persons 
who are the trustees from time to time. 
In all of the jurisdictions referred to above trusteeship is regarded as an office. Although this 
element is more pertinent in terms of South African law, the courts in all the other 
jurisdictions exert control over trusts in some way or another, reflecting the concept of 
trusteeship as an office.483 In all of the jurisdictions, the trustees owe certain fiduciary duties 
to the beneficiaries. 
In none of the jurisdictions is a trust equated to agency and it is specifically stated in the law 
of South Africa, England, Scotland and the rest of Canada that a trustee is not an agent of 
either the settlor or the beneficiary. The Civil Code of Québec is silent on whether the 
trustees are the agents of the beneficiaries or the settlor, but if the nature of the trust (being 
an autonomous patrimony in which the settlor, beneficiary or trustee has no real right) is 
considered, it is submitted that the trustee cannot be the agent for either the settlor or the 
beneficiary. 
Both inter vivos and testamentary trusts are found in all of the above jurisdictions. Similarly, 
all of the jurisdictions distinguish between vesting (or fixed) trusts and discretionary trusts. 
The exception is Québec where the Civil Code is silent on this issue. Business trusts are found 
in all of the jurisdictions, barring Scotland, where trusts are not usually used for business 
purposes. 
Regarding the requirements for a valid trust, all jurisdictions determine that inter vivos trusts 
may be created orally or in writing and that no specific technical words are required in order 
to create such a trust. Registration is also not a requirement for a valid inter vivos trust. 
However, in England, Scotland and some of the Canadian provinces, a trust for certain types 
of property, for example, land, must be in writing. In Québec, if a trust is constituted by way 
of a gift, the formal requirements for the gift must be met and in the case of a business trust, 
where an onerous contract is involved, the rules applicable to contracts must be met. In the 
case of a testamentary trust, all countries require a valid will as a precondition for the 
formation of a valid trust. 
In England, Scotland, the rest of Canada and Québec, two elements must usually be present 
in order to create a valid trust, namely, there must be a declaration of trust and the trust 
assets must be transferred to the trustees. In Québec an additional requirement is that the 
trustee must accept the trust property. In South Africa, this two-step process is not required. 
Once the requirements for a valid trust have all been met, the trust will be formed. One of 
these requirements is unique to South Africa, namely that the settlor’s intention must be 
expressed in a mode appropriate to create an obligation. In other words, as long as there is, 
                                                          
483 De Waal (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 81; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 566. 
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for example, a lawful obligation on the settlor to transfer the assets (even though actual 
transfer has not taken place), the trust will be validly created. 
In England and the rest of Canada it is possible for a settlor to declare himself or herself 
trustee of his or her property and in such a case there is no need to transfer property. In 
Scotland, it is possible for a settlor to be the sole trustee of a trust, but the exact 
requirements for this type of trust are uncertain. In Québec, it seems impossible for a settlor 
to declare himself or herself as trustee of his or her patrimony.484 Similarly, in South Africa, it 
is impossible to declare oneself a trustee of one’s own property.485 
In South Africa, England and the rest of Canada, one of the express requirements for a valid 
trust is that the settlor must have an intention to create a trust. Although none of the text 
books spell out this requirement for Scotland, it is submitted that the intention to create a 
trust is a requirement, as the settlor must declare a trust. Surely a settlor cannot declare a 
trust if he does not have the required intention. In Québec, leaving aside trusts created by 
statute or judicial order, a trust may be created by will or by a contract. Both of the latter 
ways of creating a trust involve the expression of an intention and it has been held that a 
settlor who retains significant control over the trust assets does not have the intention to 
create a valid trust. Hence it can be deduced that the intention to create a valid trust is also 
a requirement in Québec. 
Three requirements are common to South Africa, England, Scotland and the rest of Canada, 
namely certainty of trust property, certainty of the trust object and that the trust object 
must be lawful. The Civil Code of Québec is silent on these requirements. 
The law of England, Scotland and the rest of Canada contain rules against perpetuity and 
accumulation. In Québec the rule limiting the duration of the trust only applies to personal 
trusts.486 No such rules are to be found in South Africa. 
The beneficiary principle, meaning that the trust must be for the benefit of a person, not a 
purpose (unless charitable), is applicable only in England and the rest of Canada. In South 
Africa, Scotland and Québec it is possible to create a trust for a purpose which is not 
charitable. 
Administrative workability is a further requirement in England. The other jurisdictions under 
discussion do not have a similar requirement. 
In all of the relevant jurisdictions, the administration of the trust is in the hands of the 
trustees. Two aspects of trust administration must be distinguished, namely the requirement 
of joint action and that of delegation. 
Regarding the first element, trustees in South Africa must, in principle, act jointly, although 
the trust deed may allow decisions to be made otherwise, for example by majority decision. 
In England, trustees must act jointly, unless otherwise authorised by the trust instrument. In 
Scotland the trust deed may lay down rules for the conduct of the trust’s affairs, but in the 
                                                          
484 Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 28.III 3; Cantin Cumyn in Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems 76. 
485 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 144. 
486 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 arts 1271 to 1273. 
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absence of such rules, the trustees may make decisions by majority vote. This rule is subject 
to the qualification that all trustees must be consulted. However, a failure to consult any 
trustee will not result in a deed entered into by the trustees with a third party, who dealt 
onerously and in good faith, being void. Third parties are thus protected. In Canada, trustees 
must act jointly, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise. In Québec decisions may be 
taken by majority vote, unless trustees are required by law to act jointly. Under certain 
circumstances fewer than the majority may also act. 
Therefore, in South Africa, England and the rest of Canada, trustees must in principle act 
jointly, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise. In Scotland and Québec a majority is 
sufficient to take a decision. 
Regarding the second element, namely delegation, South African trustees may delegate their 
administrative functions to others, but remain responsible to supervise the actions of the 
person to whom they have delegated. Fundamental decisions must be taken by the trustees, 
though. Although a grey area may arise regarding the distinction between administrative 
functions and fundamental decisions, the principle is clear enough. In England, every trustee 
must act personally, although the trustees may (collectively) delegate some of their 
functions, as specified in the relevant legislation, to an agent. The trustees’ ability to 
delegate their functions may be curtailed in the trust deed. Trustees also have duties of 
supervision in relation to an agent. In terms of legislation (or if allowed in terms of the trust 
deed), an individual trustee may also delegate the execution or exercise of his or her powers 
or discretions. In Scotland trustees may, in terms of legislation, appoint law agents and 
factors unless prohibited by the trust deed. In terms of Canadian law, trustees may delegate 
their functions under certain circumstances. The test laid down by Waters regarding the 
circumstances under which delegation may take place (namely that policy decisions must be 
made by trustees themselves) corresponds closely to the position in South Africa (where 
fundamental decisions must be taken by the trustees). Similarly, in both countries trustees 
may never delegate all of their functions, as it would amount to an abdication of 
responsibility. Legislation in some Canadian provinces allows the trustees to employ certain 
agents. In Québec a trustee may delegate his or her duties or be represented by a third 
person for specific acts, but may not delegate generally the conduct of the administration or 
the exercise of a discretionary power, except to his or her co-trustees. 
Therefore, in South Africa, England and the rest of Canada the trustees may delegate some 
of their lesser functions, but not the more important ones. In Québec delegation of general 
administration or exercise of a discretionary power may take place, but only to co-trustees. 
In Scotland an agent may be appointed, either in terms of statute or common law, if a 
person of reasonable prudence dealing with his or her own affairs would consider such 
employment appropriate. 
To conclude, there are remarkable similarities in the laws of the jurisdictions referred to 
above, especially regarding the lack of juristic personality, some of the requirements for the 
formation of the trust and some aspects of the administration of trusts. Considering the 
history of each jurisdiction and the separate paths of development in each jurisdiction, these 
similarities are somewhat surprising, but nevertheless significant. Other aspects, such as the 
nature of beneficiaries’ interests, differ greatly and can be traced back to the specific 
property law regime applicable in each jurisdiction. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the taxation of trusts in each of the 
states under consideration. Such an overview will provide a vital backdrop for the discussion 
of the application of the provisions of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) to trusts in later chapters. More 
specifically, the way in which each state chooses to tax a trust (or trustee) and the other 
parties involved in the trust relationship, influences the manner in which the OECD MTC is 
applied in respect of the trust, the trustee or the other parties. For example, treating a trust 
as a taxable entity in terms of domestic tax law, will impact significantly on whether the trust 
should be regarded as a person or a resident for purposes of the OECD MTC. Furthermore, it 
is trite that each state levies taxes in accordance with its own law. Therefore, as an exercise 
of its sovereign power, each state decides how, when and to what extent it will tax the 
parties involved in a trust relationship. Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) are then applied to 
limit the application of the contracting states’ own laws, in order to avoid double taxation.487 
Thus, an investigation of each state’s tax laws is required to establish the way in and extent 
to which that particular state taxes trusts. The treaty will then determine whether those 
laws are to be limited. Vogel explains this point as follows: “[T]he treaty acts like a stencil 
that is placed over the pattern of domestic law and covers over certain parts. Whether the 
stencil or the pattern is examined first, the same conclusion results …”488 
According to Wheeler, many common law states (which include the United Kingdom and 
Canada) follow the same broad policy aim in the taxation of trusts, namely that income 
passing through the trust is taxed only once. She adds, however, that the mechanisms used 
to achieve this aim differ significantly.489 It may be deduced from the systems used by South 
Africa and the Netherlands respectively that these states subscribe to the same policy aim. 
However, as will become apparent from the discussion in this chapter, each of the states 
discussed in this dissertation uses a different mechanism to achieve this aim. 
There is more than one way to classify the systems used by various states. One classification 
focuses on the mechanism used, while the other focuses on the person that is to be taxed. 
Under the first classification, three systems are identified, namely (a) the initial choice 
system; (b) the credit system; and (c) the deduction system. 
In the initial choice system a choice, whether to tax the beneficiary or the trust, is made as 
trust income arises. Thus, generally speaking, if a beneficiary is entitled to the trust income, 
or it is distributed to the beneficiary within the tax year, it is taxed in the hands of the 
beneficiary. If, however, no beneficiary is entitled to the income, the trust will be liable to 
tax on the income (a typical example being retained income). When the income is eventually 
distributed to the beneficiary, no tax is imposed on either the trust or the beneficiary. 
                                                          
487 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 20 and 26. 
488 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 31. There is a debate over whether domestic tax law 
or the treaty should be applied first. However, a discussion of this debate falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
489 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 345. 
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Australia and New Zealand are examples of states that mainly use this system.490 As will 
become clear from the discussion in this chapter, South Africa also uses mainly the initial 
choice system. 
In the credit system both the trustee and the beneficiaries are taxed: the trustee on the trust 
income and the beneficiaries on the distribution. However, the beneficiaries are granted a 
credit for the tax paid by the trustee. This is the general system followed in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, although there are notable exceptions. In the deduction system both 
the trust and beneficiaries are again taxed, but this time the trust is allowed a deduction for 
the distribution made to the beneficiary. Generally, Canada and the United States of 
America follow the deduction system.491 
A different way of classifying systems of taxing trusts would be to focus on the person being 
taxed. Thus, (i) some states tax trusts based on the residency of the settlor; (ii) some states 
tax trusts based on the residency of the trustee; and (iii) some states focus on taxing the 
beneficiaries. 
The policy behind taxing trusts based on the residency of the settlor (item (i)) is that there is 
a perception that the settlor, having transferred the biggest part of the trust assets to the 
trust, will have substantial control over the assets and, furthermore, that the state in which 
the settlor resides should have the economic basis for taxing the trust, where the trust is 
established in a low-tax state. Under this system, the trust income is either attributed to the 
settlor personally, or the trustee is held liable for the tax on the trust income, based on the 
settlor’s residence. New Zeeland is identified as a state that uses this system.492 The United 
States of America’s “grantor trust” regime is also regarded as a system where taxation is 
based on the residence of the settlor.493 From the discussion below, it will become apparent 
that the Netherlands follows this system as well. 
In the case of states which tax trusts based on the residence of the trustee (or trust) (item 
(ii)) the focus is placed on the person(s) who is legally the owner(s) of the trust property. The 
United Kingdom is regarded as an example of such a state494 and Canada and South Africa 
may be added to this list. Some states tax trusts based on the fact that the beneficiaries are 
resident in that state (item (iii)). Under this system beneficiaries may be taxed either when 
they receive the trust income, or the income may be imputed to them, regardless of 
whether it was distributed to them or not. 
                                                          
490 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 347; Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 37; Koele in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law 
Jurisdictions 85–87. 
491 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 347–349; Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 37; Koele in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil 
Law Jurisdictions 85–87. 
492 Hart in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 55. 
493 Hart in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 60. Hart describes a grantor trust as one in which the settlor 
retains certain rights, benefits and powers and where, on a federal level, the settlor is taxed as if he or she still 
owns the trust assets. 
494 Hart in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 62. 
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Interestingly, authors concede that many states adopt a combination of these systems.495 
For example, in South Africa some anti-avoidance provisions will ensure that certain income 
is taxed in the hands of the settlor (item (i)). The trust is regarded as a person and taxed in 
South Africa if it is resident there on all undistributed income (item (ii)) and the beneficiaries 
of a trust are taxed if they have a vested right to the income (item (iii)). As stated above, 
South Africa may also be classified as following an initial choice system (item (a)). 
The way in which each of the states under discussion in this dissertation taxes trusts is 
addressed in the remainder of this chapter. 
3.2 South Africa 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The Income Tax Act496 defines the term “trust” as: 
“any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered and 
controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed 
under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a deceased person.”497 
Once an entity is brought within the ambit of this definition, it will be regarded as a person 
for purposes of the Income Tax Act498 and will, consequently, be liable to tax in terms of that 
Act.499 Thus, it is the trust itself that is (potentially) a taxpayer, with the trustee(s) being the 
representative taxpayer of the trust.500 Like all other taxpayers, trusts that are resident in 
South Africa are taxed, generally speaking, on their worldwide receipts and accruals, while 
trusts that are non-residents are taxed, generally speaking, only on income from South 
African sources.501 Trusts (other than “special trusts”502 and trusts that fall under a specific 
                                                          
495 Cadesky in Trusts and International Tax Treaties 9; Thuronyi and Easson in Tax Law Design and Drafting 27. 
Hart mentions the example of Australia that uses all three systems (items (i) to (iii)) (Hart in Trusts and 
International Tax Treaties 66). Other examples may also be given: The United Kingdom, classified above under 
items (b) and (ii), also taxes the beneficiary directly if the beneficiary is entitled to the income as it arises and it 
is paid directly to the beneficiary (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 347), placing it firmly within items 
(a) and (iii) respectively. In the United Kingdom and Canada, certain anti-avoidance provisions also attribute the 
trust income to the settlor under certain circumstances, which would result in these states falling under item (i) 
as well. 
496 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
497 For a discussion of this definition see ch 2.2.3. 
498 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “person”. The term trust was defined and a “trust” was included 
in the definition of “person” directly as a result of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others 
NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A). In that case the court held that a trust was not a person and could therefore not be 
liable to tax and, consequently, the trustee could not act (and be taxed) as the representative taxpayer of the 
trust. See further ch 5.2.2 and 5.4. 
499 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 5(1)(c). 
500 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1, definition of “taxpayer” and “representative taxpayer”, read with Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 1 definition of “representative taxpayer”. For a discussion of the trust as a 
taxpayer and the role of the trustee as representative taxpayer, see ch 6.2.2.2. 
501 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “gross income”. How the residence of a trust is determined for 
South African income tax purposes is discussed in ch 6.3.1. 
502 It is reiterated here that “special trusts” fall outside the scope of this dissertation. A special trust is defined 
in Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
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tax regime503) are taxed at a flat rate of 40%. Similarly, beneficiaries that are resident in 
South Africa will be taxed on their worldwide receipts and accruals, whilst non-resident 
beneficiaries will be liable to tax only on their receipts and accruals from a South African 
source.504 Thus, a South African resident beneficiary may, for example, be liable to tax on 
amounts distributed to it from a non-resident trust. Furthermore, a South African resident 
beneficiary may also be liable to tax on the distribution of a dividend from foreign shares 
owned by a South African resident trust. 
There are at least three persons who could potentially be liable for income derived by the 
trust, namely (a) the trust itself; (b) the beneficiaries; or (c) the person to whom income is 
deemed to have accrued.505 These possibilities are discussed below with reference to the 
applicable legislation. 
3.2.2 The taxation of trusts and beneficiaries 
Section 25B provides, inter alia, that: 
“Any amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during any year of 
assessment in his or her capacity as the trustee of a trust, shall, subject to the 
provisions of section 7, to the extent to which that amount has been derived for the 
immediate or future benefit of any ascertained beneficiary who has a vested right to 
that amount during that year, be deemed to be an amount which has accrued to that 
beneficiary, and to the extent to which that amount is not so derived, be deemed to be 
an amount which has accrued to that trust.”506 
The effect of this provision is that: 
(a) An amount that is received by or accrues to a trust, is deemed to have accrued to a 
beneficiary,507 if that beneficiary is ascertained, has a vested right to the income and 
the amount has been derived for the benefit of that beneficiary. In such a case, the 
beneficiary is liable to tax on the relevant amount and the trust is not taxed on that 
amount at all. 
(b) An amount that is received by or accrues to a trust is taxed in the hands of the trust if 
there is no ascertained beneficiary, for whose benefit the amount was derived, with a 
vested right to that income. In such a case, only the trust will be taxed and not the 
beneficiary. 
                                                          
503 Eg, the regime for “personal service providers” or collective investment vehicles. As stated earlier, these 
special regimes fall outside the scope of this dissertation. 
504 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “gross income”. See ch 3.2.3 regarding the source of a non-
resident beneficiary’s income. 
505 A fourth possibility exists, namely that the trustee (as representative taxpayer) may be held personally liable 
for taxes due by the trust. However, this possibility will only arise if the taxes are in arrears and the trustee 
takes certain further actions (Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 155). For a discussion of this and other 
provisions regarding the liability of trustee, see ch 6.2.2.2. 
506 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(1). 
507 The Income Tax Act defines a beneficiary as “a person who has a vested or contingent interest in all or a 
portion of the receipts or accruals or the assets of that trust” (Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of 
“beneficiary”). Clearly, both vested and discretionary beneficiaries are covered by the definition. Furthermore, 
it is irrelevant whether the person is a South African resident or not. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
In the case of a discretionary trust, the exercise by the trustee of his or her discretion in 
favour of the beneficiary will result in the beneficiary acquiring a vested right to an amount 
received by or accrued to a trustee during that year of assessment.508 Therefore, if the 
trustee of a discretionary trust exercises his or her discretion in favour of a beneficiary 
during a particular year of assessment, the beneficiary will be regarded as having a vested 
right to the relevant income and will, consequently, be taxed on that income. The trust will, 
therefore, not be liable to tax in respect of the income distributed to such a beneficiary. 
It should further be noted that it is the vesting of the amount in the hands of the beneficiary 
that results in its accrual to the beneficiary.509 An amount is vested in a beneficiary because 
of the terms of the trust deed (in the case of a vesting trust), or because of the exercise by 
the trustee of his or her discretion (in the case of a discretionary trust), typically by taking a 
resolution to distribute an amount to a specific beneficiary. Often, the exercise of the 
discretion (that is, vesting) will take place at the same time as (or just before) payment to 
the beneficiary. Payment of the amount to the beneficiary may, however, be delayed and in 
these circumstances the beneficiary will be regarded as having a vested right to the amount, 
even though it has not been paid to him or her.510 
The section further regulates who may claim the allowable deductions associated with the 
relevant trust income. Its effect is that deductions are allocated between the trust and the 
beneficiaries in the same proportion as the income that has been allocated in terms of the 
section.511 Thus, to the extent to which the income is deemed to have accrued to a 
beneficiary, the beneficiary must claim the deduction and to the extent to which the income 
is deemed to have accrued to the trust, the trust must claim the deduction.512 However, the 
deduction that a beneficiary is allowed to claim is limited to the amount deemed to have 
accrued to the beneficiary from that trust during the year of assessment.513 Any excess may 
be deducted by the trust, but, again, the deduction is limited to the taxable income of the 
trust in that year of assessment.514 Any excess to this deduction is deemed to be a deduction 
that the beneficiary may claim during the immediately succeeding year of assessment 
against an amount accrued to him or her from the trust.515 
Importantly, though, the provisions of section 25B are made subject to section 7. The 
provisions of section 7 are discussed below, but its effect on the application of section 25 is 
crucial. This is summed up by De Koker and Williams as follows: 
                                                          
508 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(2). For a discussion regarding the meaning of “vested right” and 
“discretionary right” see ch 2.2.4. 
509 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.14C. 
510 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.14C; Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.2; 
Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 25B(1). See also ch 2.2.4. 
511 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.14C. 
512 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(3). 
513 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(4). 
514 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(5)(a). However, in the case of a trust not subject to tax in South Africa, the 
excess must be carried forward and will be deemed to be a deduction which may be made by that beneficiary 
during the immediately succeeding year of assessment (Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(5)(b)). 
515 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(6). However, none of the provisions regarding the excess (that is, s 25B(4) 
to (6)) is applicable if the beneficiary is not subject to tax in South Africa on the amount accrued to him or her 
from the trust (Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(7)). 
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“The result is that income deemed to have been derived by someone, for example,a 
spouse or parent, under s 7 will remain where it has been made to lie and cannot be 
deemed to have been derived by a trust or its beneficiaries under s 25B. Section 25B 
therefore comes into operation only to the extent that s 7 does not already apply.”516 
In an international context, a further provision of section 25B should be borne in mind. It 
deals with distributions from non-resident trusts and aims to combat the accumulation of 
income in a trust (which is not from a South African source and therefore not taxed in South 
Africa) and the subsequent distribution thereof as capital, thus avoiding the payment of 
income tax in South Africa.517 It provides that if any resident acquires any vested right in the 
year of assessment to any amount representing capital of any non-resident trust, that 
amount must be included in the income of that resident in that year, if (a) that capital arose 
from any receipts and accruals of such trust which would have constituted income if such 
trust had been a resident, in any previous year of assessment during which that resident had 
a contingent right to that amount; and (b) that amount has not been subject to tax in South 
Africa in terms of the Income Tax Act.518 
De Koker and Williams explain the section by way of the following example: 
“It follows that if a resident beneficiary had a contingent right to the income of a non-
resident discretionary trust for, say, ten years during which income is accumulated in 
the trust, and he acquires a vested right to that income in a subsequent year, he will be 
liable to tax on the accumulated income accruing in that subsequent year.”519 
The section will not apply if: 
(a) The beneficiary did not have a contingent right when the income accrued to the 
trust.520 For example, if income accrued to the trust in year one, but a certain 
beneficiary only became a beneficiary in year three and the capital is distributed in 
year four, the section cannot be applied to that beneficiary.521 
                                                          
516 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.14C. Davis et al are of the view that the 
provisions of s 25B(2) (which deal with the exercise by the trustee of his or her discretion), have not been made 
subject to s 7 (Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 25B(2)). However, this argument 
cannot be accepted as the word “amount” in s 25B(2) clearly refers back to the word “amount” in s 25B(1) and 
it is clear that the accrual of that amount is subject to s 7. 
517 Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 201; Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.3.1. See also the discussion of this 
section in Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 343–350. S 
25B(2A) could possibly apply to attribute the income to the settlor, in circumstances in which the settlor is also 
a beneficiary, provided that none of the provisions of s 7 apply. Under these circumstances, the provisions of 
s25B(2A) should also be considered for purposes of para 3.2.4. 
518 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25(2A). 
519 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.15C. 
520 Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 202; Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.3.1. 
521 See Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 25B(2A) for further practical difficulties 
caused by the words “contingent right”. 
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(b) The beneficiary is not a resident at the time that he or she acquires a vested right to 
the capital, even if he or she was a resident while he or she had a contingent right to 
the income.522 
(c) The “genuine” capital of the trust is being distributed,523 that is, capital that did not 
arise as a consequence of a capitalisation of income.524 
(d) The income has already been subject to tax in South Africa.525 
(e) The receipts and accruals of the trust did not constituted “income”.526 
3.2.3 Income retains its nature 
A common law principle that is still relevant, even if section 25B is applied, is the “conduit 
pipe” principle. In terms of this principle, income accruing to a trust retains its nature until it 
reaches the beneficiaries in whose hands it will be taxed. The trust is therefore a mere 
“conduit pipe” through which income flows.527 In the case of Rosen, the court made the 
following statement: 
“It suffices to say that the trust deed may itself entitle or oblige the trustee to 
administer the dividends in such a way that he is not a mere conduit-pipe for passing 
them on to the beneficiary, that in his hands their source as dividends can no longer be 
identified or they otherwise lose their character and identity as dividends, and that the 
beneficiary is thus entitled to receive mere trust income in contradistinction to the 
benefit of the dividend rights in terms of the above crucial phrase. Thus, a trust deed 
may endow the trustee with a discretion to pass on dividends to the beneficiary or to 
retain and accumulate them. If he decides on the latter, I think (but express no firm 
view) that the dividends might then lose their identity and character as dividends, so 
that, if they are subsequently paid out to the beneficiary, they might possibly no longer 
be dividends in his hands, for the conduit-pipe had turned itself off at the relevant 
time. But if he decides on the former, i.e. to pass the dividends on to the beneficiary, 
the condition suspending the beneficiary’s entitlement thereto is fulfilled, and they 
would constitute dividends in his hands in the same way as if he had been originally 
                                                          
522 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.15C. 
523 Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 202; Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.3.1. Jooste provides further practical 
guidance to ensure that this section is not applied to “genuine” capital. He also provides a possible way in 
which the application of the section can be avoided altogether (Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 204). 
524 Davis et al point out the difficulties in applying the “arose from” criteria, stating that the interpretation of 
the phrase is likely to be very difficult in practice (Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on 
s 25B(2A)). 
525 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(2A)(b). Academic authors cite the example of income being subject to tax 
in terms of s 7(5) or s 7(8) (Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 201–202; De Koker and Williams Silke on South 
African Income Tax para 12.15C; Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.3.1). To this may be added the example of 
income that is from a South African source and therefore subject to tax in South Africa (Jooste (2002) Acta 
Juridica 186 201, Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.3.1), but see De Koker and Williams Silke on South African 
Income Tax par 12.15C for a contrary view. 
526 “Income” is defined in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and excludes exempt income. Thus, eg, exempt 
dividends will not constitute “income”. 
527 Armstrong v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1938 AD 343; 10 SATC 1. See also De Koker and Williams Silke 
on South African Income Tax para 12.16 and Davis et al Estate Planning para 6.2. 
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entitled to them unconditionally under the trust deed, i.e. as if the conduit pipe had 
always been open.”528 
Therefore, in the case of a vesting trust, the beneficiary will be taxed on the income in terms 
of section 25B, but the income will retain its nature. In the case of a discretionary trust, 
where the trustee exercises his or her discretion in favour of a beneficiary and resolves to 
distribute income to a beneficiary, the income will be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary in 
terms of section 25B, but the income will retain its nature. If, however, the trustee of a 
discretionary trust decides not to distribute any income to beneficiaries, the income will be 
taxed in the hands of the trustee and, when distributed to the beneficiaries in a subsequent 
year of assessment, will not be subject to income tax in their hands and might lose its 
character.529 
A non-resident beneficiary will only be liable to tax on income from a South African source. 
Since income retains its nature when it is distributed to a beneficiary with a vested right,530 
the rules regarding the source of income will be applied to the specific item of income 
distributed to the beneficiary to determine where it is sourced. For example, legislation 
provides that a dividend paid by a resident company531 received by or accrued to a person is 
from a source within South Africa.532 If the beneficiary has a vested right to the dividend, it is 
deemed to have accrued to the beneficiary.533 It retains its nature as dividend and will, 
consequently, be from a South African source if paid by a resident company to a non-
resident beneficiary. It is submitted that the interposition of the trust between the company 
and the beneficiary with a vested right is irrelevant for purposes of determining the source 
of the dividend. For some items of income no statutory source rule exists and the common 
law rules will apply to determine their source.534 These items of income will therefore also 
retain their nature until they reach the vested beneficiary’s hands and it is submitted that 
the usual common law source rules will have to be applied to determine the source of such 
income. Once again, the intervention of the trust between the payer of the income and the 
beneficiary will be irrelevant. However, in the case of a discretionary trust where the income 
is retained in the trust,535 the court in Rosen stated (obiter) that income loses its identity and 
character, so that, if it is subsequently paid out to the beneficiary, it may no longer be what 
it used to be, because the “conduit pipe” had turned itself off. The income may lose its 
character and identity and, thus, the beneficiary may receive only “trust income”.536 
Therefore, in the case of the beneficiary who receives a distribution from the trust in a 
                                                          
528 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A) 190–191. 
529 For a further discussion of the conduit pipe principle, see ch 8.6.3. 
530 The beneficiary may have a vested right, either because of the terms of a vesting trust, or because the 
trustee of a discretionary trust exercised his or her discretion in favour of that beneficiary. In Rosen the court 
stated that “Armstrong’s case in my view authoritatively established the conduit principle for general 
application in our system of taxation in appropriate circumstances” (Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 
1 SA 172 (A) 188). 
531 The term dividend is defined and refers only to an amount transferred or applied by a resident company 
(Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1). 
532 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 9(2)(a). Legislation also provides source rules for, inter alia, royalties and 
interest. 
533 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(1) and (2). 
534 Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 9 “general note”. 
535 That is, the trustee decides not to distribute the income to the beneficiaries during that year. 
536 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A) 190. 
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subsequent year, the income will not retain its nature and the source of the amount paid to 
the beneficiary will be the trust itself.537 
Practically, the above argument would mean that if a trust owns shares in a South African 
resident company and a non-resident beneficiary has a vested right to the dividends derived 
from those shares,538 the beneficiary would have to include the amount of the dividend in 
his or her gross income.539 In this example, it would be irrelevant whether the trust was a 
South African resident or not. If, in the example above, the dividend was a foreign 
dividend,540 the statutory source rules would not apply and, based on case law, the source of 
the dividend would be located where the company’s share register is kept.541 Therefore, if 
the company’s share register was not kept in South Africa, the dividend would not be of a 
South African source. 
3.2.4 Income deemed to be that of another 
Section 7 is an anti-avoidance provision and some of its subsections542 apply to trusts if 
certain circumstances are present. The effect of the provision is that trust income is no 
longer taxed in the trust or in the hands of the beneficiary (as it would in terms of section 
25B), but in the hands of the person to whom the income is deemed to have accrued under 
section 7. The type of transaction which the legislature aims to catch by these provisions is 
described as follows in Ovenstone: 
“[T]hose in which a taxpayer seeks to achieve tax avoidance by donating, or disposing 
of income-producing property to or in favour of another under … specified conditions 
or circumstances, thereby diverting its income from himself without his replacing or 
being able to replace it.”543 
Section 7(2)(a) applies to married persons544 and it provides that 
                                                          
537 Since the payment of such an amount is not regarded as income that is subject to income tax (it may have 
capital gains tax consequences), a further discussion of how the place of the source is to be determined, falls 
outside the scope of this dissertation, although a logical inference seems to be that a distribution from a South 
African resident trust will be from a source within South Africa. 
538 Or the trustee exercised his or her discretion in favour of a beneficiary during the relevant year, which 
results in the beneficiary obtaining a vested right to the relevant dividend. 
539 The amount will be exempted from income tax by Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 10(1)(k)(i). Dividends tax is 
not addressed in this example. 
540 A foreign dividend is, generally, any amount that is paid or payable by a foreign company (that is, a non-
resident company) in respect of a share in that foreign company where that amount is treated as a dividend or 
similar payment by that foreign company for the purposes of the corporate income tax laws of the state where 
it has its place of effective management (Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “foreign dividend” read 
with the definition of “foreign company”). 
541 Boyd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1951 3 SA 525 (A); Lamb v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1955 1 
SA 270 (A). 
542 A detailed discussion of the provisions of the relevant subsections of s 7 falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. The aim of this paragraph is simply to give a broad overview of the circumstances under which 
these sections may apply to trusts. Furthermore, other anti-avoidance sections that may be applied to trusts, 
such as s 80A–80L, are not referred to in this dissertation. 
543 Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 2 SA 721 (A) 736. 
544 The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 contains a wide definition of the term “spouse”, namely “in relation to 
any person, means a person who is the partner of such person (a) in a marriage or customary union recognised 
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“Any income received by or accrued to any person married in or out of community of 
property (hereinafter referred to as the recipient) shall be deemed for the purposes of 
this Act to be income accrued to such person’s spouse (hereinafter referred to as the 
donor) if – 
(a) such income was derived by the recipient in consequence of a donation, 
settlement or other disposition made by the donor on or after 20 March 1991 or 
of a transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out by the donor 
on or after that date, and the sole or main purpose of such donation, settlement 
or other disposition or of such transaction, operation or scheme was the 
reduction, postponement or avoidance of the donor’s liability for any tax, levy or 
duty which, but for such donation, settlement, other disposition, transaction, 
operation or scheme, would have become payable by the donor under this Act or 
any other Act administered by the Commissioner”. 
Section 7(3) provides that income shall be deemed to have been received by the parent of 
any minor child or stepchild if, by reason of any donation, settlement or other disposition 
made by that parent of that child (a) it has been received by or has accrued to or in favour of 
that child or has been expended for the maintenance, education or benefit of that child; or 
(b) it has been accumulated for the benefit of that child. Thus, if, for example, a settlor is the 
parent of a minor child and he or she donates an asset to a trust of which the minor child is a 
vested (or discretionary) beneficiary, any income arising from that donation will be 
attributed to the settlor and taxed in his or her hands. 
Section 7(4) aims to curb the avoidance of section 7(3) by preventing parents from making 
donations to each other’s children. It provides that any income received by or accrued to or 
in favour of any minor child or stepchild of any person, by reason of any donation, 
settlement or other disposition made by any other person, shall be deemed to be the 
income of the parent of that child, if such parent or his or her spouse has made a donation, 
settlement or other disposition or given some other consideration in favour directly or 
indirectly of the said other person or his or her family. 
Section 7(5) provides that if any person has made any donation, settlement or other 
disposition which is subject to a stipulation or condition to the effect that the beneficiaries545 
shall not receive the income546 thereunder until the happening of some event (whether fixed 
or contingent), so much of any income as would, but for such stipulation or condition, in 
consequence of the donation, settlement or other disposition be received by or accrue to or 
in favour of the beneficiaries, shall, until the happening of that event or the death of that 
person, whichever first takes place, be deemed to be the income of that person. De Koker 
and Williams provides the following example of the application of this provision to trusts: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in terms of the laws of the Republic; (b) in a union recognised as a marriage in accordance with the tenets of 
any religion; or (c) in a same-sex or heterosexual union which the Commissioner is satisfied is intended to be 
permanent, and ’married’, ’husband’ or ’wife’ shall be construed accordingly: Provided that a marriage or union 
contemplated in paragraph (b) or (c) shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to be a marriage 
or union out of community of property”. 
545 Or some of them. 
546 Or some portion of the income. 
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“It is submitted that the Commissioner is entitled to invoke the provisions of s 7(5) 
should … a donor, A, donate assets to a trustee subject to the stipulation that the 
income be accumulated and not be paid to the beneficiary, B, until he reaches the age 
of 21. Under such circumstances, until B turns 21 or the death of A, whichever takes 
place first, each year’s income, although accumulated by the trustee, is deemed to be 
the income of A, the donor, who will be liable to tax on it. If the stipulation, that B is 
not to receive the income until he turns 21, were not there, B would be entitled to 
receive the income immediately. The Commissioner may therefore invoke s 7(5).”547 
The question whether the exercise by the trustee of his or her discretion is an “event”, as 
contemplated in the provision, has come before the courts, but has not been conclusively 
decided.548 The application of section 7(5) is not limited to resident donors, trusts or 
beneficiaries. Thus, a non-resident donor may be taxed in terms of this section and it may 
apply equally to non-resident trusts.549 
Section 7(6) deals, inter alia, with revocable trusts. It provides that if any deed of donation, 
settlement or other disposition contains any stipulation that the right to receive any income 
thereby conferred may, under powers retained by the person by whom that right is 
conferred, be revoked or conferred upon another, so much of any income as in consequence 
of the donation, settlement or other disposition is received by or accrues to or in favour of 
the person on whom that right is conferred, shall be deemed to be the income of the person 
by whom it is conferred, so long as he retains those powers. The section applies only to 
beneficiaries with vested rights to income.550 The section will not apply if the donor needs 
the co-operation of the other trustees to revoke the right to receive income. Furthermore, it 
is not necessary that the power to revoke is actually exercised by the donor. As long as the 
donor could exercise the power to revoke, the section may be applied.551 
Section 7(8) is specifically relevant in an international context. It provides that where, by 
reason of or in consequence of any donation, settlement or other disposition552 made by any 
resident, any amount is received by or accrued to any person (such as a trust) who is not a 
resident,553 which would have constituted income had that person been a resident, there 
shall be included in the income of that resident so much of that amount as is attributable to 
that donation, settlement or other disposition. The provision also allows for the deduction of 
certain expenditure by the resident, although the deduction is limited to the amount 
included in the resident’s income.554 The aim of the provision is to thwart attempts by 
residents to move income-producing assets to, inter alia, non-resident trusts and to 
accumulate income in those trusts, thus placing the income beyond the reach of the South 
                                                          
547 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.20. 
548 Eg Estate Dempers v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1977 3 SA 410 (A) and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Berold 1962 3 SA 748 (A). 
549 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.20. However, see Oguttu Curbing Offshore 
Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 354, who points to the limitations in applying s 
7(5) to non-resident trusts. 
550 Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 7(6). 
551 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.21. 
552 Other than a donation, settlement or other disposition to an entity which is not a resident and which is 
similar to a public benefit organisation contemplated in section 30. 
553 Other than a controlled foreign company in relation to such resident. 
554 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s7(8)(b). 
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African tax net.555 The provision attributes the income that the non-resident trust receives to 
the South African resident, if the requirements of the section are met, taxing the income in 
his or her hands. It is unclear whether the section would operate if income is distributed to a 
resident beneficiary.556 
In many of the subsections of section 7 the expression “donation, settlement or other 
disposition” is used. In Ovenstone, the court held that that these words must be interpreted 
ejusdem generis, so that the expression reads as “donation, settlement or other similar 
disposition”. Thus, the word “disposition” in this expression means any disposal of property 
made wholly or to an appreciable extent gratuitously out of the liberality or generosity of 
the disposer.557 The court summed up its findings regarding this expression as follows: 
“To sum up: the critical phrase in s 7(3) – ’any donation, settlement or other 
disposition’ – excludes any disposal of property that is a wholly commercial or business 
one, ie made for due consideration; it covers any disposal of property made wholly 
gratuitously out of liberality or generosity; it also covers any disposal of property made 
under a settlement or other disposition for some consideration but in which there is an 
appreciable element of gratuitousness and liberality or generosity.”558 
The court added that: 
“[W]here the consideration, while not being due consideration, is nevertheless 
appreciable, it will mean that the income in question under s 7(3) will usually have 
accrued or been received ’by reason of’ both elements of gratuitousness and 
consideration. I see no reason why in those circumstances the income should not then 
be apportioned between the two elements. The words, ’by reason of’, themselves 
suggest some apportionment in order to give proper effect to the real cause of the 
accrual or receipt of the income.”559 
Section 7(9) provides that where any asset has been disposed of for a consideration which is 
less than the market value of such asset, the amount by which such market value exceeds 
such consideration shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a donation. The 
reason for this provision is not apparent, as the interpretation by the courts placed on the 
words “donation, settlement or other disposition” entails that an appreciable element of 
bounty must be present. Thus, a disposal of an asset for less than market value would fall 
within this meaning.560 
Furthermore, in many of the subsections of section 7 the words “by reason of” or “in 
consequence of” are used. In the Widan case561 the court held that these words indicated 
                                                          
555 Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 186. 
556 Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 187–188; Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 
7(8). 
557 Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 2 SA 721 (A) 737. This finding was confirmed in 
Commissioner: South African Revenue Service v Woulidge 2002 1 SA 68 (SCA) 74. 
558 Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 2 SA 721 (A) 740. 
559 Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 2 SA 721 (A) 740. Confirmed in Commissioner: South African 
Revenue Service v Woulidge 2002 1 SA 68 (SCA) 74. 
560 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 12.21A. 
561 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Widan 1955 1 SA 226 (A) 234. 
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some causal relation between the donation and the income in question. The court held that 
the “real efficient cause” of the income must be ascertained, holding that “income on 
income” would be hit by the relevant subsection of section 7.562 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
From the above it is clear that South Africa follows the initial choice system in the 
classification suggested by Wheeler. If, in a year of assessment, an ascertained beneficiary 
with a vested right to income exists, the income will be taxed in the beneficiary’s hands. If no 
beneficiary has a vested right to the income (for example, when the trustee of a 
discretionary trust decides to accumulate the income), the trust will be taxed on the income. 
The trust itself could therefore be a taxpayer. If, however, any of the anti-avoidance 
provisions of section 7 apply, the person to whom the income is attributed in terms of that 
section will be taxed, and not the trust or the beneficiary. Generally, income retains its 
nature as it passes through a trust and the trust is a mere “conduit pipe”. Income probably 
does not retain its nature if it is accumulated by the trustee and distributed to beneficiaries 
in a later year. If a trust is liable to tax, it is taxed at a flat rate of 40%. 
3.3 United Kingdom 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The Income Tax Act provides that the trustees of a settlement are together treated as if they 
were a single person (distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the settlement from 
time to time).563 In the discussion that follows, a distinction is made between discretionary 
trusts and fixed trusts. 
3.3.2 Discretionary trusts 
By way of an outline, it may be stated that the trustee of a discretionary trust is liable to tax 
on his or her receipt of the income and on making a discretionary payment of income. The 
beneficiaries are taxed on the discretionary payment. Appropriate tax credits are provided 
to relieve double taxation that may arise. These different levels of taxation are discussed 
below and, where applicable, a distinction is made between a resident and a non-resident 
trustee and beneficiary respectively.564 
                                                          
562 The court effectively overturned the decision in Kohler v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1949 4 SA 1022 
(T), in which the court held that “income on income” was not hit by the section (Emslie et al Income Tax Cases 
and Materials 1007; Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 7(3)). 
563 Income Tax Act 2007 s 474(1). 
564 Kessler describes the system as having three tiers of taxation in respect of discretionary trusts: (a) a charge 
on the trustee on his or her receipt of the income; (b) a charge on the trustee on making a discretionary 
payment of income; and (c) a charge on the beneficiaries on receiving a discretionary payment of income 
(Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1055–1056). In respect of Scottish trusts and 
beneficiaries, it should be noted that the Scotland Act 2012 introduces the Scottish rate of income tax, which is 
expected to be implemented in April 2016. HMRC has issued a Technical Note in which, inter alia, the position 
of Scottish trusts and beneficiaries are dealt with (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Clarifying the Scope of 
the Scottish Rate of Income Tax para 45–46).  
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3.3.2.1 Taxation of the trustee of a discretionary trust 
3.3.2.1.1 Charge on the trustee on receipt of income 
There are no special charging provisions in relation to a trust and the usual charging 
provisions therefore apply, meaning that a trustee resident in the United Kingdom is subject 
to tax on all of his or her income, while a non-resident trustee is, generally speaking, only 
subject to tax on income from a United Kingdom source.565 The trustee is taxed because he 
or she is entitled to income, or because he or she receives the income. Even though a 
trustee is not beneficially entitled to the income, he or she may sue for it and is, in that 
sense, entitled to the income. The trustee may also be said to receive the income.566 A 
trustee that is taxed at the trust rates is taxed, in respect of accumulated or discretionary 
income,567 at the dividend tax rate (currently 37,5 per cent) in respect of dividend-type 
income and at the trust rate (currently 45 per cent) in respect of other income.568 The 
trustee is thus taxed irrespective of the personal circumstances of the beneficiary.569 
3.3.2.1.2 Charge on the trustee on making a discretionary payment of income 
The trustees are charged as follows: 
“(1) Income tax is charged for a tax year if – 
(a) in the tax year the trustees of a settlement make payments as a result of 
which income tax is treated as having been paid under section 494, and 
(b) amount A is greater than amount B. 
(2) Amount A is the total amount of the income tax treated under section 494 as 
having been paid. 
(3) Amount B is the amount of the trustees' tax pool available for the tax year (see 
section 497). 
(4) The amount of the tax charged under this section is equal to the difference 
between amounts A and B. 
                                                          
565 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1057; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust 
Taxation para 8.38. Regarding residence of the trustee, see ch 6.3.2.1. 
566 Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 2013–14 para 21.8. 
567 Income is regarded as accumulated or discretionary income so far as it must be accumulated or it is payable 
at the discretion of the trustee of any other person, subject to certain exclusions. The section further describes 
when income will be regarded as payable at the discretion of the trustee (Income Tax Act 2007 s 480).  
568 Income Tax Act 2007 s 479. However, the first 1 000 pounds of income taxable at the rate applicable to 
trusts will be taxed at either the basic rate or the dividend ordinary rate (Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust 
Taxation para 6.33; Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 2013–14 para 21.10). See Chamberlain and 
Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.34 for an anti-fragmentation rule, which stops settlors from settling multiple 
trusts to take advantage of the first 1 000 pound bands. Furthermore, it should be noted that s 481, read with s 
482, describes certain amounts, which are capital for trust purposes, but treated as income for tax purposes 
and which are taxed at the top income tax rates. The details of these provisions are not discussed in this 
dissertation. 
569 Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 2013–14 para 21.8. 
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(5) The trustees are liable for the tax.”570 
Regarding the trustees’ tax pool, section 497 provides as follows: 
“(1) Take the following steps to calculate the amount of the trustees' tax pool available 
for a tax year (’the current tax year’). 
This is subject to subsections (2) and (3). 
Step 1 
Take the amount of the trustees' tax pool available for the previous tax year and 
deduct from that amount (but not so that it goes below nil) the total amount of 
income tax treated under section 494 as having been paid as a result of payments 
made by the trustees in the previous tax year. 
Step 2 
Add together all amounts of income tax for which the trustees are liable for the 
current tax year and which are of a type set out in section 498. 
Step 3 
Add the sum calculated at Step 2 to the amount resulting from Step 1. 
(2) If the trustees were non-UK resident for the previous tax year, references in 
subsection (1) to the previous tax year are to be read as references to the last tax year 
prior to the current tax year for which the trustees were UK resident. 
(3) If – 
(a) the current tax year is the tax year during which the settlement is established, or 
(b) the trustees have been UK resident for no tax year prior to the current tax year, 
ignore Steps 1 and 3 and, accordingly, the trustees' tax pool available for the current 
tax year is the sum calculated at Step 2.”571 
3.3.2.2 Taxation of the beneficiary 
3.3.2.2.1 Charge on the beneficiaries on receiving a discretionary payment of income 
In terms of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act, payments from a discretionary 
trust are subject to income tax in the hands of a resident beneficiary.572 In the case of a non-
                                                          
570 Income Tax Act 2007 s 496. 
571 Income Tax Act 2007 s 497. S 498 lists the types of income that fall within the tax pool. In effect, the taxes 
paid by the trustee on the receipt of income (and discussed in para 3.3.2.1.1) enters a tax pool and may be 
credited against the tax paid by the trustee on making a discretionary payment (and discussed in para 
3.3.2.1.2), with the result that no tax may be paid by the trustee on making a discretionary payment (Kessler 
Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1056). 
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resident beneficiary, he or she is only liable to tax in respect of income from a source in the 
United Kingdom.573 If a beneficiary receives income from the trust after the trustee has 
exercised his or her discretion in favour of the beneficiary, the trust will be the source of the 
income, and not the underlying assets. Thus, the beneficiary’s income is classified as an 
annual payment, regardless of the type of income received by the trustee, a view with which 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) agree.574 The income is regarded as being from 
a United Kingdom source if the trustee is resident in the United Kingdom.575 A beneficiary 
receives income on the date that the trustee makes the payment to him or her, or on the 
date that the beneficiary becomes legally entitled to compel the trustee to pay over the 
income.576 
A United Kingdom resident beneficiary is entitled to a tax credit equal to the income tax (at 
the trust rate on the grossed-up amount of the discretionary payment).577 A beneficiary that 
is not resident in the United Kingdom can only receive the tax credit if the trustee is resident 
in the United Kingdom. 
However, if the trustee decides to retain income as part of the capital of the trust, the 
accumulated sum loses its character as income and is treated as capital. Hence, any 
subsequent distribution to the beneficiary is not subject to income tax.578 
3.3.2.2.2 Discretionary trust treated as transparent 
Domestic law in the United Kingdom allows the beneficiary of a United Kingdom resident 
trust (and subject to certain requirements) to claim that the payment of an amount was 
received by the beneficiary himself (or herself) and not by the trust.579 The reason for this 
provision is that it allows the beneficiary to claim relief from double taxation. Furthermore, 
provided certain conditions are met, HMRC will allow a beneficiary of a United Kingdom 
resident trust to claim an exemption or relief if the trustee made a payment out of income of 
the trustee, in respect of which, had it been received directly, the beneficiary would, inter 
alia, (a) have been entitled to relief under the terms of a DTT, or (b) not have been 
chargeable to United Kingdom tax because of their not resident and/or not ordinarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
572 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 ss 577(1) and 683(1); Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents 
and Foreign Domiciliaries 1061. 
573 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 577(2). 
574 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1062; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust 
Taxation para 6.37. 
575 See Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1063, who also states that HMRC agrees 
with this view. 
576 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1064. 
577 Income Tax Act 2007 ss 493–494; Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1064–1065. 
578 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.38; Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 2013–
14 para 21.18. However, the distribution may have capital gains tax consequences. 
579 Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 s 111. The detail of this provision will not be 
discussed in this dissertation. 
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resident status.580 In a similar vein, there is also relief for a non-resident beneficiary who 
receives a payment from a non-resident trustee.581 
3.3.3 Fixed trusts 
3.3.3.1 Taxation of the trustee 
In principle, the trustee of a trust is liable to tax on income received by him or her if the 
trustee is resident in the United Kingdom.582 In the case of a non-resident trustee, the 
trustee is liable to tax on income from a United Kingdom source.583 However, these 
statements are subject to a number of exceptions.584 
Sometimes a trustee mandates585 income to a beneficiary. In such a case there is no 
statutory basis for taxing the trustee as he or she does not receive the income. The 
beneficiary not only receives the income, but is also entitled to it and, consequently, the 
trustee is not taxed on the mandated income.586 
3.3.3.2 Taxation of the beneficiary 
If the beneficiary of a fixed trust is a United Kingdom resident, he or she is liable to income 
tax on the income received from the trust.587 In the case of a non-resident beneficiary, he or 
she is liable to income tax on income if it is from a United Kingdom source.588 Generally 
speaking, if a beneficiary is entitled to the income of an English law trust (and certain other 
jurisdictions called “Baker jurisdictions”),589 the trust itself is not the source of the income, 
but the underlying assets are. In other jurisdictions (called “Garland jurisdictions”)590 the 
beneficiary does not have a specific interest in each and every trust asset and the trust is 
therefore seen as the source of the income.591 
                                                          
580 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Extra-Statutory Concessions B18; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust 
Taxation para 6.40. 
581 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Extra-Statutory Concessions B18. The detail of this concession will not 
be discussed in this dissertation. 
582 According to Chamberlain and Whitehouse, a trustee is liable to tax at the basic rate on income other than 
dividends and at the dividend rate on dividends (Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.06). 
583 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.10. 
584 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1109. 
585 The beneficiary receives the income and the trustee does not. 
586 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Manual on Trusts paras TSEM3040 and TSEM3763; Kessler Taxation of 
Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1098 and 1109; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 
6.12. 
587 The beneficiary is so liable when he or she becomes entitled to the income, even if none of the money is 
paid to him or her during the relevant year (Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.14). 
588 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1094. 
589 The name originates from the decision in Baker v Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844 HL. 
590 The name originates from the decision in Archer-Shee v Garland (1931) 15 TC 693. 
591 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.15; Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign 
Domiciliaries 1095–1096. These rules are controversial (Hardy in Topical Analysis 4.3.2; Wheeler in Taxation of 
Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 45). Some courts doubt whether it 
should always apply (R (on the application of Huitson) v HMRC [2010] EWHC 97 (Admin)). Under common law 
the trust is regarded as the source of the income under a life rent in a Scottish trust. However, this position was 
reversed by Income Tax Act 2007 s 464. 
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If the trustee of a trust has paid tax on an amount, or if the trustee received the amount 
with the tax deducted at source, the beneficiary is given a credit for that tax.592 In cases 
where the trustee mandates the income to the beneficiary, it is the beneficiary that is taxed 
on that income.593 
If income is received from abroad, the trustee resident in the United Kingdom is not liable to 
tax if that income is paid to a non-resident beneficiary.594 
3.3.4 Settlor-interested trusts595 
The trustee of a settlor-interested trust is subject to tax at the same rates as the trustee of a 
discretionary trust. However, income is also taxed in the hands of the settlor if it is treated as 
his or her income. The settlor is therefore entitled to a credit for the taxes paid by the 
trustee at the appropriate rate.596 
The Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act provides that: 
“Income which arises under a settlement is treated for income tax purposes as the 
income of the settlor and of the settlor alone if it arises 
(a) during the life of the settlor, and 
(b) from property in which the settlor has an interest.”597 
Regarding the meaning of the phrase “income which arises under a settlement”, it is 
provided that 
“References in this Chapter to income arising under a settlement include 
(a) any income chargeable to income tax by deduction or otherwise, and 
(b) any income which would have been so chargeable if it had been received in the 
United Kingdom by a person domiciled, resident and ordinarily resident 
there.”598 
Notably, the income payable to a beneficiary with a fixed interest is regarded as “income 
which arises under a settlement”, even if it is taxed in the hands of the beneficiary.599 
                                                          
592 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 6.26. 
593 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Manual on Trusts para TSEM3765. 
594 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Manual on Trusts para TSEM3160. 
595 Chamberlain and Whitehouse question whether this type of anti-avoidance legislation is really necessary, 
given that the settlor often obtains no great advantage from diverting income to a trust (Chamberlain and 
Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 7.02). 
596 Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 2013–14 para 21.14. 
597 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 624(1). The Income Tax Act 2007 s 720 deals with the 
avoiding of liability to income tax by individuals who are ordinarily UK resident by means of relevant transfers. 
According to Kessler, Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 624 and Income Tax Act 2007 s 720 
cover similar ground, but s 624 will have priority over s 720 (Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign 
Domiciliaries 1146–1147; Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 8.02). Also note that Income Tax 
Act 2007 s 624 applies only to individuals and not to corporate settlors (Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) 
Act 2005 627(4)). 
598 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 648(1). 
599 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1126. 
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A settlor has an interest in property if there are any circumstances in which the property or 
any related property600 is payable or applicable for the benefit of the settlor (or the settlor’s 
spouse or civil partner); or will or may become so payable or applicable.601 According to 
Chamberlain and Whitehouse, cases where the trust fund reverts to the settlor under a 
revocable settlement, or where the settlor is a discretionary beneficiary (or could be added 
as such), are examples where the settlor will be regarded as having an interest in property. 
However, the power to participate in the management of the trust is not sufficient to 
constitute an interest in property.602 
In order to avoid double taxation, relief is provided to a discretionary beneficiary603 of a 
settlor-interested trust (who is not the settlor) on the income paid to the beneficiary. The 
relief entails a tax credit for the tax paid by the trustee on behalf of the settlor.604 If the 
settlor is also a beneficiary, the payment to him or her is not treated as his or her income for 
income tax purposes.605 
In the case of a non-resident settlor, only income which is of a United Kingdom source is 
treated as that of the settlor. Thus, if the trust is resident in the United Kingdom, but the 
settlor is not, the trust is taxed in full on the income that is not of a United Kingdom source 
and the settlor is taxed on the income that is from a United Kingdom source. If both the trust 
and the settlor are non-residents, neither is taxed on income that is not from a United 
Kingdom source, but the settlor will be taxed on income that is from a United Kingdom 
source.606 
3.3.5 Payments to minor unmarried children of the settlor 
Income which arises under a settlement and that is paid during the settlor’s lifetime to or for 
the benefit of an unmarried minor child of the settlor607 is treated for income tax purposes 
as the income of the settlor in the tax year in which it is distributed.608 If the amount paid to 
the child is less than 100 pounds, it is not taxed to the settlor.609 However, if income is 
                                                          
600 “’[R]elated property’, in relation to any property, means income from that property or any other property 
directly or indirectly representing proceeds of, or of income from, that property or income from it” (Income Tax 
(Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 625(5). 
601 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 625. There are a number of exceptions to this general 
rule which are not discussed in this dissertation. 
602 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation paras 7.07 and 7.10. 
603 The statutory relief applies only to discretionary trusts, but no relief is needed in the case of a fixed trust 
since the beneficiary is not taxable as the trust income is the income to the settlor (and him or her alone) 
(Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1136). 
604 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 685A. 
605 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 685A(5). The legislation also provides relief to remittance 
basis taxpayers, but a discussion of this relief falls outside the scope of this dissertation (Income Tax (Trading 
and Other Income) Act 2005 s 648). 
606 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1142–1143, who also notes that later 
remittance of the income by the trust whilst the settlor is resident is irrelevant. See also Chamberlain and 
Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 7.20. 
607 Or would otherwise be treated (apart from this section) as income of an unmarried minor child of the 
settlor. 
608 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 629(1); Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation 
para 7.38. However, if Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 624 applies, that section will take 
precedence and not s 629(1). 
609 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 629(3). 
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accumulated in the (irrevocable) trust, the income is not taxed in the settlor’s hands, but if it 
is distributed at a later stage to a child who is under the age of eighteen years and 
unmarried, the distributions (up to the amount of the accumulations) are treated as the 
settlor’s income. Since the trustee would have already paid tax on the accumulated income, 
the settlor is granted an appropriate credit for the taxes so paid.610 
3.3.6 Transfer of assets abroad 
Wheeler sums up the effect of this piece of legislation611 as follows: 
“[It] operates to attribute income from an asset to an individual who is ordinarily 
resident and who transfers the income-producing asset to a non-resident. It is 
triggered if income becomes payable to the non-resident as a result of the transfer 
and/or any connected operations, and the transferor or his/her spouse has the power 
to enjoy the income or receives a capital sum connected with the transfer. The 
legislation prescribes five sets of circumstances in which an individual is regarded as 
having the power to enjoy income. Those circumstances include the individual being 
able to receive any benefit out of the income, and the receipt or accrual of the income 
operating to increase the value to the individual of any assets held by him or for his 
benefit.”612 
The legislation may also affect non-resident trusts.613 If the legislation dealing with transfer 
of assets abroad overlaps with the legislation regarding settlor-interested trusts, the latter 
will apply.614 
3.3.7 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that the United Kingdom uses the credit system described by 
Wheeler as a means of taxing trusts and their beneficiaries. The trustees are, by legislation, 
together treated as if they were a single, distinct person. Broadly speaking, a trustee of a 
discretionary trust is taxed on discretionary and accumulated income of the trustee and also 
on the making of a discretionary payment of income to a beneficiary. The beneficiary is liable 
to tax on the amount received from the trustee, but is given a credit for the taxes paid by the 
trustee. If income is accumulated beyond the tax year, it loses its character as income and is 
treated as capital when distributed to the beneficiary. Generally, in the case of a fixed trust, 
the trustee is liable to tax on his or her income. The beneficiaries are also liable to tax on 
their income from the trust, but are given a credit for the tax paid by the trust. In the case of 
a settlor-interested trust or where payments are made to the minor unmarried children of 
                                                          
610 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 7.39. The payment of certain capital benefits by the 
trustee to a settlor may, under certain circumstances, be regarded as taxable in the settlor’s hands, eg when a 
loan is repaid. However, a discussion of these provisions (Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 ss 
633–634) falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
611 Income Tax Act 2007 ss 714–751. 
612 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 84. The legislation dealing with transfer of assets abroad is, of 
course, complex and the quoted paragraph gives a very high level overview thereof. However, this overview is 
regarded as sufficient for purposes of this dissertation. 
613 See the cases cited by Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 84–85 and the examples given by 
Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation 208. 
614 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation 208. 
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the settlor, the income is taxed in the hands of the settlor. Appropriate credits are granted 
to avoid double taxation. 
3.4 Canada 
3.4.1 Introduction615 
A trust is deemed to be an individual for income tax purposes.616 This implies that a trust is 
taxed as a separate taxpayer from the settlor or beneficiary617 and it is liable to tax on its 
income earned during the year.618 Although trusts are taxed like individuals, inter vivos trusts 
pay tax at the top marginal rate,619 while testamentary trusts pay tax at the graduated rate 
schedule620 similar to individuals. 
In the following paragraphs, the position of Canadian resident trusts and beneficiaries is 
discussed first under the relevant headings. It is followed by a discussion of the taxation of 
non-resident trusts and non-resident beneficiaries. 
3.4.2 The taxation of trusts621 
Income is taxed in the trust insofar as it is not taxed in the hands of the beneficiary. Thus, a 
trust is allowed a deduction for the amount of income that is taxable in the hands of the 
beneficiary.622 It follows that a trust is only liable to tax on the income accumulated in the 
hands of the trustee(s), that is, income that is not paid or payable in the year to a 
beneficiary.623 Losses may, however, not be allocated to a beneficiary.624 Nevertheless, the 
Income Tax Act makes it possible for the trustee to deduct less than the full amount paid or 
payable to a beneficiary.625 Such an amount is designated to be taxed in the hands of the 
trust and is paid to the beneficiary tax-free.626 
                                                          
615 Only federal income tax will be described in this paragraph. In terms of the Canadian Constitution each 
province also has the ability to levy income tax (see ch 2.4.1), but a discussion of the provincial taxation of 
trusts falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
616 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2).  
617 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 540; Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault 
Analysis 104–22; Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.1. 
618 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 544. 
619 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 122(1). 
620 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 117(2) 
621 The Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(23) contains provisions relating specifically to 
testamentary trusts. These provisions deal, inter alia, with the tax year of testamentary trusts, the computation 
of the beneficiary’s income from such a trust and the payment by the trust of taxes (Ewens Canada Tax Service 
- McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 97). A discussion of these provisions falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
622 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s104(6). See also Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 
544–545 and Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.2.1. Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s104(12) allows 
for a deduction in respect of trust income in the case of a preferred beneficiary election (see ch 3.4.3.). 
623 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to 
US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 78. 
624 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 545; Brown in Topical Analysis 4.3.1. 
625 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(13). 
626 The purpose of this provision is to take advantage of losses in the trust, but the provision holds other 
practical advantages as well (Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 545; Ewens Canada Tax Service - 
McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 80). 
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If expenses are incurred by the trust to earn its income, it may be deducted by the trust in 
the normal manner.627 Furthermore, a trust that is subject to the tax at a rate of 36 per cent 
in respect of income payable to non-resident beneficiaries,628 may deduct the tax so 
payable.629 
3.4.3 The taxation of beneficiaries 
If income is payable to a beneficiary630 in a tax year and deducted by the trust from its 
income, that income must be included in the income of the beneficiary.631 However, as 
explained above, income that is designated to the trust and taxed in the trust’s hands, is not 
included in the beneficiary’s income, although it is payable to the beneficiary.632 Income is 
payable to a beneficiary if it was paid to the beneficiary in the taxation year or the 
beneficiary was entitled633 in the taxation year to enforce payment of it.634 Where the 
trustee has no discretion as to whether income must be paid to a beneficiary, it will 
automatically be regarded as payable to that beneficiary when it is derived by the trust. In 
the case of a discretionary trust, the exercise by the trustee of his or her discretion to pay an 
amount to a beneficiary (typically by way of a resolution) will result in that income being 
regarded as payable to the beneficiary. Even if the amount is only paid in the following year, 
                                                          
627 Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 97; Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.1. 
628 The tax at a rate of 36 per cent is discussed in greater detail in ch 3.4.6. 
629 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(30); Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.1.  
630 It is important to determine when a person can be regarded as a beneficiary for income tax purposes. The 
Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 108 provides that a “’beneficiary’ under a trust includes a person 
beneficially interested therein.” In turn Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 248(25) provides that “(a) a 
person or partnership beneficially interested in a particular trust includes any person or partnership that has 
any right (whether immediate or future, whether absolute or contingent or whether conditional on or subject 
to the exercise of any discretion by any person or partnership) as a beneficiary under a trust to receive any of 
the income or capital of the particular trust either directly from the particular trust or indirectly through one or 
more trusts or partnerships; (b) except for the purpose of this paragraph, a particular person or partnership is 
deemed to be beneficially interested in a particular trust at a particular time where (i) the particular person or 
partnership is not beneficially interested in the particular trust at the particular time, (ii) because of the terms 
or conditions of the particular trust or any arrangement in respect of the particular trust at the particular time, 
the particular person or partnership might, because of the exercise of any discretion by any person or 
partnership, become beneficially interested in the particular trust at the particular time or at a later time, and 
(iii) at or before the particular time, either (A) the particular trust has acquired property, directly or indirectly in 
any manner whatever, from (I) the particular person or partnership, (II) another person with whom the 
particular person or partnership, or a member of the particular partnership, does not deal at arm’s length, 
(III) a person or partnership with whom the other person referred to in subclause 248(25)(b)(iii)(A)(II) does not 
deal at arm’s length, (IV) a controlled foreign affiliate of the particular person or of another person with whom 
the particular person or partnership, or a member of the particular partnership, does not deal at arm’s length, 
or (V) a non-resident corporation that would, if the particular partnership were a corporation resident in 
Canada, be a controlled foreign affiliate of the particular partnership, or (B) a person or partnership described 
in any of subclauses 248(25)(b)(iii)(A)(I) to 248(25)(b)(iii)(A)(V) has given a guarantee on behalf of the particular 
trust or provided any other financial assistance whatever to the particular trust; and (c) a member of a 
partnership that is beneficially interested in a trust is deemed to be beneficially interested in the trust.” 
631 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(6)(b) read with s 104(13); Ewens Canada Tax Service - 
McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 59. 
632 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(13.1). 
633 “Entitled” means legally entitled (Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 51). 
634 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(24). 
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provided that the appropriate resolution was taken in the tax year, the amount will be 
regarded as payable to the beneficiary.635 
Subject to certain exceptions,636 the value of all benefits to a taxpayer from or under a trust 
must be included in computing the taxpayer’s income for the year.637 Thus, amounts paid to 
third parties for expenses incurred for the benefit of beneficiaries are considered income 
payable to a beneficiary.638 A further example is the rental of property to the beneficiary for 
an artificially low rent.639 The value of these benefits is included in the income of the 
taxpayer and cannot be deducted by the trust.640 
In terms of the preferred beneficiary election, the trust and a preferred beneficiary may 
jointly elect that part of the accumulating income (that is, income that is not payable to a 
beneficiary) of the trust for the particular year is to be included in the income of the 
preferred beneficiary, subject to certain limitations.641 A preferred beneficiary must meet 
certain criteria, including that the beneficiary must suffer from a mental of physical 
impairment, or be dependent on another because of a mental or physical infirmity.642 The 
purpose of these provisions is to allow a preferred beneficiary to elect to include in his or her 
income the income of the trust that is being accumulated for the preferred beneficiary’s 
benefit. In effect, the income (which did not become payable to the preferred beneficiary) is 
taxed at the preferred beneficiary’s rates and not at the trust’s rates.643 However, the 
attribution rules discussed below may still apply to attribute the income to the settlor, 
despite the preferred beneficiary election.644 
If an amount was taxed in the trust (because it was not paid or payable to a beneficiary in a 
particular year or was designated to be taxed in the trust)645 and subsequently paid out to 
the beneficiary, the amount so paid to the beneficiary is not subject to tax in the 
beneficiary’s hands.646 
3.4.4 Flow-through character of income 
As a general rule, income included in the hands of a beneficiary of a trust, is deemed to be 
income from a property that is an interest in the trust and not from any other source.647 
                                                          
635 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 547. 
636 One of these exceptions is that if an amount has been included in the beneficiary’s income under s 104(13), 
it is not included again in terms of s 105(1). 
637 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 105(1). 
638 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 548. 
639 Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 107. 
640 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 548; Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault 
Analysis 108–109.  
641 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(14) and (15). 
642 The definition of “preferred beneficiary” is contained in Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 108 and 
refers to other requirements as well. 
643 Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.2.1. 
644 Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault Analysis 67. 
645 See ch 3.4.2 above. 
646 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 550; Danon Switzerland's Direct and International 
Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 
79. 
647 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 108(5). 
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Thus, income derived by the trust from various sources loses its character when it flows 
through to the beneficiaries.648 There are, however, a number of important exceptions to 
this rule, which means that the income will not lose (but rather retain) its character when it 
flows through to the beneficiary.649 For example, dividends received by the trust on a share 
in a Canadian resident corporation retain its nature if it is included in the beneficiary’s 
income and the trust so designated it.650 A further example is foreign source income 
received by the trust. It retains its nature when so designated by the trust and included in 
the income of the beneficiary.651 
3.4.5 Income taxed in the hands of the settlor 
Although income is usually taxed in the hands of either the trust or the beneficiaries, certain 
anti-avoidance provisions attribute the income to the settlor. 
Section 74.1 provides that if an individual has transferred or lent property, either directly or 
indirectly, by means of a trust, to or for the benefit of a person who is the individual’s spouse 
or common-law partner, any income or loss from the property or from property substituted 
therefor, is deemed to be income or a loss of the individual.652 It further provides that if an 
individual has transferred or lent property, either directly or indirectly, by means of a trust to 
or for the benefit of a related minor,653 any income or loss of that person from the property 
or from property substituted for that property is deemed to be income or a loss of the 
individual.654 The purpose of these rules is to prevent income splitting between family 
members.655 Payments of income from transferred property that are made to a spouse or 
minor in the exercise of a discretion by the trustee, will still be attributed to the individual. 
Income accumulated in a trust for the benefit of a spouse or related minor is not subject to 
attribution.656 
Section 75(2) provides that where property is held by a trust on condition (a) that it or 
property substituted therefor may (i) revert to the person from whom the property was 
directly or indirectly received (in this subsection referred to as “the person”), or (ii) pass to 
persons to be determined by the person at a time subsequent to the creation of the trust, or 
(b) that, during the existence of the person, the property shall not be disposed of except 
with the person’s consent or in accordance with the person’s direction, any income or loss 
                                                          
648 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to 
US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 82. 
649 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 549; Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.2.1. 
650 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(19) and (20). Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax 
Law 549. The beneficiary may then use the Canadian dividends tax credit (Danon Switzerland's Direct and 
International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to US, Canadian and New Zealand 
Trust Taxation 83). 
651 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(22); Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 550. 
The beneficiary can therefore directly claim the tax credit attached to the foreign income (Danon Switzerland's 
Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to US, Canadian and New 
Zealand Trust Taxation 84). 
652 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 74.1(1). 
653 That is a person under the age of 18 years who is related to the individual making the transfer as a child, 
other descendant, brother, sister, niece or nephew (Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 551). 
654 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 74.1(2). 
655 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 551. 
656 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 552. 
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from the property or from property substituted for the property shall, during the existence 
of the person while the person is resident in Canada, be deemed to be income or a loss of 
the person. Due to this section, it is not advisable, from a tax point of view, to establish a 
trust of which the settlor is the sole trustee.657 The section may even operate in 
circumstances where there is more than one trustee, of which the settlor is one, but the 
trustees must act jointly.658 
If a trust is subject to section 75(2), a Canadian resident settlor is taxable on the trust's 
worldwide income irrespective of whether the trust is resident or non-resident. However, in 
the case of a non-resident settlor of such a trust, he or she is taxable only on the trust's 
Canadian source income.659 
3.4.6 Non-resident trusts and non-resident beneficiaries 
In the case of a resident inter vivos trust with, inter alia, non-resident beneficiaries, the trust 
may be taxed at the rate of 36 per cent660 on the least of (a) the designated income661 of the 
trust for the year, (b) the amount that, but for subsections 104(6) and 104(30), would be the 
income of the trust for the year, and (c) 100/64 of the amount deducted under paragraph 
104(6)(b) in computing the trust’s income under Part I for the year, to the extent that such 
income is payable to beneficiaries in that tax year.662 In addition the trust must withhold tax 
on the remaining amount (that is, the amount remaining after the 36 per cent of tax has 
been deducted) which is distributed to non-resident beneficiaries. The withholding tax is 
discussed in more detail below. 
If a Canadian resident trust pays income to a non-resident beneficiary and, generally 
speaking, the amount would have been included in the beneficiary’s income had the 
beneficiary been a Canadian resident,663 the payment is subject to a withholding tax of 25 
per cent.664 The withholding tax may, of course, be reduced by a DTT. The trustee is obliged 
to withhold the tax from the payment to the beneficiary. 
The Income Tax Act contains a provision aimed at preventing a non-resident trust, which 
carries on business in Canada, from escaping Canadian tax because its income was entirely 
payable to beneficiaries who fall outside the Canadian tax net. Thus, if income of a trust that 
is not resident in Canada throughout its tax year is payable to, inter alia, beneficiaries who 
                                                          
657 Brown in Topical Analysis para 1.4.2. 
658 Hogg et al Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 553. 
659 Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.2.1. 
660 In addition to the federal tax of 29 per cent. 
661 Designated income is summarised by Brown as “all income earned by the trust from the conduct of a 
business in Canada or from the ownership of Canadian real property, resource property, or timber property 
and on taxable capital gains arising from the disposition of such businesses or properties” (Brown in Topical 
Analysis para 4.3.1). 
662 Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.1; Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 210.2(1).  
663 Thus the amount is reduced by the trust’s deductible expenses and losses. However, the amount includes 
dividends that would otherwise be exempt from tax in the trust (or in the hands of beneficiaries who are 
resident in Canada) (Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.3). 
664 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 212(1)(c); Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.3. 
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are non-resident persons (subject to certain exceptions relating to beneficiaries who are 
subject to Canadian tax), the income cannot be deducted by the trust.665 
Section 94(3) deems certain non-resident trusts to be resident in Canada.666 This provision 
has been explained by the Canadian Department of Finance as follows: 
“New section 94 of the Act takes a different approach to the taxation of non-resident 
trusts (NRTs). In general, if a Canadian resident contributes property to a NRT (other 
than an ‘exempt foreign trust’), the NRT is deemed to be resident in Canada for a 
number of purposes, and the contributor (excepting electing contributors in respect of 
the NRT), the NRT and certain Canadian resident beneficiaries of the NRT may all 
become jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable to pay Canadian tax on the income of 
the trust. The existing rules that limit the ability to enforce this liability against a 
beneficiary will continue to apply to certain beneficiaries and contributors. For more 
details on this limit, see the commentary on subsections 94(7) to (9). 
More specifically, new section 94 divides the NRT into two notional portions. The 
‘resident portion’ of the trust generally includes all property of the trust in respect of 
which there has been a contribution by a current or former resident of Canada, and 
certain other non-contributed amounts. The ‘non-resident portion’ of the trust 
generally includes all other property of the trust. The NRT generally is not taxed on 
income derived from its non-resident portion, unless the income is from certain 
Canadian sources. 
In computing its income under the Act, the NRT will have the ordinary deductions 
available, under subsections 104(6) and (12), for certain amounts in respect of 
beneficiaries. After claiming any such deductions, the NRT will then have available a 
deduction in respect of amounts included in the income of an ‘electing contributor’ in 
respect of the trust. 
New section 94 is intended to apply to NRTs where the amount to be distributed to a 
beneficiary of the trust depends upon a discretionary power, but may also apply to a 
trust in which all interests are ‘fixed interests’ if the trust is not an ‘exempt foreign 
trust’ as defined in subsection 94(1) (which can include cases where the trust elects 
not to be an exempt foreign trust). The new rules are not intended to impact upon 
legitimate commercial trusts. In respect of these NRTs, existing paragraph 94(1)(d) is 
carried forward, with some modifications, as new section 94.2 of the Act. For more 
information, see the commentary on new section 94.2.”667 
If a trust is deemed to be resident in Canada in terms of this section and has Canadian 
source income, the amount that a trust can deduct, if it makes a distribution to a non-
resident beneficiary, is limited.668 
                                                          
665 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(7). 
666 See ch 6.3.3.2 for a discussion of this provision. 
667 Minister of Finance Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act, the Excise Tax Act and Related 
Legislation 15–16. 
668 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(7.01) and Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault 
Analysis 53–54. This provision is not dealt with in detail in this dissertation. 
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Non-resident trusts that are not subject to section 94(3) are subject to tax on income having 
a substantial economic connection to Canada 669 and are subject to withholding tax on 
income that is otherwise sourced in Canada.670 
If a non-resident trust distributes income to a Canadian resident beneficiary, the amounts 
are taxable if they are in the form of income, and are not taxable otherwise. However, 
income is not defined for this purpose. The income does not retain its nature for Canadian 
tax purposes (treated as income from property) and a Canadian resident beneficiary is 
unable to obtain credit for foreign taxes paid by the trust.671 
3.4.7 Conclusion 
Canada may be regarded as utilising the deduction system to ensure that double taxation 
between the trust and the beneficiary is avoided.672 A trust is regarded as an individual for 
income tax purposes and is thus a taxpayer that may be liable to tax on its income. Generally 
speaking, a trust is taxed insofar as the income is not taxed in the hands of the beneficiary. 
This outcome is achieved by allowing the trust to deduct income taxed in the beneficiary’s 
hands. The beneficiary is then taxed on income payable to the beneficiary and deducted by 
the trust. Generally, income does not retain its nature when it is passed on through a trust to 
a beneficiary, although there are important exceptions to this rule. Under certain 
circumstances, the income is not taxed in the hands of the trust or the beneficiary, but is 
attributed to and taxed in the hands of the settlor. 
3.5 The Netherlands 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Until 2010, there was little or no legislation involving the taxation of trusts in the 
Netherlands. Case law and policy statements by the authorities determined the taxation of 
the relevant parties to the trust. Taxpayers were encouraged to reach an agreement with 
the tax authorities on all the tax issues in advance.673 However, in 2010, legislation which 
aims to govern the taxation of trusts entered into force.674 Trusts, especially discretionary 
trusts, were seen as abusive675 and the legislation was an attempt to address this abuse. This 
legislation is discussed below. 
                                                          
669 That is, income earned by a non-resident who is employed in Canada, carries on business in Canada or who 
disposes of taxable Canadian property. Permissible expenses and deductions may be deducted in calculating 
the income. (Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.1.1). 
670 Brown in Topical Analysis paras 4.1.1 and 4.3.1. 
671 Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.2.2. 
672 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References to 
US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 78. 
673 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 224; 
Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65. 
674 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a. 
675 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 251. 
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3.5.2 Afgezonderd particulier vermogen 
The legislation introduces the concept of an afgezonderd particulier vermogen (APV), 
translated as separated private property,676 separate private fund,677 or separated private 
assets.678 Wheeler describes an APV as follows: 
“[I]t has a private aim that is more than incidental; the separation of the fund is not 
carried out in exchange for the issue of any shares, profit shares, membership rights, 
shared entitlement or comparable rights; and the separation of the fund does not give 
any shared economic entitlement. The separation of assets into such a fund is defined 
as: separating assets in such a fund for no consideration or on abnormal conditions; or 
transferring assets to such a fund that has a private aim that is more than incidental 
and that is a private aim of the transferor or defined family members of the 
transferor.”679 
Clearly, companies with a share capital, mutual funds and partnerships are not covered by 
this definition.680 However, the rest of the definition is vague. It is, for example, unclear what 
the term private (in “private purpose”) means. According to Auerbach it refers to “a limited 
group of people, usually a family”.681 He further asserts that the words “more than 
inessentially” mean more than ten to fifteen per cent, but that it is unclear how this 
percentage should be measured. Some authors are of the view that the definition was 
deliberately left equivocal in order to accommodate hybrid arrangements and other entities 
that will be developed in future.682 It has been asserted that, in determining its status as an 
APV, it is irrelevant whether an entity has juristic personality or not.683 
Authors agree that irrevocable discretionary trusts will be regarded as APVs.684 However, 
some doubt whether fixed (or vesting) trusts will be regarded as APVs, because such trusts 
                                                          
676 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 250. 
677 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65. 
678 Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 413. 
679 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65. Auerbach translates the definition as follows: “[A]n entity, with 
or without legal personality, that more than inessentially serves a private purpose, unless against the 
separation of property (a) shares, jouissance rights, membership rights, certificates of joint entitlement or 
similar rights were issued, or (b) a joint economic entitlement was created” (Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in 
Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 251). The definition is contained in the Wet 
inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 2 and reads as follows: “[E]en afgezonderd vermogen waarmee meer dan 
bijkomstig een particulier belang wordt beoogd, tenzij tegenover de afzondering van dit vermogen: a. een 
uitreiking van aandelen, winstbewijzen, lidmaatschapsrechten, bewijzen van deelgerechtigdheid of daarmee 
vergelijkbare rechten heeft plaatsgevonden, of b. een economische deelgerechtigdheid is ontstaan”. 
680 Also, if “een stichting toch als algemeen nut beogende instelling kan worden aangemerkt”, it will not be 
regarded as an APV in terms of regulation (Bresser Belastingplicht voor de Vennootschapsbelasting van 
Stichtingen en Verenigingen 129). 
681 Support for this view may be found in Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 
66. 
682 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 252; 
Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 66 and Bresser Belastingplicht voor de 
Vennootschapsbelasting van Stichtingen en Verenigingen 128. 
683 Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 66. 
684 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 251; 
Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65; Boer and Freudenthal (2009) June WPNR 507 508; Roelofs (2010) 
6887 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1632 1636. 
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would constitute shared economic entitlements (economische deelgerechtigdheid).685 If this 
view is correct, it would mean that fixed trusts would still be governed by the position prior 
to the introduction of the relevant legislation.686 
If a trust is regarded as an APV, the implication is that the income, expenses, assets and 
liabilities of the APV are attributed back to the contributor for income tax purposes.687 
Typically, the settlor of a trust will also be the contributor for purposes of an APV, but this is 
not necessarily so.688 Upon the contributor’s death, the income is attributed to his or her 
heirs (in terms of the will or the rules of intestate succession) in proportion to their 
entitlements to the contributor’s estate. On an heir’s death, the attribution is made 
proportionally to his or her heirs and so the process continues.689 In order to prevent the 
possible avoidance of the legislation, heirs who were disinherited, but who are still 
beneficiaries of the APV, are treated as heirs for attribution purposes.690 Nevertheless, if an 
heir is not and cannot become a beneficiary of the APV, the attribution of income will not 
apply to him or her.691 If there are both fixed (or vested) beneficiaries and discretionary 
beneficiaries in a trust, Auerbach contends that the APV legislation (and therefore 
attribution to the contributor) will only apply to the “discretionary part” of the trust.692 If 
there is more than one contributor, he argues that the attribution will take place “on a pro 
rata basis”.693 
3.5.3 The APV legislation is not applicable 
If a trust is not regarded as an APV, the trustee cannot be taxed in relation to the trust assets 
as the trustee lacks any economic interest.694 
                                                          
685 Boer and Freudenthal (2009) June WPNR 507 508; Roelofs (2010) 6887 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1632 1635. 
686 Roelofs (2010) 6887 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1632 1635. 
687 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 1. An exception applies if the trust carries on a business and is 
subject to tax on its net profit at at least ten per cent (Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 7 Wheeler 
(2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65; Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of 
International Tax Law 253; Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 376). 
688 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 252; 
Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65; Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken 
Loonbelasting 68 and Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 413. 
689 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 1; Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 252; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65 and Heithuis et al 
Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 69. If, however, the contributor, his or her partner, or 
heirs cannot be identified, the income will be attributed to the beneficiary of the APV (Wet inkomstenbelasting 
2001 s 2.14a para 5; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65; Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 252–253). 
690 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 4; Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 252 and Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken 
Loonbelasting 70. 
691 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a para 6; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 65; Auerbach in 
Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 253 and Heithuis et al 
Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 69. 
692 See also Heithuis et al Inkomstenbelasting alsmede Hoofdzaken Loonbelasting 68. 
693 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 252. 
694 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 242–243; 
Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 64; Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en 
vennootschapsbelasting 313–314. 
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In terms of the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting,695 the Dutch corporate income tax 
legislation, only certain listed entities that are resident in the Netherlands are subject to tax 
on their worldwide income. However, the trust does not fall within any of these entities and 
can, accordingly, not be subject to comprehensive corporate income tax.696 Some non-
resident trusts will qualify as doelvermogens (purpose funds),697 which would mean that 
they will be subject to corporate income tax under the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 
1969 in respect of certain of their Dutch income.698 A trust is not subject to personal income 
tax in terms of the Wet inkomstenbelasting.699 
If the argument, that a fixed (or vesting) trust is not an APV, is correct, the beneficiaries of 
such a trust may be liable to tax. Should the payments be regarded as periodic payments, 
these payments may be taxed in either box one or box three.700 If the distribution represents 
a consideration for another payment, the value of the right to the distribution will fall in box 
three. If the periodic payment is not paid as consideration for another payment, it will be 
taxed in box one.701 If the payment is not a periodic payment and the trustee is obliged to 
pay all the income of the trust to the beneficiary, it will not fall in box one and the 
beneficiary will be taxed as if he or she is a usufructuary of the trust assets.702 
The settlor of a trust is, generally speaking, not subject to tax on the trust’s income. If, 
however, a trust is regarded as transparent, the trust is disregarded and the assets are 
attributed directly to the settlor. The implication is that the settlor will be taxed on the 
income as if these assets were his or hers. A revocable trust is an example of a trust that may 
be regarded as transparent, although the facts of each case should be considered carefully 
as some revocable trusts will not be regarded as transparent. In the case of irrevocable 
trusts, the trust assets will not be attributed to the settlor, unless the trust is regarded as 
transparent (for example, if the settlor is also the trustee).703 
                                                          
695 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. 
696 Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 303–306; Auerbach in 
Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 243. Both these authors 
mention the business trust as a possible exception to this statement, but only if the business trust is regarded 
as a juristic person. Therefore, if a trust is regarded as a juristic person, it will qualify as one of the listed 
entities and could be liable to corporate income tax if it is also regarded as a resident in the Netherlands. Since 
business trusts fall outside the scope of this dissertation, the point will not be further considered, save to 
mention that in none of the jurisdictions studied in this dissertation is a business trust regarded as a juristic 
person (see ch 2.7).  
697 The term doelvermogen is not defined in the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969 and its exact content 
is uncertain. The Anglo American trust has been described as the standard example of an entity that would 
qualify as a doelvermogen (Stevens Belastingplicht in de Vennootschapsbelasting 149; Boer De Anglo-
Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 307). 
698 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969 s 3; Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 244; Te Spenke and De Vries Taxation in the Netherlands 41; Pijl in Cahiers 
de Droit Fiscal International: Conflicts in the Attribution of Income to a Person 460. 
699 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001. 
700 Personal income tax is levied in terms of the Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001, which uses three different boxes 
into which income is classified. 
701 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 246. See 
also Roelofs (2010) 6887 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1632 1634. 
702 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 246. 
703 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 244–245. 
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3.5.4 Conclusion 
The entry into force of the APV regime has marked an enormous change in the way that a 
trust and the parties thereto are taxed in the Netherlands. The effect of the APV legislation is 
that the settlor of the trust will almost always be taxed on the trust income. Although there 
is some debate regarding the meaning of the term APV, it is reasonably clear that a 
discretionary trust will be regarded as an APV. Consequently, the income of a discretionary 
trust will usually be attributed to the settlor and taxed in his or her hands. Some argue that a 
fixed trust cannot be regarded as an APV. If this view is correct and the APV regime is not 
applicable, the (uncertain) position prior to the introduction of the APV legislation will 
prevail. 
3.6 Conclusion 
All of the states under discussion in this dissertation have the same broad policy aim, namely 
that income passing through a trust is taxed only once. These states use different 
mechanisms to achieve this aim, with South Africa following the initial choice system, the 
United Kingdom following the credit system, Canada following the deduction system and the 
Netherlands following a system of attributing trust income to the settlor. It may also be 
noted that all of the states address tax avoidance through the use of trusts, a point which 
will be reverted to below. 
In both South Africa and Canada, the trust itself may be a taxpayer. The position in the 
United Kingdom is different, where the trustees are viewed as if they were a single person, 
distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the trust. Thus, the trustee is regarded as 
the taxpayer and not the trust itself. In the Netherlands, the trust or the trustee is not taxed 
if the APV regime applies. If it does not, neither the trust nor the trustee will, generally, be 
taxed. 
In the United Kingdom and in Canada, the trust income is included in the trustee’s (United 
Kingdom) or the trust’s (Canada) income. In the case of Canada, the amount payable to the 
beneficiary is then deducted, whereas in the United Kingdom the beneficiary receives a 
credit for the tax paid by the trustee. In South Africa, if the beneficiary is liable to tax, no 
inclusion of the income in the trust’s hands takes place and in the Netherlands, if the APV 
regime applies, the income is attributed to the settlor and the trust is not taxed. In all of 
these states, except for the Netherlands under the APV regime, the amount on which a 
beneficiary is to be taxed is included in his or her income. A further similarity between South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada is that the distribution of accumulated income of a 
discretionary trust704 to the beneficiary is free of any income tax in the beneficiary’s hands. 
In South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada, it is not a requirement that income in fact 
be paid to the beneficiary for it to be regarded as the beneficiary’s income for tax purposes. 
As long as the beneficiary has an enforceable right to the income, it will be regarded as the 
beneficiary’s income, irrespective of whether it has actually been paid to the beneficiary. 
In South Africa income retains its nature (or character) as it flows through the trust and the 
trust is seen as a mere conduit. The position in the United Kingdom is different in respect of 
                                                          
704 That is, income that is not distributed to the beneficiary in the year in which the trust obtains the income. 
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discretionary trusts, where the trust is regarded as the source of the income and not the 
underlying assets. In the case of a fixed interest trust, the underlying assets (and not the 
trust itself) of an English law trust is regarded as the source of the income, but in respect of 
“Garland jurisdictions” the trust is seen as the source of the income. In principle, Canada 
deems income included in the hands of a beneficiary of a trust to be income from a trust. 
There are, however, a few important exceptions to this rule. It is submitted that all three of 
these jurisdictions feature the flow-through of the nature of the trust income to a greater or 
lesser extent. 
As mentioned earlier, all of the states under discussion have rules intended on curbing tax 
avoidance through the use of trusts. All of these states attribute income of the trust to the 
settlor under certain circumstances.705 In the Netherlands, the income is almost invariably 
attributed to the settlor (although there is an exception to this rule). In South Africa, the 
United Kingdom and in Canada, income is attributed to the settlor if the trust is created for 
the benefit of a minor child or a spouse706 of the settlor or if the settlor retains a fair 
measure of control over the trust, for example by retaining the power to revoke the trust. In 
South Africa, if a resident settlor makes a donation settlement or other disposition to a non-
resident trust which results in the trust receiving an amount which would have constituted 
income, had the trust been a resident, the income is attributed to the settlor. Broadly similar 
legislation is found in the United Kingdom in its transfer of assets abroad legislation, 
although the South African legislation may be wider in scope and is not limited “to situations 
in which the resident transferor can obtain any benefit from the income, nor is there any 
escape clause if the transferor can demonstrate that the transfer was not made for tax 
avoidance reasons”.707 In South Africa, income is also attributed to the settlor if, broadly 
speaking, the beneficiary’s receipt of the income is delayed until the happening of an event 
stipulated by the settlor. 
A further point illustrating the anti-avoidance policy of all the states under discussion, is that 
they all tax trusts (or the trustee) at a very high tax rate, making a trust an unattractive 
vehicle from a tax perspective. 
South Africa, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands furthermore have provisions dealing 
with non-resident trusts and non-resident beneficiaries. Broadly speaking, South Africa and 
the United Kingdom apply their usual rules to these trusts and beneficiaries, subject to the 
limitation that income must be from a source in that country to be taxable. However, both of 
these states also have specific rules relating to non-resident trusts (for example, sections 
7(8) and 25B(2A) in South Africa) or non-resident beneficiaries (for example, a beneficiary 
that is not resident in the United Kingdom can only receive the tax credit if the trustee is 
resident in the United Kingdom). Broadly speaking, Canada employs a unique set of rules in 
respect of non-resident trusts. 
In conclusion, there are many similarities regarding the taxation of trusts between the states 
considered in this dissertation. Given the similar policy considerations, these similarities are 
to be expected. However, there are also marked differences between the systems employed 
                                                          
705 Obviously the exact circumstances under which these provisions apply differ from state to state. Only the 
general trends are noted here. 
706 In all three states the provisions cover not only married persons, but also partners. 
707 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 275. 
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to achieve the policy. Given that each exercises its sovereignty in making its own tax laws, 
these differences are also predictable. As will become evident in the further chapters of this 
dissertation, these similarities and differences significantly influence the outcome of the 
application of the OECD MTC to a trust (and the other parties to the trust) by each of the 
relevant states. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the interpretation and status of double taxation treaties (DTT)708 in 
each of the relevant states. The purpose of this chapter is to create a backdrop for the 
further chapters of this dissertation, in which the relevant provisions of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) will be 
analysed to determine how trusts are to be treated in terms of the OECD MTC. Without this 
vital backdrop, the references to the OECD MTC, its commentary and reports in later 
chapters may not be appreciated. Also, the influence of interpretation and status accorded 
to its treaties in relation to other legislation in each state will become apparent in later 
chapters. 
This aim of providing the required backdrop is achieved by sketching, briefly, the background 
to the OECD and its model tax convention. After making certain general points regarding the 
interpretation of treaties, each of the relevant countries’ approach to treaty interpretation 
will be discussed. Lastly, the status of DTTs in each of the states will be addressed. 
Throughout this chapter the emphasis will fall on the South African position.709 
4.2 Background to the OECD MTC 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developent (OECD) was formed in 1961. Its 
predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was created in 
order to manage the Marshall plan, which was financed by the United States of America 
(USA) to rebuild Europe after the Second World War. When the USA and Canada joined the 
OEEC, the OECD was formed. Currently there are 34 member countries,710 including the 
United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands.711 Although South Africa is not a member of 
the OECD, it is part of the Enhanced Engagement proposal, which means that South Africa 
participates in some of the OECD’s activities, such as regular economic surveys.712 South 
Africa is also part of the group of non-OECD member countries whose positions on the OECD 
MTC are set forth in a section to the OECD MTC.713 
Decisions of the OECD are taken by consensus by its Council and are binding on member 
countries. Recommendations, which are also made by consensus by the Council, are not 
                                                          
708 This part of the dissertation draws on the research contained in an earlier article (Du Plessis (2012) 24 SA 
Merc LJ 31 ). 
709 The reasons for this emphasis are twofold. Firstly, the dissertation is written from a South African 
perspective and, secondly, there is limited literature available on this topic in South Africa.  
710 OECD "History" 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761863_36952473_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed 
on 27/05/2011). 
711OECD "Members and Partners" 
<http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed on 
27/05/2011). 
712 OECD "Enhanced Engagement" 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_201185_41668772_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed on 
27/05/2011).  
713 South Africa has observer status, meaning that South Africa’s views (that is the parts of the OECD MTC and 
Commentary with which South Africa agrees or disagrees) are published separately by the OECD (Kobetsky 
International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 159).. 
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binding.714 Specialised committees are formed to work on specific policy areas.715 One of 
them is the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), which has several working parties.716 After 
consensus is reached within a working party, it makes recommendations to the CFA and, if 
approved, these are forwarded to the Council for adoption.717 
The OECD has published a number of model tax conventions and draft model tax 
conventions, including the loose-leaf OECD MTC, which was first published in 1992. This 
model convention is updated every two to three years.718 The last update, and the one on 
which this dissertation is based, was approved by the OECD Council in July 2010.719 Each 
model tax convention is accompanied by commentary drafted by the CFA.720 Member 
countries of the OECD may enter reservations to the articles of the OECD MTC in order to 
preserve their freedom to depart from the OECD MTC. They may also enter observations to 
the commentary to indicate how they will apply the provisions of a particular article.721 
Although the OECD MTC is not an international treaty and therefore not binding on the 
OECD member states, its influence has been widely acknowledged. Both members and non-
members of the OECD use the OECD MTC as a basis for negotiating DTTs722 and the vast 
majority of treaties entered into used the OECD MTC as basis.723 Indeed, the OECD MTC has 
been described as the “keystone of the tax treaty system”.724 
                                                          
714 Ward (2006) 60 BFIT 97 97. 
715 OECD "Who does What?" 
<http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed on 
27/05/2011). 
716 Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the 
OECD Model 9; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital para A.01. 
717 Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the 
OECD Model 11; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital para A.04. 
718 Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the 
OECD Model 7–8; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 158; 
Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 25; Olivier and Honiball 
International Tax: a South African Perspective 268. 
719 OECD "OECD approves the 2010 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention" 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en_2649_33747_45689952_1_1_1_1,00.html> (accessed on 
27/05/2011). 
720 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para A.06; Ward (2006) 60 BFIT 97 97. 
721 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para A.08. 
722 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para A.07; OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 13–14; Kobetsky 
International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 157; Panayi Double Taxation, Tax 
treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 25. 
723 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para A.11; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 159. 
724 Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 159. 
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4.3 Interpretation of the OECD MTC725 
In this paragraph, general comments will be made regarding the interpretation of DTTs (the 
OECD MTC). Thereafter, the interpretation of treaties in each of the relevant states will be 
discussed. 
4.3.1 General points regarding the interpretation of DTTs 
Any DTT has a dual nature: firstly, it is an international agreement entered into between two 
states (that is, a bilateral agreement) and, secondly, it becomes part of domestic law. As an 
international agreement, it is subject to the rules of interpretation of other treaties, in other 
words, public international law, but as domestic law it is subject to the rules applicable to 
domestic legislation.726 
Under public international law, the treaty is to be given an autonomous meaning (that is, the 
meaning of the treaty irrespective of the domestic law of the relevant states).727 In terms of 
public international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention)728 contains rules regarding the interpretation of treaties.729 Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands have ratified the Vienna Convention.730 Even though South 
Africa has not ratified the Vienna Convention, most authors agree that South Africa is, 
generally speaking, bound by the provisions of the Vienna Convention, as it is merely a 
codification of customary international law.731 However, in Harksen v President of the 
Republic of South Africa732 the Constitutional Court stated that the extent to which the 
Vienna Convention reflects customary international law is by no means settled. Yet it 
assumed that a particular provision of the Vienna Convention did reflect customary 
international law and, therefore, formed part of South African law. The point has been made 
that although the court cast doubt on whether the Vienna Convention reflects customary 
international law, articles 32 and 31, dealing with the interpretation of treaties, are generally 
                                                          
725 The topic of the interpretation of DTTs is very extensive and literature on the topic abounds. This 
dissertation will not attempt to discuss the interpretation of DTTs comprehensively. Rather, the most 
important issues will be highlighted. Art 3(2) of the OECD MTC is discussed in ch 5 of this dissertation. Other 
specific points regarding the interpretation of treaties will be addressed in later chapters as they crop up. 
726 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.02; Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 12–000; Avery Jones (2001) 55 BFIT 220 222. 
727 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Adan [2001] 2 WLR 143; Avery Jones (2001) 55 BFIT 
220 222. 
728 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
729 Not all authors agree that the Vienna Convention is useful when it comes to the interpretation of treaties. 
According to Arnold “the provisions of the Vienna Convention dealing with the interpretation of tax treaties are 
largely meaningless. Art. 31 is so vague and general and selfevident that it cannot provide any real guidance for 
– or control over – the interpretive process. Art. 32, which appears to be more rule-like, is equally meaningless 
because it allows reference to supplementary materials in all instances, but then attempts to limit the use (but 
not the weight) of such material. It is not surprising then that Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention do not 
appear to have had any practical effect on the interpretation of tax treaties in actual cases” (Arnold (2010) 64 
BFIT 1 8). This view is shared by Ward (Ward (2006) 60 BFIT 97 98). 
730 Anonymous "Trade Treaties International Conventions" <http://www.jurisint.org/en/ins/421.html> 
(accessed on 31/05/2011). 
731 Scholtz (2004) 29 SAYIL 202 207; Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 308; 
Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective 414.  
732 Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 825 (CC). 
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accepted as correctly indicating customary international law.733 In Glenister v President of 
the Republic of South Africa the majority of the court relied on art 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention, stating that “the subsequent practice of states in applying a treaty can be used 
to indicate how the states have interpreted the treaty and thus give content to treaty 
obligations”.734 The minority also quoted with approval from the Vienna Convention.735 The 
Constitutional Court’s reliance on the Vienna Convention adds weight to the view that the 
Vienna Convention forms part of South African law. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal in the 
United Kingdom is of the view that South Africa is bound to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention even though South Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention.736 
The point of departure when considering the Vienna Convention is article 26, which states 
that treaties are binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention then provide as follows: 
“Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
  
                                                          
733 West The Taxation of International (non-resident) Sportspersons in South Africa 24–25. 
734 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 187 and fn 43. 
735 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 91. 
736 Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578 para 17 where the 
court stated that “[t]he rules of interpretation set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are rules 
of customary international law and therefore binding on all States regardless of whether or not they are parties 
to that Convention”. 
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Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
The general trend amongst courts in various countries is to apply the rules of public 
international law to interpret DTTs and not the normal rules for the interpretation of 
domestic legislation.737 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention specifically refers to the 
ordinary meaning of a term. In this regard the ordinary meaning has been described as “the 
meaning that naturally flows from a reading of the text considering its object and purpose 
and taking into account the common intention of the parties. This refers to the way that a 
specific term would be understood in that particular context”.738 
As stated in the relevant articles of the Vienna Convention, courts may also use extrinsic 
aids739 to interpret a DTT, one of which is the OECD Commentary to the OECD MTC.740 
Although there are several categories of material mentioned in articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention in which the Commentary may be classed in order to provide a basis for 
their use in the interpretation of a DTT, the Commentary does not fit neatly into any of these 
categories. Futhermore, academic writers do not agree on the category in which the 
Commentary should be placed.741 
Despite this uncertainty, the courts in many countries use the OECD Commentary in the 
interpretation of treaties,742 but the exact basis on which they do so is unclear and not 
                                                          
737 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.02; Brincker in Silke on International Tax para 12.8.1. Arnold argues that DTTs should not be interpreted 
differently from domestic legislation. He provides a number of reasons usually given for the differences in 
interpretation, but argues that these differences, although real, do not justify different interpretational 
approaches (Arnold (2010) 64 BFIT 1 9–12).  
738 Sada Garibay (2011) 65 An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 3(2) of the OECD Model (2010) . 
739 Examples of extrinsic aids include the OECD MTC, its Commentary, travaux préparatoires and unilateral 
material. (Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para E.09.) 
740 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.09. 
741 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.12. According to Baker the possible categories are ”Article 31(1): material establishing the ordinary 
meaning to be given to terms of the treaty; Article 31(2): as part of the context of the treaty, an agreement 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, or an instrument made by one or 
more parties and accepted by the other parties; Article 31(3) a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty; Article 31(4) material establishing a special meaning to be given to 
terms in the treaty; Article 32: as a supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty.” See also Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 164. 
742 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.10; OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 29.1; Crown Forest 
Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802. 
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frequently explicitly stated by the courts.743 The OECD itself certainly intended that the 
Commentary be used in the interpretation of DTTs.744 The OECD Commentary are not 
considered binding rules of international law.745 Thus, although neither the OECD MTC nor 
its Commentary is legally binding on the courts, the courts often place significant weight on 
the Commentary, although the basis on which this is done is not always clear. 
A further point of uncertainty regarding the use of the Commentary is the version of the 
Commentary to be used. If a DTT was concluded in a given year and the OECD subsequently 
changed the Commentary, which Commentary is to be used when a dispute arises? The 
OECD’s view is that existing treaties should be interpreted in the spirit of the revised 
Commentary, as far as possible.746 The OECD concedes that if the revised articles or 
Commentary in substance differ from those used in previously concluded treaties, the 
revised Commentary are irrelevant.747 The OECD’s view that the latest version of the 
Commentary should be used is not shared by all.748 
4.3.2 South Africa 
4.3.2.1 The Constitution749 
The Constitution provides that customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament.750 Thus customary international 
law forms part of South Africa’s domestic law and can only be trumped by an act of 
Parliament or the Constitution. A South African court may take judicial notice of customary 
international law, which, in practice, would mean the consideration of judicial decisions, 
both foreign and South African, and international law treatises.751 A court would consider 
                                                          
743 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.12; Arnold (2010) 64 BFIT 1 8; Mössner (2010) 64 BFIT 16 ; Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax 
Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the OECD Model 31; Erasmus-Koen and Douma 
(2007) 61 BFIT 339 349; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 34. 
744 OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 29, although the OECD 
does not consider the Commentary as binding. The OECD has also made a non-binding recommendation that 
the OECD members follow the Commentary (Ward (2006) 60 BFIT 97 99; Engelen (2006) 60 BFID 105 105). 
745 Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the 
OECD Model 52. A contrary view is held by Engelen (Engelen (2006) 60 BFID 105 106–109). Some authors have 
described the Commentary as “soft law” (eg Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 45), 
although Ward et al are of the opinion that “attaching the description ‘soft law’ to the commentaries does not 
give the commentaries any status or position in international law that they would not have had in the absence 
of such a descriptive and somewhat ambiguous label” (Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties 
with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the OECD Model 38). 
746 OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 33. 
747 OECD Introduction to OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital paras 33–35. 
748 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.13; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 46; Kobetsky International Taxation of 
Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 167. For an overview of the approaches followed by courts in a 
number of countries as well as the views of academic authors, see Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax 
Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the OECD Model 95–110. 
749 Generally speaking the pre-1996 constitutional position will not be discussed. Treaties entered into by South 
Africa prior to the Constitution is regarded as binding on the country in terms of s 231(5) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
750Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 232. 
751 Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective 51. 
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these sources for guidance as to whether or not a particular rule is accepted as a rule of 
customary international law. As stated above, the Vienna Convention is considered to be a 
codification of customary international law and therefore forms part of South African law.752 
On the view that the OECD MTC and its Commentary are not international law, these will not 
form part of South African domestic law.753 
Futhermore, the Constitution provides that when interpreting any legislation, every court 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international 
law.754 On the basis that the OECD MTC and its Commentary are not international law, South 
African courts will not be obliged to interpret the Income Tax Act755 in a way that is 
consistent with the OECD MTC and its Commentary. 
4.3.2.2 Case law 
In the next paragraphs the limited South African case law on the interpretation of treaties 
will be discussed with a view to drawing a conclusion regarding South Africa’s approach to 
treaty interpretation. Reference will firstly be made to cases in which non-taxation treaties 
were interpreted and thereafter selected cases in which DTTs were interpreted, will be 
discussed. 
In Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd756 the Labour Appeal Court was requested to find that 
certain employees had a right to strike based on the relevant provisions of International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Organise and ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. It was 
submitted that these conventions formed part of South African law based on sections 231 
and 233 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the court made no finding regarding the 
basis on which the relevant ILO conventions formed part of South African law, but from the 
judgement it seems as if the court assumed that it was bound by these conventions. In 
interpreting the conventions, the court relied on an ILO report to the International Labour 
Conference by the Committee of Experts, unfortunately again without providing a basis for 
its reliance.757 
In Seton CO v Silveroak Industries Ltd758 the court had to interpret the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act,759 which was promulgated because South Africa 
was a party to the “New York Convention”. The court, basing its finding on section 233 of the 
Constitution, held that the decisions of other countries, which also incorporated the 
provisions of the convention into their national legislation, had persuasive authority. 
                                                          
752 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 232. 
753 For a contrary view see Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 312, who argue 
that the Commentary on the OECD MTC probably forms part of South Africa’s customary international law. 
754 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 233. 
755 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
756 Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 1009 (LAC). 
757 Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 1009 (LAC) paras 21–27. 
758 Seton Co v Silveroak Industries Ltd 2000 2 SA 215 (T). 
759 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 of 1977. 
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In S v H760 the court had to interpret the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (1980). The court referred to numerous foreign judgements 
and also to what it termed “Hague Convention jurisprudence in a number of international 
jurisdictions”.761 The court furthermore quoted with approval a decision in which the House 
of Lords held that a purposive construction had to be given to the relevant convention.762 
Furthermore, the court adopted a test which “gives effect to the spirit of the convention”.763 
In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing764 the court was called upon to interpret a 
provision in the DTT between South Africa and Switzerland. The treaty was based on the 
1963 OECD MTC and was domesticated by virtue of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act and 
therefore it was held by the court to have effect as if enacted into the Income Tax Act.765 The 
court acknowledged the widespread use of the OECD MTC by stating that: 
“This model has served as the basis for the veritable network of double taxation 
conventions existing between this country and other countries and between many 
other countries inter se.”766 
The court also observed that the DTT makes liberal use of what has been termed 
"international tax language”.767 The court a quo in Downing clearly referred to a certain 
passage in the OECD Report as part of its judgement. The Appellate Division quoted, with 
approval, the relevant part of the court a quo’s judgement in which it referred to the OECD 
Report.768 The Katz Commission regarded this part of the Appellate Division’s judgement as 
acknowledging the OECD’s commentary as an “important guide in interpreting concepts 
used in South African double taxation agreements,”769 a sentiment acknowledged by 
numerous authors.770 
Futhermore, the court in Downing preferred to interpret certain words in their “natural 
meaning”. It referred to the intention of the parties to the treaty and concluded that the 
article should be read as a whole in order to interpret it.771 
A clause in the DTT between South Africa and Germany was the focus of the court’s 
attention in ITC 1473.772 Without providing any grounds for doing so, the court, in order to 
support its interpretation of the relevant provision, referred to a letter by the German 
Ministry of Finance to the South African authorities, which seems to reflect an agreement 
between the countries regarding the interpretation of the relevant article. 
                                                          
760 S v H 2007 3 SA 330 (C). 
761 S v H 2007 3 SA 330 (C) para 44. 
762 S v H 2007 3 SA 330 (C) para 45. 
763 S v H 2007 3 SA 330 (C) para 49. 
764 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A). 
765 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) 522–523. 
766 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) 523. 
767 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) 523. 
768 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) 526. 
769 Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 5th Interim Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa - basing the South African 
Income Tax System on the Source or Residence Principle - Options and Recommendations para 4.1.2. 
770 Eg Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 311. 
771 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) 528. 
772 ITC 1473 1989 52 SATC 128 (C) 132. 
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In ITC 1503773 the court had to interpret an article in a treaty between South Africa and 
another country (its name not being mentioned in the report) for the avoidance of double 
taxation on income and profits derived from sea or air transport. The court held that the 
meaning of the treaty had to be determined according to the principles governing the 
interpretation of contracts in South Africa. The court held that it was obliged to determine 
what the language of the document would ordinarily be understood to mean and considered 
the fact that the arrangements in the treaty have the effect as if enacted in the Income Tax 
Act by virtue of section 108(2), to be irrelevant.774 The taxpayer and the Commissioner 
agreed in the statement of facts that they were entitled to refer to the text and Commentary 
of the 1977 OECD Model agreement without any admissions being made as to the 
evidentiary value and subject to permission of the court.775 In its judgement the court relied 
on the Commentary to the OECD Model in support of its conclusion.776 No reasons were 
given for the reference to the Commentary, but it may be explained by the agreement 
reached between the parties. 
In ITC 1544777 the court had to decide whether non-resident shareholders’ tax (NRST) 
imposed by South Africa fell foul of the non-discrimination article in the treaty between 
South Africa and the Netherlands. NRST was levied on dividends paid, inter alia, to 
companies which were not South African companies. A South African company paid 
dividends to its shareholder, a Dutch company, and tried to reclaim the NRST previously 
paid. The Dutch company argued that NRST discriminated against it on the basis of 
nationality and that such discrimination was prohibited by the non-discrimination clause in 
the South Africa-Netherlands treaty. The court found that NRST was indeed discriminatory 
against the Dutch company.778 The relevant treaty was domesticated in terms of section 
108(2) of the Income Tax Act and the court held that the effect of that section is 
“[t]o grant statutory relief in certain circumstances where the South African Act 
imposes a tax, where the provisions of a double-tax Convention grants an immunity or 
exemption from such tax to persons governed by the Convention. Tax is not payable to 
the extent to which an immunity or exemption from tax is granted in terms of a 
binding double tax Convention which has been proclaimed and thus has statutory 
effect.” 
The court held that, in the light of section 108 of the Income Tax Act, the non-discrimination 
provision in the treaty “governed” the relevant NRST provisions and that no NRST was 
therefore payable by the Dutch company. It is submitted that the court therefore found that 
the provisions of a DTT had the effect of limiting the tax imposed by a previously enacted 
section of the Income Tax Act. 
The DTT between South Africa and the United Kingdom was interpreted in ITC 1735.779 The 
court confirmed that the treaty had effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act by reason of 
                                                          
773 ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T). 
774 ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T) 347. 
775 ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T) 346. 
776 ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T) 348. 
777 ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 456 (T). 
778 ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 456 (T) 463. 
779 ITC 1735 2002 64 SATC 455. 
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section 108(2). When interpreting the term “athlete” in the relevant treaty, the court 
attributed the “modern ordinary meaning” to the term and concluded that the parties could 
not have intended that a more impractical and limited meaning should apply. In determining 
what the “modern ordinary meaning” was, the court referred, inter alia, to the work by 
Vogel.780 
In AM Moolla Group Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service781 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had to interpret a provision in a trade treaty between South Africa 
and Malawi for the reduction of certain customs duties. The court relied on the provisions of 
the Customs and Excise Act,782 which provides for the domestication of certain treaties, to 
conclude that the relevant treaty formed part of that Act. The court’s interpretation of the 
provisions of the treaty was based entirely on the fact that the treaty formed part of the 
Customs and Excise Act. Hence, it found that the meaning to be attached to a term used in 
the treaty, was the meaning ascribed to it in the relevant provision of the Customs and 
Excise Act (and regulations thereto) and not the ordinary meaning of the term. The court 
further held that, because the treaty formed part of the Customs and Excise Act and that, 
hence, the meaning of a term used in this Act was ascribed to the treaty, the interpretation 
of the treaty provisions must change when the Act is changed. 
In Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service783 the court had to decide whether Secondary Tax on Companies (STC), levied in 
terms of section 64B of the Income Tax Act, was a tax on dividends as provided for in article 
7 of the DTT between South Africa and Germany and, in the alternative, whether STC was a 
tax substantially similar to taxes previously charged in South Africa (and explicitly mentioned 
in the particular DTT). The court did not refer to the OECD MTC or its Commentary in the 
judgement. This may be partly explained because article 7 of the relevant DTA specifically 
requires the law of the country where the company paying the dividend is resident to be 
applied. Hence the court, in deciding the first argument, was entitled – as it did – to have 
regard only to South African law. 
Grundlingh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service784 afforded the court an 
opportunity to consider the treatment of partnerships under a DTT. The treatment of 
partnerships is dealt with in the OECD commentary and the OECD has also produced a 
comprehensive report on the matter.785 None of these sources were, regrettably, referred to 
by the court and the court therefore missed an opportunity, not only to comment on the 
legal status of the OECD Commentary and other materials,786 but also to gain assistance 
from these sources.787 
In a case touching on the interpretation of treaties, handed down in June 2011 by the 
Western Cape High Court in the matter of The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for 
                                                          
780 ITC 1735 2002 64 SATC 455 464. 
781 AM Moolla Group Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2003 65 SATC 414. 
782 Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 s 1 (definition of “the Act”) and s 49(1)(a). 
783 Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 70 SATC 195. 
784 Grundlingh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2009 72 SATC 1. 
785 Eg Commentary on the OECD MTC art 1 paras 2–6 and OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax 
Convention to Partnerships (1999). 
786 Hattingh (2010) 127 SALJ 38 45. This contribution also criticises the judgement on other points. 
787 Brincker in Silke on International Tax para 12.8.8. 
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the South African Revenue Service,788 the applicant, a Mauritian company, was the sole 
trustee of a trust, known as SISM, which was established and registered in Mauritius. The 
court was called upon, inter alia, to issue a declaratory order to the effect that SISM was not 
a “resident” of South Africa and that it had not carried on business through a “permanent 
establishment” in South Africa. Not only were the relevant definitions in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act relevant, but also the provisions of the DTT between South Africa and 
Mauritius, which included a definition of “resident”. It is important to note that although the 
South African Revenue Service’s (SARS) reasons for the assessment and the taxpayer’s (in 
other words the trustee’s) objection formed part of the papers in the application, the court 
was not asked to pronounce on the merits of either. The declaratory relief was aimed at 
establishing whether SISM was a “taxpayer”, which turned on the questions of whether it 
was a resident of South Africa or had conducted business through a permanent 
establishment. Much of the court’s judgement therefore focused on whether it had 
jurisdiction to grant the order prayed for. The court would only have jurisdiction if it had to 
decide a question of law and this was determined by whether the facts were fully found and 
sufficiently clear. In deciding this point in relation to the issue of residence, the court 
referred to the United Kingdom decision of Smallwood,789 but never referred to the OECD 
Commentary on article 4 (dealing with residence). Regarding the issue of permanent 
establishment, the court again did not refer to the OECD Commentary on the relevant 
article, even though there is Commentary pertinent to the points considered by the court. In 
neither of the two issues did the court refer to any international literature on the meaning of 
either of the relevant terms. Perhaps the court’s limited engagement with these issues may 
be explained if the nature of the relief prayed for is borne in mind, but given the fact that the 
court does make findings regarding residence and permanent establishment, its cursory 
consideration of these two important concepts is disappointing. 
The latest case dealing with the interpretation of treaties was that of Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd.790 Tradehold was incorporated in South 
Africa and on 2 July 2002 its board, at a meeting in Luxembourg, took a decision that all 
future meetings of the board of directors would be held in Luxembourg. The court confirmed 
that with that decision Tradehold’s place of effective management was moved to 
Luxembourg.791 At the relevant time the definition of resident792 provided that Tradehold 
remained a resident of South Africa for domestic tax purposes, because it was incorporated 
in South Africa. It was only when this definition was amended that Tradehold ceased to be a 
resident of South Africa in terms of the Income Tax Act. SARS assessed Tradehold for a 
deemed disposal of certain assets when Tradehold ceased to be a resident (an “exit tax”). 
Tradehold argued, successfully, that the DTT between South Africa and Luxembourg 
prevented South Africa from taxing the relevant gain. Regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty, the court held that: 
                                                          
788 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. This case 
will also be discussed in greater detail in ch 6 of this dissertation. 
789 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
790 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). This case is 
reverted to in ch 6. 
791 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 3. 
792 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
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“The DTA is based upon the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital agreed to 
by the committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which has served as the basis for similar 
agreements that exist between many countries. In interpreting its provisions one must 
therefore not expect to find an exact correlation between the wording in the DTA and 
that used in the domestic taxing statute. Inevitably, they use wording of a wide nature, 
intended to encompass the various taxes generally found in the OECD member 
countries. In addition, because the double tax agreements are intended to encompass 
not only existing taxes, but also taxes which may come into existence at later dates 
(see Art 2(2)), and bearing in mind the complex nature of taxation in the various 
member countries, inevitably the wording in the DTA cannot be expected to match 
precisely that used in the domestic taxing statute. In SIR v Downing supra Corbett JA 
remarked at 523C-D: 
‘The convention makes liberal use of what has been termed “international tax 
language” (see Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society, 
1960 AC 459 at p 480).’” 
The court also adopted the approach of a United Kingdom court in interpreting a DTT, 
namely 
“that the first step in any interpretive inquiry is to ascertain where in the scheme of 
the double tax agreement the relevant tax falls, and then to consider whether the tax 
can be imposed consistently with the obligations undertaken thereunder.”793 
In Tradehold the relevant DTT provided that gains from certain alienations could only be 
taxed in the residence state.794 The court held that the term “alienation” in the relevant 
treaty “must be given a meaning that is congruent with the language of the DTA having 
regard to its object and purpose”.795 It also held that the parties to the DTT must have been 
aware of the relevant provisions in the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act and must have 
intended the treaty to apply to capital gains of the kind provided for in the Eighth Schedule. 
It therefore held that a deemed disposal in terms of the Eighth Schedule is an “alienation” 
for purposes of the DTT. 
On the basis of this overview of South African case law on the interpretation of treaties, the 
following general points can be made: 
(a) It seems that in those judgements where the South African courts have referred to the 
OECD MTC and its Commentary796 or other international instruments or reports,797 it 
has followed the international trend (referred to above) of being silent on the basis of 
the reference. In some cases no mention is made of the OECD model or its 
                                                          
793 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 20. 
794 Art 13(4) of the OECD MTC. 
795 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 23. 
796 See eg Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A); ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T); 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
797 See eg Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 1009 (LAC). 
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Commentary.798 South African courts might, therefore, refer to the OECD materials. 
But whether this will be done, and, if so, on what basis, may not be clear. As argued 
above, the Constitution does not seem to provide such a basis. 
(b) Both foreign precedent799 and the work of academic writers,800 are often relied upon 
as persuasive authority, a practice that is in line with the Constitution. 
(c) The courts will apply the provisions of a DTT and thereby limit or extinguish tax 
liabilities imposed by the Income Tax Act.801 Therefore, to the extent that a DTT is 
applied to legislation existing at the time that a DTT was entered into, the provisions of 
the treaty will be given precedence. It is submitted that this practice of South African 
courts are in line with section 233 of the Constitution, although courts rarely expressly 
refer to this provision on this point. 
(d) The courts generally seem to attribute the natural or ordinary meaning to words used 
in a treaty. To the extent that the natural or ordinary meaning of words is a reference 
to an autonomous treaty meaning (and not a meaning as conferred by the domestic 
law of the relevant states), South African courts appear to be following the 
international trend of interpreting the provisions of a treaty in accordance with public 
international law.802 This conclusion is supported by the many references in the cases 
to an interpretation in accordance with the intention of the parties803 (that is, the two 
contracting states). A case that stands in sharp contrast to the other cases is that of 
AM Moolla. In AM Moolla the court attributed the domestic law meaning to the treaty 
provision and even stated that the treaty meaning would change as domestic 
legislation changes, both findings based on the fact that the relevant treaty formed 
part of domestic legislation. No mention was made in the case of section 233 of the 
Constitution and the court’s obligation to interpret the relevant legislation in 
accordance with international law, provided that it is a reasonable interpretation. Nor 
was there any reference to any of the cases regarding treaty interpretation. It is 
submitted that the principles laid down in Downing and the other cases cited above, 
namely that the ordinary meaning should be attributed to the treaty, are preferable, 
especially in the light of the provisions of the Constitution. 
                                                          
798 See eg Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 70 SATC 
195; Grundlingh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2009 72 SATC 1; ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 
456 (T); ITC 1735 2002 64 SATC 455; The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service 74 SATC 127. 
799 See eg Seton Co v Silveroak Industries Ltd 2000 2 SA 215 (T); S v H 2007 3 SA 330 (C); The Oceanic Trust Co 
Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127; Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
800 See eg ITC 1735 2002 64 SATC 455; ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 456 (T). 
801 See eg Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A); ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 456 (T); ITC 1503 
1990 53 SATC 342 (T); Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 
(SCA). 
802 Olivier and Honiball suggest that domestic rules of interpretation should be the “initial focus” in interpreting 
DTTs, but that “international rules” also have to be taken into account (Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a 
South African Perspective 306–307). It is submitted that public international law (that is, the autonomous 
meaning) is, and should be, applied and not the domestic rules of interpretation. 
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4.3.3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, courts have acknowledged that a literal approach to the 
interpretation of DTTs is not appropriate as it may be inconsistent with the purposes of the 
treaty. If a provision is ambiguous, a purposive construction must be followed. It should be 
taken into account that the provisions were not drafted by English draftsmen and are not to 
be interpreted only by English judges. It should be interpreted on broad principles that are 
generally accepted and not in accordance with technical rules of English law or precedent. 
One of these broad principles is the rule embodied in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
requiring good faith in the interpretation of the treaty, in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. If this 
approach is followed, but the meaning of the provision is unclear, ambiguous or leads to an 
absurd result, supplementary means of interpretation may be consulted. These aids to the 
interpretation of the treaty, as well as foreign precedents (which may have persuasive value) 
and academic writings are not a substitute for the study of the terms of the treaty and their 
use is discretionary, not mandatory.804 In Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs, the court held that these principles set out above are largely derived from 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention and that there is no conflict between the two. 
The court furthermore stated that the formulation of these principles in the court cases was 
in the nature of a summary and that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention dealt with 
certain matters which were not included in this formulation.805 According to Schwarz 
“although the Commerzbank principles remain the central statement on tax treaty 
interpretation in UK law, the Court of Appeal has mandated a more systematic analysis by 
reference to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention (1969) in Ben Nevis”.806 
In Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA807 the court held that the 
term “beneficial owner” is to be given an international fiscal meaning not derived from the 
domestic laws of contracting states, confirming that an autonomous meaning should be 
given to the relevant tax treaty. The OECD Commentary has been used to interpret the 
meaning of specific articles in United Kingdom DTTs.808 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Sun 
Life Assurance Company of Canada v Pearson809 has stated that it is common ground that the 
court is entitled to consider the Commentary. In Ben Nevis, the Court of Appeal referred to 
certain academic authors, foreign case law, the OECD Commentary and a parallel treaty 
without commenting on the authority of any of these sources.810 The court did, however, 
refuse to admit expert evidence on the interpretation of the relevant DTT and Protocol, 
stating that its interpretation was a matter for the court.811 Regarding a memorandum of 
understanding entered into between the two tax authorities, the taxpayer argued that it 
                                                          
804 IRC v Commerzbank AG [1990] STC 285 297–298; Memec plc v IRC 1998 [1998] STC 754 766; Commissioners 
for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 26. 
805 Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578 para 17. 
806 Schwarz (2014) 68 BFIT 20 22. 
807 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158. 
808 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 313; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: 
a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para E.10. 
809 Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Pearson [1986] STC 335 CA. 
810 Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578 paras 33 and 35–38. 
See also Schwarz (2014) 68 BFIT 20 22–24.  
811 Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578 para 34. 
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could not be used to interpret the DTT and Protocol, since it was not entered into between 
the states. The court held that: 
“Notwithstanding the fact that the Memorandum of Understanding in the present case 
was concluded between the tax authorities of the Contracting States, I consider that it 
is admissible on the construction of the 2010 Protocol and the 2002 Convention 
pursuant to Article 31(2) and/or 31(3), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as an 
agreement relating to the treaty, which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty (Article 31(2)(a)) or a subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions (Article 31(3)(a)) or subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation (Article 31(3)(b)). The Memorandum of Understanding was concluded 
between the appropriate organs of the Contracting States for this particular purpose. 
Moreover, I note that in Commerzbank Mummery J. was not addressing the status of 
the joint statement in the context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”812 
4.3.4 Canada 
In Canada the courts have accepted that rules governing the interpretation of treaties are 
different to those governing the interpretation of domestic law. A more liberal approach is, 
therefore, applied in the interpretation of DTTs, in “the interests of the comity of nations”.813 
In Crown Forest Industries the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the paramount goal 
in interpreting a treaty is to find the meaning of the relevant words and that this process 
involves considering the language used and the intention of the parties.814 The courts have 
also accepted that the rules of the Vienna Convention are applicable to Canadian DTTs.815 
The Supreme Court has indicated that the OECD MTC and Commentary form part of the legal 
context of the treaty and, therefore, play an important role in the interpretive process.816 
These may then be referred to without the need to first find an ambiguity.817 In Her Majesty 
the Queen v Prévost Car Inc the Federal Court of Appeal also stated that the Commentary 
was “a widely-accepted guide to the interpretation and application of the provisions of 
existing bilateral conventions”.818 
4.3.5 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the courts have indicated that the OECD Commentary is of great 
importance in the interpretation of DTTs.819 Case law suggests that courts willingly look to 
                                                          
812 Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578 para 39. 
813 MNR v Saunders (1954) 54 DTC 524 526. See also Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802; 
Kandev (2007) 55 Canadian Tax Journal 31 35; Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African 
Perspective 311; Watson and Baum (2012) 60 Canadian Tax Journal 149 153. 
814 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 para 22. 
815 Hausman (2001) 55 BFIT 93 93; Kandev (2007) 55 Canadian Tax Journal 31 36. 
816 Ward (2006) 60 BFIT 97 99; Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 10.  
817 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802; RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc v R (1997) 97 DTC 
302 315. 
818 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 10. 
819 Van Brunschot (2005) 59 BFIT 5 6; Erasmus-Koen and Douma (2007) 61 BFIT 339 349. 
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the commentary for help in the interpretation of treaties.820 The Dutch Ministry of Finance 
has also acknowledged the importance of the OECD MTC and its Commentary in the 
interpretation of treaties.821 
4.4 Status of tax treaties 
There are different procedures by which DTTs form part of domestic law in each state.822 In 
some states the treaty automatically becomes part of domestic law when it takes effect. In 
other states the treaty becomes part of domestic law upon parliamentary approval, whilst in 
still others legislation is needed to make the treaty part of domestic law.823 In some 
countries, once the treaty becomes part of the domestic law, it has no higher status than any 
other law. If there is a conflict between the provisions of a tax treaty and the domestic 
income tax legislation, the question that arises is how the conflict should be resolved. In 
countries where a treaty has a higher status than domestic legislation, a conflict is resolved 
by the treaty’s higher status.824 
4.4.1 South Africa 
The Constitution provides that an international agreement binds the Republic only after it 
has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces.825 Futhermore, any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it 
is enacted into law by national legislation.826 In other words, in order to be bound on an 
                                                          
820 Van Brunschot (2005) 59 BFIT 5 10. 
821 Ministerie van Financiën Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid para 1.3.3. 
822 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.01. 
823 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.01. 
824 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.03; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 48. 
825 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 231(2). S 231(3) provides that an agreement of a technical, 
administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, 
entered into by the national executive binds the Republic, without the need for parliamentary approval. It is 
submitted that the provisions of s 108(2), which envisages parliamentary approval, indicate that DTTs are not 
of the kind referred to in s 231(3). In practice, DTTs are dealt with in terms of s 231(2) (Olivier and Honiball 
International Tax: a South African Perspective 295). 
826Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 231(4), which provides that “[a]ny international agreement 
becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation, but a self-executing provision 
of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. The concept of a self-executing provision is controversial. Scholtz is of 
the view that the incorporation of the concept of the self-executing provision in the Constitution is unfortunate 
and argues convincingly that the reference to self-executing provisions can be ignored (Scholtz (2004) 29 SAYIL 
202 216). Dugard asserts that a treaty will be self-executing “only if the language of the treaty so indicates and 
existing municipal law, either common law, or statute, is adequate in the sense that it fails to place any 
obstacle in the way of treaty application” (Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective 57). Ferreira 
and Scholtz approve of Dugard’s definition and add “that the only way in which a South African court can 
decide whether a treaty is a self-executing treaty in terms of section 231(4), is to establish first and foremost 
the extent to which the domestic law allows for the application of the provisions of the treaty and only 
thereafter decide whether the particular treaty should be declared to be self-executing or not” (Ferreira and 
Scholtz (2009) XL CILSA 264 269). See also Swanepoel (2013) 10 LitNet Akademies. Some academic authors are 
of the view that DTTs are not self-executing, (eg Brincker in Silke on International Tax para 12.7.1; Olivier and 
Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 304) whilst others argue that treaties are self-executing 
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international law level, South Africa requires parliamentary approval for a DTT. Thereafter, 
and in order for it to form part of South African domestic law, enactment by national 
legislation is required.827 
There are three methods available to the legislator by which a treaty may be incorporated 
into domestic law. One of these is an enabling act of Parliament which gives the executive 
the power to domesticate the treaty by means of proclamation or notice in the Government 
Gazette.828 The Income Tax Act provides that the national executive may enter into DTTs 
with other countries.829 It further provides that once Parliament has approved the relevant 
treaty, the treaty must be published in the Gazette, whereupon the treaty shall have effect 
as if enacted in the Income Tax Act.830 The Income Tax Act therefore constitutes the national 
legislation, required by the Constitution, by which the DTT becomes part of domestic law. 
Once a treaty has been domesticated via legislation, ordinary domestic statutory obligations 
are created.831 The minority judgement in Glenister stated the position more emphatically 
and suggested what would happen when a conflict arises: 
“It is implicit, if not explicit, from the scheme of s 231 that an international agreement 
that becomes law in our country enjoys the same status as any other legislation. This is 
so because it is enacted into law by national legislation, and can only be elevated to a 
status superior to that of other national legislation if Parliament expressly indicates its 
intent that the enacting legislation should have such status. On certain occasions, 
Parliament has done this by providing that, in the event of a conflict between the 
international convention that has been incorporated and ordinary domestic law, the 
international agreement would prevail. The amicus therefore properly accepted that, 
upon incorporation under s 231(4), an international agreement assumes the status of 
ordinary legislation in our law. In addition, the amicus also accepted, quite properly, 
that, if there is a conflict between an international agreement that has been 
incorporated into our law and another piece of legislation, that conflict must be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Hattingh (2009) 63 BFIT 442 446; Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 36.14). The view preferred in this 
dissertation is that a DTT is not self-executing.  
827 Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 36.14 is of the view that enactment by national legislation is not 
required. According to Hattingh, South Africa’s DTTs must be approved by Parliament in terms of s 231(2) of 
the Constitution, a DTT not being an agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession (as envisaged in s 231(3) of the Constitution). 
He argues, however, that South Africa’s DTTs are self-executing and therefore do not require national 
legislation in order to become law in South Africa. In terms of his argument, the purpose of s 108 is to 
empower the tax administration to carry out treaty obligations in the context of the powers granted under the 
Income Tax Act. S 108 therefore does not serve to grant rights to taxpayers in terms of the treaty. Hattingh 
states that s 108 of the Income Tax Act is not proper enacting legislation. His argument is based on the fact that 
South Africa does not pass separate legislation for each and every DTT entered into by South Africa, as is done 
in the United Kingdom.  
828 Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective 61, cited with approval in the minority judgement by 
Ngcobo CJ in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 55. The other two 
methods mentioned by Dugard are that the provisions of the treaty may be set out in the wording of an act of 
parliament and the treaty may be incorporated as a schedule to the legislation. See also Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 18. 
829 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 108(1). 
830 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 108(2). 
831 Per Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J delivering the majority judgement in Glenister v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181. 
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resolved by the application of the principles relating to statutory interpretation and 
superseding of legislation.”832 
In a footnote, the minority suggested that subsequent legislation, which conflicts with the 
legislation domesticating the international agreement, would supersede the domesticating 
legislation (in the absence of a provision in the domesticating legislation that it would prevail 
over subsequent legislation). However, since the matter was not before the court, it 
explicitly chose not to express a firm view on the matter.833 
The conclusion that may be drawn from the above is that, according to both judgements in 
Glenister,834 a treaty, once it is domesticated via legislation, has the same status as other 
legislation. In the case of DTTs, this would imply that a DTT, which is domesticated via 
section 108 of the Income Tax Act, enjoys no higher status than any other provision of the 
Income Tax Act.835 
In the AM Moolla case836 the court, whose judgement was centred wholly on the fact that 
the treaty formed part of the Customs and Excise Act, held that if there were to be an 
apparent conflict between general provisions of the Customs and Excise Act and particular 
provisions of the treaty, the Act must prevail. However, the treaty must be construed in such 
a way as to avoid any conflict between the Act and the terms of the treaty and on the facts 
the court found that the Act gave content to the expressions used in the treaty, with the 
result that no conflict arises between the Act and the treaty. 
The judgement in Moolla appears to be in conflict with the minority judgement in Glenister 
insofar as the Moolla case suggests that the provisions of the Customs and Excise Act will 
prevail over a treaty which forms part of the Act, whilst the minority judgement in Glenister 
clearly indicates that the normal principles of statutory interpretation must be followed to 
resolve the conflict. 
The status of DTTs was recently pronounced on in the case of Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service v Van Kets.837 In this case the Australian Tax Office (ATO) requested 
SARS to provide certain information in terms of the DTT between South Africa and Australia. 
The information required by the ATO related to an Australian resident, a certain Saville, and 
his links with a non-resident company known as RLCF. The relevant information was held by 
Van Kets and SARS attempted to use sections 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act838 to obtain 
information regarding Saville and RLCF from Van Kets. These sections enable SARS, “for the 
                                                          
832 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 100–101. 
833 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) footnote 88. 
834 For criticism against both the majority and minority judgements in Glenister, see Tuovinen (2013) 130 SALJ 
661. 
835 Brincker in Silke on International Tax para 12.2; Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African 
Perspective 303; Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 25. 
For a contrary view, see Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 36.14, who argues that “the Constitution 
places South Africa’s commitments under international tax treaties, once approved by Parliament, at a level 
superior to ordinary parliamentary legislation (such as the Income Tax Act)”. 
836 AM Moolla Group Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2003 65 SATC 414. 
837 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC). For further comment 
on the case see Anonymous (2011) 60 The Taxpayer 232 . 
838 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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purposes of the administration of the Act in relation to any taxpayer”, to procure 
information from such taxpayer or any other person. Van Kets argued that since neither 
Saville nor RLCF were “taxpayers”, as defined, SARS could not rely on the relevant sections in 
the Income Tax Act to obtain the information from him. A “taxpayer” is defined, inter alia, as 
any person chargeable with any tax under the Income Tax Act.839 Since Van Kets was not 
chargeable with tax, but merely held information, he could not be regarded as a taxpayer. 
SARS argued that these sections of the Income Tax Act were the means by which it invoked 
the power to obtain information requested by foreign revenue authorities in terms of DTTs. 
If Van Kets’s argument were to succeed, SARS argued that it would not have any legislative 
mechanism to obtain the information, available in South Africa, which it was obliged to 
provide to the foreign tax authorities, unless the information related to a “taxpayer”. 
Article 25 of the South Africa-Australia DTT provides, inter alia, as follows: 
“(1) The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this 
Agreement or to the administration or enforcement of the domestic law 
concerning taxes referred to in Article 2, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not 
contrary to the Agreement. The exchange of information is not restricted by 
Article 1.” 
And further: 
“(3) In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to 
impose on a Contracting State the obligation: 
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the law and 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State; 
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable by the competent authority 
under the law or in the normal course of the administration of that or of 
the other Contracting State[.]” 
The court cited section 108 of the Income Tax Act and referred to the dates and Gazettes by 
which the relevant treaty came into force and was amended, respectively. The court further 
referred to sections 231(2) to (4) of the Constitution and the majority judgement in 
Glenister, concluding that “[t]he effect of s 108 is thus to ensure that domestic statutory 
obligations are created”. Moreover, the court found, based on these sections in the 
Constitution and the guidance of the Constitutional Court in Glenister, that the Income Tax 
Act was an enabling act, giving the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in South 
African law by means of a notice in the Government Gazette.840 After reference was made to 
a textbook,841 the court found that the provisions of a DTT rank at least equally with 
domestic law, including the Income Tax Act and that the provisions of these two documents 
should, therefore, be “reconciled and read as one coherent whole”.842 The court held that 
the relevant DTT had to be interpreted as part of the Income Tax Act and that consequently 
                                                          
839 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
840 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 18. 
841 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 305. 
842 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 22. 
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sections 74A and 74B had to be interpreted so as to be compatible with the provisions of the 
DTT. The word “taxpayer” should, therefore, include those taxpayers who fall within the 
scope of the DTT. Since an Australian resident, such as Saville, would fall within the scope of 
the DTT, he would also be regarded as a taxpayer, making section 74 applicable to Van Kets 
as “any other person” who would be obliged to furnish information regarding a taxpayer, 
namely Saville. 
It was argued before the court that article 25 of the DTT expressly provides that South Africa 
is not obliged to carry out administrative measures at variance with South African law or 
supply information which is not obtainable under South African law. In terms of this 
argument, SARS’s powers are limited by sections 74A and 74B, read with the definition of 
“taxpayer”, to information relating to a taxpayer, as defined. Hence SARS could not provide 
the information requested by the ATO in terms of the DTT, as SARS was unable to use 
sections 74A and 74B to procure the information. It seems that the court did not directly 
address this point, save to state that such an argument would cause an inconsistency to the 
extent that SARS would not be able to comply with the ATO’s request. It then relies on the 
fact that the DTT forms part of the Income Tax Act and that the “compatible” interpretation, 
set out above, should be followed. 
The court therefore did not so much interpret the DTT, but rather chose to expand the 
meaning of the term “taxpayer” in the Income Tax Act, because of an article in the DTT. In 
effect, the court changed the meaning ascribed to a term in terms of the definition section. 
There is a long line of cases in South African law which deals with the departure from a 
defined term when interpreting legislation. Pertinent in tax matters is the case of 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Simpson,843 in which Watermeyer, CJ, stated that: 
“it seems to me that effect should be given to the rule laid down by Halsbury, Laws of 
England, in para. 591 of Vol. 31 (Hailsham ed.), viz.: 
‘A definition section does not necessarily apply in all the possible contexts in 
which a word may be found in the statute. If a defined expression is used in a 
context which the definition will not fit, it may be interpreted according to its 
ordinary meaning.’” 
In dealing with the same topic, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Hoban v Absa Bank Ltd t/a 
United Bank844 quoted, with approval, a passage from Canca v Mount Frere Municipality845 in 
which it was stated that: 
“The principle which emerges is that the statutory definition should prevail unless it 
appears that the Legislature intended otherwise and, in deciding whether the 
Legislature so intended, the Court has generally asked itself whether the application of 
the statutory definition would result in such injustice or incongruity or absurdity as to 
                                                          
843 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Simpson 1949 4 SA 678 (A) 692. 
844 Hoban v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 1999 2 SA 1036 (SCA) 1044. 
845 Canca v Mount Frere Municipality 1984 2 SA 830 (Tk). 
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lead to the conclusion that the Legislature could never have intended the statutory 
definition to apply.”846 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in the same case further explained that “context” should not 
be limited to parts of a legislative provision which immediately precede and follow the 
specific passage under examination, but includes the entire enactment in which the word 
appear, and in its widest sense also enactments in pari materia and the situation or 
”mischief” sought to be remedied. Futhermore, the court held that the legislative intention 
must be ascertained when analysing the context.847 The test accepted in the Hoban case has 
been approved in other judgements of the Supreme Court of Appeal,848 as well as by the 
Constitutional Court.849 
It seems that the court in the Van Kets case did not apply the test laid down in the above-
mentioned cases when it decided to expand the meaning of the word “taxpayer” to include 
those who fall within the scope of the DTT. It is submitted that the court’s finding that the 
DTT forms part of the Income Tax Act and ranks equally to all the other provisions of the 
Income Tax Act, is correct in the light of the Glenister case and the provisions of the 
Constitution. Bearing in mind the point made about the meaning of context in the Hoban 
case, it is fair to assume that the relevant DTT forms part of the context when interpreting 
the definition of “taxpayer”.850 The purpose of the relevant sections of the Income Tax Act 
and the articles of the DTT would also have to be ascertained to paint the full picture of the 
context. One would then have to ask whether the application of the definition of “taxpayer” 
would result in an injustice or incongruity or absurdity, given this context. 
Applying this analysis, the purpose of the relevant provisions will now be examined. The 
purpose of inserting a provision such as article 25 into a DTT is set out as follows by the 
OECD: 
“In the first place it appears to be desirable to give administrative assistance for the 
purpose of ascertaining facts in relation to which the rules of the Convention are to be 
applied. Moreover, in view of the increasing internationalisation of economic relations, 
the Contracting States have a growing interest in the reciprocal supply of information 
on the basis of which domestic taxation laws have to be administered, even if there is 
no question of the application of any particular article of the Convention.”851 
                                                          
846 Canca v Mount Frere Municipality 1984 2 SA 830 (Tk) 832. 
847 Hoban v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 1999 2 SA 1036 (SCA) 1044. 
848 ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd 1999 3 SA 924 (SCA); Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 
2003 1 SA 113 (SCA). 
849 Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 6 SA 129 (CC). 
850 The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011, s 151 tries to address the shortcoming in the definition of “taxpayer” 
highlited in the van Kets case by defining a “taxpayer” to mean, inter alia, “a person who is the subject of a 
request to provide assistance under an international tax agreement.” That Act continues to provide in s 46(1) 
that SARS may, for the purposes of the administration of a tax Act in relation to a taxpayer, whether identified 
by name or otherwise objectively identifiable, require the taxpayer or another person to, within a reasonable 
period, submit relevant material (whether orally or in writing) that SARS requires. The administration of a tax 
means, inter alia, to give effect to the obligation of the Republic to provide assistance under an international 
tax agreement. (Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 3(2)(i)). 
851 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 26 para 1. 
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The court in Van Kets did refer to the purpose of article 25 by way of an example, but no 
reference was made to the OECD MTC or its commentary. 
Croome and Olivier describe the purposes of sections 74A and 74B as ensuring that each 
taxpayer pays the correct amount of tax,852 that SARS may verify information contained in a 
tax return853 and to broaden the tax base.854 
The context within which the meaning of the definition of “taxpayer” is to be evaluated is, 
therefore, the whole of the Income Tax Act, which includes the relevant, equally ranking, 
DTT and the purpose of the relevant provisions as set out above. Articles 25(3)(a) and (b) of 
the DTT, which provide that South Africa is not obliged to act contrary to the Income Tax Act, 
limit South Africa’s obligations in terms of the DTT. This limitation forms part of the context 
and should inform the interpretation of the definition of “taxpayer”. It is, therefore, 
submitted that applying the defined meaning to the term ”taxpayer” would not result in an 
injustice or incongruity or absurdity. Consequently, it is submitted that the court was not 
justified in extending the meaning of the term “taxpayer” as it did in the case. 
It is furthermore submitted that the court should have considered the provisions of section 
233 of the Constitution. That section obliges the court to prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the word “taxpayer” and sections 74A and 74B, that is consistent with the 
relevant DTT,855 over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with such treaty. 
Articles 25(3)(a) and (b) themselves state that South Africa’s obligations under the treaty are 
limited to what is allowed under the Income Tax Act, namely articles 74A and 74B read with 
the definition of “taxpayer”. South Africa’s obligations in terms of article 25(1) of the DTT 
are, therefore, limited to that which is allowable in terms of the Income Tax Act. Interpreting 
the term “taxpayer” in accordance with its defined meaning would have been consistent 
with the relevant treaty, as is required by section 233 of the Constitution. 
In the recent case of Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd856 
the court again had the opportunity to pronounce on the status of DTTs in South Africa. The 
court referred to section 108 of the Income Tax Act, calling it “enabling legislation” and then 
held that “[o]nce brought into operation a double tax agreement has the effect of law”.857 
The court described the “legal effect” of a DTT by quoting a passage from Downing, which 
also stated that a treaty has effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act.858 
By referring to section 108 as “enabling legislation” the court, arguably, confirmed the 
argument set forth above, namely that the Income Tax Act, more specifically section 108, 
serves as the national legislation which is required to domesticate the international 
agreement entered into by the national executive.859 The court, however, did not address 
this point directly, which is a pity, given the divergence of views regarding the process 
required for domestication of DTTs. 
                                                          
852 Croome and Olivier Tax Administration 110. 
853 Croome and Olivier Tax Administration 111. 
854 Croome and Olivier Tax Administration 118. 
855 The DTT being a source of international law. 
856 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
857 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 16. 
858 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 16. 
859 As is required by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 231(4). 
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Regarding the court’s statement that “a double tax agreement has the effect of law”, it is 
noticeable that the court did not specifically state whether the DTT ranks higher, equally or 
lower than other domestic legislation.860 The court did refer to a passage in Downing in 
which it was stated that the treaty has effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act, giving the 
impression that the court views the treaty as part of the Income Tax Act. It is interesting to 
note that the court did not refer to the Glenister case, in which the majority of the court 
specifically held that ordinary domestic statutory obligations are created when a treaty is 
domesticated. However, the court continued to state the following: 
“Double tax agreements effectively allocate taxing rights between the contracting 
states where broadly similar taxes are involved in both countries. They achieve the 
objective of s 108, generally, by stating in which contracting state taxes of a particular 
kind may be levied or that such taxes shall be taxable only in a particular contracting 
state or, in some cases, by stating that a particular contracting state may not impose 
the tax in specified circumstances. A double tax agreement thus modifies the domestic 
law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to the extent that there is any 
conflict.”861 
It may be argued that the court, when it stated that a DTT applies in preference to domestic 
law, referred to domestic law existing at the time when the treaty came into effect. 
However, in the very next paragraph, the court acknowledges that “double tax agreements 
are intended to encompass not only existing taxes, but also taxes which may come into 
existence at later dates (see Art 2(2))”.862 The court was, therefore, very much aware of the 
influence of subsequent legislation on existing treaties. It is submitted that the court 
effectively stated that a DTT will always apply in preference to domestic law in the case of 
conflict. The court did not refer to the Glenister, Van Kets or AM Moolla decisions in making 
this point. 
In examining the South African case law863 regarding the conflict between the relevant act 
and DTTs in South Africa, it is submitted that three views may be distinguished: 
(a) The view expounded in AM Moolla, namely that the treaty forms part of the relevant 
act and in the case of conflict between the general provisions of the relevant act and 
particular provisions of the treaty, the act must prevail. However, the treaty must be 
construed in such a way as to avoid any conflict between the act and the terms of the 
treaty. In AM Moolla the court found, on the facts, that the Act gave content to the 
                                                          
860 In support of the view that a DTT and the Income Tax Act rank equally, it could possibly be argued that the 
court did not state the obvious, but that it meant to say that DTTs do not rank higher or lower than the Income 
Tax Act.  
861 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 17. 
862 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 18. 
863 Academic writers hold different views regarding the possibility of so-called “treaty override”. Hattingh is of 
the view that any attempt to override South Africa’s obligations in terms of a DTT by means of subsequent 
legislation will be unconstitutional (Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 36.14). Brincker suggests that 
since a DTT is not incorporated into domestic legislation by means of specific adoption, the treaty may override 
the national legislation except to the extent that the national legislation specifically provides otherwise 
(Brincker in Silke on International Tax 12.7.1). Olivier and Honiball also indicate that domestic legislation may, 
in some circumstances, override a DTT (Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 317). 
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expressions used in the treaty, with the result that no conflict arose between the Act 
and the treaty. 
(b) The Supreme Court of Appeal in Tradehold was of the view that a DTT modifies the 
domestic law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to the extent that there 
is any conflict. 
(c) In Glenister both judgements indicated that ordinary domestic statutory obligations 
are created once a treaty is domesticated via legislation. The minority was of the view 
that if there is a conflict between a domesticated international agreement and other 
domestic legislation, the conflict must be resolved by the application of the principles 
of statutory interpretation and superseding of legislation. The judgement in Van Kets 
seems to follow the minority’s view to the extent that the court in Van Kets found the 
provisions of a DTT to rank at least equally with domestic law and that the provisions 
of the Income Tax Act and the DTT should, therefore, be “reconciled and read as one 
coherent whole”. 
It is submitted that the preferred view is that of the minority in Glenister. Thus it is 
suggested that a DTT and the Income Tax Act, which domesticates the treaty, ranks equally 
and that in the case of conflict between the provisions of a DTT and the Income Tax Act, the 
normal principles of statutory interpretation should be followed to resolve the conflict.864 It 
is submitted that these principles would include: 
(a)  A reference to section 233 of the Constitution which compels a court to prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the Income Tax Act that is consistent with international 
law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. In 
other words, the Income Tax Act should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with 
South Africa’s DTTs, being a source of international law,865 unless such an 
interpretation is unreasonable. Therefore, a court will be compelled to interpret the 
Income Tax Act in such a way that taxation is limited in accordance with the provisions 
of a treaty, unless such an interpretation is unreasonable. It is argued above that South 
African courts have thus far not hesitated in letting the provisions of a DTT prevail over 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act (AM Moolla being an exception) and it is 
submitted that such an approach is in line with the Constitution. 
In interpreting subsequent legislation which conflicts with an existing treaty, a court 
would have to pay particular attention to the requirement of reasonableness. 
(b) The maxim lex posterior priori derogate,866 a rule specifically referred to by the 
minority in Glenister in the relevant footnote, albeit completely obiter. This rule has 
been described as follows: 
“A statutory provision clearly inconsistent and irreconcilable with its preceding, 
hierarchically equal or subordinate counterparts in pari materia revokes them to 
the extent of such inconsistency and irreconcilability.”867 
                                                          
864 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 315 seem to support this view. 
865 Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective 25. 
866 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 317. 
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The rule is, however, qualified in a number of respects, one of which is that 
subsequent legislation dealing in general terms with a matter will not prevail over 
more specific prior legislation (generalia specialibus non derogant).868 
If this rule were to be applied, it would be possible for subsequent provisions of the 
Income Tax Act to override provisions of a treaty. However, a treaty entered into after 
enactment of a relevant provision in the Income Tax Act would not be caught by such a 
rule. 
(c) The presumption that legislation does not violate international law.869 
4.4.2 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the power to make treaties rests with the Crown and authority to 
negotiate and conclude treaties is given to her agents.870 DTTs are binding on the United 
Kingdom in international law as soon as they are concluded, but they do not have effect as 
part of domestic law unless legislative action is taken. Therefore, the Taxation (International 
and Other Provisions) Act871 provides the enabling legislation for treaties to take effect in 
domestic law by providing that DTTs shall have effect if Her Majesty by Order in Counsel 
declares the arrangements made.872 Authority indicates that taxpayers’ rights accrue by 
virtue of the legislation incorporating the treaty and not by virtue of the treaty itself.873 
In the United Kingdom a subsequent treaty prevails over existing legislation.874 Two cases in 
the United Kingdom seem to suggest that subsequent legislation overrides an earlier 
treaty.875 However, the legislation relevant in these cases did not contain a provision similar 
to that in the current Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act, namely that “double 
taxation arrangements have effect in accordance with subsections (2) to (4) despite anything 
in any enactment”.876 Thus the relevant legislation provides that a treaty shall override 
legislation. One qualification must be added to this statement, namely that if Parliament 
specifically intended legislation to override a treaty, the legislation will prevail, and not the 
treaty.877 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
867 Du Plessis in LAWSA para 293. 
868 Du Plessis in LAWSA para 293. 
869 See the discussion of this presumption in Du Plessis in LAWSA para 388. 
870 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 10–100. 
871 Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. This Act repealed the Income and Corporation Taxes 
Act 1988 s 788, which previously governed DTTs. 
872 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 10–200. Schwarz in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Practical 
Issues in the Apprlication of Double Tax Conventions 703; Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping 
and the European Community 19; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 21. See also Commissioners 
for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 9. 
873 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.02; Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 19. 
874 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 10–600. 
875 IRC v Collco Dealings Ltd (1961) 39 TC 509 (HL); Woodend (KV & Ceylon) Rubber & Tea Co Ltd v CIR [1971] AC 
321. 
876 Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 s 6(1). Previously a similar provision was contained in 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 s 788(3).  
877 Padmore v IRC (No 2) [2001] STC 280; See Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 10–600 for examples where 
legislation specifically overrode a DTT. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
4.4.3 Canada and the Netherlands 
In Canada, each treaty forms part of domestic law via separate legislation.878 In this 
legislation it is provided that the treaty will prevail over domestic legislation.879 
In the Netherlands, a treaty becomes domestic law when it is published.880 Furthermore, 
treaties are given a special status.881 Thus, treaties will prevail over domestic law, even if the 
domestic legislation entered into force after the treaty did.882 
4.5 Conclusion 
South Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but it is submitted that the important 
principles regarding interpretation of treaties contained in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention is customary international law and, therefore, forms part of South African law 
via section 232 of the Constitution. 
The OECD MTC and its Commentary is not international law and therefore it does not form 
part of South African law in terms of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution does 
not oblige a court to interpret the Income Tax Act in a way that is consistent with the OECD 
MTC or its Commentary. The case law reveals that some South African courts seem to ignore 
the OECD MTC and its Commentary. Other South African courts acknowledge the 
importance of the OECD MTC and Commentary and rely on these in their decisions, but the 
basis on which this is done, is not expressed. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s latest recognition of the importance of the OECD MTC in the Tradehold case will 
induce other courts to refer to OECD material, albeit without guidance from this court 
regarding the grounds for such reference. 
                                                          
878 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.01, Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 25; Ward et al The Interpretation of Income 
Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the OECD Model 55. Bowman and Baker are of 
the view that DTTs are binding on Canada without implementing legislation, but that it is practice to introduce 
legislation in Parliament to adopt the provisions of each DTT, to ensure consistency between the Income Tax 
Act and the relevant treaty (Bowman and Baker in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Practical Issues in the 
Application of Double Tax Conventions 286). 
879 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.04. However, Olivier and Honiball contend that “treaty law will not override Canadian domestic law” 
(Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 304). 
880 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 2002 s 93 reads as follows: “Bepalingen van verdragen en van 
besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, die naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, hebben 
verbindende kracht nadat zij zijn bekendgemaakt.” See also Ward et al The Interpretation of Income Tax 
Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries of the OECD Model 60; Kobetsky International Taxation 
of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 49. 
881 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para F.03; Erasmus-Koen and Douma (2007) 61 BFIT 339 349. 
882 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 2002 s 94 reads as follows: “Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende 
wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder 
verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties.” See also Ministerie 
van Financiën Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid para 2.19; Kobetsky International Taxation of Permanent 
Establishments: Principles and Policy 49; Anonymous in Nederlandse Regelingen van International 
Belastingrecht I.A.–49; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 20. 
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With one exception, South African courts seem to interpret DTTs in accordance with public 
international law, thereby following the trend internationally. Thus, treaties are generally 
interpreted by South African courts in accordance with the ordinary meaning of words and 
the intentions of the state parties to the treaty. 
South African courts apply DTTs to limit existing legislation, thereby giving precedence to 
treaties in relation to legislation existing at the time that the treaty was entered into. It is 
submitted that this is in accordance with the Constitution. 
It is further submitted that South Africa is bound to its DTTs on an international level, once a 
DTT is approved by Parliament. The DTT becomes part of domestic law, once it is published 
in the Government Gazette. Although the DTT forms part of the Income Tax Act, it is not yet 
settled whether the DTT outranks the other provisions of the Income Tax Act in a case of 
conflict. Three views were identified by studying case law, namely that (a) the Income Tax 
Act must prevail (AM Moolla), (b) a treaty modifies domestic law and will apply in preference 
to domestic law in the case of conflict (Tradehold) and (c) the legislation and treaty rank 
equally and any conflict must be resolved by the application of the principles of statutory 
interpretation and superseding legislation (minority in Glenister and Van Kets). Although the 
view preferred in this dissertation is the last one (that is, (c)), it is acknowledged that view 
(b) will probably be applied in future in South Africa, as the judgement was one by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and dealt specifically with DTTs. 
The United Kingdom is a party to the Vienna Convention. The courts in the United Kingdom 
have laid down their approach to the interpretation of treaties, which includes that the 
purpose of the treaty must be given effect to, rather than following a literal approach. The 
courts have also applied the principles embodied in the Vienna Convention and have 
accepted the use of the international fiscal meaning of words. The courts in the United 
Kingdom use the OECD Commentary in the interpretation of their tax treaties. 
In the United Kingdom, DTTs become part of domestic law once an Order in Counsel declares 
that the treaty has been made. Legislation provides that a treaty will override domestic 
legislation. If Parliament specifically intended legislation to override a treaty, the legislation 
will, however, prevail and not the treaty. 
Canada is a party to the Vienna Convention and their courts have accepted that the rules of 
the Vienna Convention apply to Canadian DTTs. The courts have also accepted that rules 
governing the interpretation of treaties are different to those governing the interpretation 
of domestic law. In interpreting DTTs, the most important objective is to find the meaning of 
the relevant words and in this regard the language used and the intention of the parties 
must be considered. The Canadian courts have also attached an important role to the OECD 
commentary as part of the interpretation process. In Canada, each treaty forms part of 
domestic law via separate legislation, in which it is provided that the treaty will prevail over 
domestic legislation. 
The Netherlands is a party to the Vienna Convention. The courts in the Netherlands have 
indicated that the OECD Commentary is of great importance in the interpretation of DTTs. In 
the Netherlands, a treaty becomes domestic law when it is published. Treaties will prevail 
over domestic law. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
Thus it may be concluded that in England, Canada and the Netherlands the OECD 
Commentary are acknowledged as an important interpretative tool. Although South African 
courts have acknowledged the prominence of the OECD MTC, the Commentary is not 
consistently used and if it is used, the basis upon which it is used is unclear. Regarding the 
status of tax treaties, it is clear that tax treaties prevail over domestic legislation in Canada 
and the Netherlands and, generally speaking, also in the United Kingdom. Although the 
South African approach is not settled yet, indications are that treaties will prevail over 
domestic legislation. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Article 1 of the OECD MTC provides that: 
“This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the 
contracting states.” (own emphasis.) 
Consequently, only “persons” may rely on the provisions of the OECD MTC883 and it is 
therefore crucial to determine whether a trust is a person for purposes of the Convention.884 
A country applying the double taxation treaty (DTT) (patterned on the OECD MTC) would 
therefore have to determine whether the trust with which it is confronted can be regarded 
as a person. 
Very limited case law is available on this point. In South Africa the court in Oceanic Trust Co 
Ltd N.O. v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service885 was asked to issue a 
declaratory order that the relevant trust was not a resident of South Africa and did not carry 
on trade through a permanent establishment in South Africa. Although the treaty between 
South Africa and Mauritius was referred to, the question whether the relevant trust was a 
person under the treaty, was never addressed. In the United Kingdom case of Wenslaydale’s 
Settlement Trustees v IRC,886 which concerned the treaty between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, the impression is gleaned that the court assumed that the trust was a person.887 The 
residence of a trust was discussed in Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs 
v Smallwood,888 but the question whether the trust is a person was never raised and one is 
again left with the notion that the court assumed the trust to be a person for purposes of 
the treaty.889 In the absence of judicial guidance on this point, the relevant provisions of the 
OECD MTC will be analysed and the application thereof in each of the chosen states will be 
discussed.890 
The OECD has also provided limited guidance on the question whether a trust is a person for 
purposes of the OECD MTC. In its report regarding collective investment vehicles, the OECD 
states that: 
“Under the domestic tax law of most common law countries, the trust, or the trustees, 
acting collectively in their capacity as such, constitutes a taxpayer. Accordingly, failing 
to treat such a taxpayer as a person would also prevent it from being treated as a 
                                                          
883 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para 1B.01. 
884 Of course a person also has to be a resident to qualify for relief in terms of the treaty. The question of 
residence of a trust is considered in ch 6. 
885 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
886 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241. 
887 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para 1B.18 fn 5. 
888 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
889 The question whether the trustee is a person for purposes of the treaty was specifically addressed by the 
Chancery Division (Smallwood v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2009] EWHC 777 
(Ch)). This decision was overturned on appeal, but the Court of Appeal never explicitly addressed whether the 
trust or trustees were a person.  
890As explained in ch 1, the structure of this chapter will be based on the relevant provisions of the OECD MTC, 
with an analysis of the position in the different states provided in the conclusion. 
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resident despite the fact that, as a policy matter, it seems logical to treat it as a 
resident when the country in which it is established treats it as a taxpayer and a 
resident. The fact that the tax law of the country where the trust is established would 
treat it as a taxpayer would be indicative that the trust is a person for treaty 
purposes.”891 
The OECD does not provide any reason, based on the wording of the model, for its view. It 
only seems to suggest that policy and logic indicate that a trust, that is a taxpayer, should be 
treated as a person. The wording of the OECD MTC is examined below. 
The term person is defined in the OECD MTC as follows: 
“The term ‘person’ includes an individual, a company and any other body of 
persons.”892 
The OECD Commentary on this definition makes it clear that the definition of person is not 
exhaustive and is used in a very wide sense.893 
In turn, the term “company”, which is used in the definition of the term person, is defined as 
follows: 
“The term ‘company’ means any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body 
corporate for tax purposes.”894 
According to the OECD Commentary, the tax laws of the country where the entity is 
organised, should be used to determine whether the entity is treated as a body corporate.895 
If the above two definitions are read together, it is clear that a trust may qualify as a person 
if it falls within any one of the following criteria: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) any other body of persons; 
(c) a body corporate; or 
(d) any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes. 
In addition, a trust may qualify as a person if it falls within the ordinary meaning of the term 
person. 
                                                          
891 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles para 
26. Although the report states in para 4 that only trusts that are collective investment vehicles are dealt with in 
the report, it is submitted that the paragraph quoted above does give an indication of the OECD’s view of trusts 
in general. 
892 OECD MTC art 3(1)(a). 
893 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 2. 
894 OECD MTC art 3(1)(b). 
895 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 3. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
127 
Regarding item (a) above, a trust will not usually be regarded as an individual in terms of the 
trust laws or tax laws of each of the relevant states.896 An exception to this general 
statement is Canada. The Canadian Income Tax Act provides that a trust will be deemed to 
be an individual (barring certain exceptions).897 Therefore, although the trust is not a person 
under Canadian common law, it is an individual and therefore a person, in terms of the 
Canadian Income Tax Act.898 The term “individual” is not defined in the OECD MTC and 
therefore article 3(2) of the OECD MTC applies. Generally speaking, that article provides that 
when a country (Canada in this case) applies a treaty based on the OECD MTC and a term is 
not defined in the treaty, the term shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the 
Canadian tax law meaning attached to it.899 Hence a trust will (unless the context requires 
otherwise) be regarded as a person for treaty purposes in Canada.900 Furthermore, Canada 
generally provides in its treaties that a trust falls within the definition of person.901 Thus, in 
the treaties that Canada has concluded with South Africa,902 the United Kingdom903 and the 
Netherlands,904 provision has been made in the definition of person for a trust. 
In terms of item (c) above, a trust will be a person if it is a body corporate. In none of the 
relevant states is a trust regarded as a juristic person under the law of trusts of the specific 
jurisdiction.905 Hence, a trust will not be regarded as a body corporate. 
Generally, a trust will therefore only be regarded as a person for purposes of the convention 
if it falls within any of the following three criteria (which have been renumbered for the sake 
of convenience): 
(a) “any other body of persons”, as set out in the definition of the term person (item (b) 
above); 
(b) an “entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes”, as set out in the 
definition of company, in the country where it is organised (item (d) above); or 
                                                          
896 See ch 3. 
897 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2). 
898 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 paras 10 and 13. See also ch 3.4.1. 
899 See 5.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of art 3(2) of the OECD MTC. 
900 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 93; Brown in Topical Analysis para 8.1; Tremblay and Wharram in Special 
Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 14:49. 
901 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 93; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital 1B.17. Brown in Topical Analysis para 8.1; Tremblay and Wharram in 
Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 14.49; Easson in Special 
Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12:9. The question whether a 
trust is a person for treaty purposes was not discussed inFundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 
520, as the definition of person in the relevant treaty included a trust. 
902 Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income signed on 
27 November 1995 art 3(1)(d). 
903 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed on May 7 2003 art 1. 
904 Convention Between Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed on 27 May 1986, as amended art 
3(1)(d). 
905 See ch 2. More specifically, ch 2 gives examples, for each of the relevant jurisdictions, where trusts are 
treated as juristic persons, even though trusts are not, in law, juristic persons. It is submitted that these 
examples do not result in the trust being regarded as a juristic person and therefore a body corporate for 
purposes of the OECD MTC. 
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(c) a “person” in terms of the ordinary meaning of that term. 
The meaning of each of these possibilities will be considered next. 
5.2 Any other body of persons 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The words used in the definition of person are “any other body of persons” (own emphasis). 
Therefore, an entity which is either an individual or a company (as defined) cannot be a body 
of persons. Since the definition of company means any body corporate or any entity that is 
treated as a body corporate for tax purposes, the term any other body of persons must 
surely exclude body corporates and entities treated as body corporates for tax purposes. 
Therefore, an entity which is a juristic person or an entity treated as a juristic person for tax 
purposes, will not be a body of persons. Trusts do not have juristic personality in any of the 
states relevant to this dissertation and therefore trusts will not be barred from being 
regarded as a body of persons in this regard. The meaning of the term “entity treated as a 
body corporate for tax purposes” is discussed below, but if a trust is regarded as such an 
entity, it will not be a body of persons. 
The term906 body of persons is not defined in the OECD MTC. Thus, article 3(2) of the OECD 
MTC907 becomes relevant. This provision states that: 
“As regards the application of the convention at any time by a Contracting State, any 
term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the 
meaning that it has at the time under the law of that State for the purpose of the 
taxes to which the convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of 
that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that 
State.” 
Thus, unless the context otherwise requires, it is the laws of the relevant states that will 
determine the meaning of the term body of persons. The article suggests that not only the 
tax law meaning of the term should be taken into account, but also any other domestic law 
meaning(s) of the term. Where, however, there are different meanings attached to a term, 
the meaning under the tax laws, to which the treaty applies, should, arguably, prevail.908 A 
description of the meaning of the term in the domestic laws of the relevant states is given in 
the next paragraph. Whether the “context requires” that a meaning other than the domestic 
law meaning is used, is discussed in a later paragraph.909 
                                                          
906 In this dissertation the word “term” is used to refer to the words “body of persons”. The word term was 
chosen over other possibilities such as “phrase” or “concept”, since art 3(2) of the OECD MTC uses the word 
term and since the words body of persons is defined in the United Kingdom and is therefore a term in that 
state. In order to be consistent, the word term was therefore used throughout the chapter. 
907 Other issues that may be relevant in the interpretation of art 3(2) of the OECD MTC include whether the 
statutory or ambulatory approach should be followed and which state’s laws are to be applied. These issues 
will not be addressed in detail in this dissertation. Reference will be made in passing to these issues in other 
chapters. 
908 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 13.1; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para E.22. 
909 See para 5.2.6 below. 
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5.2.2 South Africa 
In South Africa the term body of persons is not defined in the Income Tax Act,910 but the 
term has been dealt with in numerous tax cases. 
In ITC 227911 the court had to decide whether a club could be regarded as a separate taxable 
entity. At that stage the relevant legislation’s definition of the term person included “any 
body of persons corporated or unincorporated” (own emphasis). The court held the club to 
be a body of persons, stating that 
“[i]t consists of a number of persons partly described as proprietary and partly as non-
proprietary members, associated together for certain purposes. These persons have 
common interests and act in common, asserting their voice by means of meetings and 
a majority vote of members, being represented for administrative purposes by the 
Stewards. In this respect they constitute an association, that is to say, a body of 
persons associated together for some common object or purpose. They accordingly fall 
within the definition of ‘person’…”.912 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs913 it was 
contended that the relevant association was not a taxable entity. The applicable income tax 
legislation contained no definition of the term person, but in terms of the then applicable 
Interpretation Act914 a person included, inter alia, “any body of persons corporate or 
unincorporated”. The issue before the court was whether the relevant association was a 
body of persons unincorporated. In this regard the court held that a body of persons 
unincorporated means “an association of persons which does not have a legal persona 
separate from its constituent members”.915 
However, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO916 it was 
specifically held that a trust did not constitute a body of persons unincorporated whose 
common funds are the collective property of all its members, as referred to in the current 
Interpretation Act.917 Hence a trust was not a person for purposes of the Income Tax Act.918 
Even though the word “unincorporated” formed part of the term interpreted by the court 
(that is, “body of persons unincorporated”), it is submitted that the addition of that word is 
not decisive. 
                                                          
910 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The term body of persons is used in a number of places in the Income Tax Act 
(eg the definition of “agent” in s 1, the definition of “date of grant” in s 8B and the definition of “date of 
distribution” Sch 8, para 74), but is never defined. 
911 ITC 227 (1931) 6 SATC 234 (U).  
912 ITC 227 (1931) 6 SATC 234 (U)238–239. 
913 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs 1960 3 SA 291 (A). 
914 Interpretation Act 5 of 1910. 
915 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs 1960 3 SA 291 (A) 302. 
916 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A). 
917 Interpretation Act 33 of 1957. The wording of this Act is exactly the same as that of the Interpretation Act 5 
of 1910. 
918 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A) 370. The Income Tax Act 
was amended to include a trust in the definition of person in s 1 of the Income Tax Act as a consequence of the 
Friedman case. 
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Thus it is clear that for South African tax law purposes a trust is not a body of persons. 
Hence, if South African law is applicable, in terms of article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, a trust 
would not be regarded as a body of persons. Below the question is addressed whether the 
context requires that South African law is not applicable and possible meanings other than 
the South African domestic law meaning of the term is suggested. 
5.2.3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Income Tax Act919 contains a definition of the term body of 
persons, namely: 
 “’body of persons’ means any body politic, corporate or collegiate and any company, 
fraternity, fellowship and society of persons whether corporate or not corporate.”920 
The Interpretation Act,921 which applies to all legislation, including tax legislation,922 does not 
contain a definition of the term body of persons. It does, however, define the term person as 
follows: 
 “’Person’ includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporated.” 
According to Avery Jones, the definition of person in the Interpretation Act “impliedly gives a 
more general meaning to that expression [body of persons], by including anything which 
may be described as a body of persons, whether or not incorporated.”923 Avery Jones opines 
that although there is no authority on whether trustees are included in the Interpretation 
Act meaning of body of persons, there seems no reason why trustees should not be 
regarded as such.924 
Avery Jones, commenting on a previous version of the Income Tax Act, but on a definition 
that is identical to the one contained in the Income Tax Act 2007, is of the view that trustees 
are not a “body of persons” for purposes of the Income Tax Act.925 It is submitted that the 
same would hold true for a trust. 
However, the Income Tax Act 2007 now contains the following provision: 
 “For the purposes of the Income Tax Acts (except where the context otherwise 
requires), the trustees of a settlement are together treated as if they were a single 
person (distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the settlement from time to 
time).”926 
                                                          
919 Income Tax Act 2007. 
920 Income Tax Act 2007 s 989. 
921 Interpretation Act 1978. 
922 S 5 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that “[in] any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words 
and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed according to that Schedule”. 
923 Avery Jones (1991) 11/12 BTR 453 458. 
924 Avery Jones (1991) 11/12 BTR 453 459. 
925 Avery Jones (1991) 11/12 BTR 453 461. 
926 Income Tax Act 2007 s 474(1). 
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Under the 2007 legislation, the trustees are a body of persons,927 by virtue of the trustees 
being treated as if they were a single person. The trustees, as a single person, are regarded 
as distinct from the persons who act as trustees928 The single person is therefore treated as 
distinct from the individual(s) or company(ies) who are the trustees, acting in their private 
capacity.929 Furthermore, there is a case that suggests that trustees are a body of persons.930 
One is also left with the impression in the Smallwood-case931 that the trustees are regarded 
as a body of persons, although this point was never explicitly addressed by the court.932 
However, the position of the trust itself is not addressed in any of these sources and it is 
submitted that, based on the formulation of the Income Tax Act, the trust will not be 
regarded as a body of persons. 
5.2.4 Canada 
The term body of persons is not defined in the Canadian Income Tax Act.933 The author has 
been unable to find case law which indicates the meaning of the term body of persons for 
purposes of Canadian income tax law. The question whether a trust is a body of persons 
therefore does not seem to crop up in Canadian law. Two possible reasons in relation to 
DTTs may be submitted. First, as stated above, the Canadian Income Tax Act provides that a 
trust will be deemed to be an individual (and hence a trust will be regarded as a person for 
treaty purposes in Canada). An entity which is an individual cannot be a body of persons.934 
Second, as stated above, Canada generally provides in its treaties that a trust falls within the 
definition of person.935 Thus, it is unnecessary to determine whether a trust is a body of 
persons for treaty purposes. 
5.2.5 The Netherlands 
Since 2010, the Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 creates the concept of the afgezonderd 
particulier vermogen (APV).936 Although the definition of an APV is vague and broad, many 
trusts, especially discretionary trusts, will be regarded as APV’s, which, generally speaking, 
                                                          
927 Cleave, commenting on a fairly similar provision in respect of capital gains, states that the relevant section 
was “statutory confirmation that trustees are a ‘body of persons’ and thus qualified as a ‘person’ under Article 
3(1) of the Model” (Cleave (2011) 6 BTR 705 708). 
928 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230. 
929 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 229. 
930 Reid's Trustee v IRC 14 TC 512. 
931 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 69. 
932 The Chancery Division specifically decided that “the trustee or trustees of the Smallwood settlement are 
treated as a person within the meaning of the Convention” (Smallwood v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs [2009] EWHC 777 (Ch) para 9). This decision was based on wording fairly similar to that 
contained in the Income Tax Act 2007 s 474(1). Although the decision was overturned on appeal, the Court of 
Appeal did not pronounce explicitly on the question whether the trust or trustee is to be regarded as a person. 
933 RS 1985 c 1 (5th suppl). 
934 See 5.2.1. 
935 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 93; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital 1B.17. The question whether a trust is a person for treaty purposes was 
not discussed inFundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520, as the definition of person in the 
relevant treaty included a trust and the case primarily dealt with the Canadian domestic law rule regarding the 
residence of a trust. During the course of the judgment, the court confirmed that, for domestic purposes, a 
trust is an individual and also a person. 
936 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a, effective from January 2010. The taxation of trusts in the 
Netherlands, including the APV regime, is discussed in greater detail in ch 3.5. 
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means that the income is attributed to the settlor. It is submitted that the APV is a concept 
for Netherlands tax purposes only and that it does not create a new entity as such. 
Consequently, it is unnecessary to determine whether an APV will be regarded as a person 
for purposes of the OECD MTC. The question remains whether the trust itself (which may be 
an APV for domestic Netherlands tax law) will be regarded as a person. This paragraph 
therefore considers whether a trust will be regarded as a body of persons. 
Some authors are of the view that the term vereniging van personen (body of persons) 
implies a non-profit organization, which is also used in non-tax law.937 Others are of the view 
that the term is not limited to non-profit organisations and that it includes ieder 
samenwerkingsverband van personen (every collaboration of persons) and that the term 
personen refers not only to natural persons, but also to companies.938 The term vereniging 
van personen is also used where the OECD MTC uses the term “association” in the definition 
of “national”.939 The term vereniging van personen is not found in the Wet 
inkomstenbelasting940 or the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting.941 It is submitted that a 
trust will not be regarded as a vereninging van personen.942 The reason for this view is that a 
trust will be formed and governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than the Netherlands 
and such a jurisdiction will determine its nature. In terms of the law of the jurisdictions 
referred to in this dissertation, a trust is not regarded as a body of persons. The trustees of a 
trust might, however, be regarded as a vereniging van personen in the wide sense described 
above. 
5.2.6 Does the context require otherwise?943 
Stated briefly, under article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, an undefined term shall have the 
meaning that it has under the laws of the relevant state, unless the context otherwise 
requires. 
In determining whether the context requires otherwise, one should establish what is meant 
by the term “context”. Avery Jones et al have written extensively on this subject, concluding 
that there are two approaches to the meaning of context. The first is that 
“one starts with the a narrow meaning of context, essentially the internal context, 
which is used to interpret a treaty in conjunction with other factors, such as the object 
and purpose of the treaty, subsequent agreement and practice, supplementary means 
of interpretation, and in some cases the text in other official language.” 
The second is that any type of material which can properly be described as context may be 
considered. The authors concede that in practice there may be very little difference in the 
results of these approaches.944 
                                                          
937 Avery Jones et al (2006) 60 BFIT 220 222. 
938 Anonymous in Nederlandse Regelingen van Internationale Belastingrecht IB–276. 
939 Avery Jones et al (2006) 60 BFIT 220 222. 
940 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001. 
941 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. 
942 Anonymous in Nederlandse Regelingen van Internationale Belastingrecht IB–276. 
943 Due to the Canadian position on “body of persons” it is not necessary to discuss whether the context 
requires otherwise in relation to Canada. 
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Other authors agree that the “context” should be given a wide interpretation and not be 
limited to the narrow definition of context in the Vienna Convention945 (in other words, the 
text of the treaty, its preamble and annexes and agreements in connection with the 
treaty).946 
The OECD’s commentary provides as follows regarding the meaning of “context”: 
 “The context is determined in particular by the intention of the Contracting States 
when signing the Convention as well as the meaning given to the term in question in 
the legislation of the other Contracting State (an implicit reference to the principle of 
reciprocity on which the Convention is based).”947 
According to Avery Jones et al, the indications from the context must be reasonably strong 
for the domestic law meaning to be disregarded.948 Sada Garibay is of the view that courts, 
internationally, will conclude that the context requires that a meaning other than the 
domestic law meaning be used in the following circumstances: 
(a) If the result of applying the domestic meaning would be contrary to the intention of 
the parties to the treaty. The intention of the parties may be established by referring 
to the treaty text, the opinion of an expert who participated in the treaty negotiation, 
extrinsic materials (without a clarification of the meaning of this term), travaux 
préparatoires, domestic law, the Commentary on the OECD Model, the non-inclusion 
of a specific alternative provision established in Commentary and records relating to 
the discussions between the treaty parties, as well as the speeches of the relevant 
Ministers, the preamble to the DTT, press releases and even the interpretation of the 
treaty partner. 
(b) If the literal meaning clashes with the object or purpose of the DTT. 
(c) If the existing Commentary on the OECD Model contained a definition at the time that 
the DTT was signed and the parties did not provide differently. 
(d) If the treaty benefits would have been granted in abusive situations.949 
But what meaning should be attached to a term if the domestic law meaning is not used?950 
Some authors suggest that the ordinary or natural meaning951 should be used, while others 
suggest that an international fiscal meaning should be applied.952 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
944 Avery Jones et al (1984) 1 BTR 90 104. 
945 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(2). 
946 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 214; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual 
on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para E.20; Sada Garibay (2011) 65 An Analysis of 
the Case Law on Article 3(2) of the OECD Model (2010) para 9. 
947 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 12. 
948 Avery Jones et al (1984) 1 BTR 90 108; See also Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 215. 
949 Sada Garibay (2011) 65 An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 3(2) of the OECD Model (2010) para 7. 
950 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.20. 
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In the recent South African case of Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold Ltd,953 the Supreme Court of Appeal was asked to apply article 3(2) of the relevant 
DTT, which corresponds to article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. In this case the meaning of the 
term “alienation”, in article 13(4) of the relevant treaty, which deals with capital gains, was 
considered. Paragraphs 12(1) and (2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act provides 
for a deemed disposal of certain property and the question before the court was whether 
the deemed disposal could be regarded as an alienation within the meaning of art 13(4). The 
term alienation is undefined in the relevant treaty (and in the OECD MTC) and thus the court 
was asked to apply article 3(2) of the relevant treaty to interpret the term in accordance 
with the South African law meaning of that term. The South African Revenue Service argued 
that in terms of the South African law meaning of the term alienation, a deemed disposal 
cannot be regarded as an alienation.954 
Although the court held that article 3(2) applied,955 the court did not use the South African 
law meaning of the term alienation, but failed to explain why. The court held that the term 
“must be given a meaning that is congruent with the language of the DTA having regard to 
its object and purpose”.956 It further stated that article 13 is widely cast and that the parties 
intended that article 13 apply to the type of capital gain provided for in paragraph 12 of the 
Eighth Schedule. More specifically, the court held that “the term ‘alienation’ as it is used in 
the DTA is not restricted to actual alienation. It is a neutral term having a broader meaning, 
comprehending both actual and deemed disposals of assets giving rise to taxable capital 
gains”.957 
It is submitted that one can deduce from the case that the court applied article 3(2) to the 
term alienation, but, although the court never expressly stated this, held that the “context 
requires otherwise”.958 In other words, it is inferred that the context required that the South 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
951 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.20; Brincker in Silke on International Tax para 16.12; Sada Garibay (2011) 65 An Analysis of the Case Law 
on Article 3(2) of the OECD Model (2010) 8. 
952 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
para E.20.  
953 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
954 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 13. 
955 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 19. The 
case may be criticised on a number of points, one of which includes the court’s failure to address the provisions 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 Sch 8 para 13. For a debate on this point of criticism see Emslie (2012) 61 The 
Taxpayer 92 92; Anonymous (2012) 61 The Taxpayer 121 121; Classen (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 387; and Seiler 
(2013) 67 BFIT 580. Other points of criticism are addressed in other chapters of this dissertation, eg paras 
4.3.2.2 and 4.4.1.  
956 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 23. 
957 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 25. 
958 It is regrettable that the court did not expressly pronounce on this issue. It would have been invaluable to 
have the court’s views on the meaning of context and a firm indication of the circumstances under which it 
would disregard the South African domestic law meaning of a term. Because the court failed to give reasons 
why it did not apply the South African meaning of the word alienation, one is left with the task of inferring 
what the court meant, a task bordering on speculation. With so little case law dealing with the interpretation of 
DTTs in South Africa, the lack of guidance on this important issue is disappointing. It is also possible to argue 
that the court did not (tacitly) hold that the context requires that the South African meaning of the term 
alienation should not be used, but rather that the court did apply the South African meaning of the term, but 
not the meaning argued for by SARS. This would mean that the court in effect found that the South African law 
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African law meaning of the word be disregarded. But what meaning did the court use 
instead? 
Earlier on in its judgement the court observed that the relevant DTT was based on the OECD 
MTC. It held that when interpreting the provisions of a DTT there will not be an exact 
correlation between the wording of the treaty and that used in the domestic legislation. The 
wording used in model-based treaties is wide in nature and intended to encompass the 
various taxes generally found in the OECD member countries. Also, for other reasons 
mentioned in the case, “the wording in the DTA cannot be expected to match precisely that 
used in the domestic taxing statute”.959 The court then referred to the Downing case in 
which the concept of “international tax language” was used.960 
It is submitted that, arguably, the Supreme Court of Appeal has indicated a preference for 
the international fiscal meaning of a term, rather than the ordinary meaning of the term, if, 
in terms of article 3(2), the context requires that the domestic law meaning of the term be 
disregarded. 
In the United Kingdom, case law suggests that the ordinary meaning of the term body of 
persons should be used in a case where the context requires that the domestic law meaning 
be disregarded. In Padmore v Commissioners of Inland Revenue961 the relevant DTT defined 
the term person as including “any body of persons, corporate or not corporate”. It was 
argued that, by virtue of a provision similar to article 3(2), since the term body of persons 
was undefined in the relevant treaty, the definition under United Kingdom tax law (a 
definition in the same terms as the one contained in the Income Tax Act 2007 which was 
quoted above) was applicable. The court held that the United Kingdom tax law definition 
was not applicable, since the words “corporate or not corporate” in the definition of person 
would have been unnecessary if the intention was for the United Kingdom tax law definition, 
which also contains these words, to apply. Furthermore, the court, having assumed that a 
partnership (the relevant entity in the case) was not covered by the definition in the United 
Kingdom tax law, held that it was highly improbable that the intention was to exclude a 
partnership from the definition of person, since a partnership was such a commonly used 
vehicle for commercial activity. Applying the ordinary meaning of the term body of persons, 
the court held that a partnership was plainly a body of persons. 
The OECD MTC uses a different wording in its definition of person as the applicable treaty 
did in Padmore, so the first argument will not extend to the OECD MTC.962 The second 
argument, namely that it was unlikely that the intention was to exclude a commonly used 
vehicle, would, however, equally apply to trusts. Based on this argument, the Income Tax Act 
2007 definition of body of persons would not be used but rather the ordinary meaning of the 
term. Under such a meaning it is unlikely that trustees would not be regarded as a person.963 
Avery Jones et al state that “[t]he internal tax law meaning…is almost certainly not intended 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
meaning of the term did not have the narrow meaning contended for by SARS, but that the term included 
deemed disposals in terms of South African law.  
959 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 18. 
960 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 18. 
961 Padmore v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1989] STC 493. 
962 Avery Jones (1991) 11/12 BTR 453 464. 
963 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 91. 
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to be incorporated into treaties, a case of the context otherwise requiring”.964 Would a trust 
(as opposed to the trustees) be regarded as a body of persons under the ordinary meaning 
of the term? It is submitted that, given the nature of a trust in both England and Scotland,965 
a trust will not be regarded as a body of persons.966 
In South Africa, if an argument similar to the second one in Padmore is followed, one would 
be able to contend that the domestic law meaning of the term, as enunciated in the 
Friedman-case (which states that a trust is not a body of persons), should be ignored. Then 
the ordinary meaning of the term should be applied, since it is unlikely that the intention 
was to exclude a commonly used vehicle such as a trust. Given the nature of a trust,967 it is 
submitted that a South African trust will not, in the ordinary meaning of the term, be 
regarded as a body of persons. The nature of a trust (subject to all the detail and 
qualifications discussed elsewhere968) is that it is a sui generis institution in which a trustee 
holds property for the benefit of another or for a specific purpose. It is submitted that such 
an institution cannot be described as a body of persons.969 The trustees or the beneficiaries 
may arguably be a body of persons, but not the trust itself.970 
Since a trust cannot be formed in terms of Dutch law, another jurisdiction’s law will have to 
be applied to determine the nature of a trust. If a trust is formed in any of the jurisdictions 
considered in this dissertation, it is submitted that a trust will not be regarded as a body of 
persons, because of the nature of the trust.971 Arguably, the trustees of a trust may be a 
body of persons within its ordinary meaning. 
If an international fiscal meaning for the term body of persons were to be applied, one 
would have to establish what such meaning is. As pointed out by Vogel,972 this is a difficult 
task and it is with hesitance that an interpretation is offered below. The term body of 
persons was first used in the OECD MTC in its 1963 draft, although it was used earlier in 
some treaties entered into by the United Kingdom.973 It is not suggested, however, that the 
term, as it was used the United Kingdom at the time, was incorporated in the OECD MTC.974 
In its deliberations regarding the amendment of the definition of person, Working Party 14 
of the Fiscal Committee considered that the term body of persons includes: 
(a) bodies of persons which are not treated as taxable units under the tax laws of any of 
the contracting states; 
(b) bodies of persons which are taxable units under the tax laws of any of the contracting 
states and treated in exactly the same way as juristic persons; and 
                                                          
964 Avery Jones et al (2006) 60 BFIT 220 222. 
965 See ch 2.3.3. 
966 Cf Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12:9. 
967 See ch 2.2.4. 
968 See ch 2.2.4. 
969 Cf Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.9. 
970 For a contrary view see Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 285. 
971 Cf Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.9. 
972 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 58. 
973 Avery Jones et al (2006) 60 BFIT 220 223. 
974 Avery Jones et al (2006) 60 BFIT 220 222. 
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(c) bodies of persons which are taxable units under the tax laws of any of the contracting 
states, but which are not treated in the same way as juristic persons.975 
The Working Party considered it advisable that the term should include all three of the 
categories set out above, stating that countries were free in bi-lateral negotiations to 
eliminate problems arising from the differences in their tax systems due to the broad 
definition of person and to exclude entities if they thought it desirable.976 Thus it may be 
deduced that the OECD MTC includes all three of the categories listed above in the phrase 
body of persons.977 
However, bearing in mind that the wording of the definition is “any other body of persons” 
(own emphasis), the point raised earlier should be considered, namely that if an entity is an 
individual or a company (including and entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax 
purposes), it will not be regarded as a body of persons for purposes of the treaty. It is 
therefore necessary to determine the meaning of the phrase “entity that is treated as a body 
corporate for tax purposes” and this will be done in the next paragraph. The view taken 
there is that the phrase “entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” refers 
only to item (b) above, namely taxable units under the tax laws of any of the contracting 
states and treated in exactly the same way as juristic persons. It is therefore submitted that 
an international fiscal meaning of “body of persons” denotes only items (a) and (c) listed 
above. 
In South Africa, trusts are, at least sometimes, treated as taxable units (but not in the same 
way as juristic persons)978 and could therefore, potentially, fall within item (c). Even if trusts 
were treated as transparent (which they sometimes are), trusts could fall within item (a) 
above. If the suggested international fiscal meaning of “body of persons” were used, a trust 
may potentially qualify as such. However, items (a) and (c) still refer to “bodies of persons” 
and one would therefore have to overcome the argument made above that a trust is not a 
body of persons within the ordinary meaning of that term. All in all, arguing that a trust is a 
person because it falls within the international fiscal meaning of the term, suggesting an 
international fiscal meaning and arguing that the trust is indeed covered by that meaning, 
cannot be done with much confidence. It is submitted that the same would hold true for the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
5.3 Entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes 
The OECD’s Commentary on the meaning of the relevant phrase is not very illuminating. It 
merely states that: 
                                                          
975 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Working Party no 14 of the Fiscal Committee Second 
Report on the Article on Definitions 2–3. The OEEC is the predecessor to the OECD. 
976 OECD Working Party No 14 of the Fiscal Committee Third Report on the Article on Definitions 5. 
977 This argument is based on the premise that a court will, in interpreting an actual treaty, consider the 
meaning of the provisions of the OECD MTC and that the deliberations of the Working Party will be considered 
relevant and authoritative in this regard. 
978 See ch 3.2.2. 
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 “In addition the term covers any other taxable unit that is treated as a body corporate 
according to the tax laws of the Contracting State in which it is organised.”979 
What the Commentary does add, is that the tax laws of the Contracting State in which the 
taxable unit is organised, should be applied to determine whether the entity is treated as a 
body corporate. Avery Jones et al criticise the wording of the Commentary, saying that the 
state in which the entity is organised should be irrelevant and that the tax laws of the state 
in which the entity is resident should rather be used to determine whether it is treated as a 
body corporate. These authors call for the amendment of the Commentary to reflect that 
the tax laws of the residence state of the taxable unit should be used to determine whether 
it is treated as a body corporate.980 
Avery Jones et al further state that only entities that are treated like juristic persons under 
the tax laws of any of the contracting states (that is, item (b) of Working Party 14’s list of 
entities included as a body of persons)981 are included in the phrase “entity that is treated as 
a body corporate for tax purposes”. In other words, entities not treated as taxable units and 
entities treated as taxable units, but which are not treated in the same way as juristic 
persons under the tax laws of any of the contracting states (that is items (a) and (c) of 
Working Party 14’s list of entities included as body of persons), are not to be regarded as 
entities that are treated as a body corporate for tax purposes.982 
In South Africa, trusts are, generally speaking, taxed in terms of a specific section of the 
Income Tax Act and at a rate which differs from that of companies.983 A trust is therefore not 
subject to the same tax regime as a juristic person and will therefore not be regarded as an 
“entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” in terms of South African tax 
laws. 
In the United Kingdom, generally speaking, trusts and companies are taxed in terms of 
different statutes and at different rates.984 Trusts and companies are therefore not subject 
to the same tax regime and, consequently, a trust will not be regarded as an “entity that is 
treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” in terms of United Kingdom tax laws. 
In Canada trusts are treated as individuals for federal income tax purposes.985 Generally 
speaking, inter vivos trusts are taxed at the top marginal rate of income tax on their 
undistributed income,986 while testamentary trusts are taxed at the same tax rates as 
individuals.987 There are also specific sections in the federal legislation dealing with the 
                                                          
979 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 3. 
980 Avery Jones et al (2009) 4 BTR 406 413. 
981 See ch 5.2.6. 
982 Avery Jones et al (2009) 4 BTR 406 412. 
983 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B. Trusts other than special trusts (see ch 1) are taxed at a rate of 40%, while 
companies are, generally speaking, taxed at a rate of 28%. See also ch 3.2. 
984 Eg companies may be taxed in terms of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 and trusts in terms of the Income Tax 
Act 2007 part 9 ch 3 or the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005. Scottish trusts are taxed in terms 
of the same regime as other trusts in the United Kingdom. (Garden and Mackintosh Trusts and Estates in 
Scotland 2009/2010 37 and further.) See also ch 3.3. 
985 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2). 
986 Anonymous Canadian Master Tax Guide para 7280; Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 122(1)(a). 
987 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 117(2). 
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taxation of trusts.988 Generally speaking, corporations are subject to tax at a flat rate at 
federal level.989 The same tax regime therefore does not apply to trusts and companies and 
therefore a trust is not an “entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” in 
terms of federal Canadian tax laws.990 
In the Netherlands some trusts will be treated as APV’s, which, generally speaking, means 
that the income is attributed to the settlor.991 Companies are taxed in terms of the Wet op 
de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. Some non-resident trusts will qualify as doelvermogens 
(purpose funds), which would mean that they will be subject to corporate income tax under 
the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969 in respect of their Dutch income. To the extent 
that a trust can be resident in the Netherlands, these trusts are not subject to tax in terms of 
the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969.992 Therefore, while some trusts are not subject 
to the same tax regime as companies and will therefore not qualify as an “entity that is 
treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” in terms of the tax laws of the Netherlands, a 
few others will. 
5.4 Ordinary meaning of the term person 
The OECD’s commentary on the definition of person states, inter alia, the following: 
“The definition of the term “person”… is not exhaustive and should be read as 
indicating that the term “person” is used in a very wide sense (especially Articles 1 and 
4).”993 
In addition, the definition of the term person uses the word “includes” and not “means”. 
According to Avery Jones et al: 
“When a treaty partially defines a term by saying that it “includes” certain things, 
Article 3(2) can still be applied to complete the definition of the term.”994 
It has therefore been suggested that the ordinary meaning of a term may be used to 
interpret that term, where the word includes is used in the definition of the term.995 In other 
words, the words of inclusion (“an individual, a company and any other body of persons”) 
are not used to interpret the term person, but rather its ordinary meaning. 
In South Africa and directly as a result of the Friedman case,996 which held that a trust was 
not a person for income tax purposes and therefore not taxable, the definition of the term 
                                                          
988 Eg Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104. See also ch 3.4. 
989 Dwyer (2011) Country Analyses IBFD para 1.10.1.1. 
990 Publicly traded income trusts formed after 31 October 2006 (also known as “SIFT trusts” may be an 
exception, as they are taxed as if they were corporations (Dwyer (2011) Country Analyses IBFD 11.6.2.4; 
Anonymous Canadian Master Tax Guide para 7282). 
991 See ch 3.5. 
992 See ch 3.5.2. Although it is highly unlikely that a trust will be resident in the Netherlands (see ch 6.3.4). 
993 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 3 para 2. 
994 Avery Jones et al (1984) 1 BTR 14 21. 
995 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 91. 
996 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A). 
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“person” in the Income Tax Act was amended and now includes a trust.997 Hence, a trust is a 
person for domestic income tax purposes. 
Using this domestic law definition to complete the treaty definition of the term person, as 
suggested by Avery Jones et al, it is submitted that a trust will be regarded as a person for 
treaty purposes.998 
One could be tempted to argue that, because a trust is regarded by some as a separate 
entity (although not a juristic person),999 it will be regarded as a person within the ordinary 
meaning of that word. However, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s 
Estate1000 and the Friedman case1001 it was held that a trust is not a person. 
It may therefore be concluded that if the Income Tax Act did not define the trust as a person 
for South African domestic tax purposes, the trust would not have been regarded as a 
person in terms of the OECD MTC. 
In the United Kingdom, the Income Tax Act 2007 contains no definition of the term person. 
However, the Interpretation Act does stipulate that a person includes “a body of persons 
corporate or unincorporated”. It has been argued above that a trust is not a body of persons 
in the United Kingdom. It is therefore submitted that a trust will not qualify as person in 
terms of the definition of person in the Interpretation Act. It is worth noting that on fairly 
similar wording in the South African Interpretation Act, a South African court has held that a 
trust is not a person. Bearing in mind the legal nature of a trust in the United Kingdom,1002 it 
is submitted that a trust will not be regarded as a person.1003 
Since a trust is deemed to be an individual in Canada, it is unnecessary to argue whether a 
trust will be regarded as a person under its ordinary meaning. 
5.5 Trust versus trustee 
In the above paragraphs it was considered whether a trust is a person for purposes of article 
1 of the OECD MTC. Some argue that this may not be a decisive question since the trustee(s) 
will usually be regarded as a person(s).1004 Using the same criteria derived from the wording 
of the OECD MTC and set out above, this paragraph will consider whether the trustee(s) of a 
trust will be regarded as a person. 
                                                          
997 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
998 See also Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 285. 
999 See ch 2.2.4. 
1000 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 3 SA 833 (A) 840. 
1001 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A) 370. 
1002 See ch 2.3.3. 
1003 See Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230, who emphaticalle states that a trust is 
not a person in English law. However, he argues further that this point is not insuperable as treaties can be 
loosely construed. Under such a construction it could be argued that a trust is a person (in the treaty sense) 
even though not a person in English law. But he argues that there is no need to follow this course. 
1004 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 1B.20. 
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In South Africa, the domestic tax law meaning of the term body of persons is “an association 
of persons which does not have a legal persona separate from its constituent members”.1005 
It is submitted that trustees of a trust may fall within this definition and thus qualify as a 
body of persons. If the context requires that the domestic law meaning of the term be 
disregarded and the ordinary meaning of the term be used, it is submitted that the trustees 
will be considered a body of persons. Furthermore, it is submitted that the trustee(s) of a 
trust will be regarded as a person within the ordinary meaning of that word.1006 Thus, a 
trustee(s) will be regarded as a “person” for purposes of the OECD MTC from a South African 
perspective. 
In the United Kingdom, if the domestic law meaning of the term body of persons is used, the 
trustees of a trust will be regarded as such, because of the amended wording of the Income 
Tax Act 2007. Furthermore, if the domestic law meaning of the term “body of persons” is 
disregarded and the ordinary meaning of the term is used, the trustees of a trust will be 
regarded as a body of persons. In terms of the ordinary meaning of the term “person”, the 
trustees will be regarded as a “person”.1007 Therefore, the trustees of a trust will be regarded 
as a “person” for purposes of the OECD MTC in the United Kingdom. 
In Canada the Income Tax Act provides that a reference to a trust shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, be read to include a reference to the trustee.1008 Thus, a trustee will be 
regarded as a person for purposes of the OECD MTC on the same basis as a trust.1009 
In the Netherlands the trustees of a trust might be regarded as a “body of persons”. 
Therefore, from a South African, United Kingdom, Canadian and possibly a Dutch 
perspective, the trustees of a trust could qualify as a “person” for purposes of the OECD 
MTC. 
It is submitted that whether the trust or the trustees are regarded as a “person” under the 
OECD MTC, is a relevant question. For example, if the trustees are regarded as a “person” 
and the trustees are resident in more than one country, determining the residence of the 
                                                          
1005 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs 1960 3 SA 291 (A) 302 and 
para 5.2.2. The court in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A) held 
that a trust is not a body of persons, but did not pronounce whether the trustees would qualify as a body of 
persons. 
1006 In Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Lotz 1998 (2) SA 282 (O) the trustees of a trust were held to be 
a person within the meaning of the phrase “'n ander persoon as 'n natuurlike persoon” in the Transfer Duty Act 
40 of 1949. The definition of the term person in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 does not refer to “trustee”, 
but only to “trust”. However, the definition of person uses the word “includes”, which suggests that others, 
such as trustees, may be included as persons. The definition of the word trustee in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962 also suggests that a trustee is a person. 
1007 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 91. See also Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 
130 who regards the trustees as a “collective legal person” or a “deemed person” in terms of the Income Tax 
Act 2007 s 474(1). Kessler states that a trustee is “deemed to be a distinct, notional person”(Kessler Taxation of 
Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 229). Kessler furthermore argues, it is submitted, convincingly, that in 
the case of a single trustee (whether corporate or individual) the trustee should be regarded as a separate 
person, distinct from the person acting in their private capacity (Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign 
Domiciliaries 230). 
1008 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(1). 
1009 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 fn 93; Waters Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada ch 13.II 3; Tremblay and 
Wharram in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 14:49. 
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trustees may become problematic. Determining the residence of the trust would clearly 
solve some of these problems (although determining the residence of a trust is not without 
its challenges).1010 Furthermore, some view the trustees as the person to whom treaty 
benefits will be given, whereas other countries view the trust as the entity to which the 
benefits of the treaty will be given. This and other problems regarding the attribution of 
income will be addressed in a later chapter.1011 
5.6 Characterisation1012 
In the introduction to this chapter it was stated that the state applying the treaty (OECD 
MTC) would have to determine whether the trust with which it is confronted can be 
regarded as a person. But what laws will that state apply in making such a determination? In 
this dissertation it is assumed that all states characterise the other state’s entity as a trust 
for both tax and general law purposes.1013 
Taken from the viewpoint of the source state (State S), when applying the treaty, it will have 
to decide whether the trust resident in the other state (State R) is a person. State S must 
therefore decide whether it may impose its taxes in full or at the reduced treaty rate, or 
refrain from taxing the specific income. If State S may impose its taxes (either in full or at a 
reduced rate), State R must provide appropriate relief, either by exempting the income or 
granting a credit. From State R’s perspective, it will apply the treaty in deciding whether or 
not to grant the appropriate relief for the taxes paid in State S and for this purpose it will 
decide whether or not the trust is a person entitled to relief.1014 
Determining which state’s laws will apply to assess whether a trust is a person, has 
significant practical value. An example best illustrates this point. A trust organised and 
resident in the United Kingdom earns income from a South African source. Both South Africa 
and the United Kingdom characterise the trust as such for income tax and other purposes. 
South Africa as the source state has to decide whether the trust is a person for purposes of 
the OECD MTC. In this chapter the view was taken that in South Africa a trust is a person for 
purposes of the OECD MTC, whereas under United Kingdom law, a United Kingdom trust will 
not be regarded as a person. If the United Kingdom trust therefore qualifies as a trust for 
South African domestic law purposes, it will be regarded as a person if South African law is 
applied. 
Article 23 of the OECD MTC provides that where a resident of state R derives items of 
income which, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, may be taxed in State S, State 
R shall exempt the relevant income or provide an appropriate credit for the taxes paid in 
State S.1015 The OECD commentary provides that the phrase “in accordance with the 
                                                          
1010 The residence of a trust is addressed in the following chapter of this dissertation (ch 6). 
1011 See ch 7. 
1012 The words characterisation, classification and qualification are used as synonyms in this paragraph. 
1013 Easson states that when applying tax rules, whether international or domestic, the first step is to classify 
the entity for tax purposes. A conflict in classification may, however, arise between states due to differences in 
definition, characterisation and legal attributes. (Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and 
Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.2.)  
1014 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.8–12.10. 
1015 OECD MTC art 23A(1) and 23B(1). 
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provisions of the treaty” is important where State S and State R classify the same item of 
income differently for purposes of the OECD MTC.1016 The commentary continues as follows: 
 “Where, due to differences in the domestic law between the State of source and the 
State of residence, the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income or 
capital, provisions of the Convention that are different from those that the State of 
residence would have applied to the same item of income or capital, the income is still 
being taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, as interpreted and 
applied by the State of source. In such a case, therefore, the two Articles require that 
relief from double taxation be granted by the State of residence notwithstanding the 
conflict of qualification resulting from these differences in domestic law.”1017 
The article therefore in effect provides that State R is obliged to follow State S’s classification 
of the income.1018 It is important to note that article 23 only applies in the case where State 
R is obliged to grant relief (an incomplete provision). In other words, where State S must 
refrain from taxing the relevant income (a complete provision), article 23 is not applied. 
Therefore the commentary to the article, suggesting that State R is obliged to follow State 
S’s classification, is not applicable in the case of a complete provision.1019 
It may be argued that the commentary only applies to conflicts regarding the qualification of 
income.1020 Other conflicts of qualification are therefore not solved by this particular passage 
in the commentary. Vogel specifically states that conflicts of qualification regarding the 
provisions dealing with personal scope, is to be dealt with in terms of article 3(2) and not 
article 23 and the commentary thereto.1021 Thus, if states do not agree on whether a trust is 
a “person” for purposes of the treaty, the commentary to article 23 will not apply, but rather 
article 3(2). Avery Jones, on the other hand, argues that in the case where State S’s domestic 
law applies via art 3(2) (and the context does not require that domestic law be ignored), that 
the mutual agreement procedure (article 25 of the OECD MTC) be used to resolve the 
conflict.1022 He also suggests that the mutual agreement procedure be used in the case 
where an autonomous meaning is given to a treaty term, for example when article 3(2) is 
applied and the context requires that the domestic meaning be disregarded.1023 
It is submitted that State S, in deciding whether a trust is a person, for purposes of the 
treaty, will apply its domestic law. State R, in deciding whether or not to grant relief, would, 
if it is assumed that article 23 can be applied, be obliged to follow state S’s qualification of 
the income and, by implication, its determination that the trust is a person. Where article 23 
                                                          
1016 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 23 para 32.2. 
1017 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 23 para 32.3. 
1018 The further Commentary refers to situations in which State R is not obliged to follow State S’s classification 
of income (Commentary on the OECD MTC art 23 para 32.5–32.7). 
1019 Vogel (2003) 57 BFIT 41 43. 
1020 Avery Jones (2001) 55 BFIT 220 220; Vogel (2003) 57 BFIT 41 43. 
1021 Vogel (2003) 57 BFIT 41 43. 
1022 Avery Jones (2001) 55 BFIT 220 220; Avery Jones (2003) 57 BFIT 184 186. His view is based on the 
Commentary on the OECD MTC art 23 para 32.5, which states that conflicts resulting from the different 
interpretation of the facts or different interpretation of the provisions of the convention (as opposed to 
conflicts of qualification due to the different provisions in domestic law, where State R is obliged to follow 
State’s qualification) is solved through the mutual agreement procedure. 
1023 Avery Jones (2001) 55 BFIT 220 221. 
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is not applied, State R would, according to Avery Jones, be obliged to follow the mutual 
agreement procedure to resolve the matter if it does not agree with State S. 
5.7 Conclusion 
By analysing the relevant definitions of the OECD MTC, five alternative criteria were 
identified by which a trust could qualify as a person for purposes of the treaty. These five 
criteria are that a trust could be regarded as: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) any other body of persons; 
(c) a body corporate; 
(d) any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes; or 
(e)  that a trust may fall within the ordinary meaning of the term person. 
This paragraph will discuss whether a trust will qualify as a person in each of the relevant 
states, based on the criteria set out above as applied in the specific state. 
In terms of South African law a trust is neither an individual, nor a juristic person. The term 
body of persons is not defined in the OECD MTC. If the South African tax law meaning of the 
term is applied via article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, it has been concluded above that, based on 
the relevant case law, a trust will not be regarded as a body of persons. Consequently it may 
be argued that the context requires that the South African domestic law meaning of the 
term body of persons be disregarded. If the ordinary meaning of the term body of persons is 
used, it is submitted that a trust will not be regarded as a body of persons. Conceivably an 
international fiscal meaning of body of persons may be used and possibly a trust will fall 
within the suggested international fiscal meaning of body of persons. In South Africa, a trust 
is not subject to the same tax regime as a juristic person and will therefore not be regarded 
as an entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes in terms of South African tax 
laws. However, in terms of the ordinary meaning of the term person, a trust will be regarded 
as a person for purposes of the treaty. 
Thus a court will regard a trust governed by South African law as a person for purposes of 
the treaty. To place the matter beyond any doubt, it may be advisable for South Africa to 
routinely include a trust specifically in the definition of person in the treaties concluded with 
other countries, as is done in Canada. 
In South Africa the trustees of a trust will be regarded as a person for purposes of the OECD 
MTC. 
In the United Kingdom, a trust is not an individual, nor a juristic person. Applying the United 
Kingdom meaning of the term body of persons, it is submitted that a trust is not a body of 
persons, based on the formulation of the Income Tax Act. If one argues that the context 
requires that the domestic law meaning of the term be disregarded in terms of article 3(2) of 
the OECD MTC, it is submitted that a trust will not be a body of persons within the ordinary 
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meaning of that term. If the possibility of using an international fiscal meaning of the term 
body of persons is considered (where the context requires that the domestic law meaning be 
ignored), it is submitted that a trust may possibly qualify as a body of persons. Trusts and 
companies are not subject to the same tax regime and consequently a trust will not be 
regarded as an entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes in terms of United 
Kingdom tax laws. A trust will not be regarded as a person in terms of the ordinary meaning 
of the term person. The trustees of a trust are, however, regarded as a person for purposes 
of the OECD MTC. 
In Canada a trust will be regarded as a person because it is deemed to be an individual for 
purposes of Canadian income tax. Furthermore, Canada generally provides in its treaties that 
a trust falls within the definition of the term person. Since a reference to a trust is to be read 
to include a reference to the trustee, a trustee will be regarded as a person for purposes of 
the OECD MTC. 
In the Netherlands the concept of the APV is regarded as a domestic tax arrangement only 
and not as a separate entity. It is therefore relevant whether a trust, which, by definition, 
will be formed by virtue of the laws of another country, will be regarded as a person from 
the Dutch perspective. A trust is neither regarded as a juristic person, nor as an individual. If 
the domestic law meaning of the term body of persons is used, a trust will not be regarded 
as such in the Netherlands. Even if the context requires that the domestic law of the 
Netherlands be disregarded and the ordinary meaning of the words body of persons be 
applied, it is submitted that a trust will still not qualify as such. Under the uncertain 
international fiscal meaning of the term body of persons, a trust may possibly qualify. Some 
trusts will not be regarded as an entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes in 
the Netherlands, as trusts and companies are not subject to the same tax regimes while 
other trusts that are subject to the same tax regime as companies will qualify as such. It is 
submitted that the trustees of a trust might be regarded as a body of persons. 
To summarise, in South Africa and Canada both the trust and the trustees will be a person 
for purposes of the OECD MTC.1024 In the United Kingdom, it is submitted that only the 
trustees would be regarded as a person, since the trust itself will not qualify as a person. In 
the Netherlands the trust is not a person for purposes of the OECD MTC, but the trustees 
might be. Thus, in all of the states considered, the trustees will be regarded as a person. In 
only two of the states will the trust itself be regarded as a person. 
  
                                                          
1024 Although both the trust and the trustees could qualify as a “person”, it is submitted that the questions of 
attribution of income and residence (both of which will be addressed in later chapters) will determine which of 
the two should be the person for purposes of the OECD MTC. See specifically ch 6.2.2.2. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Article 1 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax 
Convention (OECD MTC) provides that 
“[t]his Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the 
contracting states” (Own emphasis). 
Thus, in addition to being a person, a trust also has to be a resident of one or both of the 
contracting states in order to benefit from the double taxation treaty (DTT).1025 It is also 
important for the functioning of some of the distributive articles of the OECD MTC to 
determine where the recipient of the income (or in some cases the payer) is resident.1026 
Therefore, if a trust receives (or pays) certain income, its residence will have to be 
determined in order to apply the distributive rules of the treaty. 
Article 4 of the OECD MTC deals with residence. It provides, inter alia, that 
“[f]or the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ 
means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason 
of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar 
nature, and also includes that State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof. This term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that 
State in respect only of income from sources in that State or capital situated 
therein.”1027 
This provision does not actually define the term residence.1028 Rather, to determine whether 
a person is a “resident of a contracting state” the domestic laws of the relevant state is 
applied and if the person is liable to tax by reason of his or her domicile, residence, place of 
management or any other criterion of a similar nature, in terms of that domestic legislation, 
the person is a resident of a contracting state for purposes of the treaty. As the respective 
domestic rules of the contracting states may cause a person to be a resident in both states, 
article 4 contains two tiebreaker provisions (one in respect of individuals and one in respect 
of persons other than individuals) to resolve the conflict. Thus the tiebreaker provision 
determines where the person will be resident for purposes of the treaty.1029 
                                                          
1025 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.01; Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 14–050; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions 223; Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation para 51.02. 
1026 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.01; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 223; Van Raad in Cursus 
Belastingrecht IBR–Hfdst. 3–133. 
1027 OECD MTC art 4(1). 
1028 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 233. The Commentary states, however, that the 
expression “resident of a contracting state” is defined (Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4 para 8).  
1029 In terms of art 4 of the OECD MTC residence is determined for purposes of the treaty. Usually this will mean 
that the person’s residence in terms of domestic legislation is unaffected. However, in some countries (eg 
South Africa) a person ceases to be a resident for domestic law purposes if that person is deemed not to be a 
resident for treaty purposes (Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital para 4B.02; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 225; Kessler 
Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 212). 
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There are two situations in which an entity’s eligibility for treaty benefits will have to be 
determined:1030 
(a) Where a non-resident of a treaty country claims a reduction of source country 
taxation. In relation to trusts, this will occur, for example, if a South African resident 
trust acquires income from a source in another country and the trust wants to claim a 
reduction of taxes in that other country in terms of the DTT. Another example would 
be where a trust that is not resident in South Africa (say, a resident of Canada) receives 
income from a South African source and wants to claim a reduction of South African 
withholding tax in terms of the South Africa-Canada DTT; and 
(b) Where a taxpayer, in terms of a DTT between its residence country and the source 
country, claims relief in its residence country from double taxation for taxes paid in the 
country in which the income was sourced. For example, a South African resident trust 
may claim relief from double taxation in South Africa in respect of taxes paid in the 
source country. 
According to Easson, in the first situation ((a) above) it is the law of the country where the 
treaty claimant asserts residence that must be used to determine its residence.1031 In the 
second situation ((b) above) residence is determined in terms of the treaty and depends on 
liability to tax in the country of residence.1032 
This chapter will discuss the application of the provisions of article 4 of the OECD MTC to 
trusts. As a starting point, the requirements of article 4(1) will be discussed. The liable to tax 
requirement and the requirement that liability must be by reason of certain factors, will be 
focused on. Since article 4(1) requires that reference be made to domestic law, a discussion 
of the domestic law determining the residence of trusts in each of the relevant states will 
follow. The tiebreaker provision of article 4(3) of the OECD MTC and its application in 
relation to trusts will also be discussed. 
6.2 The requirements of article 4(1) of the OECD MTC 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Couzin lists four requirements that a company must meet, in order to be a resident in terms 
of article 4(1):1033 
                                                          
1030 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.7. 
1031 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.9. 
1032 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.10. 
Some support for Easson’s view may be gleaned from Lang, who states that whether a person qualifies under 
art 4(1) and is thus liable to tax, is to be considered under the laws of the state of residence and not under the 
laws of the state of source or the state of application (as mentioned in art 3(2)) (Lang (2001) 55 BFIT 596 598). 
1033 Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 105. Kessler lists four other requirements: (a) there 
must be a person; (b) the person must be liable to tax in the state; (c) the person must be domestic law 
resident in that state; (d) domestic law residence must be the reason for liability to tax (Kessler Taxation of 
Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 213). Requirement (a) in Kessler’s list is addressed in ch 5. 
Requirement (b) in Kessler’s list corresponds with requirement (a) in Couzin’s list. The reference to “domestic 
law residence” in requirements (c) and (d) in Kessler’s list should be read as “UK law resident”. If it is borne in 
mind that a person is liable to tax in the UK by reason of residence (Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and 
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(a) the company must be liable to tax in the relevant state; 
(b) such liability must be “by reason of” a connecting factor; 
(c) the connecting factor must fall within the listed criteria; and 
(d) the liability to taxation must arise under the laws of one of the contracting states. 
It is submitted that these requirements apply equally to trusts and will, accordingly, be 
discussed in relation to trusts in this paragraph.1034 
6.2.2 Liability to tax and fiscal transparency 
6.2.2.1 General comments 
In order to qualify as a resident of a contracting state, a person has to be liable to tax in that 
state by reason of certain criteria. The term liable to tax is not defined in the OECD MTC.1035 
The Commentary suggests that liable to tax connotes “comprehensive taxation” or “full 
liability to tax”.1036 Such comprehensive or full liability to tax arises only when a state taxes a 
person’s worldwide income (under the criteria mentioned) and does not arise when such a 
state taxes a person’s income only from sources arising in that state.1037 
However, a person does not in fact have to pay tax in order to be liable to tax.1038 Thus, the 
Commentary notes that most countries will view bodies that are exempted from tax if they 
meet certain criteria, such as charities, as liable to tax.1039 Indeed, Couzin regards the term 
liable to tax to mean “liable to be liable to tax”.1040 However, there is a continuum of non-
taxability, ranging from the use of losses to eliminate taxes on the one end to the complete 
exclusion of a person from the income tax system on the other and it is unclear where the 
line must be drawn. The effect of the OECD MTC seems to be that, if domestic legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Foreign Domiciliaries 211 and 213), it is submitted that requirements (c) and (d) in Kessler’s list are in effect the 
same as requirements (b) to (d) of Couzin’s list.  
1034 Although all four requirements are addressed in this paragraph, the requirements are combined under two 
headings, for the sake of convenience. 
1035 Strictly speaking “liable to tax” is not a term, but a phrase. However, the word “term” was used in ch 5 in 
relation to other words in the OECD MTC and, for the sake of consistency and convenience, this is continued in 
relation to “liable to tax”. 
1036 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4 para 8.3.  
1037 De Graaf and Pötgens (2011) 39 Intertax 169 169. The Commentary states that the intention of the second 
sentence of article 4 is not to exclude from the scope of the DTT all residents from states that employ the 
territorial principle in their taxation (Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4(1) para 8.3). According to Wheeler 
this explanation by the OECD is not entirely satisfactory (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 252).  
1038 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.05; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 63; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions 229; Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 108. Many authors 
distinguish between the terms “liable to tax” and “subject to tax”, the former having a wider meaning than the 
latter, connoting an abstract liability to tax, which will be met even if a person does not actually pay any tax 
due to, eg, a loss or an exemption. The term “subject to tax”, on the other hand, connotes an effective or 
actual liability to pay tax (eg see De Graaf and Pötgens (2011) 39 Intertax 169 172; Baker Double Taxation 
Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital para 4B.05; Wheeler 
(2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 287).  
1039 Commentary on art 4 of the OECD MTC para 8.6. 
1040 Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 107. 
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first imposes a liability to tax and then reduces it, the person will be liable to tax. If, however, 
no tax is imposed from the start, a person will not be regarded as liable to tax. This effect 
has been criticised.1041 
In South Africa, no case law exists and the revenue authority has issued no guidance 
regarding the question whether exempt entities are liable to tax. However, the view has 
been expressed that in South Africa public benefit organisations that enjoy exemption from 
tax, will be regarded as liable to tax.1042 In the United Kingdom, charities are regarded as 
liable to tax and therefore resident for treaty purposes. This view is supported by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).1043 It has been argued that in Canada, case law 
suggests that tax-exempt entities are not liable to tax and therefore not residents.1044 The 
Canadian revenue authority disagrees with this interpretation and it is generally accepted 
that tax-exempt entities are liable to tax.1045 In the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad has held 
that, with regard to a DTT that expressly referred to certain exempt entities as treaty 
residents, other exempt entities that were not mentioned will not be regarded as liable to 
tax.1046 However, from this judgement one cannot deduce how the court will interpret a 
provision similar to article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. The Dutch Ministry of Finance therefore 
prefers to include criteria regarding liability to tax to ensure certainty regarding all exempt 
entities. It is their policy that tax-exempt institutions, such as pension funds and other non-
profit organisations, be regarded as liable to tax.1047 
It should further be noted that the OECD MTC does not require a resident of a state to be 
liable to tax on a specific item of income in order to claim treaty benefits regarding that 
income. Provided that there is a general liability for tax and the person derives or receives 
income, the treaty will be applied, irrespective of whether the person is liable to tax on the 
specific item of income.1048 This point is well illustrated by the Smallwood case1049 in the 
United Kingdom. The case concerned the liability to capital gains tax in the United Kingdom 
                                                          
1041 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 252. See also Couzin Corporate Residence and International 
Taxation 115. There are further points of uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the term liable to tax. The 
term tax is not defined, but a sensible interpretation would be to limit the liability to income tax and not any 
other tax (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 253). Furthermore, both the literature and case law suggest 
that there is uncertainty on whether potential liability to tax is enough for a person to be regarded as liable to 
tax for purposes of the DTT. This issue arises when a person has significant connections with a state, but that 
state does not in fact impose any tax (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 253; Galea (2012) 66 BFIT para 
3.1). This latter point will be reverted to when Lang’s view is discussed in ch 6.2.2.3.3. 
1042 Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 715. 
1043 Kessler and Brown Taxation of Charities and Non-Profit Organisations 415. 
1044 Ward et al (1996) 44 Canadian Tax Journal 408 419. 
1045 Brooks in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 430; Berry (2007) 46 Tax Notes 
International 933 934. 
1046 2009 HR 08/05071. 
1047 Ministerie van Financiën Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid para 2.2.1. Certain commentators take a different 
view of the Hoge Raad’s decision. They interpret it to mean that a person must actually be liable for tax in 
order to be regarded as a resident. These commentators provide reasons why they do not agree with the Hoge 
Raad’s decision and also propose amended wording for the OECD MTC to ensure greater clarity regarding the 
meaning of the term liable to tax (De Graaf and Pötgens (2011) 39 Intertax 169). 
1048 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 273. Wheeler refers to the absence of the link between a 
resident’s liability for tax and a specific item of income for which treaty protection is claimed as the “missing 
keystone” in DTTs (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 280). See also Couzin Corporate Residence and 
International Taxation 110.  
1049 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
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of the trustees (or the settlor) of the Smallwood Settlement. The trustees argued that they 
were not liable to the relevant tax, based on the provisions of the DTT between the United 
Kingdom and Mauritius, which, according to the trustees, granted the sole right to tax capital 
gains to Mauritius. Mauritius does not, in fact, tax capital gains. If the trustees’ argument 
were to succeed (which it did not), the effect would be that no tax would be payable in 
either the United Kingdom or Mauritius. The Court of Appeal accepted that the fact that 
Mauritius does not tax capital gains, is irrelevant for the application of article 4, in the sense 
that liable to tax refers to any of the taxes covered by the relevant DTT.1050 Therefore, the 
fact that capital gains tax, which was the tax in issue in this case, was not charged in 
Mauritius, was irrelevant, based on the fact that the trustees were in general liable to tax in 
Mauritius. The court further confirmed that the term liable to tax means “chargeable to tax”, 
in the sense that although a person may be physically resident for only part of a year, if that 
physical residence leads to chargeability for the whole year under the domestic laws of the 
residence country, the person will be a resident that is liable to tax for purposes of the 
treaty.1051 
6.2.2.2 Trust versus trustee 
In a previous chapter it was concluded that in South Africa and Canada both the trust and 
the trustee could be regarded as a “person” for purposes of the OECD MTC. In the United 
Kingdom only the trustees can be regarded as a “person” and in the Netherlands the 
trustees might be regarded as a person. It was submitted that the issue of residence would, 
inter alia, determine who the relevant person would be that could claim relief in terms of a 
DTT.1052 
The point is also illustrated by the case law. In the South African case of Oceanic Trust1053 the 
court pronounced on whether the relevant trust was a resident. In the Canadian Fundy 
Settlement case, the court had to decide where the trust was resident for Canadian domestic 
law purposes. The court was emphatic that the relevant taxpayer was the trust and not the 
trustees and that it was the trust’s residence that had to be determined.1054 In the United 
Kingdom case of Smallwood, the court was concerned with the residence of the trustees for 
treaty purposes.1055 However, the court in Smallwood seemed to equate the residence of the 
trust with the trustees: 
“The POEM with which this case is concerned is, as it seems to me, the POEM of the 
trust , i.e. of the trustees as a continuing body.”1056 
It has led Cleave to observe that the difference between the residence of the trust (as in 
Fundy Settlement) and the trustees (as in Smallwood) may be more apparent than real.1057 
This sentiment is echoed by Kessler who doubts that the question whether the person for 
                                                          
1050 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 12. 
1051 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 paras 40–42. 
1052 See ch 5.7. 
1053 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1054 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 13. 
1055 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 69. 
1056 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 69. The 
court used the acronym POEM, which, off course, refers to “place of effective management”.  
1057 Cleave (2011) 6 BTR 705 713. 
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the purposes of the OECD MTC is the trustees (as a body) or the trust, makes a difference in 
practice.1058 
It is suggested that the domestic law of the relevant states should be examined to determine 
whether the trust’s or the trustees’ residence should be determined. As stated above, it is 
the tax laws of the state where the treaty claimant is resident that should determine 
whether that person is resident.1059 
In South Africa, a trust is included in the definition of person.1060 The terms trust, trustee and 
beneficiary are all defined for purposes of the Income Tax Act.1061 The term taxpayer is 
defined to mean “any person chargeable with any tax leviable under this Act”.1062 The main 
charging provision provides that income tax is to be paid annually in respect of the taxable 
income received by or accrued to or in favour of any person (other than a company) during 
the year of assessment ending the last day of February each year.1063 The provision that 
specifically deals with trusts provides that 
“[a]ny amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during any year of 
assessment in his or her capacity as the trustee of a trust, shall, subject to the 
provisions of section 7, to the extent to which that amount has been derived for the 
immediate or future benefit of any ascertained beneficiary who has a vested right to 
that amount during that year, be deemed to be an amount which has accrued to that 
beneficiary, and to the extent to which that amount is not so derived, be deemed to be 
an amount which has accrued to that trust.”1064 
From this provision it can be deduced that an amount to which no ascertained beneficiary 
has a vested right during the year, is deemed to be an amount which has accrued to the 
relevant trust. Therefore, although the trustee receives an amount (or it accrues to the 
trustee), it is deemed under the relevant circumstances to accrue to the trust. Returning to 
the main charging provision, it is, accordingly, the trust (which is a person, by definition) to 
whom the income accrues and which is therefore liable to tax. The trust will therefore 
qualify as a taxpayer, since it is chargeable with tax. 
The trustees of the trust are, however, regarded as the representative taxpayers of the 
trust.1065 The Tax Administration Act defines a taxpayer, inter alia, as a person chargeable to 
tax or a representative taxpayer.1066 That Act further provides that a person chargeable to 
tax is a person upon whom the liability for tax due under a tax act is imposed and who is 
                                                          
1058 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230. 
1059 See ch 6.1. 
1060 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “person”. 
1061 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
1062 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “taxpayer”. 
1063 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 5(1)(c). The term “taxable income” is also defined in s 1. 
1064 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(1). 
1065 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 para (c) of the definition of “representative taxpayer”, read with the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 1 definition of “representative taxpayer”. 
1066 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 151. 
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personally liable for the tax.1067 The Tax Administration Act sets out the liability of a 
representative taxpayer, namely 
“[a] representative taxpayer is, as regards – 
(a) the income to which the representative taxpayer is entitled; 
(b) moneys to which the representative taxpayer is entitled or has the 
management or control; 
(c) transactions concluded by the representative taxpayer; and 
(d) anything else done by the representative taxpayer, 
in such capacity – 
(i) subject to the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the taxpayer represented; 
(ii) entitled to any abatement, deduction, exemption, right to setoff a loss, and 
other items that could be claimed by the person represented; and 
(iii) liable for the amount of tax specified by a tax Act.”1068 
A representative taxpayer may be assessed in respect of any tax, but such assessment is 
regarded as made upon the representative taxpayer in such capacity only. The Tax 
Administration Act also provides for personal liability of the representative taxpayer and 
reads as follows 
“A representative taxpayer is personally liable for tax payable in the representative 
taxpayer’s representative capacity, if, while it remains unpaid  – 
(a) the representative taxpayer alienates, charges or disposes of amounts in respect 
of which the tax is chargeable; or 
(b) the representative taxpayer disposes of or parts with funds or moneys, which are 
in the representative taxpayer’s possession or come to the representative 
taxpayer after the tax is payable, if the tax could legally have been paid from or 
out of the funds or moneys.”1069 
Bearing in mind that the trustee of a trust manages and controls the trust funds, it is clear 
that the trustee, as representative taxpayer, is liable for the amount of tax specified in the 
Income Tax Act. Regarding the personal liability of the trustee as representative taxpayer, it 
should be noted that personal liability only kicks in when tax remains unpaid. Therefore, as 
long as the trustee keeps tax payments up to date, there will be no personal liability. If, 
however, taxes are unpaid, personal liability only arises when certain actions are taken by 
the trustee (for example, alienation or disposal of certain amounts). If these actions are not 
                                                          
1067 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 152. 
1068 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 154. 
1069 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 155. 
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taken while taxes are unpaid (that is, if the trustees “do nothing”, including failing to pay the 
tax due), there is no personal liability for the trustee in terms of the Tax Administration Act. 
It is therefore submitted that the trustee, as representative taxpayer, is not chargeable to 
tax, since only one of the two conditions for chargeability is met: although the trustee is 
liable for the tax due, he or she is not, generally speaking, personally liable for the tax.1070 If 
this argument is incorrect and the trustee can be charged with tax in his or her 
representative capacity in terms of the Tax Administration Act, it should be borne in mind 
that in the case of an inconsistency between the Tax Administration Act and the Income Tax 
Act, the latter prevails.1071 
It is therefore submitted that in terms of South African law the person chargeable to income 
tax is the trust and not the trustee. In terms of South African domestic tax law, the trust is 
therefore the only person who could be liable to tax and, accordingly, a resident for 
purposes of article 4(1) of the OECD. 
In the United Kingdom the trustee of a trust, and not the trust itself, is liable to tax.1072 
HMRC states that 
“[t]rusts are not themselves liable to tax in the UK, but the trustees on behalf of the 
trust may be liable to tax in the UK. A trust therefore cannot be a resident of the UK for 
the purposes of any UK Double Taxation Convention (DTC).”1073 
In respect of the United Kingdom where it is the trustee, and not the trust, whose residence 
must be determined, a further matter must be addressed. A trustee acts in his or her 
personal capacity and in his or her capacity as trustee. A trustee also has two separate 
estates.1074 A trustee is liable to pay tax in these separate capacities as well. In the United 
Kingdom, the trustees are regarded as a distinct, notional person for income tax purposes, 
separate from the persons who are trustees.1075 Thus, for tax purposes “… the person acting 
as trustee is generally regarded as a separate person from the same person acting in its 
private capacity”.1076 However, the OECD MTC does not distinguish between the different 
capacities of the relevant person.1077 Prebble therefore argues that if a person is a resident 
in his or her personal capacity, but also happens to be a trustee of a trust, that trustee is also 
resident in his or her capacity as trustee.1078 Prebble contends that the wording of clauses 
similar to article 4(1) of the OECD MTC does not support a distinction between the different 
capacities.1079 
                                                          
1070 It would be absurd to argue that the trustee could potentially qualify as a resident for treaty purposes 
(because the trustee is regarded as liable to tax) only in circumstance where taxes are in arrears and the 
trustee has taken certain actions to alienate or dispose of amounts that could have been used to pay the taxes. 
1071 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 4(3). 
1072 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230. 
1073 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs International Manual para 162034. 
1074 See ch 2.3.3. 
1075 Income Tax Act 2007 s 474. 
1076 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 229. 
1077 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 250; Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 49. 
1078 Wheeler seems to support this point (Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd 
Symposium of International Tax Law 49). 
1079 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 6. 
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Kessler, on the other hand, argues that the trustees (whether there is one or more than one) 
are regarded as a body of persons and therefore constitute a “person” for treaty purposes. 
He asserts that that person (which he calls the “trustee-person”) is “necessarily distinct from 
the persons who act as trustees.”1080 He argues that it is possible for a person to be treaty-
resident in one state in his or her private capacity and treaty-resident in another state in his 
or her trustee capacity.1081 Kessler’s view is preferred as article 4(1) specifically requires the 
application of domestic law and in terms of United Kingdom domestic law the trustees are 
regarded as a person distinct from the persons acting as such in their personal capacities. 
In Canada it is the trust and not the trustee that is liable to tax. The Supreme Court of 
Canada recently stated as follows: 
“… s. 2(1) is the basic charging provision of the Act, and its reference to a ‘person’ must 
be read as a reference to the taxpayer whose taxable income is being subjected to 
income tax. This is the trust, not the trustee.”1082 
Commenting on this case, Avery Jones and Nikolakakis make the following interesting point: 
“In contrast UK tax law refers to the trustee and never to a trust. As soon as one talks 
about a trust being the taxable person, even though one knows that it is not legally a 
person, one is drawn to thinking of it as an entity (and it is the same with 
partnerships). Looking for the trust’s central management and control seems to be a 
natural consequence of thinking in this way, whereas in the UK the legislation talks 
about the trustee and so the question is one of the residence of the trustee, which 
fortunately the statute deals with, but if it had not it is very doubtful that the courts 
would have come up with central management and control. The different way of 
viewing the question affects the answer, although even if the taxable person is the 
trustee as such it would be necessary to rely on some form of abstraction where there 
are multiple trustees and they do not all reside in the same place.”1083 
To conclude, in South Africa and Canada, the relevant person who is liable to tax in terms of 
domestic law is the trust itself. It is therefore the trust that is the “person” for purposes of 
article 1 and it is the trust whose residence should be determined in terms of domestic law 
for purposes of article 4(1). In the United Kingdom, it is the trustees, as a body, that is liable 
to tax in terms of domestic law. It is therefore the trustees (as a body) who are a person for 
purposes of article 1 and whose residence should be determined for purposes of article 4(1). 
The question therefore arises how the treaty should be applied if one state taxes the trust 
and the other state taxes the trustees.1084 For example, if trustees that are resident in the 
United Kingdom receive income from a South African source, they will try to obtain a 
reduced withholding tax rate in terms of the treaty between South Africa and the United 
Kingdom. South Africa would have levied the withholding tax against the trust. Similarly, a 
South African resident trust may receive income from a source in the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
1080 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230. 
1081 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 229. 
1082 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520. 
1083 Avery Jones and Nikolakakis (2012) 14 International Tax Law Reports 1090 1092. 
1084 Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 50. 
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The other example would be where trustees resident in the United Kingdom claim relief in 
the United Kingdom from double taxation for taxes paid in South Africa where the income 
was sourced. Similarly, a South African resident trust may claim relief in South Africa for 
taxes paid in the United Kingdom on income sourced in that country. 
It is submitted that this point is a problem of attribution, a matter that will be addressed in a 
later chapter.1085 
6.2.2.3 Fiscal transparency 
6.2.2.3.1 General 
It is generally accepted that if a state treats an entity as fiscally transparent, it is not liable to 
tax and therefore cannot be regarded as a resident of a contracting state.1086 By fiscal 
transparency is meant that the income is not taxed in the hands of the relevant entity, but 
rather in the hands of the members or associates.1087 Thus, in the case of a trust, it will be 
regarded as transparent if income is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries, rather than in 
the trust itself. 
Couzin identifies two reasons why transparent partnerships should not be regarded as liable 
to tax and it is submitted that these reasons could be applied to trusts as well. Firstly, it is 
inappropriate to describe a partnership that is not a tax subject as a resident of that state. 
Residence, as used in article 4(1) in relation to the list of criteria, connotes a connecting 
factor that is susceptible to give rise to tax liability. It is improbable that a state that treats a 
partnership as transparent, can apply its domestic concept of residence to that partnership 
in a sensible way. Secondly, the likelihood of a transparent partnership becoming taxable is 
very remote, since it would require a change in the nature of the tax system. It is therefore 
unreasonable to assume that the contracting states intended the term liable to tax to 
include such a remote possibility.1088 
6.2.2.3.2 Degrees of transparency 
Different degrees of transparency may be noted:1089 
                                                          
1085 See ch 7 in general and more specifically examples 7.3.1.3 and 7.3.2.3. 
1086 Vogel (2001) 55 BFIT 91 91; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 63; Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty 
Interpretation 51.03; OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 34. The 
contrary view of Lang is discussed below. The aforementioned report by the OECD regarding partnerships 
focuses on partnerships, but acknowledges that many of the principles contained in the report may apply with 
respect to other non-corporate entities (OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships para 1). The report has been used in academic literature to examine the position of trusts (eg 
Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers and Danon 
(2004) 32 Intertax 210).  
1087 Larking IBFD International Tax Glossary 423; OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships para 19. 
1088 Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 117. 
1089 The terminology used by Baker (Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital 1B.30) is followed in this paragraph. See also Larking IBFD International 
Tax Glossary 423; OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 21; Easson in 
Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12.11. 
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(a) Complete transparency: the entity is completely ignored for tax purposes. 
(b) Transparency with reporting requirements: the entity is not taxed, but it has certain 
reporting duties towards the taxing authorities. These entities are sometimes referred 
to as “translucent” or “translucid”. 
(c) Optional transparency: the entity or its participators may elect whether it will be 
regarded as transparent or not. 
(d) Partial transparency: the entity is taxed on part of its income and its members or 
associates on the other part.1090 
In practice, the degree of transparency of an entity, especially trusts, may change from year 
to year. Thus, trusts (more specifically, discretionary trusts) may be fully transparent in one 
year, opaque in the next and partially transparent in a further year. This may happen 
because the trustee may decide to distribute all of the trust’s income to a beneficiary in a 
given year, which will cause the trust to be fully transparent. In the next year, the trustee 
may decide not to distribute any income, making the trust completely opaque in that year. 
In a further year, the trustee may decide to distribute a portion of the income to the 
beneficiaries and retain the rest, making the trust partially transparent. 
The question that arises is therefore what level of transparency is required for an entity to 
be regarded as either transparent or opaque. If an entity is classified as “opaque”, it may be 
regarded as a resident (because it is liable to tax), whereas classification as “transparent” will 
lead to the conclusion that the entity is not liable to tax and therefore is not a resident.1091 
According to the OECD, to determine whether a partnership is liable to tax 
“the real question is whether the amount of tax payable on the partnership income is 
determined in relation to the personal characteristics of the partners (whether the 
partners are taxable or not, what other income they have, what are the personal 
allowances to which they are entitled and what is the tax rate applicable to them). If 
the answer to that question is yes, then the partnership should not itself be considered 
to be liable to tax. The fact that the income is computed at the level of the partnership 
before being allocated to the partners, that the tax is technically paid by the 
partnership or that it is assessed on the partnership as described in the preceding 
paragraph will not change that result.”1092 
A factor that may indicate that the partnership itself is not liable to tax, but rather the 
partners, is that income retains its nature when it is allocated to a partner, who then adds 
                                                          
1090 Easson notes a second example of partial transparency, namely where the entity pays tax, not for its own 
account, but for the account of its participants. Participants are allowed a credit for their share in the tax on 
their personal income tax liability (Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text 
of Seminar Papers 12.12). 
1091 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12:13. 
1092 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 40. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
his or her share of the partnership income to his or her income to determine his or her 
taxable income.1093 
From the Partnership Report it may therefore be deduced that entities that fall within items 
(a) (completely transparent) and (b) (transparent with reporting requirements) above will 
not be regarded as residents in the relevant state.1094 An illustration of the treatment of a 
partnership falling within item (b) may be found in the South African case of Grundlingh.1095 
The case involved a South African resident individual, who was a partner in a partnership of 
attorneys which was formed and practised in Lesotho. It was common cause that a 
partnership is not a juristic person in either South Africa or Lesotho. Nor was it treated as a 
separate taxable entity in either of the two states. Both states therefore regarded the 
partnership as transparent and taxed the partner on his or her share of the partnership 
income. In terms of the relevant Lesotho tax legislation, the partnership was, however, 
required to file a partnership return of income, but the legislation was explicit that the 
partners and not the partnership were taxable. The court held that the Lesotho partnership 
was not “an enterprise liable to pay tax in Lesotho”, as was required by article 7 of the DTT 
between South Africa and Lesotho (which was based on article 7 of the OECD MTC). The 
court’s finding demonstrates the point that the practical, administrative rules which treated 
the partnership as a “separate” entity, such as the filing of a partnership return, is irrelevant 
in determining whether the partnership is liable to tax. What is relevant is the legal position 
of the partnership as a transparent entity, which was set out by the relevant statute.1096 
Applying the Partnership Report to trusts, it could be argued, in respect of trusts falling 
within items (a) (completely transparent) and (b) (transparent with reporting requirements) 
above, that these trusts are not liable to tax. Therefore, if a trust is completely ignored for 
tax purposes and is consequently completely transparent, with or without reporting 
requirements, it will not be regarded as liable to tax and, hence, not be a resident of the 
relevant state. An example of a trust that is completely ignored for tax purposes is a bare 
trust in the United Kingdom,1097 where the beneficiary is, generally speaking, chargeable to 
tax.1098 Similarly, a bare trust is excluded from the definition of a trust in terms of Canadian 
legislation and is therefore ignored for tax purposes.1099 In South Africa, an example of a 
completely transparent trust for income tax purposes would be a vesting trust, where all the 
income accrues to ascertained beneficiaries with vested rights.1100 
                                                          
1093 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 38. 
1094 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 1B.30; OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships paras 34–40. 
1095 Grundlingh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2009 72 SATC 1. 
1096 Hattingh (2010) 127 SALJ 38 45. 
1097 A bare trust is one in which a beneficiary has an immediate and absolute title to the income and capital of 
the trust. The beneficiary is entitled to the equitable interest in the trust without any contingencies attached 
(Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 42.01). See also ch 2.3.4.2 in respect of Scotland. 
1098 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 42.06; Gordon et al Tiley and Collison's UK Tax Guide 
2013–14 para 21.3. 
1099 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(1); Brown in Topical Analysis para 1.4.1. 
1100 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 25B(1). See ch 2.2.4 regarding vesting trusts in South Africa. See also Honiball 
and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 287, who supports the view that vesting trusts will not be 
liable to tax. 
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Academic authors suggest that entities falling within item (c) (optional transparency) above 
should be regarded as residents if they elect to be treated as non-transparent.1101 Others 
suggest that if these entities elect to be treated as transparent, it is the partners, rather than 
the partnership, that is liable to tax, so that the partnership is not entitled to the benefits of 
the treaty.1102 Yet in the Canadian case of TD Securities,1103 the court, in a controversial 
decision,1104 held that a United States Limited Liability Company (LLC) was liable to tax and 
therefore a resident of the United States for purposes of the treaty between the United 
States and Canada. In terms of United States legislation, the LLC was treated as transparent 
(having failed to exercise an election to be treated as opaque), its income being taxed in the 
hands of its only shareholder, a United States resident corporation. The court held that the 
LLC itself, and not its shareholder, was regarded as liable to tax and therefore a resident of 
the United States.1105 
6.2.2.3.3 Partially transparent entities 
The Partnership Report specifically states that it does not deal with the residence of entities 
falling under item (d) (partially transparent entities) above.1106 The report acknowledges that 
trusts, specifically, are often treated by domestic tax laws as partially transparent.1107 Partial 
transparency in the case of a trust could entail, for example, that the beneficiaries of a trust 
are taxed on the income distributed to them, while the trust (or the trustee) is taxed on the 
undistributed trust income. A further example would be where the trust is taxed on the full 
amount of the trust income, but the beneficiaries are allowed a credit for the tax paid, to set 
off against their own personal liability for tax.1108 Easson applies the test laid down in the 
Partnership Report and quoted above to partially transparent entities other than 
partnerships and concludes that partially transparent trusts that are taxed on their 
undistributed income, will not be transparent and will consequently be regarded as liable to 
tax. He argues that, even if a trust distributes all of its income and therefore pays no tax, it 
will still be regarded as liable to tax. Similarly, in the case of a trust that is taxed on the full 
                                                          
1101 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 1B.30; Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 121. 
1102 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 63. 
1103 TD Securities (USA) LLC v Her Majesty the Queen 2010 TCC 186. 
1104 For criticism against the case see Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 337 and the references cited 
there. 
1105 See also Linklaters LLP v Income tax Officer - International Taxation Ward 1(1)(2), Mumbai ITA No 
4896/Mum/03 and 5085/Mum/03, an Indian case in which a similar conclusion was reached and the German 
decision of the Bundesfinanzhof BFH decision of 20 August 2008 I R 39/07. In the states under scrutiny, trusts, 
generally, do not have such an election. An exception to this statement is that in Canada a trustee can 
designate dividends received from a Canadian resident corporation to retain its nature in the hands of the 
beneficiary. (A trustees can also designate that foreign source income retain its nature if it is taxed in the hands 
of the beneficiaries, but this arrangement only applies for purposes of granting a tax credit to the beneficiary 
and is not a general rule.) As stated earlier, the fact that income retains its nature may indicate that the 
beneficiaries, rather than the trust, are liable to tax. In Canada, trustees may effectively elect whether or not 
certain dividend income retains its nature in the hands of the beneficiary. Whether this election will put the 
trust within the category of optional transparency and what the effect of such categorisation will be, falls 
outside the scope of this dissertation. The focus of this dissertation falls on South Africa.  
1106 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 37. 
1107 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 37. 
1108 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12:12. 
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amount of the income, with a credit granted to the beneficiary, the trust will be regarded as 
liable to tax.1109 
A further argument in favour of Easson’s view that a trust should be liable to tax even if it 
distributes all of its income is the following. In the case of a discretionary trust, the trustees 
may decide to retain all of its income in year one, distribute all of its income in year two and 
distribute a portion of its income (retaining the rest) in year three. It would seem 
undesirable that an entity would be regarded as liable to tax in year one when all the income 
is retained, but not in year two (when all the income is distributed), only to be regarded as 
liable to tax again in year three (when part of the income is distributed and part of the 
income is retained). 
Baker regards partially transparent entities as “clearly liable to tax on the income on which 
the entity is liable to tax.”1110 In the case of trusts, this would mean that a trust that is taxed 
on undistributed income would be liable to tax in relation to that income. Regarding that 
portion of the income which is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries only, Baker suggests 
that a “flow-through” approach should be followed, as it is both “pragmatic and consistent 
with the Partnership Report”.1111 
The “flow-through” approach set out in the Partnership Report entails that where a 
partnership as such does not qualify as a resident because the partnership is not liable to 
tax, the “partners should be entitled to the benefits of the Conventions entered into by the 
countries of which they are residents to the extent that they are liable to tax on their share 
of the partnership income in those countries”.1112 Applying the “flow-through” approach to 
trusts, as Baker suggests, would presumably entail that the beneficiaries resident in the 
relevant countries would be entitled to the benefits of the applicable DTTs, to the extent 
that they are liable to tax on the income distributed to them. 
Although Baker’s view is attractive, a point made earlier should be borne in mind, namely 
that the OECD MTC does not require that a resident of a state be liable to tax on a specific 
item of income in order to claim treaty benefits regarding that income. Assume that a trust 
retains part of its income and distributes the remainder of its income. The trust is taxable on 
the undistributed portion of the income and would therefore be liable to tax for purposes of 
the DTT. The fact that a portion of its income is distributed and therefore taxed in the hands 
of the beneficiaries, will not alter the fact that the trust is liable to tax.1113 
There is a dissenting view regarding the meaning of the term liable to tax which should be 
borne in mind here. According to Lang,1114 if tax-exempt persons can be regarded as liable to 
                                                          
1109 Easson in Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice: Text of Seminar Papers 12:14. 
1110 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 1B.30. 
1111 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 1B.30. 
1112 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 47. The commentary to art 1 
of the OECD MTC.  
1113 In practice, it may be very difficult to determine what income was retained and what income was 
distributed. See Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 287 who support the point that a 
trust will be regarded as liable to tax even if it is taxed only on retained income. 
1114 Lang (2001) 55 BFIT 596 . 
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tax, then persons who are not considered taxable entities should also be regarded as liable 
to tax. In his view, it should be irrelevant whether a person is first regarded as taxable and 
then granted exemption, or whether a person is not considered a taxpayer at all. He argues 
that the words “by reasons of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other 
criterion of similar nature” does not mean that the criteria mentioned are the cause of tax 
liability itself. His reason is that the rule could then not be applied in states who tax on the 
basis of the principle of territoriality, because the tax treatment in these states does not 
depend on these criteria. He argues that “other criterion of a similar nature” should entail 
criteria that imply a similarly close connection to the state, such as domicile, residence or 
place of management. He concludes that 
“[a]s a result, every person having his domicile, residence, place of management or 
other criterion of a similar nature which expresses a similarly close relation to that 
state is considered liable to tax and therefore a “resident”. Neither actual taxation nor 
the qualification as a taxable entity is a requirement for residence under Art. 4(1) of 
the OECD Model.”1115 
He furthermore states: 
“According to the language of the distributive norms of the OECD Model, however, the 
other contracting state requires only that the person to whom income is allocated 
according to the laws of the source state be a resident. It is irrelevant whether the 
income is taxed in the hands of the resident person, in the hands of another taxpayer, 
or not at all. It is only relevant whether the person to whom the income is allocated 
according to the laws of the source state has a close enough connection to the other 
contracting state so that he can be considered a resident there.”1116 
In terms of Lang’s view, it would therefore be irrelevant that trusts are transparent (or any 
degree thereof). As long as the trust has a close enough connection to the residence state to 
be considered a resident, it should be able to qualify as a resident for purposes of the treaty. 
If Lang’s view is followed, a completely transparent trust would still be regarded as a 
resident for treaty purposes. Similarly, partially transparent trusts would also be regarded as 
residents.1117 
Support for Lang’s view is provided by Vogel, who states that if an entity is a “person” within 
the meaning of article 3(1) of the OECD MTC, but is not taxed in its residence state, it should 
be considered a resident “to the extent that its physical connection with the contracting 
State satisfies those criteria which, if a tax liability existed, would cause the organization to 
be taxable as a resident”.1118 
Lang’s view is criticised by Danon and it is submitted that this criticism is justified. Danon 
argues that the wording of article 4(1), which uses the words “is liable to tax” (own 
                                                          
1115 Lang (2001) 55 BFIT 596 598. 
1116 Lang (2001) 55 BFIT 596 599. 
1117 The fact that in South Africa income to which a beneficiary has a vested right (or obtained a vested right 
due to the exercise by the trustees of their discretion in favour of the beneficiary in that year) never forms part 
of the income of the trust and is deemed to have accrued to the beneficiary, will be irrelevant, in Lang’s view, 
and the trust will still be regarded as a resident. 
1118 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 95. 
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emphasis), rather than “could be liable to tax”, indicates that the person claiming the 
benefits of the DTT should be regarded as a taxable person by the residence state. 
Furthermore, the term liable to tax should be interpreted under the domestic law of the 
residence state1119 and not by reference to another DTT provision.1120 Lang’s view is also 
contrary to the Partnership Report, the view of the majority of academics referred to above 
and the decision in Crown Forest Industries.1121 
Edwardes-Ker’s approach focuses on what he calls “taxability”. In his view, it should be 
irrelevant whether an entity qualifies as a “person” for purposes of the OECD MTC. The only 
relevant consideration to determine whether an entity may claim treaty benefits is 
“taxability”, by which he means that an entity is taxable or liable to tax.1122 Regarding trusts, 
he suggests that if a trust is taxable on income (for example, if income is accumulated) in its 
residence state, then it should be regarded as a resident of that state for treaty purposes. 
However, if the trust is not taxable on income (because it passes through to the beneficiaries 
or belongs to the beneficiaries), the trust should not be able to claim treaty benefits. Only 
the beneficiaries, who are taxable on the income in their resident states should be entitled 
to claim treaty benefits under the relevant treaties.1123 Danon interprets Edwardes-Ker’s 
view to mean that in cases where the trust is allowed to deduct its distributions from its 
income (as is the case in Canada), the trust will not be regarded as “taxable” and therefore 
not a resident. Danon criticises Edwardes-Ker’s view, because it conflicts with both the 
wording of article 4(1) and its goal.1124 
Koele classifies trusts that are taxed under the systems found in the United Kingdom and 
Canada as “semi-transparent” and trusts that are taxed under the system found in South 
Africa as transparent. She states that in the case of “semi-transparent” trusts, although the 
trustee is liable to tax, the tax due is “neutralised” by either a simultaneous deduction of the 
distributed income, or by a credit to the beneficiary, suggesting that the trustee might not, 
in fact, be liable to tax.1125 
It is suggested that closer consideration1126 of the domestic system applied to a particular 
trust is required in order to ascertain whether a partially transparent entity should be 
regarded as liable to tax. 
In South Africa, a trust is regarded as a person and is taxed at a specific tax rate for trusts. A 
trust is obliged to file a tax return and the trustees are regarded as the representative 
                                                          
1119 By virtue of the words “under the laws of that State”. 
1120 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 285. 
1121 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 a case that is discussed in more detail at ch 6.2.3. 
1122 Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation para 50.03. 
1123 Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation para 51.12. 
1124 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 277. It is submitted that Danon’s interpretation of Edwardes-
Ker’s view could be extended to systems that allow for a credit (as is the case in the United Kingdom) or which 
simply initially elect not to tax the trust if a beneficiary is entitled to the income (as is the case in South Africa).  
1125 Koele in The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions 88. 
1126 Ch 3 of this dissertation provides an overview of the taxation of trusts in each of the relevant states. Only a 
few salient points are highlighted here in order to make the point in this paragraph. Inevitably, this paragraph 
will repeat some of the content of ch 3. 
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taxpayers of the trust.1127 The income (and associated expenditure which may be deducted) 
is taxed either in the hands of the trust, or the hands of the beneficiaries. If taxed in the 
hands of the trust, the personal circumstances of the beneficiaries are not taken into 
account to determine the trust’s tax liability.1128 Income that is taxed in the hands of the 
trust and later distributed, will probably not retain its nature. Income that is taxed in the 
hands of the beneficiary simply passes through the trust and retains its nature.1129 
Therefore, in respect of income that is taxed in the hands of the trust, the trust is liable to 
tax for purposes of article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. This conclusion is reinforced if the above 
quoted test in the Partnership Report for determining whether a partnership is liable to tax, 
namely that the personal characteristics of the beneficiaries are not taken into account to 
determine the trust’s tax liability, is applied to trusts. Furthermore, the fact that the personal 
circumstances of the beneficiaries are irrelevant in the computation of the trust’s tax 
liability, indicate that the trust is liable to tax. 
In respect of income that is not retained in the trust, but distributed to the beneficiary and 
taxed at the level of the beneficiary, it is arguable that a trust should not be regarded as 
liable to tax. In such a case the income does not form part of the trust’s taxable income at 
all, but simply flows through the trust. In respect of charities, it was stated above that the 
the effect of the OECD MTC appears to be that, if domestic legislation first imposes a liability 
to tax and then reduces it, the person will be liable to tax. If, however, no tax is imposed 
from the start, a person will not be regarded as liable to tax. Applying this line of reasoning 
to trusts it may be argued that since the income that is distributed to beneficiaries never 
forms part of the trust’s income, the trust does not have an initial liability to tax. Hence, it 
will not be regarded as liable to tax. Furthermore, the personal characteristics of the 
beneficiaries determine the amount of tax payable and the relevant income retains its 
nature. 
However, reference should again be made to the point that there is no need for a trust to be 
liable to tax on a specific item of income in order to claim treaty benefits regarding that 
income. If a trust is regarded as liable to tax in respect of income taxed in the trust (that is, 
retained income), it will be regarded as liable to tax and there is no need to label a specific 
item of income as income taxed in the hands of the trust or in the hands of the beneficiary, 
in order for the trust to claim treaty benefits in respect of that specific income. If the trust is 
liable to tax on some income, it will be liable to tax on all income.1130 It is submitted that if a 
trust is a discretionary trust, the trust will, arguably, be regarded as liable to tax on this basis, 
                                                          
1127 See ch 3.2.1. 
1128 See ch 3.2.2. 
1129 See ch 3.2.3. 
1130 Some support for this point may be gleaned from Danon, who argues that New Zealand trustees will be 
regarded as liable to tax for purposes of art 4(1) of the OECD MTC. New Zealand taxes the trustees, rather than 
the trust itself, but it is submitted that this difference is irrelevant for the point made here. New Zealand 
follows the same basic system as South Africa, in that trust income is either taxed in the hands of the 
beneficiary, or in the hands of the trustee. If a trustee derives income which is not paid to the beneficiary 
within six months after the end of the tax year or which does not vest absolutely in interest in a beneficiary, the 
trustees are liable to pay tax on that income. The trustees, if there is more than one, are taxable as a single 
unit. According to Danon “… it seems obvious that a trustee may be considered ‘liable to tax’ within the 
meaning of Art 4 para. 1 …” (Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts 
with Particular References to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 282). 
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even in years in which the trustees resolve to distribute all of the trust’s income.1131 The 
reason for this submission is that if the trustees did not exercise their discretion, the trust 
would have been liable to tax. The tax system therefore provides for the possible liability to 
tax of the trust. The determining factor is the exercise of their discretion by the trustees.1132 
In the United Kingdom the trustees are together treated as if they were a single person, 
distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the settlement from time to time.1133 In 
the case of discretionary trusts, the trustee is liable to tax on income arising in the trust.1134 
If the trustee distributes income to a beneficiary, the beneficiary is taxed on the distribution, 
but is entitled to a credit for the tax paid by the trustee. Generally, the trust will be the 
source of the income and not the underlying assets.1135 In the case of a fixed trust the 
trustee of a trust is, in principle, liable to tax on the income received by him or her, although 
there are exceptions to this principle, for example, when the trustee mandates income to a 
beneficiary.1136 Although the beneficiary of a fixed trust is also liable to tax on the income 
received from the trust, the beneficiary is, broadly speaking, entitled to a credit for taxes 
paid by the trustee. If the beneficiary receives income from an English law trust, the 
underlying assets, and not the trust itself, is regarded as the source of the income. The 
opposite is true in the case of income from a trust in the “Garland” jurisdictions.1137 
It seems reasonably clear that the trustees are liable to tax for purposes of article 4(1) of the 
OECD MTC. The trustees are regarded as a single person, distinct from the trustees from 
time to time. Applying the Partnership Report to trusts, it is clear that in the United Kingdom 
the personal characteristics of the beneficiaries do not influence the tax payable by the trust. 
The characterisation of the beneficiary’s income is controversial. In some trusts the income 
retains its nature, whereas in other trusts the trust is regarded as the source of the income. 
Furthermore, the amount that will ultimately be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary does, 
initially, form part of the income of the trustee. As in the case of exempt entities, one could 
argue that where the income is initially included in the trustee’s income, the trustees will be 
regarded as liable to tax. Therefore, even if all or part of the trustees’ income is distributed 
to beneficiaries, the trustees will be regarded as liable to tax. 
In Canada, a trust is a taxpayer and deemed to be an individual.1138 The trust’s taxable 
income is computed without reference to the beneficiaries’ circumstances. A trust is taxable 
on its income, but the trust is allowed a deduction for the amounts distributed to a 
beneficiary.1139 The amount is then, generally, included in the income of the beneficiary.1140 
Income distributed to a beneficiary generally loses its character. Therefore, even though 
                                                          
1131 Support for this view may be found in Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 287. 
1132 The case of a trust where all the income is vested in the beneficiary, eg, by virtue of the trust instrument 
(that is a vesting trust), differs from a discretionary trust, in that the tax system does not provide for the trust 
to be liable to tax at all in the circumstances. The view taken in this dissertation is that a vesting trust is 
transparent. 
1133 Income Tax Act 2007 s 474(1). 
1134 See ch 3.3.2.1.1. 
1135 See ch 3.3.2.2.1. 
1136 See ch 3.3.3.1. 
1137 See ch 3.3.3.2. 
1138 See ch 3.4.1. 
1139 See cg 3.4.2. 
1140 See ch 3.4.3. 
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trusts may derive income from a variety of sources, when distributed to beneficiaries, it will 
not retain its nature and beneficiaries will report the income that they receive simply as 
income stemming from an interest in a trust.1141 Trusts may not allocate losses to 
beneficiaries.1142 
It therefore seems reasonably clear that a trust is liable to tax for purposes of article 4(1) of 
the OECD MTC. Applying the Partnership Report to trusts, it is clear that in Canada the 
personal characteristics of the beneficiaries do not influence the tax payable by the trust and 
income, generally, does not retain its nature when distributed to beneficiaries.1143 
Furthermore, the amount that will ultimately be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary does, 
in fact, initially form part of the income of the trust. As in the case of exempt entities, it may 
be argued that where the income is included in the trust’s income from the start, the trust 
will be regarded as liable to tax. Therefore, even if all or part of the trust income is 
distributed to beneficiaries, the trust will be regarded as liable to tax. 
Taking stock of all the arguments presented above, it is submitted that there is merit in 
regarding a partially transparent trust (or trustee) as liable to tax, even in circumstances 
where all its income is distributed,1144 and it is submitted that this approach may, arguably, 
be theoretically sounder. However, Baker’s approach seems the more practical solution to 
this conundrum. In terms of this approach a trust(ee) that is taxed on undistributed income 
would be liable to tax in relation to that income. Regarding that portion of the income that is 
taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries resident in the relevant countries 
would be entitled to the benefits of the applicable conventions, to the extent that they are 
liable to tax on the income distributed to them. 
The OECD has also produced subsequent reports to the Partnership Report and it is 
examined below whether these reports may shed light on how the liable to tax requirement 
should be applied to transparent entities.1145 In a report entitled Tax Treaty Issues Related to 
REITS (the REITS Report), the OECD described a REIT as “a widely held company, trust or 
contractual or fiduciary arrangement that derives its income primarily from long-term 
investment in immovable property (real estate), distributes most of that income annually 
and does not pay income tax on income related to immovable property that is so 
distributed”.1146 The OECD acknowledged that there are considerable differences between 
countries regarding the way in which REITS are structured and the manner in which the 
                                                          
1141 See ch 3.4.4, although there are important exceptions to this rule.  
1142 See ch 3.4.2. 
1143 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 276. 
1144 Analysing the different domestic tax laws of each state, this argument is a bit harder to make in terms of 
South African tax law, since the income that is attributed to the beneficiary is not taxed in the trust at all. 
However, if Lang’s view is followed, this would be irrelevant. 
1145 The OECD has also issued a report entitled “OECD Discussion Draft on the Application of Tax Treaties to 
State-owned Entities, Including Sovereign Wealth Funds“, which is not discussed in this dissertation, as it is 
submitted that this report does not add any new insight regarding the liable to tax requirement. 
1146 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 3. Naturally, only certain relevant 
aspects of the REITS Report are discussed in this dissertation. 
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exemption of their income is achieved.1147 In respect of the treaty entitlement of a REIT, the 
report states: 
“It seems, however, that in most cases, the REIT would meet the condition of being 
liable to tax for purposes of the treaty definition of ’resident of a Contracting State’, 
subject to the particular problems arising from the application of tax treaties to 
trusts.”1148 
The report, after noting that the investors in REITS will, in most cases, be entitled to the 
benefits of the DTT entered into by their resident states,1149 goes on to answer the question 
of who the relevant taxpayer is for purposes of the DTT. In cases where the REIT is treated as 
a transparent entity, the principles of the Partnership Report must be followed. In countries 
where the REIT is not treated as transparent, the REIT itself will be the relevant taxpayer.1150 
Since the REIT does not pay income tax in its residence state (to the extent that it is 
distributed), difficulties may arise in relation to the application of relief from double taxation 
either in the domestic law or in tax treaties. The report therefore states that it is considered 
appropriate for the state of residence to allow relief from double taxation that the source 
state has levied on the REIT, even if the residence state taxes the investor and not the REIT 
itself.1151 Furthermore, all distributions by REITS are to be classified as dividends irrespective 
of the legal form that the REIT may take.1152 Thus, distributions by a REIT that is structured as 
a trust, will be treated as dividends, even though a trust could not possibly declare 
dividends. 
In a report regarding the granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective 
investment vehicles (the CIV Report),1153 the OECD states that portfolio investors in 
securities often pool their funds with other investors in collective investment vehicles (CIVs) 
and that these CIVs may take different forms, including trusts.1154 The OECD recognises that 
there are substantial differences between countries regarding the tax treatment of CIVs, 
with some states regarding CIVs as transparent and others regarding them as opaque. The 
goal in most countries is, however, that tax is levied only at one level, that is, either at the 
CIV level, or the investor level.1155 The CIV Report confirms that in countries that view the 
CIV as transparent for tax purposes or that totally and unconditionally exempt CIVs from 
taxation, the CIV will not be regarded as liable to tax. In countries where the CIV is regarded 
as opaque, it will be liable to tax, despite the fact that specific items of income may be 
exempt, that it is subject to a lower rate of tax, or that it receives a deduction for dividends 
                                                          
1147 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 4. 
1148 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 9. 
1149 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 10. 
1150 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 15. 
1151 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 16. 
1152 OECD Tax Treaty Issues Related to REITS Public Discussion Draft para 28. 
1153 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles . 
Once again, only the relevant aspects of this report are mentioned in this dissertation. 
1154 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles para 
1. 
1155 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles 
paras 27–28. 
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paid to investors.1156 In countries where the CIV is not liable to tax, investors should be able 
to claim treaty benefits, but because of administrative difficulties, this cannot be achieved. 
Hence, the report suggests that CIVs should be able to claim the benefits of a DTT on behalf 
of its investors.1157 
In answering the question of whether a partially transparent entity will be liable to tax and 
therefore a resident for purposes of a treaty, little guidance is provided by the OECD REITS 
Report and the CIV Report. The Partnership Report, although it specifically states that it does 
not apply to flow-through entities, seems to offer the greatest assistance. 
6.2.2.3.4 Conclusion regarding transparency 
Reviewing the position of a trust(ee), their transparency and the liable to tax requirement, 
the following points may be deduced: 
(a) A trust(ee) that is completely transparent or transparent with reporting requirements 
(items (a) and (b) above) will not be regarded as liable to tax and therefore cannot be a 
resident for purposes of the treaty. 
(b) A trust(ee) that is completely opaque will be regarded as liable to tax. Generally 
speaking, if no income has been distributed to a beneficiary, a trust will be regarded as 
opaque in South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
(c) A trust(ee) that is partially transparent should, it is submitted, be liable to tax in 
respect of income on which it is taxed (that is, income which they retain) and 
beneficiaries should be liable to tax on income on which they are taxed (that is, income 
that is distributed to them). 
6.2.2.4 Trust income deemed to be that of another1158 
A further point that must be considered is the influence of provisions which deem the 
income of one entity to be that of another person for tax purposes. Typically, in the case of a 
trust, the income of the trust is deemed to be that of the settlor. Examples of these types of 
provisions can be found in South Africa,1159 the United Kingdom,1160 Canada1161 and the 
Netherlands.1162 The question that arises is whether a trust(ee) will be regarded as liable to 
tax if its income is deemed to be that of the settlor for tax purposes. 
In answering this question, it should be borne in mind that these deeming provisions 
sometimes attribute only certain amounts of income to the settlor. For example, in terms of 
certain provisions in the relevant South African legislation, only income that is received by or 
                                                          
1156 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles para 
29. 
1157 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles 
paras 36–40. 
1158 The question whether the person to whom the income is attributed may claim treaty benefits falls outside 
the scope of this dissertation. 
1159 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 7. See ch 3.2.4.  
1160 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 624. See ch 3.3.4. 
1161 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 75(2). See ch 3.4.5. 
1162 Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 s 2.14a. See ch 3.5. 
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accrued to a trust by reason of or in consequence of a donation, settlement or other 
disposition, is deemed to have accrued to the donor (typically the settlor).1163 Therefore, 
other income, which does not accrue to the trust by reason of such donation, settlement or 
other disposition, will not be affected by the provision and the trust will therefore still be 
liable to tax on those amounts. A further example can be found in a provision in the South 
African legislation that attributes income received by or accrued to or in favour of a trust for 
the benefit of a minor child, to the child’s parent (usually the settlor of the trust), under 
certain circumstances.1164 If there are both minor and major children of the parent who are 
beneficiaries of the trust, then all the trust’s income will not be attributed to the parent. 
Since the trust may still be liable to tax on income that is not attributable to the settlor, the 
trust may still be liable to tax for purposes of the treaty.1165 
This point is echoed by Danon, who states: 
“In our opinion, these rules do not affect nor concern the issue of residence under a 
DT[T] patterned upon the OECD M[T]C. Indeed, by simply referring to a person ’liable 
to tax’, Art 4 para 1 OECD M[T]C merely requires a subjective tax liability of the person 
claiming the DT[T] benefits. That is, not only is it irrelevant for this purpose whether 
the person effectively pays taxes in the residence State, it is also immaterial whether 
the treaty favoured income is fiscally attributed to this person. In other words, this 
provision does not focus on particular income streams, treating a taxpayer as a 
resident in respect of one income stream and not the other.”1166 
According to Lang’s view regarding the meaning of liable to tax, it does not matter that the 
income is not taxed in the hands of the trust (or trustee), but rather in the hands of the 
settlor. All that is relevant is that the person to whom the income is allocated according to 
the laws of the source state (that is, the trust) has a close enough connection to the other 
contracting state so that he can be considered a resident there.1167 
The Tax Court of Canada, in Garron v R,1168 dealt with the issue of income of the trust being 
deemed to be that of another and its effect on treaty entitlement, by referring to the 
wording of the specific provision of the treaty, as well as its objectives. The case is discussed 
below in greater detail,1169 but the relevant facts were that two trusts were held liable for 
capital gains tax on the sale of certain shares. The applicable Canadian legislation contained 
                                                          
1163 Eg Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 ss 7(2), (3), (4) and (8). 
1164 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 7(3), which reads as follows: “Income shall be deemed to have been received 
by the parent of any minor child or stepchild, if, by reason of any donation, settlement or other disposition 
made by that parent of that child, (a) it has been received by or has accrued to or in favour of that child or has 
been expended for the maintenance, education or benefit of that child; or (b) it has been accumulated for the 
benefit of that child.” 
1165 It serves to repeat here that there is no requirement for a resident of a state to be liable to tax on a specific 
item of income in order to claim treaty benefits regarding that income. 
1166 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 279. 
1167 Lang (2001) 55 BFIT 596 599. 
1168 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79. Although this case went on appeal, first to the Federal Court of 
Appeal (St Michael Trust Corp as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v Her Majesty the Queen 2010 FCA 309) and 
then to the Supreme Court of Canada (Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520), these 
appeal judgements did not deal with this specific issue.  
1169 See ch 6.3.3.1. 
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a provision that would, under certain circumstances, attribute the gain to the main 
beneficiaries of the trusts. The trustee of the trusts argued that the following provision in 
the relevant DTT prevented Canada from taxing the gain in the hands of the trust: 
“Gains from the alienation of any property, other than those mentioned in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3, may be taxed only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a 
resident.”1170 
Although neither the Canadian government nor the main beneficiaries argued that this 
provision in the DTT would prevent Canada from taxing the main beneficiaries in terms of 
the legislation that deemed the gain to be that of the main beneficiaries, the court held that 
it did. The court held that the plain language of the provision meant that gains realised from 
the alienation of property by trusts resident only in Barbados may not be taxed in Canada. 
Furthermore it held that the provision is unambiguous and broad enough to apply to an 
attribution provision.1171 It also stated that the primary objective of the treaty was to 
minimise the potential for double taxation and that interpreting the treaty in a way that 
would allow Canada to tax the main beneficiaries would defeat this objective.1172 
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal also held, obiter, that the provision deeming the gains 
of an Austrian Private Foundation (“Privatstiftung”) to be that of a beneficiary, could not be 
applied, due to the application of the DTT between Canada and Austria. In Her Majesty the 
Queen v Peter Sommerer,1173 the taxpayer’s father formed a private foundation in Austria. 
The taxpayer, his wife and children were potential beneficiaries and the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the private foundation. The taxpayer had, on two separate occasions, sold 
shares to the private foundation and the private foundation had, in turn, sold the shares to 
third parties, realising capital gains. The question in the case was whether the capital gain 
could be attributed to the taxpayer in terms of the relevant Canadian legislation. The court 
found that it could not, but nevertheless continued to examine the effect of the provisions 
of the applicable DTT on such an attribution to the taxpayer. The court held that the 
provisions of the DTT prevented Canada from taxing the taxpayer on the gain (if it were to 
be attributed to him). It held that attribution provisions usually give rise to problems of 
economic double taxation, rather than juridical double taxation. The DTT could not be 
interpreted in such a manner that economic double taxation was excluded from the 
outset.1174 It also confirmed the court a quo’s view that the attributed gain fell within the 
literal meaning of the wording of the relevant provision of the DTT.1175 
                                                          
1170 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 330. 
1171 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 331. 
1172 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 paras 333–337. 
1173 Her Majesty the Queen v Peter Sommerer 2012 FCA 207. The Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 has 
since been amended in response to the Sommerer case. S 75(2) was unchanged, but s 94 was amended (see 
Falk and Morand "Budget 2013: A Response to Sommerer" 
<http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=6260> (accessed on 04/11/2013) for a discussion of these 
amendments). See ch 6.3.3.2 for a discussion of s 94(3) and the amendment. 
1174 Her Majesty the Queen v Peter Sommerer 2012 FCA 207 paras 66–67. 
1175 Her Majesty the Queen v Peter Sommerer 2012 FCA 207 para 62. 
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In the Smallwood case1176 (which is also discussed below in greater detail) the same type of 
deeming provision was applied, but the court never addressed the point that the settlor of 
the trust would be taxed and not the trustees. 
6.2.3 By reason of certain factors 
Article 4 states that a person is a resident of a contracting state if the person is liable to tax 
under domestic law by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature. According to Baker the intention of the OECD MTC is to refer to 
recognised criteria for imposing comprehensive taxation.1177 It is important to note that each 
of the criteria mentioned in article 4 refers to domestic tax law terms, which must be 
interpreted in accordance with the domestic law of the particular state.1178 
One of the criteria listed in the article is that of “place of management”. This criterion must 
be distinguished from “place of effective management” (POEM), as found in article 4(3) of 
the OECD MTC. The distinction is based on the different purposes for which the two 
concepts are used. The first is used to include “all forms of unlimited liability to tax which are 
based on effective, externally visible criteria”.1179 The latter is used in order to avoid double 
residence for treaty purposes. Hence, an autonomous meaning should be given to the 
concept of POEM, whilst “place of management” is to be interpreted in accordance with 
domestic law.1180 
The Canadian case of Crown Forest Industries1181 turned on the words “by reason of” and the 
criteria that follow. In that case a Canadian company, Crown Forest Industries, paid rental to 
a company, Norsk, which was incorporated in the Bahamas. Norsk’s only office and place of 
business was, however, in the USA. Norsk never paid tax in the Bahamas and, due to a 
specific exemption for which it qualified in the USA, never paid tax in the USA either. Canada 
levied a withholding tax of 25 per cent on the rental paid to Norsk, but Crown Forest 
Industries claimed that the treaty between Canada and the USA reduced the rate to ten per 
cent. The issue to be determined by the court was whether Norsk qualified as a resident of 
the USA for purposes of the Canada-USA treaty, which contained an article similar to article 
4(1) of the OECD MTC. In terms of the Internal Revenue Code in the USA, Norsk, as a foreign 
corporation, was taxed on its taxable income from the conduct of a trade or business within 
the USA. The Internal Revenue Code went on to exempt certain amounts, Norsk falling 
within one of these exemptions. 
In determining whether Norsk was a resident of the USA, the court had to decide whether 
Norsk was liable to tax in the USA by reason of its domicile, residence, place of management 
or any other criterion of a similar nature. The court highlighted that liability to taxation must 
be by reason of one of the listed grounds, stating that that phrase “connotes the existence of 
                                                          
1176 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
1177 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.06. 
1178 Widrig in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 274; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions 230. For a contrary view see Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 135. 
1179 Widrig in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 278. 
1180 Widrig in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 278. 
1181 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
some sort of causal connection or, in the least, some relationship of proximity”.1182 The court 
held that the fact that Norsk had its place of management in the USA was not causally or 
proximately linked to the basis on which Norsk was taxed in the USA. Norsk’s tax liability in 
the US arose because it conducted a trade or business which was effectively connected to 
the USA. Norsk’s place of management was but one of many factors which was used to 
determine Norsk’s liability to taxation and could not be elevated to an actual ground for 
liability. 
The court considered whether the ground for liability in the USA, namely conduct of a trade 
or business effectively connected with the USA, could be regarded as a “criterion of a similar 
nature” to the other ones enumerated in article 4(1) and that Norsk would hence be a 
resident of the USA. The court found that the “similar element among the enumerated 
criteria is that, standing alone, they would each constitute a basis on which states generally 
impose full tax liability on world-wide income”.1183 Furthermore the court held that the 
criteria set out in article 4(1) involved more than just being liable to tax on some part of 
income. Rather, these criteria require comprehensive tax liability imposed by a state which, 
in the case of the USA, is liability on a worldwide basis. Norsk’s liability in the USA was 
limited to source liability and therefore the criterion of conduct of a trade or business within 
the USA did not amount to one similar to the enumerated criteria.1184 
The Crown Forest Industries case therefore indicates that there should be a causal link or 
some relationship of proximity between the grounds for tax liability in a state and the 
criteria enumerated in article 4(1). The case furthermore indicates that the enumerated 
criteria connote comprehensive liability imposed by a state and that any basis of taxation 
which is to be classified as a “criterion of a similar nature” should also involve 
comprehensive liability and not just source-based taxation. 
Regarding the last point, the Canadian courts have considered a case in which the question 
was whether a trust is liable to tax by reason of its residence.1185 In this case, the relevant 
treaty article contained the same wording as article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. The applicable 
Canadian legislation deemed a trust to be a resident if certain conditions were met.1186 Both 
the Tax Court of Canada1187 and the Canadian Federal Court1188 agreed that if the deeming 
provisions applied, the scheme of taxation to which the trust would be liable, was more 
limited than the scheme of taxation applying to trusts resident under the general principles. 
Thus it was held that if the deeming provisions applied, the trust would not be liable to tax 
                                                          
1182 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 para 25. 
1183 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 para 40. 
1184 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 para 40. The court also held, in the second part 
of the judgement, that the intention of the drafters of the convention indicated that Norsk should not be 
regarded as a resident. 
1185 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79; St Michael Trust Corp as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v Her 
Majesty the Queen 2010 FCA 309. This case is discussed in greater detail in ch 6.3.3.1. 
1186 The latest version of the legislation is discussed in greater detail in ch 6.3.3.2. The case was decided on an 
earlier version of the relevant section. 
1187 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 316. 
1188 St Michael Trust Corp as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v Her Majesty the Queen 2010 FCA 309 para 87. 
Although the matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, 
[2012] 1 SCR 520), this point was not decided by that court. 
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by reason of its residence.1189 Prior to this case it was suggested in academic literature that it 
would be difficult to argue that the relevant deeming provision did not result in 
comprehensive taxation as envisaged in Crown Forest Industries. However, it was argued 
that the deeming provision would not result in liability by reason of the trust’s domicile, 
residence, place of management, place of incorporation or any other criterion of a similar 
nature. Liability would simply arise by reason of the deeming provision.1190 
According to some authors, the phrase “criterion of a similar nature” does not only connote 
comprehensive liability to tax. They submit that it should also be interpreted in the context 
of the terms “domicile”, “residence” and “place of management”, meaning not only that the 
criterion should be similar, but also that it should have a certain local connection, as do the 
other three criteria.1191 
In Robert MO Morris and Neville Leroy Smith Trustees of the RCI Trust v Minister of National 
Revenue,1192 the Canadian Federal Court held that any other criterion of a similar nature 
“would include other aspects of actual physical presence and not more esoteric concepts 
such as deemed residence”.1193 The court was asked to find that the trust was not only 
resident in Barbados (which the Minister conceded), but that it was also a resident of 
Canada, thereby applying the tiebreaker in article 4(3) of the relevant DTT. However, the 
court held that article 4(3) required residence in terms of article 4(1) and, because there 
were no “actual physical factors”, such as domicile, residence or place of management 
linking the trust to Canada, that it was not a resident in Canada. 
An issue that has led to academic debate is whether incorporation of a juristic person should 
be regarded as a “criterion of a similar nature”.1194 Some states regard an entity as resident 
if it is incorporated in that state. One view is that incorporation is not a criterion similar to 
domicile, residence or POEM because it lacks effective personal attachment to the 
territory.1195 Another view is that incorporation is a criterion of a similar nature because it 
leads to unlimited liability.1196 Working Party No. 2 decided not to expressly include 
                                                          
1189 This finding of the court was criticised by Avery Jones and Nikolakakis, stating that the court gave too much 
weight to the relevant dictum in Crown Forest Industries. They argued that if the wording of the treaty means 
“liable otherwise than on a source basis”, the relevant deeming provision would result in such liability (Avery 
Jones and Nikolakakis (2012) 14 International Tax Law Reports 1090 1100).  
1190 Roth (2004) 52 Canadian Tax Journal 329 415. Avery Jones and Nikolakakis seem to support this point, 
stating that “as a matter of plain words” a person is not liable to tax by reason of the listed criteria in terms of 
the relevant deeming provision. They continue to ask whether “… in spite of the wording, does it mean not 
similar in nature but similar in result, that is taxation as a resident …” (Avery Jones and Nikolakakis (2012) 14 
International Tax Law Reports 1090 1099). 
1191 Widrig in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 280; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions 233. 
1192 Robert MO Morris and Neville Leroy Smith Trustees of the RCI Trust v Minister of National Revenue 2009 FC 
434. 
1193 Robert MO Morris and Neville Leroy Smith Trustees of the RCI Trust v Minister of National Revenue 2009 FC 
434 para 37. 
1194 Couzin argues that the place of incorporation could fall under the criterion of domicile (Couzin Corporate 
Residence and International Taxation 136), but prefers the argument that it falls under the residence criterion 
(Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 139). 
1195 Widrig in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 281; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double 
Taxation Conventions 233. 
1196 Attard in History of Tax Treaties The relevance of the OECD Documents for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
203. 
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incorporation as a criterion under article 4(1) and was of the view that incorporation was 
primarily found in the tax system of the United States and rarely used in other existing 
bilateral treaties.1197 
The debate is relevant to trusts, in that South African law provides that a person such as a 
trust is resident, inter alia, if it is incorporated, established or formed in South Africa.1198 
Quite clearly a trust cannot be incorporated as it is not, generally speaking, a juristic person. 
It is submitted that the criterion of “established or formed” in South Africa is similar to that 
of incorporation in that it is a formal criterion, dealing with the coming into being of entities. 
It is therefore relevant to determine whether the criterion of “established or formed” in 
relation to trusts will be viewed as a criterion “of a similar nature” for purposes of article 
4(1). 
It is submitted that the view that formal criteria, such as incorporation or “established or 
formed”, are criteria of a similar nature, is to be preferred. In the Crown Forest Industries 
case the only requirement set by the court for a criterion to qualify as a “criterion of a similar 
nature” was that it should lead to comprehensive liability. On this basis, the criterion of 
“established or formed” in South Africa would also lead to comprehensive taxation and 
therefore it is submitted that this criterion is of a similar nature to the other enumerated 
criteria. In any event, the criterion of “established or formed” is merely used to determine 
whether a trust is resident in South Africa under South African law and the criterion of 
residence is an explicit criterion.1199 
It is to be noted that Canada has placed a reservation on article 4 of the OECD MTC to the 
effect that it may use the place of incorporation or organisation with respect to a 
company.1200 South Africa has not entered a similar reservation when stating its position on 
the relevant article. It is submitted that South Africa should enter such a reservation to 
ensure that it is able to rely on the criterion of “established or formed” in relation to trusts. 
                                                          
1197 Attard in History of Tax Treaties The relevance of the OECD Documents for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties  
202. 
1198 The criteria and their application in South Africa to trusts is discussed more fully in ch 6.3.1. 
1199 Support for this argument may be found in Couzin Corporate Residence and International Taxation 139, 
who argues that the criterion of place of incorporation of companies, which deems a company to be resident, 
will most likely be accepted as causing liability to tax by reason of residence. 
1200 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4 para 27. Canada does not use “incorporation” or a similar criterion in 
relation to trusts. (See ch 6.3.3.) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
175 
6.3 Residence under domestic law 
6.3.1 South Africa1201 
6.3.1.1 The definition of “resident”1202 
In terms of the Act, a person, other than a natural person,1203 is resident in South Africa if: 
(a) it is incorporated, established or formed in South Africa; or 
(b) it has its POEM in South Africa. 
However, any person who is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for 
purposes of the application of any agreement entered into between the governments of the 
Republic and that other country for the avoidance of double taxation, is not a resident.1204 
Furthermore, the definition was recently amended by the addition of two proviso’s.1205 The 
first states that where any person that is a resident ceases to be a resident during a year of 
assessment, that person must be regarded as not being a resident from the date on which 
that person ceases to be a resident. The second proviso deals with foreign investment 
entities and provides that certain activities must be disregarded when determining where a 
foreign investment entity has its POEM.1206 
                                                          
1201 This part of the dissertation draws on the research contained in an earlier article (Du Plessis (2009) 21 SA 
Merc LJ 322). 
1202 It is possible for a court to disregard the defined meaning of a term, but this is an exception. (See ch 4.4.1 
for the test to determine whether a court may disregard the defined meaning of a term.) The possibility of 
using another meaning of the term can only be considered and an alternative meaning can only be proposed, if 
the context within which the term is used is analysed. In this dissertation the possibility of using an alternative 
meaning to the defined meaning of “residence” is not considered.  
1203 The Act also lays down the criteria in terms of which a “natural person” is a resident of South Africa. It is 
submitted that in order to determine whether a trust is a resident in terms of the Act, the criteria for a person 
other than a natural person should be applied. The reason for this view is that a trust itself is deemed to be a 
“person” for purposes of the Act (Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “person”) and a trust is clearly not 
an individual. The definition of the term “trust” in the Act clearly does not refer to a natural person (Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “trust”). In academic literature the criteria for persons other than natural 
persons have been applied to trusts without discussion (eg: Van der Merwe (2002) 14 Residence of a Company 
- the Meaning of 'Effective Management' 79 79; Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African 
Perspective 153; Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 680; Oguttu Curbing 
Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 337). In The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 the court also applied the criteria for persons 
other than individuals when determining the residence of a trust. 
1204 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “resident”. This definition further excludes in paragraph (B) 
certain companies that qualify as controlled foreign companies. 
1205 Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012 s 2(1)(w). 
1206 A “foreign investment entity” is defined as follows: “any person other than a natural person (a) that is not 
incorporated, established or formed in the Republic; (b) the assets of which consist solely of a portfolio of one 
or more of the following: (i) amounts in cash or that constitute cash equivalents; (ii) financial instruments that 
(aa) are issued by a listed company or by the government of the Republic in the national, provincial or local 
sphere; or (bb) if not issued by a listed company or by the government of the Republic in the national, 
provincial or local sphere, are traded by members of the general public and a market for that trade exists; (iii) 
financial instruments, the values of which are determined with reference to financial instruments 
contemplated in subparagraph (ii); or (iv) rights to receive any asset contemplated in subparagraph (i), (ii) or 
(iii), which amounts, financial instruments and rights are held by that person for investment purposes; (c) 
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One of the implications of this definition is that a trust may be a resident in South Africa if it 
is established or formed in South Africa. Once established or formed in South Africa, its 
status as a resident (for domestic law purposes) will only be disturbed if it is deemed to be 
exclusively a resident of another state by virtue of a DTT. If a trust is not established or 
formed in South Africa, it will be a resident if it has its POEM in South Africa. Once again, a 
trust that is effectively managed in South Africa will, however, not be a resident if it is 
deemed to be exclusively a resident of another state for purposes of a DTT. 
That particular sentence of the definition of resident, which provides that a person is not a 
resident if that person is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for 
purposes of a DTT, is crucial and has the effect that a trust, which is regarded as a resident of 
another state in terms of any double tax agreement, will cease to be a resident of South 
Africa for all purposes. Therefore, in determining the residence of a trust (or any other 
person), theoretically, all of South Africa’s double tax agreements have to be examined to 
determine whether the trust is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another state. If it is 
deemed to be exclusively a resident of another state in terms of any double tax agreement, 
it will not be regarded as a South African resident. 
The tiebreaker provisions of the OECD MTC, which would typically be the provision deeming 
a trust to be exclusively resident in one or the other state, will be discussed below. In the 
following paragraph the two alternative tests for residence will be analysed. 
6.3.1.2 Incorporated, established or formed 
6.3.1.2.1 Introduction 
A trust is not, generally speaking, a juristic person1207 and so the word “incorporated” does 
not apply to trusts. Trusts would rather be “established or formed”, but neither of these 
words is defined in the Act.1208 
It should also be noted that the phrase used in the Act is the following: “incorporated, 
established or formed in the Republic” (own emphasis). This phrase can be interpreted in 
two possible ways. Firstly, it could mean that the trust is to be established or formed within 
South Africa’s borders. Secondly, it could mean that the trust is to be established or formed 
in terms of South African law. The second meaning relies on the noscitur a sociis rule of 
interpretation which provides that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
where no more than 10 per cent of the shares, units or other form of participatory interest in that person are 
directly or indirectly held by persons that are residents; and (d) where that person has no employees and has 
no directors or trustees that are engaged in the management of that person on a full-time basis.” According to 
National Treasury, the reason for this amendment is that many foreign investors (such as pension funds or 
other institutional investors) use South African investment managers to advise them on their South African and 
African investments. To ensure that the use of the South African investment manager does not result in the 
foreign investor being effectively managed in South Africa, a “carve-out” from the POEM test was created. If a 
foreign investor qualifies as a foreign investment entity, certain services performed by the investment 
manager, such as financial product advice, will be disregarded when applying the POEM test in relation to the 
foreign investor (National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 
para 5.11). This provision will only apply in relation to trusts if the South African fund manager operates as a 
trust, but this possibility is not further investigated in this dissertation.  
1207 See ch 2.2.4. 
1208 See also Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 338.  
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“the meaning that a linguistic signifier generates can be restricted by other signifiers 
with which it is associated, irrespective of whether the latter constitute a genus. The 
signifiers also do not have to fit a scheme of, for instance, general ones preceded by 
more specific ones.”1209 
Applying this rule, the words “established or formed” must be interpreted to connote a 
meaning similar to the word with which it is associated, namely “incorporated”. Since the 
phrase “incorporated … in the Republic” can only mean incorporated in terms of the law of 
the Republic, so too must the phrase “established or formed in the Republic” mean that an 
entity must be formed or established in terms of South African law. Furthermore, it may be 
argued that from a policy perspective, South Africa should only tax as residents those 
entities which are formed in terms of South African law (leaving POEM aside for the 
moment) since the residence basis of taxation is premised on the ground that residents 
enjoy the protection of the state and should therefore contribute towards the costs of the 
government of the state in which they reside.1210 
In this dissertation, however, the first interpretation (namely that the trust is to be 
established or formed within South Africa’s borders) is preferred. The reasons for this 
preference are as follows. The phrase “in the Republic” is used elsewhere in the same 
definition in the sense of “within South Africa’s borders”, for example in the phrase “if that 
person was physically present in the Republic”.1211 Also, in other sections of the Income Tax 
Act the phrase clearly means “within South Africa’s borders”.1212 Furthermore, it is 
submitted that if the legislature intended the words to mean “in terms of South African law”, 
it would have used words such as those used in the definition of “company”, namely “under 
any law in force … in the Republic”.1213 
Although the first interpretation is the preferred one, it is submitted that the interpretation 
of the words “in the Republic” contained in the phrase “incorporated, established or formed 
in the Republic” in the definition of “resident”, should be clarified by legislative amendment. 
Applying the first interpretation to trusts, it means that only trusts established or formed 
within the borders of South Africa will qualify as residents under this criterion. Inter vivos 
trusts are usually formed by way of a contract and hence the time and place that the 
contract is entered into should be established in order to determine the time and place of 
establishment of the trust. A testamentary trust is formed by way of a will and so the time 
and place of formation or establishment of a testamentary trust would have to be 
determined. 
                                                          
1209 Du Plessis in LAWSA para 347. 
1210 Support for this argument may be found in Muller Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South African 
Income Tax Perspective 161. She further argues that if the definition of “trust” in the Income Tax Act is read 
together with the criterion of established or formed, the definition is tailored so that entities created and 
owing their existence to South African laws, is intended. 
1211 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of resident para (a)(ii). 
1212 Eg in ss 9(2), 9H(4)(a), 10(1)(c)(iii), 33(1), 35A(1), 47A, 47B and 47K. 
1213 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “company” paras (a) and (b). 
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6.3.1.2.2 Time and place of establishment or formation 
As set out in an earlier chapter, it is on the date that the settlor and trustee execute the trust 
deed (or enter into an oral agreement) that the inter vivos trust is formed, irrespective of the 
date on which the beneficiary accepts.1214 A testamentary trust is usually formed at the date 
of the testator’s death.1215 
As an inter vivos trust is created by way of a contract, the rules on the place of formation of 
a contract are relevant. The general rule (also known as the “information theory”) provides 
that a contract is concluded at the place where the offeror is informed that the offeree has 
accepted the offer.1216 But the information theory will not apply in all instances. The offeror 
may specify a manner of acceptance that makes it unnecessary to inform him or her.1217 In 
terms of the expedition theory, a contract in which the offer was posted will come into 
existence at the place where the letter of acceptance was posted.1218 The expedition theory 
will apply only if the offer was made via the post and not if it was made between parties 
present (inter praesentes).1219 It should be noted that in the case of contracts concluded by 
telephone, the parties are considered to be in each other’s presence and thus the contract 
will come into being when and where the offeree’s acceptance is communicated to and 
received by the offeror.1220 Of course, parties may specify in their agreement where a 
contract will come into being and then the theories mentioned above will not apply. 
                                                          
1214 See ch 2.2.2. Muller argues that the date on which the trust administration commences is the relevant date 
to determine whether a trust has been established or formed. Her argument is based on the definition of 
“trust” in the Income Tax Act which provides that a trust is “any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets 
which are administered and controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is 
appointed under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a deceased person” (own emphasis). She 
submits that this definition “looks to the moment when the trust administration has commenced, as opposed 
to when it is created”. She refers to authority that distinguishes between essentialia for the creation of a valid 
trust and essentialia at the commencement of the administration of the trust. The latter requires a duly 
appointed trustee and the transfer of ownership or control of the trust property to the trustee. She argues that 
it is only once these essentialia are met that a trust is established or formed (Muller Determining the Residence 
of a Trust: a South African Income Tax Perspective 167). It is submitted that this argument cannot be 
supported. The time of formation of an entity (the trust, in this case) is regulated by the relevant law governing 
that entity (trust law in this case), not the Income Tax Act. The fact that a trust, duly formed in terms of trust 
law, qualifies as a “trust” for purposes of the Income Tax Act, does not alter this. If the legislature wished to 
amend the time of establishment or formation of a trust in the Income Tax Act from that established by trust 
law, it would have done so in more explicit terms. 
1215 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 37; Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The 
Case of South African Companies and Trusts 315. 
1216 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 55; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 68. See 
also Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts 338. 
1217 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 68; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 68. 
1218 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 69; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 72. 
1219 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 71; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 73. 
1220 Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 4 SA 49 (SCA) 54. The court also stated that contracts concluded by way of telefax 
and telex are contracts where the parties are considered to be in each other’s presence. This part of the court’s 
judgement has been criticised (Van Der Merwe Information and Communications Technology Law 150). More 
importantly, though, telexes and telefaxes are considered to be “data messages” as defined in s 1 of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 and the time and place of their conclusion are 
therefore now governed by that Act, making the Jamieson case irrelevant in relation to telexes and telefaxes 
(Van Der Merwe Information and Communications Technology Law 150). 
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Regarding electronic transactions, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(ECTA)1221 provides that, in the absence of contrary arrangements in the agreement, an 
agreement concluded by means of data messages1222 is concluded at the time and place 
where the acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror.1223 A data message is 
regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data message enters 
an information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is capable 
of being retrieved by the addressee.1224 The data message is regarded as having been 
received at the addressee’s usual place of business or residence.1225 Thus, as stated in Jafta v 
Ezimvelo KZN Wildlife, “… section 23 supplants the general rule of the common law that an 
acceptance of an offer must come to the knowledge of the offeree for a contract to 
arise”.1226 
The default rule laid down in ECTA regarding the place of formation of the contract is 
problematic. Although no attempt will be made to suggest any real solutions, some of the 
difficulties with the default rule are briefly mentioned here. It is unclear whether the phrase 
“usual place of …” qualifies only the word “business” or whether it also qualifies the word 
“residence”. Clearly, “residence” and “usual place of residence” could potentially be 
interpreted differently. The two places of receipt – “usual place of business” and “residence” 
– seem to be alternatives and this invites the question of which one will prevail if they are 
not in the same place. One possible interpretation could be to apply the criterion of 
“residence” to individuals and “usual place of business” to businesses, but ECTA gives no 
indication that this was the legislature’s intention. Nor does ECTA define the terms “usual 
place of business” or “residence”. The definition of “resident” in the Income Tax Act1227 
                                                          
1221 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. This Act does not authorise the execution of 
wills in electronic format and is therefore not relevant to testamentary trusts (Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 4, read with Schedule 2; Muller Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South 
African Income Tax Perspective 182). 
1222 A “data message” is defined in s 1 of ECTA as “data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic 
means”. An e-mail is an example of a “data message” as defined (Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act 25 of 2002 s 1 definition of “e-mail”). A data message would, however, not include electronic 
communications if the parties are “to all intents and purposes in each other's presence”, to use a phrase 
quoted in Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 4 SA 49 (SCA). An example of communication that uses the internet, but 
that would not be a “data message” as defined, is the conclusion of an oral contract by way of “Skype”. The 
rules set out above for parties who are inter praesentes would apply to contracts concluded by these means 
(Van Der Merwe Information and Communications Technology Law 148).  
1223 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 22. It is submitted that the conclusion of a 
trust deed is not an “automated transaction” (defined as “an electronic transaction conducted or performed, in 
whole or in part, by means of data messages in which the conduct or data messages of one or both parties are 
not reviewed by a natural person in the ordinary course of such natural person’s business or employment” 
(Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 1)), and that the provisions regarding automated 
transactions contained in ECTA are not applicable to trust deeds. 
1224 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 23(b). Both these requirements must be met 
(Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC) para 90). 
1225 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 23(c). 
1226 Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC) para 80. This case also confirmed that an SMS will be 
regarded as “electronic communication” and therefore be governed by ECTA (para 112). Furthermore, the 
court held that s 23 of ECTA does not create a presumption or a deeming provision. Thus, a lower standard of 
proof is required of an addressee who denies receipt. The court found that what will constitute sufficient 
evidence to shift its evidential burden depends on the circumstances of each case, taking into account the 
overarching objectives of ECTA (para 88). 
1227 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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cannot simply be read into ECTA. In interpreting the word “residence” in ECTA, the dictum of 
Galgut J in Tick v Broude1228 should be borne in mind: 
“[T]he word ‘residence’ has not acquired any technical meaning and is used in law with 
many shades of meaning ranging from mere physical presence to domicile … All the 
above cases show that ‘residence’ is a word which varies in meaning according to the 
circumstances under which it is used. In most cases it will be a question of degree.” 
The term “usual place of business” should also be interpreted in accordance with the 
purposes of ECTA. In the light of these uncertainties, it is submitted that parties should 
consider stipulating in a trust instrument that is sent electronically exactly where the 
agreement will be concluded.1229 
If the above theories and legislation are applied to the law of trusts, then under the 
information theory an inter vivos trust is created where the settlor (usually the offeror) is 
informed of acceptance by the trustee (the offeree). Accordingly, if the information theory 
applies to a trust deed, the trust will be “formed” or “established” in South Africa only if the 
settlor (as offeror) is present in South Africa when informed of acceptance by the trustee. If 
the expedition theory is applied, a trust will only be “formed” or “established” in South 
Africa if the trustee posts1230 the trust deed in South Africa. If there is more than one trustee, 
it is submitted that the intention of the parties must be examined. If it is their intention (as it 
usually would be) that all the trustees must accept the offer before a valid trust would be 
created, it would mean that in a case in which the information theory were applied, the trust 
will come into existence at the time when and place where the settlor is present when 
informed that the last trustee has accepted the offer. An example illustrates the point: a 
settlor wishes to form a trust of which A, B and C are to be trustees. A and B sign the trust 
deed, and the founder is present in South Africa when notified of their signature, but is 
outside South Africa when informed of C’s acceptance. In that event, the trust will not be 
resident in South Africa. In this example, the place where the trustees accept is irrelevant, 
because the information theory applies. 
In the case where the trust deed signed by the trustees is posted and the expedition theory 
applies, it is submitted that the trust will be formed at the place where the last trustee 
accepts the offer by posting the signed trust deed to the founder. On the same facts in the 
above example, the trust would be formed at the place where C posts the trust deed, 
irrespective of the place where A or B posts the trust deed. If the expedition theory is 
                                                          
1228 Tick v Broude 1973 1 SA 462 (T) 469. 
1229 It should be noted that the Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill (draft) in GN 888 
of 2012 GG 35821 of 26-10-2012 was published in 2012. This Bill proposes an amendment to the definition of 
“data message”, so that it will now read as follows: “electronic communications including (a) voice, where the 
voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) any other form of electronic communications stored as a 
record”. Furthermore a new definition of “e-mail” is proposed, namely “electronic mail such as a data message 
used or intended to be used as a form of correspondence between the originator and addressee”. Moreover, s 
23(c) will be amended to read as follows: “regardless of the device, will be regarded as having been sent from 
the originator's usual place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual place 
of business or residence". It is submitted that none of these proposed amendments affect the conclusions 
reached above. 
1230 The word “post” is used in the conventional sense: to use the official system by which letters are carried 
and delivered. 
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applied, the place where the founder is present at the time of signature by any of the parties 
is irrelevant.1231 In the case of a trust instrument sent via e-mail,1232 and if it is assumed that 
the parties have not made an alternative arrangement, the trust will be formed in South 
Africa if the settlor (offeror) is resident or has his or her usual place of business in South 
Africa, whatever the expressions “usual place of business” or “residence” may mean. 
As regards a testamentary trust, it is submitted that the trust is formed at the place where 
the testator executes the will through which the trust is formed.1233 Although the 
testamentary trust is formed only on the death of the testator, the will is the instrument 
through which the trust is formed and the place of its execution is therefore the pertinent 
place. It should be noted the execution of a will means compliance with all the formalities 
required for a valid will.1234 Hence it is only once all the formalities have been complied with 
that a will is executed.1235 For example, a will signed by a testator is executed only once the 
witnesses have also signed it. If a testator who signed a will in South Africa with no witnesses 
present then travels to another country and acknowledges his or her signature in front of 
two competent witnesses in that country, he or she executes his or her will in that other 
country, not in South Africa. It is submitted that a trust formed in such a will is not formed in 
South Africa. The place where the testator dies is irrelevant. 
Since a trust is not “established” or “formed” through the registration of the trust 
instrument, or the authorisation of the trustees by the Master,1236 these formal acts by the 
                                                          
1231 In a case where the settlor is also a trustee, it is submitted that the same principles set out in this paragraph 
will apply. 
1232 Or via SMS. 
1233 Oliver and Honiball state that a testamentary trust is resident in South Africa if the will in terms of which it 
was created was “drawn up” in South Africa (Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 
153). Oguttu agrees with this view (Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African 
Companies and Trusts 338). Muller criticises the view that trusts are formed at the place where the will is 
executed on three grounds: (a) It may result in trusts being regarded as resident in South Africa although they 
only have a “formal or superficial connection of signatures affixed to the trust instrument, but has no 
substantive connection in that the Will may not necessarily be lodged with such countries’ authorities nor may 
the trust be recognised under its laws”; (b) The country where the will was executed may not be aware of its 
existence; (c) There is no requirement that the date and place where a will was executed, be recorded in the 
will. Although such a recordal is usually included in practice, a will not containing such a recordal will still be 
valid and evidence will have to be led to show its place of execution, which may cause a protracted enquiry. 
She concedes, however, that despite the impracticalities and on a “strict literal interpretation of the relevant 
law”, it is correct in law that the place where a testamentary trust is formed, is where the will is executed. She 
submits that a trust should be regarded as formed at the place where it is subject to public authority, but 
acknowledges that this is a practical proposal, which is not supported by the relevant legal framework (Muller 
Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South African Income Tax Perspective 171–179). Muller’s criticism is 
based on practical grounds, but it is submitted that a legislative amendment would be required to 
accommodate her proposal. Such an amendment is recommended in this paragraph. However, as the law 
stands currently, her proposal cannot be supported.  
1234 In re Jennett 1976 1 SA 580 (A) 584. 
1235 The Wills Act 7 of 1953 s 2(3) provides that a court shall order the Master to accept a document that does 
not comply with all the formalities for the execution of a will if the court is satisfied that the document drafted 
or executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof, was intended to be that person’s 
will. There may be cases where a document, which does not comply with all the formalities for execution, 
makes provision for a testamentary trust and is accepted by the courts as a will in terms of the above-
mentioned provision. It is submitted that in such a case, the trust will be formed where the document was 
drafted or executed by the deceased. 
1236 See ch 2.2.5. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
Master are irrelevant in determining a trust’s residence.1237 In the Oceanic Trust1238 case, the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) initially relied on the fact that the particular trust (the 
residence of which was in issue) was registered with the Master of the High Court, who 
issued authority to the trustee to act as such, to show that the trust was established in South 
Africa. However, this ground was abandoned and it is submitted that one can deduce from 
its conduct in this case that SARS also does not view these facts as determining the trust’s 
place of formation or establishment. 
It seems that if the rules on the formation of trusts are applied in order to determine their 
residence, the place of “formation” or “establishment” may be either arbitrary or easily 
manipulated. 
One possible solution to this problem could be to amend the Income Tax Act to provide that 
a trust will be resident in South Africa if registration of the trust instrument and 
authorisation of trustees are required in terms of the Trust Property Control Act.1239 
However, this solution would not apply to oral trusts which are not covered by that Act.1240 
In the absence of such an amendment, the second criterion to determine residence, POEM, 
will be very important. 
6.3.1.3 POEM1241 
As mentioned above, a trust will be resident in South Africa if it has its POEM in South Africa 
(and provided that it is not deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for 
purposes of a DTT). The two central questions that must be answered are therefore what 
the meaning of POEM is and how the term POEM is to be applied to trusts.1242 
6.3.1.3.1 The meaning of POEM in the Income Tax Act and DTTs 
Regarding the meaning of the term POEM, it should be noted that it is not defined in the 
Income Tax Act. The question has been raised whether the term POEM used in the Income 
Tax Act should be given the same or a different meaning as the term POEM used in article 
4(3) of the OECD MTC. 
The Katz Commission, which first proposed the introduction of the term POEM into the 
Income Tax Act, seemed to suggest that the meaning should be the same.1243 Van der 
Merwe argues that the term bears the same meaning in both the Income Tax Act and article 
                                                          
1237 For a contrary view see Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and 
Trusts 314. 
1238 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1239 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
1240 See ch 2.2.5. 
1241 The acronym POEM is used for the term “place of effective management”. Strictly speaking POEM is not a 
term, but a phrase or a concept. However, the word “term” was used in other parts of this dissertation (eg ch 
5) in relation to other words in the OECD MTC and, for the sake of consistency and convenience, this is 
continued in relation to POEM. 
1242 The latter question will be addressed in ch 6.4.4. 
1243 Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 5th Interim Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa - basing the South African 
Income Tax System on the Source or Residence Principle - Options and Recommendations para 6.1.2.1; Olivier 
and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 27. 
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4(3), based on the fact that treaties entered into by South Africa form part of the Income Tax 
Act in terms of section 108(2).1244 Van der Merwe also argues that the Income Tax Act has 
adopted the same purpose as article 4(3), namely to determine a single residence.1245 De 
Koker and Williams also take the view that the term bears the same meaning in both the Act 
and in DTTs.1246 Olivier and Honiball imply that the term does not have the same meaning 
for purposes of the Income Tax Act and for treaty purposes, based on the influence of SARS’s 
Interpretation Note.1247 A similar view is expressed in Juta’s Commentary on Income Tax.1248 
Hattingh tentatively suggests that South African courts may attach a different meaning to 
the term for purposes of the Income Tax Act and for treaty purposes. This view is based on 
the opinion that South African courts will interpret legislation based on its function and the 
context. The function and context differ under the Income Tax Act and a DTT in relation to 
POEM in that in the Income Tax Act it serves as one of two connecting factors to establish 
residence. Under a DTT POEM “…serves to resolve double taxation by providing 
comprehensive taxing rights on a worldwide income to only one contracting State to a tax 
treaty and limited source taxing rights to the other country party to that tax treaty”.1249 
In Oceanic Trust1250 the court did not discuss the question whether the meaning of the term 
POEM in the Income Tax Act, with which it was confronted, was the same as the meaning of 
the term under a DTT. However, the court did adopt the test laid down in the United 
Kingdom case of Smallwood in relation to POEM, a case which dealt with the meaning of 
POEM in a treaty context.1251 Arguably, one could deduce that the court, by implication, 
indicated that the same meaning should apply in the Income Tax Act as in a DTT. The court in 
Tradehold did not discuss this question either. 
The Constitution provides that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.1252 It was argued 
earlier in this dissertation that there is no obligation on South African courts to interpret the 
Income Tax Act in a way that is consistent with the OECD MTC and its Commentary, since 
neither of these are international law instruments.1253 The DTTs entered into by South Africa 
are, however, a source of international law1254 and as such an interpretation of the Income 
Tax Act that is consistent with South Africa’s DTTs should be preferred. Since the term POEM 
is used in most of South Africa’s DTTs,1255 it is submitted that the term POEM in the Income 
Tax Act should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the term POEM used in South 
Africa’s DTTs. This argument is supported by the fact that a DTT forms part of the Income 
                                                          
1244 Van der Merwe (2002) 14 Residence of a Company - the Meaning of 'Effective Management' 79 79. 
1245 Van der Merwe (2002) 14 Residence of a Company - the Meaning of 'Effective Management' 79 88. 
1246 De Koker and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 14.42. 
1247 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 42. 
1248 Davis et al Juta's Commentary on Income Tax Commentary on s 1 definition of resident. 
1249 Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 725. 
1250 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1251 Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 426, who also avers that the court in Oceanic relied on the OECD 
Commentary on art 4(3) of the OECD MTC. 
1252 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 233. 
1253 See ch 4.3.2.1. 
1254 See ch 4.4.1. 
1255 Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 721. 
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Tax Act.1256 Thus the term POEM should be given the same meaning in the Income Tax Act as 
it is given under South Africa’s DTTs. 
It is furthermore submitted that although the context differs, the aim of the term POEM 
under DTTs and the Income Tax Act is the same. The aim in the DTT context is to “determine 
‘best residency’ from a choice of at least two residencies”.1257 However, as argued by Van 
der Merwe, the aim of the Income Tax Act is also to determine a single residence for an 
entity.1258 Van der Merwe’s argument may find support in the decision in Oceanic Trust 
where the court, in interpreting the meaning of POEM in the Income Tax Act, adopted the 
“Smallwood test”, which included a statement that there can only be one POEM at any one 
time.1259 
6.3.1.3.2 SARS’s view regarding the meaning of POEM 
Different views have been expressed in South Africa regarding the meaning of POEM. SARS 
has issued an Interpretation Note in 2002 to explain its views on the meaning of the 
term.1260 This note states that “effective management” is not the same as shareholder 
control1261 or control by the board of directors. The note sets out SARS’s general approach as 
follows: 
“The place of effective management is the place where the company is managed on a 
regular or day-to-day basis by the directors or senior managers of the company, 
irrespective of where the overriding control is exercised, or where the board of 
directors meets. 
Management by these directors or senior managers refer to the execution and 
implementation of policy and strategy decisions made by the board of directors. It can 
also be referred to as the place of implementation of the entity’s overall group vision 
and objectives. 
Management structures, reporting lines and responsibilities vary from entity to entity, 
depending on the requirements of the entity, and not hard and fast rules exist. It is 
therefore not possible to lay down absolute guidelines in this regard.” 
The Interpretation Note also contains a paragraph dealing with the practical application of 
SARS’s view. This paragraph, read with the one quoted above, reinforces the view that SARS 
considers the POEM to be the place where management decisions are implemented. The 
                                                          
1256 See ch 4.4.1. 
1257 Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 426. 
1258 Van der Merwe (2002) 14 Residence of a Company - the Meaning of 'Effective Management' 79 88. 
1259 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 54. As 
mentioned earlier, Smallwood dealt with the meaning of POEM in a treaty context, where the aim is to 
determine a single residence for purposes of the application of the treaty. The court in Oceanic Trust did not 
make a distinction between the treaty context and the context of the Income Tax Act. 
1260 South African Revenue Service Resident: Place of Effective Management (Persons other than Natural 
Persons). It is axiomatic that SARS’s Interpretation Notes are not law (Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a 
South African Perspective 42; Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 685). 
Therefore, neither the courts nor taxpayers are bound to Interpretation Notes. 
1261 But see Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 who argues that shareholder control of a company may be 
relevant to determine POEM. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
place where decisions are made (as opposed to implemented) is therefore irrelevant. Also, it 
is clear that SARS does not view the overall and top level of management as “effective 
management”. Rather, according to SARS, it is a lower level of management that is the 
effective management. SARS’s view on the meaning of the term POEM has been both 
criticised and praised.1262 One point that should be noted regarding this Interpretation Note 
is that the drafters clearly had companies and not other entities such as trusts in mind when 
drafting the note. 
In September 2011, SARS issued a Discussion Paper1263 regarding the term POEM. Its 
intention was to invite comments from taxpayers and practitioners regarding their concerns 
on the meaning of POEM and to provide a framework for discussion of possible revisions to 
the Interpretation Note. According to SARS certain practitioners were concerned that foreign 
operating subsidiaries of South African headquarter companies would be regarded as being 
effectively managed in South Africa, thereby negating the benefits of the headquarter 
company regime. 
The Discussion Paper makes it clear that it is limited to “issues involving domestic and 
foreign companies” and continues that “[l]egal persons other than companies, such as … 
trusts, present separate and distinct issues and will be addressed in a subsequent 
project”.1264 Its statement that a trust is a legal person is clearly wrong in law1265 and it is 
hoped that this error will be corrected in the “subsequent project”. Despite its seemingly 
limited intention (in relation to the headquarter company regime) and incorrect statement, 
it is submitted that the Discussion Paper is still a useful indication of SARS’s views on the 
meaning of POEM and it is therefore discussed in more detail. 
The Discussion Paper gives a brief description of SARS’s current interpretation of POEM as 
set out in Interpretation Note 6. It then summarises some of the criticism1266 that has been 
levelled against this Note. The main point of criticism has been that the Interpretation Note 
has focused on implementation and execution of decisions, rather than the place where 
those decisions were being taken.1267 Turning to the use of the term POEM internationally, 
the Discussion Paper draws a distinction between the “board-centric approach” (meaning 
that the decision-making by the company’s board or similar structure is the key factor) and 
the “continental approach” (meaning that importance is placed on the place where senior 
management operates). The Discussion Paper continues to consider the criticism against the 
board-centric approach noting that it “has failed to keep pace with changes in 
                                                          
1262Eg Oguttu (2008) 41 Comparative and International LJ 80 99 and 103. 
1263 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management.  
1264 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 2. 
1265 See ch 2.2.4. 
1266 For criticism of the Interpretation Note see eg Van der Merwe (2006) 18 The Phrase 'Place of Effective 
Management' Effectively Explained? 121; Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax 
Law 689.  
1267 Other points of criticism noted in the Discussion Paper are the inconsistent use of terminology, that some 
of the factors listed in the Interpretation Note to determine a company’s POEM are inconsistent with the 
Note’s general approach and the failure to provide guidance in the case of passive or intermediate holding 
companies (South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective 
Management para 6).  
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telecommunications, international travel and modern business practices”.1268 It also 
discussed the OECD’s response to these changes, mentioning that in 2008 the OECD 
amended its commentary dealing with POEM to omit any reference to the board of 
directors.1269 After a discussion of two United Kingdom cases,1270 the Discussion Paper makes 
certain tentative proposals. Its first proposal is that the general approach of Interpretation 
Note 6 should be retained, but that this approach should be refined. More specifically, the 
Discussion Paper explains that the “second level” of management, that is, “those ‘top’ 
personnel who ‘call the shots’ and exercise ‘realistic positive management’”, will be 
regarded as effectively managing the company. The Discussion Paper continues as follows: 
“In general, these individuals would be the senior officers or executives who are 
responsible for: (1) actually developing or formulating key operational or commercial 
strategies and policies for, or taking decisions on key operational or commercial 
actions by the company (regardless of whether those strategies, policies and decisions 
are subject to formal approval by a board or similar body) and (2) ensuring that those 
strategies and policies are carried out. Areas of decision-making involving 
extraordinary matters (such as major acquisitions, disposals, mergers or new 
borrowing) that are commonly reserved to a company’s board or its shareholders 
generally would not be considered part of this ‘second level of management’ for a 
foreign operating subsidiary and therefore generally would not affect the 
determination of a foreign operating subsidiary’s place of effective management. 
Similarly, day-to-day operational decision-making by junior and middle management 
would also generally fall outside of the second level of management, as would the 
performance of routine administrative or support functions.”1271 
The Discussion Paper further proposes that references in Interpretation Note 6 to 
“implementation” of decisions be omitted. The implication of this omission will be that the 
place where decisions are taken (as opposed to being implemented) will be relevant. The 
Discussion Paper also correctly emphasises that no definitive rules can be laid down and that 
the facts and circumstances of each case must be considered to determine the POEM of a 
company.1272 Further proposals include the definition of certain terms and amendments to 
the list of facts and circumstances contained in the Interpretation Note which are used to 
determine a company’s POEM.1273 
                                                          
1268 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 7.1. 
1269 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 7.2. 
1270 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 7.3 discusses Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 
and Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC). Both cases are discussed in a later paragraph (chs 6.3.2.2 and 
6.4.3.2). 
1271 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 8.1. 
1272 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
para 8.1. 
1273 South African Revenue Service Discussion Paper on Interpretation Note 6: Place of Effective Management 
paras 8.2 and 8.3. 
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Since the publication of the Discussion Paper, SARS has not issued any further publications 
specifically dealing with POEM and neither have they withdrawn the Interpretation Note. 
However, the Income Tax Act has been amended subsequent to the Discussion Paper, but 
none of SARS’s proposals were implemented through an amendment of the Income Tax Act. 
6.3.1.3.3 Case law and academic views regarding the meaning of POEM 
Since the publication of the Discussion Paper, the Supreme Court of Appeal has pronounced 
on the meaning of POEM in the Tradehold1274 case. In that case the taxpayer, Tradehold, was 
an investment holding company incorporated in South Africa. Tradehold had only one asset, 
namely 100 per cent of the shares in Tradegro Holdings which, in turn, held 100 per cent of 
the shares in Tradegro Limited, a company incorporated in Guernsey, which owned 
approximately 65 per cent of the shares in a United Kingdom-based company. Tradehold’s 
board resolved at a meeting in Luxembourg that all future board meetings would take place 
in Luxembourg. The court held that “[t]his had the effect that, as from [the date of the board 
meeting], Tradehold became effectively managed in Luxembourg”.1275 
Effectively the court held that the decision by Tradehold’s board (that all future board 
meetings would be held in Luxembourg) and possibly their further board meetings, 
constituted the effective management of Tradehold. The court therefore held that in this 
case effective management took place at the highest level of management, namely the 
board of directors, and that it is the place of decision-making (and not its implementation) 
that is relevant. However, it is submitted that it would be an oversimplification of the court’s 
decision if it were to be deduced that decision-making at board level will always equal 
effective management.1276 In this regard it should be borne in mind that Tradehold was an 
investment holding company and that its only asset was its shareholding in its wholly-owned 
subsidiary. The management activities of this company would certainly be very different 
from the management activities undertaken in an operating company. It is unlikely that an 
investment holding company with only one asset would have any other level of management 
than a board of directors. The board’s activities would presumably be limited to decisions 
regarding transactions involving the shares or (possibly) the acquisition of new assets. It is 
therefore not surprising that the court in Tradehold held that its POEM was the place where 
its board made its decisions. In other circumstances, a court may arguably come to a 
different conclusion, although the decision in Tradehold would have to be carefully 
distinguished, bearing in mind that it was a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
                                                          
1274 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). This case was 
discussed earlier in this dissertation in relation to other topics (see ch 4.3.2.2. and ch 5.2.6.). The discussion of 
the case in this paragraph focuses only on the aspects relating to POEM. 
1275 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 3. 
1276 Classen (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 387 394 seems to agree with this conclusion, but for different reasons. She 
also argues that the Tradehold case was very fact specific and did not influence the interpretation of the POEM 
concept “because the application of this test to the facts of this matter was not attempted by the parties 
before court”. It is not clear what the author means when she says that the matter was not “attempted by the 
parties before court”, but it is nevertheless submitted that it cannot be accepted that Tradehold did not 
influence the interpretation of POEM. The court had all the facts that it required to make a decision regarding 
POEM in front of it and on that basis pronounced on the meaning of POEM. It is submitted that the decision is 
no more fact specific than any other and may be applied, subject to the argument set out in the main text, to 
other cases. Although a fuller discussion of the point by the Supreme Court of Appeal would have been 
welcome, the decision cannot be dismissed because of the lack of such a discussion.  
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A further case to be borne in mind when discussing the POEM of a trust is Oceanic Trust.1277 
The facts in that case are that SIMS was a trust that was established and registered in 
Mauritius. Its sole trustee was the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd, a company registered and 
incorporated in Mauritius. In terms of the trust deed, the law of Mauritius was to govern the 
administration of the settlement and trustees were obliged to maintain their principal place 
of business at, and conduct their affairs from, premises in Mauritius. SIMS acted as captive 
reinsurer to MCubed Life Ltd, a South African registered company (and, it is assumed, also a 
South African resident for tax purposes). 
SARS issued an assessment against SIMS averring, inter alia, that SIMS was a resident of 
South Africa. SIMS had lodged an objection against the assessment. But before this matter 
was heard by the relevant court, SIMS, through its trustee, the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd, 
approached the court for a declarator. It asked the court, inter alia, to find that it was not a 
resident. The basis of Oceanic Trust Co Ltd’s application was that SARS accused it of failing to 
provide it with certain information. In terms of the Income Tax Act,1278 only “taxpayers” are 
required to provide information to SARS. Whether SIMS was a taxpayer and therefore 
obliged to provide the information to SARS, turned on whether it was a resident and, more 
specifically, whether it had its POEM in South Africa. The court was therefore not asked to 
decide the merits of the appeal against the assessment, but merely to rule on whether or 
not SIMS had its POEM in South Africa. 
In order to qualify for the declaratory order, SIMS, through its trustee, had to show that only 
questions of law (and not questions of fact) had to be decided by the court. SARS contended 
that this application involved both questions of law and questions of fact and that the court 
therefore could not issue the declaratory order. Much of the judgement dealt with the issue 
of whether there were only questions of law, or also questions of fact, to be decided. In the 
end, the court sided with SARS. The effect was that the court could not grant the relief 
prayed for by SIMS’s trustee. 
However, the court continued (in what is submitted to be an obiter finding1279) to state that 
it had not been established that SIMS’s POEM was outside South Africa. In deciding the 
meaning of the term POEM, the court applied the test laid down by the Special 
Commissioners in the United Kingdom case of Smallwood.1280 This test, the court found, was 
                                                          
1277 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. This case 
was referred to briefly earlier in this dissertation (see ch 4.3.2.2.), but is discussed in greater detail here. 
1278 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 74. 
1279 Classen (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 387 395 shares the view that the finding is obiter. However, she continues to 
state that POEM was not applied to the facts in the case. It is submitted that this statement is not correct. The 
court stated that “[t]herefore, applying the Smallwood test, the facts to the extent that they have been 
established, do not, in my view, establish that the POEM of SISM was in Mauritius, and not in South Africa (The 
Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 58). It is clear 
from this statement that the court did apply POEM (as interpreted in the Smallwood case) to the facts, to the 
extent that the facts were established. 
1280 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. This case is 
discussed in greater detail in chs 6.3.2.2 and 6.4.4. It is unclear why the court referred only to the decision by 
the Special Commissioners and not the decision by the Court of Appeal (the Chancery Division deciding the case 
on a different point, making the consideration of POEM unnecessary). The decision of the Special 
Commissioners was delivered in 2008 and the Court of Appeal’s decision in June 2010. The decision in Oceanic 
Trust was handed down almost a year later in June 2011. 
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as follows.1281 The POEM is the place where key management and commercial decisions that 
are necessary for the conduct of the entities business are in substance made. The POEM will 
ordinarily be the place where the most senior group of persons (for example, a board of 
directors) makes its decision, where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are 
determined. However, no definite rule can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances 
must be examined to determine the POEM of an entity. There may be more than one place 
of management, but only one POEM at any one time. The court added that the decision in 
Smallwood was not based only on this test, but also on a specific provision in the United 
Kingdom legislation. The court also highlighted that the court in the Smallwood case 
analysed the facts and the scheme in great detail before deciding on the issue of POEM. 
On the facts before it, the court held that at least some of the key management decisions 
and at the very least some of the key commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of 
SIMS’s business were in substance made in South Africa.1282 Hence, the court held that it had 
not been established that SIMS’s POEM was in Mauritius. Presumably, the court’s finding in 
this regard was based on the following facts, which the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd conceded may 
be relied on to decide the matter. SIMS derived all its business from MCubed Life Ltd. SIMS 
was required to invest all the reinsurance premiums in assets to be held in South Africa and 
it also appointed a South African asset manager to manage these assets. The asset manager 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCubed Holdings Ltd and MCubed Holdings Ltd was also 
the only shareholder in MCubed Life Ltd. MCubed Holdings Ltd and its operating division 
frequently gave instructions to the asset manager on the SIMS investments. SIMS held a 
bank account in South Africa and never transferred any money to and from Mauritius. 
SIMS’s entire income was generated from business activities actually conducted in South 
Africa. 
A significant aspect of this case is the court’s adoption of the test laid down in Smallwood 
regarding the meaning of POEM. The court did not mention SARS’s (different) view regarding 
POEM, or any of the OECD material regarding the meaning of POEM in DTTs. However, by 
adopting the Smallwood test, the court effectively adopted the meaning of POEM as 
expressed in the OECD commentary to article 4 of the OECD MTC (albeit prior to its 
amendment in 2008). It could therefore be argued that the South African domestic tax law 
meaning of POEM is the same as that expressed by the OECD in its commentary to article 4 
(prior to its amendment). 
One puzzling aspect of the case is the way that it dealt with the definition of residence. The 
taxpayer was assessed for the 2000 to 2007 years of assessment. The definition of “resident” 
was amended, with effect from 26 February 2003, to include an exception, namely that “any 
person who is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of the 
application of any agreement entered into between the government of the Republic of 
South Africa and that other country for the avoidance of double taxation, would not be a 
resident”.1283 Therefore, at least from the 2004 tax year onwards, as long as the taxpayer 
could show that it was a resident of Mauritius for purposes of the DTT, it could not be 
regarded as a resident in South Africa. 
                                                          
1281 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 54. 
1282 This point will be returned to later in this chapter (see ch 6.4.4.). 
1283 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of resident, amended by Exchange Control Amnesty and 
Amendment of Taxation Laws Act 12 of 2003 s 33. 
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The court quoted the definition contained in the relevant DTT, which reads as follows: 
“For the purposes of this agreement: 
(a) The term ‘resident of Mauritius’ means any person who, under the laws of that 
state, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of 
management or any other criterion of a similar nature. This term does not 
include any person who is liable to tax in Mauritius in respect only of income 
from sources in Mauritius; and 
(b) The term ‘resident of South Africa’ means any individual who is ordinary resident 
in South Africa and any legal person which has its place of management in South 
Africa.” (emphasis added by Court) 
What is immediately apparent from the definition of resident of South Africa is that only 
individuals and juristic persons are dealt with. In terms of South African law, a trust is neither 
and individual, nor a juristic person,1284 and one could therefore argue that a trust is not a 
resident of South Africa for purposes of the DTT. If this argument were to succeed, it would 
not be necessary to apply the tiebreaker provision in the relevant DTT, as the trust would 
not be a dual resident. It would only be a resident of Mauritius, which would mean that, 
from 2004 onwards, the trust would not be regarded as a resident of South Africa for South 
African domestic law purposes. However, the argument could possibly fail if trusts are 
regarded as juristic persons in terms of Mauritian trust law. 
Academic authors have given differing views on the meaning of POEM. Most of these views 
were expressed before the decisions in Oceanic Trust and Tradehold were handed down and 
are therefore not discussed in detail.1285 Some of these authors prefer a view similar to that 
of SARS (that is, that day-to-day management is to be regarded as effective management) 
whilst others prefer a meaning that focuses on the highest level of decision-making. 
According to Gutuza the views illustrate two possible approaches, the one focusing on the 
“directing mind” of the company and the other focussing on company rules as set out in its 
documents and in the law. Gutuza further states: 
“The first approach would attribute certain ‘human’ characteristics to the company by 
seeking to find the ‘mind’ which effectively manages it. This mind is located in some 
individual or body of persons. The second approach would scrutinise the company’s 
founding documents, and the relevant law (both case law and legislation) to determine 
which person or body is empowered to ‘effectively manage’ the company in terms of 
its rules. The first approach can also be referred to ‘de facto place of effective 
management’, while the latter can be referred to as the ‘legal place of effective 
management’.”1286 
                                                          
1284 See ch 2.2.4. 
1285 For a summary of academic authors’ view on the meaning of POEM, see Hattingh in Residence of 
Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 707; Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 427, Olivier and Honiball 
International Tax: a South African Perspective 28 and Muller Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South 
African Income Tax Perspective 229–235.  
1286 Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 428. 
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It is submitted that the court in Oceanic Trust used the first approach (that is, seeking the 
“directing mind” of the trust) to determine the question of POEM.1287 Thus, the court 
considered the place where SIMS’s business activities were conducted and where its income 
was generated; the person that gave instructions on the use of the premiums and how 
investments should be made; the corporate structure that SIMS formed part of; the reason 
for SIMS’s formation in the first place; and the lack of documentation regarding trustee 
meetings.1288 These facts considered by the court in reaching its decision that SIMS did not 
have its POEM in South Africa, indicate that the court wanted to determine who the “mind” 
was that effectively managed it. 
According to Gutuza the second approach (that is, the approach that looks at the rules that 
give the company its juristic personality and that regulate its actions) cannot be used in the 
case of a trust, since the trust does not have juristic personality (although it is regarded as a 
person for purposes of the Income Tax Act).1289 Although Gutuza is undoubtedly correct that 
a trust is not a juristic person, it is submitted that the document(s) (if there are any) through 
which a trust is formed and the rules of trust law could also be applied in the case of a trust 
to determine who may effectively manage it. Therefore, even though a trust does not obtain 
juristic personality through the trust documents or trust law, these sources still govern the 
functioning of the trust and on this basis the second approach identified by Gutuza can still 
be applied to trusts.1290 Interestingly, in Oceanic Trust the taxpayer’s (that is, SIMS’s) 
argument was based on this approach. It argued that SIMS’s sole trustee, Oceanic Trust, had 
no links to South Africa and that SIMS could only act through its trustee (a company) and 
that the director of the company had never been to South Africa. All management decisions 
regarding SIMS were taken by the sole trustee and these were consequently taken in 
Mauritius. It also argued that the place where SIMS’s business activities took place and 
where some of its business was carried on, should not be confused with its POEM.1291 As 
stated earlier, the court applied the first approach (the directing mind approach) to 
determine POEM and this could serve as an indication that South African courts will apply 
this approach in determining the POEM of a trust. 
6.3.1.3.4 Conclusions regarding the meaning of POEM 
Regarding the meaning of the term POEM in South Africa, it is submitted that the term 
POEM as used in the Income Tax Act should be interpreted in a similar way as the term 
POEM in South Africa’s DTTs. Given that most of South Africa’s DTTs are based on the OECD 
                                                          
1287 Gutuza also states that the Court in Oceanic Trust applied the “directing mind” approach (Gutuza (2012) 24 
SA Merc LJ 424 428). In support of her view Gutuza quotes a passage from para 20 of the judgement in Oceanic 
Trust. However, this passage comes from SARS’s letter of assessment which was quoted by the court in setting 
out SARS’s argument. It is submitted that the court gives no indication that it agrees with this passage and it 
can therefore not be taken to have been adopted by the court or even “favoured” by it. Therefore, although 
Gutuza’s conclusion is correct, her reason cannot be agreed with. 
1288 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 55. 
1289 Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 427 and 429. 
1290 Gutuza acknowledges that if this approach were used in Oceanic Trust, the first matter to be considered 
would be the role and decision making by the trustees (Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 429). Support for the 
view set forth above may be found in Muller Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South African Income Tax 
Perspective 244. 
1291 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 48. 
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MTC, the meaning of the term POEM in terms of the tiebreaker provision of the OECD MTC 
is important. This meaning is discussed below.1292 
Furthermore, SARS’s view regarding POEM, as expressed in their Interpretation Note and 
insofar as it focuses on implementation, is clearly not the interpretation that will be 
followed. This is evident from Tradehold and Oceanic Trust and SARS has indicated in its 
Discussion Paper that it will not pursue this interpretation. Thus it is the place of decision-
making that will be relevant in determining the place of effective management for South 
African purposes. To the extent that SARS’s Interpretation Note relied on a lower level of 
management than the top level of management, the decisions in Tradehold and Oceanic 
Trust indicate that the tide has turned towards top level management. In Tradehold, a 
decision at board level was regarded as effective management. In Oceanic Trust, the court, 
adopting the Smallwood test, stated that POEM is the place where key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in 
substance made. The POEM will ordinarily be the place where the most senior group of 
persons (for example, a board of directors) makes its decision and where the actions to be 
taken by the entity as a whole are determined. 
Therefore, both as regards decision-making (and not implementation) and the level of 
decision-making, the South African domestic law position corresponds in broad terms to the 
position set out by the OECD in their Commentary to article 4(3).1293 
If a South African court is asked to determine the POEM of a trust, it is likely to adopt the 
directing mind approach. Following the approach in Tradehold and Oceanic Trust, the POEM 
of a trust for South African domestic law purposes will be where the highest level of 
management is exercised. Usually the trustees will exercise this level of management, 
although this is not always the case (as was illustrated in Oceanic Trust). In the final analysis 
all the facts and circumstances of a particular case will have to be considered.1294 
6.3.1.4  Is it possible to change a trust’s residence? 
Once established or formed in South Africa, a trust can only change its residence if it is 
deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of the application of a 
DTT.1295 Typically, POEM would be used in a treaty as a tiebreaker, as it is in article 4(3) of 
the OECD MTC, to determine where a trust is resident for purposes of a treaty. One would 
                                                          
1292 See ch 6.4.3. 
1293 See ch 6.4.3. 
1294 See ch 6.4.4. 
1295 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 13(5) allows a “foreign company” to “transfer its registration to the 
Republic from the foreign jurisdiction in which it is registered, and thereafter exist as a company in terms of 
this Act as if it had been originally so incorporated and registered”, provided that the conditions set out in ss 
13(6) and (7) are met. Although a trust (whether or not it was established within or outside the Republic) is 
included in the definition of “juristic person” in s 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 13(5) clearly applies only 
to a “foreign company”. In turn, a “foreign company” is defined as meaning “an entity incorporated outside the 
Republic, irrespective of whether it is (a) a profit, or non-profit, entity; or (b) carrying on business or non-profit 
activities, as the case may be, within the Republic.” It is submitted that the reference to incorporation in this 
definition excludes trusts, since trusts are seldom incorporated entities and in none of the jurisdictions under 
discussion in this dissertation are trusts incorporated. It is thus submitted that a foreign trust (that is not 
incorporated) will not be able to transfer its registration to South Africa in terms of the Companies Act.  
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therefore have to determine whether any DTT may be applied to a trust that was established 
or formed in South Africa and, if so, whether POEM is used as a tiebreaker. Assuming that 
these two conditions are met, it would therefore be possible to change the residence of a 
trust by moving its POEM to a state outside South Africa. The decision in Tradehold1296 
illustrates how the POEM of a company was changed, namely by resolving that all future 
directors’ meetings would be held in Luxembourg. By analogy, one could argue that under 
certain circumstances a decision by the trustees of a trust to hold al further trustee meetings 
in another state, would result in a change in the trust’s POEM and therefore a change in its 
residence. 
In the case of a trust that was not established or formed in South Africa, but which has its 
POEM in South Africa and is, accordingly, resident in South Africa, a change in residence will 
similarly be achieved by a change in the POEM of the trust (on the assumptions that a DTT 
applies and that POEM is the tiebreaker). 
Trusts that are not resident in South Africa may become resident in South Africa by moving 
its POEM to South Africa. From a trust law perspective it should be noted that foreigners 
may be appointed as trustees in respect of trust property in South Africa.1297 The Trust 
Property Control Act also empowers the Master to authorise a trustee who is appointed 
outside South Africa, but who has to administer property in South Africa.1298 
6.3.2 United Kingdom 
6.3.2.1 The Income Tax Act 2007 
The position of trusts is governed by the Income Tax Act 2007. It provides that, except where 
the context otherwise requires, “the trustees of a settlement are together treated as if they 
were a single person (distinct from the persons who are the trustees of the settlement from 
time to time)”.1299 According to Schwarz, this provision bestows collective juristic personality 
on the trustees and means that they are “to be treated as a single ‘deemed person’ for the 
purposes of the Taxes Act unless the context requires otherwise”.1300 The Income Tax Act 
2007 further provides that if all the trustees of a trust are United Kingdom residents, the 
single person (that is the trustees as “deemed person”) will be United Kingdom resident and 
ordinarily United Kingdom resident.1301 Thus, the trustees of the trust must be identified and 
their actual place of residence in their personal capacities must be determined, applying 
                                                          
1296 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
1297 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 205. 
1298 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 8. 
1299 Income Tax Act 2007 s 474(1). It continues in s 474(2) to state that if different parts of the settled property 
in relation to a settlement are vested in different bodies of trustees, subsection (1) and sections 475 and 476 
apply in relation to the different bodies as if they were all one body. Subsection 3 provides an example. 
1300 Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 130. 
1301 Income Tax Act 2007 s 475(2) and (4); Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 130. 
The relevance of the distinction between “resident” and “ordinarily resident” is that residence is the “central 
determinant of liability”, while “ordinarily resident” determines liability only in certain special cases and may 
even limit the liability to United Kingdom taxation (Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK 
Taxation 61). 
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either the test for individual or corporate residence, depending on the nature of the 
trustee.1302 If all the trustees are not United Kingdom residents, this rule will not apply. 
If at least one trustee is United Kingdom resident and at least one trustee is non-United 
Kingdom resident, the single person (that is the trustees as “deemed person”) will be United 
Kingdom resident and ordinarily United Kingdom resident, if a settlor in relation to the 
settlement (the trust) meets a further condition. This further condition depends on whether 
the settlement arose on the death of the settlor or not. If the settlement arose on the death 
of the settlor,1303 and immediately before the settlor’s death he or she was United Kingdom 
resident, ordinarily United Kingdom resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom, then the 
condition is met from the time of the settlor’s death until the settlor ceases to be a settlor in 
relation to the settlement.1304 In the case where the settlement does not arise on the death 
of the settlor and at a time when the settlor made the settlement, the settlor was United 
Kingdom resident,1305 ordinarily United Kingdom resident or domiciled in the United 
Kingdom, then the condition is met from that time until the settlor ceases to be a settlor in 
relation to the settlement.1306 
Thus, in the case where at least one trustee is United Kingdom resident and at least one 
trustee is non-United Kingdom resident, the emphasis changes from the trustees to the 
settlor and it is irrelevant where the majority of trustees are resident.1307 It should also be 
noted that if the settlor was not United Kingdom resident, ordinarily United Kingdom 
resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom, the trustees will not be resident or ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom.1308 Transfers of property between settlements may also 
influence trustees’ residence.1309 
If a non-resident person acts as a trustee of a settlement in the course of a business that the 
trustee carries on in the United Kingdom through a branch, agency or permanent 
establishment there, then it is assumed that the trustee is a United Kingdom resident for the 
                                                          
1302 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 185. 
1303 Whether by will, intestacy or any other way. 
1304 Income Tax Act 2007 s 476(2). 
1305 Or is treated for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as making the settlement. 
1306 Income Tax Act 2007 s 476(3). It does not matter if the trustee later becomes a United Kingdom resident or 
domiciled there (Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 4.03). 
1307 Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 130. 
1308 Provided, of course, that at least one trustee is United Kingdom resident and at least one trustee is non-
resident (Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 131; Chamberlain and Whitehouse 
Trust Taxation para 4.03). Kessler opines that if a settlor was not UK resident at the time when the settlement 
was made, but later in that year, or in a subsequent year, becomes a resident, the trust will not become UK 
resident, since the emphasis is on the specific time when the settlor made the settlement (Kessler Taxation of 
Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 187). 
1309 According to Schwarz “[I]f there is a transfer of property between settlements, and a settlor is treated as a 
settlor in relation to the transferee settlement as a result, and immediately before the transfer, that settlor 
meets the residence, ordinary residence or domicile condition as a settlor in relation to the transferring 
settlement, then he also meets that condition as a settlor in relation to the transferee settlement from the 
time he becomes such a settlor until he ceases to be such a settlor” (Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, 
Domicile and UK Taxation 131. See also Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 4.04). 
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purpose of determining the residence and ordinary residence of the single person (that is, 
the trustees as “deemed person”).1310 
According to HMRC the “branch” and “agency” tests apply to non-resident trustees and the 
“permanent establishment test” to corporate trustees.1311 Furthermore, HMRC proposes 
that three questions are relevant in applying the relevant section,1312 namely (a) is the 
trustee carrying on a business in the UK? (in this regard the business referred to is the 
business of providing a professional service as a trustee for a fee1313 and does not refer to 
the business of a particular trust that might be conducted by the trustee); (b) if the trustee is 
carrying on a business in the UK, is it carrying on that business through a branch, agent, or 
permanent establishment1314 in the UK?; (c) if so, is the trustee carrying on the activity of 
being a trustee of that particular trust in the course of its business through the branch, agent 
or permanent establishment? Regarding this last question, HMRC states that activities that, 
in line with the OECD’s commentary, are of a preparatory and auxiliary nature are not 
regarded as activities that are carried on by the trustee functioning as a trustee. Thus, HMRC 
identifies certain “core activities of a trustee” which, if carried on by the trustee, will be 
regarded as the activity of being a trustee. In identifying the “core activities of a trustee”, 
HMRC states that 
“[a] trustee is the person who has a legal duty to manage the assets of that trust in the 
best interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries. The trustee manages, employs and 
disposes of the trust assets in accordance with both the terms of the trust and the 
duties and responsibilities which the law places upon trustees. The core activities of a 
trustee would therefore be regarded as including: 
10.1 the general administration of the trusts. 
10.2 the over-arching investment strategy. 
10.3 monitoring the performance of those investments. 
10.4 decisions on how trust income will be dealt with and whether distributions 
should be made.”1315 
                                                          
1310 Income Tax Act 2007 s 476(6). See also Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 
132. 
1311 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Trustee Residence Guidance para 5. For further guidance on HMRC’s 
view, see Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales et al Trustee Residence 
Taxguide, agreed to by HMRC. Kessler agrees that this is the correct position (Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents 
and Foreign Domiciliaries 193). 
1312 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Trustee Residence Guidance para 8. 
1313 A trustee who does not charge a fee or only recoups expenses, does not carry on a business - a rule that 
may provide relief for family trusts (Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 190). 
1314 There is some debate as to what meaning should be attached to the permanent establishment (PE) 
concept, the United Kingdom domestic law definition of PE, or the treaty definition of PE (found in article 5 of 
the OECD MTC). Kessler’s view is that the United Kingdom domestic law definition applies, but HMRC’s view is 
that the relevant treaty definition applies. According to Kessler, it will often not matter which definition is used, 
as there is probably no difference between the United Kingdom domestic law definition of PE and the OECD 
MTC definition of PE and the latter definition is mostly used in actual United Kingdom treaties (Kessler Taxation 
of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 195). 
1315 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Trustee Residence Guidance para 10. 
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According to HMRC, non-core activities (that is, activities of a preparatory or auxiliary 
nature) include “information gathering meetings, including meetings with independent 
agents or with beneficiaries”.1316 
6.3.2.2 Is it possible to change a trust’s residence? 
A United Kingdom resident trust will become non-resident if its United Kingdom trustees 
resign in favour of non-resident trustees.1317 If the settlor was not United Kingdom resident 
or ordinarily resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom at the time that the settlement 
was funded, then the trust will become non-resident if at least one trustee is resident and at 
least one trustee is non-resident. 
From a trust law perspective, it is possible for United Kingdom resident trustees to resign in 
favour of non-resident trustees. Provided that it can be shown that the beneficiaries will 
benefit from such an appointment, the courts will not interfere with the appointment of 
non-resident beneficiaries.1318 A trust deed may (and it is suggested, should) expressly allow 
for the appointment of non-resident trustees and for the change of the proper law of the 
trust.1319 
A non-resident trust may become resident in the United Kingdom if all its trustees are United 
Kingdom resident. 
In Commissioners For Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood, 1320 an attempt was 
made to change the residence of the trustees, by using a so-called “round the world 
scheme”. Mr Smallwood, a resident of the United Kingdom, created a trust for the benefit of 
himself and his family in 1989. Mr Smallwood, who had the power to appoint trustees, 
appointed a firm resident in Jersey as trustee in 1994, after the previous trustees had 
retired. The trust assets included shares in a United Kingdom company that, if sold, would 
result in a substantial liability for capital gains tax in the United Kingdom. A tax-planning 
exercise was undertaken in terms of which the Jersey firm resigned and a Mauritian 
company was appointed as trustee in December 2000. The shares were sold in January 2001, 
and in March 2001 the Mauritian trustees resigned and Mr Smallwood appointed himself 
and his wife as trustees. The taxpayer argued that at the time when the shares were sold 
and the capital gain was realised, the trustees were resident solely in Mauritius and that in 
terms of article 13(4) of the DTT between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, the United 
Kingdom was prevented from taxing the gains.1321 The taxpayer therefore argued that the 
only relevant time at which the residence of the trustees was to be determined, was at the 
date of disposal. According to the taxpayer, the fact that the trustees became resident in the 
United Kingdom after the date of disposal (and therefore became liable to tax in the United 
Kingdom for the whole tax year) was irrelevant for the application of the DTT. This argument 
                                                          
1316 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Trustee Residence Guidance para 11. Controversially, HMRC includes 
the frequency, along with the nature and importance, of activities as a criterion to determine whether a trustee 
was acting as such (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Trustee Residence Guidance para 12; Schwarz Booth & 
Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 133).  
1317 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 4.13. 
1318 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation paras 4.14 and 4.15. 
1319 Chamberlain and Whitehouse Trust Taxation para 4.16. 
1320 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
1321 Since Mauritius does not have capital gains tax, the gain would effectively not be taxed. 
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was rejected by the court. Instead it held that the term “residence” in article 4(1) of the DTT 
(which conformed to article 4(1) in the OECD MTC) referred to “chargeability to tax” and not 
“physical residence”. Therefore, even though the trustees only became residents in the 
period subsequent to the disposal of the shares, it made them chargeable to tax and 
therefore liable to tax by reason of their residence for purposes of article 4(1).1322 
This view meant that the tiebreaker provision in article 4(3), namely POEM, had to be 
applied, since the trustees were liable to tax in both the relevant states. In other words, the 
person is deemed to be a resident only of the state in which its POEM is situated, for 
purposes of the treaty. The majority of the court emphasised that it was the POEM of the 
trustees of the trust, as a continuing body (and not the POEM of the Mauritian trust 
company), that had to be determined. In this regard the majority, per Lord Justice Hughes, 
held that 
“[t]he scheme was devised in the United Kingdom by Mr Smallwood on the advice of 
KPMG Bristol. The steps taken in the scheme were carefully orchestrated throughout 
from the United Kingdom, both by KPMG and by Quilter. And it was integral to the 
scheme that the trust should be exported to Mauritius for a brief temporary period 
only and then be returned, within the fiscal year, to the United Kingdom, which 
occurred. Mr Smallwood remained throughout in the UK. There was a scheme of 
management of this trust which went above and beyond the day to day management 
exercised by the trustees for the time being, and the control of it was located in the 
United Kingdom.”1323 
Thus the majority of the court held that the POEM of the trust was in the United Kingdom, 
which meant that the United Kingdom was entitled, in terms of the relevant DTT, to tax the 
gain on the sale of the shares. Thus the export of the trust to Mauritius did not have the 
desired effect. 
6.3.3 Canada 
6.3.3.1 Central management and control1324 
The Canadian Income Tax Act does not contain a definition of the term “residence” that is 
relevant to determine the residence of a trust and hence the term must be interpreted in 
accordance with general principles.1325 In the case of Fundy Settlement v Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Canada recently pronounced on the test to be applied to determine the 
                                                          
1322 This part of the judgement has been criticised as follows: “With respect to the Special Commissioners, and 
to the Court of Appeal who upheld their approach, it is submitted that Article 4(1) of the Treaty cannot award 
treaty residence in the UK to trustees for the part of the year in which they are non-resident, simply because 
domestic law does not regard them as resident. The argument that the trustees were treaty resident for the 
purposes of Article 4(1) because they were liable (chargeable) to tax on a capital gain by reason of a period of 
residence starting subsequently to the gain ignores the fact that they were only liable by reason of a statutory 
‘force of attraction’ provision and not because they were actually resident at the relevant time” (Cleave (2011) 
6 BTR 705 709). 
1323 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 70. 
1324 Throughout this dissertation, “central management and control” is used as one concept. Both the courts 
and academic authors recognize it as one concept and use the singular verb in relation to it. 
1325 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 123. 
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residence of a trust under Canadian domestic law.1326 The facts were that a resident of 
Barbados, a corporation known as St Michal’s Trust Corp, was the trustee of two trusts, the 
Fundy Settlement and the Summersby Settlement. Both trusts were formed by a person 
resident in St Vincent in the Caribbean, but the beneficiaries were all resident in Canada. The 
issue was whether the Canadian government was entitled to withholding tax on the sale of 
certain shares in Canadian corporations by the trusts. In terms of the tax treaty between 
Canada and Barbados, tax would only be payable in the state in which the seller was 
resident. It therefore had to be determined whether the trusts were resident in Canada. 
The trustee argued that the residence of the trust was the residence of the trustee, which 
the Tax Court (the court of first instance) had found to be in Barbados. For the Canadian 
Minister of Finance (the Minister) it was argued that the appropriate test to determine the 
residence of a trust was the place where its central management and control was situated. 
The Minister argued that the central management and control of the trust was exercised by 
its main beneficiaries in Canada. 
The court observed that there was very little authority on the question of the residency of a 
trust, but that the residence of corporations was determined by the central management 
and control test.1327 The court quoted the well-known dictum from De Beers Consolidated 
Mines, Ltd. v. Howe: 
“In applying the conception of residence to a company, we ought, I think, to proceed 
as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A company cannot eat or sleep, 
but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really 
keeps house and does business. … [A] company resides for purposes of income tax 
where its real business is carried on. … I regard that as the true rule, and the real 
business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides.”1328 
After observing that the central management and control test was adopted in Canada as the 
test for the residency of a corporation, the court stated that the central management and 
control of a corporation will generally be where its board of directors exercises its 
responsibilities. If, however, the facts show that the central management and control of the 
corporation was carried out by a shareholder, it will be resident where that shareholder is 
resident and making decisions.1329 The court held that 
“[a]s with corporations, residence of a trust should be determined by the principle that 
a trust resides for the purposes of the Act where ‘its real business is carried on’ (De 
                                                          
1326 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520. The case concerned two trusts and four other 
persons who were also assessed on the relevant gains. The case was first heard by the Tax Court of Canada, 
then the Federal Court of Appeal and lastly by the Supreme Court of Canada. The citations of the different 
appeal cases differ significantly, but in fact they all refer to the same matter. In this dissertation the following 
citations will be used to refer to the respective judgements: Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 (Tax Court of 
Canada), St Michael Trust Corp as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement v Her Majesty the Queen 2010 FCA 309 
(Federal Court of Appeal) and Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 (Supreme Court of 
Canada). 
1327 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 8. 
1328 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe [1906] AC 455 (HL) 458. 
1329 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 9. 
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Beers, at p. 458), which is where the central management and control of the trust 
actually takes place.”1330 
On the facts the Tax Court had found that the trustee had a restricted role, namely to 
provide administrative services, and that the trustee had limited responsibility beyond that. 
It had further found that the main beneficiaries exercised central management and control. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal therefore confirmed that the trusts were resident in Canada, 
where its central management and control was exercised. It noted that the residence of the 
trust could sometimes be the residence of the trustee. This would be the case if the trustee 
exercises central management and control and these duties are performed where the 
trustee is resident.1331 
In finding that the trustee had a limited role and that the main beneficiaries exercised 
central management and control, the Tax Court found that there was an unwritten 
agreement that the trustee would comply with the recommendations of the main 
beneficiaries and that the main beneficiaries understood this from the outset.1332 This 
unwritten agreement was enforceable through the mechanism of a protector, who was 
entitled to replace the trustee.1333 The Tax Court took into account a number of factors to 
reach its decision. A director of the trustee drafted an internal memorandum suggesting that 
that the trustee would act in an administrative capacity only and that the trustee would 
make no distributions without the main trustees’ consent. The limited evidence on how the 
proceeds of the sale were handled, suggested that it was under the direction of the two 
main beneficiaries. The same tax advisers acted for the main beneficiaries and the trusts and 
the main beneficiaries directed the tax minimisation plans. The trustee submitted very few 
documents in support of its case that it played an active role in managing the trusts, whereas 
the documents submitted by the Minister supported the view that the trustee played a very 
limited role. It was questionable whether the trustee had the relevant expertise in managing 
trust assets. The oral evidence presented to the court was consistent with the trustee’s 
limited role.1334 
6.3.3.2 Income Tax Act 
In terms of the Income Tax Act, a trust may be deemed to be a resident of Canada.1335 The 
Canadian Department of Finance explains that the following trusts are subject to the rules 
contained in the relevant section: 
                                                          
1330 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 15. 
1331 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 15. This case is criticised by Avery Jones 
and Nikolakakis because the finding of the court that the trust was resident in Canada, means that the trust 
was dual resident, because the court implied that it was also resident in Barbados. The relevant DTT provided 
that in the case of dual residence “the competent authorities shall by mutual agreement endeavour to settle 
the question and to determine the mode of application of this Agreement” (Avery Jones and Nikolakakis (2012) 
14 International Tax Law Reports 1090 1097). Cleave raises essentially the same point in relation to the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s decision (Cleave (2011) 6 BTR 705 712). 
1332 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 194. 
1333 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 191. 
1334 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 paras 196–252.  
1335 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 94(3). See ch 3.4.6 for a more detailed discussion of this section. 
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“In general, a trust (other than an exempt foreign trust) will be subject to tax for a 
taxation year as a trust resident in Canada if a contribution was made to the trust by a 
person (other than a recent immigrant to Canada or an exempt person) that is resident 
in Canada at a specified time (generally, the end of the year). In addition, a trust (other 
than an exempt foreign trust) will generally be subject to Canadian tax for a taxation 
year if there is a resident beneficiary under the trust. More specifically, if: a 
contribution was made by a person when the person was resident in Canada (or 
generally within a 60-month period before the person became resident in Canada or 
within a 60-month period after the person ceased to be resident in Canada), where the 
contributing person is an individual (other than a trust), at the specified time the 
individual had been resident in Canada for more than 60 months, and at the specified 
time there is a person (other than a successor beneficiary) that is resident in Canada 
and is a beneficiary under the trust.”1336 
As stated above, the court in Garron1337 held, on the previous version of this provision, that if 
such a deeming provision applied, the trust would not be liable to tax by reason of its 
residence for purposes of the relevant treaty. Residence by virtue of this deeming provision 
would therefore not result in treaty residence. However, in 2013, the Income Tax 
Conventions Interpretation Act was amended by the inclusion of the following provision: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of a convention or the Act giving the convention the 
force of law in Canada, if a trust is deemed by subsection 94(3) of the Income Tax Act 
to be resident in Canada for a taxation year for the purposes of computing its income, 
the trust is deemed to be a resident of Canada, and not a resident of the other 
contracting state, for the purposes of applying the convention (a) in respect of the 
trust for that taxation year; and (b) in respect of any other person for any period that 
includes all or part of that taxation year.”1338 
Thus, by virtue of this provision, a trust that is deemed to be resident in Canada for purposes 
of the relevant section of the Income Tax Act, is also deemed to be resident in Canada for 
purposes of a DTT. 
6.3.3.3 Is it possible to change a trust’s residence? 
It is submitted that the residence of a trust may be changed by moving the central 
management and control of a trust. Some authors state that the residence of a trust may 
change if the trustee ceases to reside in Canada or if the trustee is replaced by a non-
resident trustee.1339 This statement is only correct insofar as the trustee, in fact, manages 
and controls the trust and such management and control takes place where the trustee 
resides.1340 It is submitted that the better test will be to find the person(s) who manage and 
                                                          
1336 Minister of Finance Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act, the Excise Tax Act and Related 
Legislation. 
1337 Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79 para 316 and St Michael Trust Corp as Trustee of the Fundy Settlement 
v Her Majesty the Queen 2010 FCA 309 para 87. Although the matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520), this point was not decided by that court. 
1338 Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act RSC 1985 c I–4 s 4.3. 
1339 Ewens Canada Tax Service - McCarthy Tetrault Analysis s 104 21; Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.1.2. 
1340 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 15. 
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control the trust1341 and to examine whether such management and control has moved. The 
movement of the central management and control of a trust may take place because the 
person(s) who manage and control the trust changed, for example, by appointing a new 
trustee(s) who is a non-resident. The central management and control of a trust may also 
move, because the place where central management and control is exercised has changed – 
for example, a trustee exercises central management and control from a different place, 
because all trustee meetings are held at a different place. 
6.3.4 The Netherlands 
The Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting (the Dutch corporate income tax legislation) provides 
that if an entity is formed in terms of Dutch law, it is deemed to be a resident of the 
Netherlands.1342 Since trusts are not formed in terms of Dutch law, this provision will not 
apply to determine a trust’s residence. 
Earlier, the view was taken that a trust does not, generally speaking, fall within one of the 
categories that would be liable to corporate income tax as a resident.1343 However, if this 
view is not correct and if a trust could be classified as one of the entities listed in the Wet op 
de vennootschapsbelasting,1344 it may be liable for Dutch corporate income tax.1345 In terms 
of the Algemene wet inzake ryksbelasting, the place where an individual resides and an 
entity is settled, is determined according to the circumstances.1346 The circumstances under 
which an entity will be regarded as resident in the Netherlands are not set out in the 
legislation. Rather, it has been left to the courts to determine those circumstances.1347 In this 
regard the courts have held that the place of effective management of a company is usually 
conclusive. Other factors that will be taken into account include the place of residence of the 
directors, the place where board meetings take place, the place where the company has its 
head office and the place where the shareholders are resident.1348 Regarding the meaning of 
place of effective management, it is the higher level of strategic management that is taken 
into account, rather than the day-to-day management. The courts have also formulated a 
rule that assumes that the effective management of a company is in the hands of its board 
of directors, although there may be exceptions.1349 
Translating these rules to trusts, it is submitted that a trust will be resident in the 
Netherlands if its place of effective management is in the Netherlands. Usually, a trust’s 
high-level strategic management is carried out by its trustees and it will therefore be 
                                                          
1341 See ch 6.4.4. 
1342 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969 s 2(4). 
1343 See ch 3.5.2. 
1344 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. 
1345 See ch 3. 
1346 Algemene wet inzake rijksbelasting s 4(1). The Dutch text reads as follows: “Waar iemand woont en waar 
een lichaam gevestigd is, wordt naar de omstandigheden beoordeeld”. This section has been translated as 
follows: “The place of residence of an individual or an entity [lichaam] is determined according to 
circumstances” (De Boer in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 560). 
1347 De Boer in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 561; Kosters (2011) Country Analyses 
IBFD para 1.1.5. 
1348 De Boer in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 562; Kosters (2011) Country Analyses 
IBFD para 1.1.5. 
1349 De Boer in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 563. 
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assumed (as is done in the case of companies) that the trustees effectively manage a trust. 
Other factors that may play a role to determine whether a trust is resident in the 
Netherlands include the place of residence of the trustees, the place where trustee meetings 
take place and the place where the beneficiaries are resident. However, a contrary view is 
held by Boer. He argues that since a trust is usually managed by its trustees, it will usually be 
resident where the majority of trustees are resident or settled.1350 
It should, however, be borne in mind that it is doubtful whether a trust will be subject to 
corporate income tax as resident and it is only if it is so liable that it will be regarded as liable 
to tax for purposes of a DTT. If a trust is not a resident, it may be liable to corporate income 
tax as a doelvermogen (purpose fund). However, since it will only be liable to tax on Dutch 
income, no comprehensive liability to tax will arise and such trusts will, accordingly, not be 
regarded as liable to tax in the Netherlands for DTT purposes. 
Prior to the introduction of the concept of afgezonderd particulier vermogen (APV) in the 
Dutch income tax legislation for individuals, trusts and trustees were not liable to income tax 
on trust income.1351 Thus, a trust could not be a resident for treaty purposes, since it was not 
liable to tax and it is submitted that this position will still apply to trusts that do not qualify 
as APVs. If a trust is regarded as an APV, its income is, generally speaking, attributed to the 
settlor. It is therefore submitted that it will not be regarded as a resident for treaty 
purposes, since it is not liable to tax. 
6.4 Dual residence and the tiebreaker provision 
6.4.1 Introduction: Which tiebreaker should be applied and to whom? 
Article 4 contains two tiebreaker provisions which determine where a person, who is 
regarded as a resident by both state parties to the DTT, will be resident for purposes of the 
treaty.1352 A person can only be resident in one state for purposes of the treaty. The first1353 
of the two tiebreakers applies to individuals and the second, which uses the criterion of 
POEM,1354 to persons other than individuals. 
In this regard, the question arises which of these two tiebreakers should be applied to trusts. 
Case law in the United Kingdom and Canada suggests that the second tiebreaker should be 
applied to trusts. The OECD Commentary in respect of the second tiebreaker (that is, POEM) 
states that this tiebreaker “concerns companies and other bodies of persons, irrespective of 
whether they are or not legal persons”.1355 Earlier in this dissertation it is argued that in 
                                                          
1350 Boer De Anglo-Amerikaanse trust in de inkomsten- en vennootschapsbelasting 302. 
1351 Auerbach in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 243. 
1352 The application of this article assumes that both states regard the trust as resident in that state. States that 
do not view a trust as a person that is liable to tax and therefore a resident (eg if a state views a trust as a 
transparent entity), will, obviously, not apply this provision to trusts. If, however, Lang’s view (which is 
discussed in ch 6.2.2.2.3) is applied, it is not necessary for a trust to be a taxable entity. As long as there is a 
close connection with a state of residence, it will be regarded as resident in the state of residence. 
1353 OECD MTC art 4(2). 
1354 OECD MTC art 4(3) reads as follows: “Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than 
an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State 
in which its place of effective management is situated”. 
1355 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4 para 21. 
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South Africa, trusts are not bodies of persons, but that the trustees of a trust are a body of 
persons in the United Kingdom and, maybe, in the Netherlands.1356 Applying the OECD 
Commentary, the second criterion should therefore be applied in the United Kingdom (and 
possibly the Netherlands) to the trustees of a trust. As set out in the Commentary, the fact 
that the trustees are not a juristic person, is irrelevant and article 4(3) should be applied. It 
was also argued in this dissertation that a trust is not a company (as defined in the OECD 
MTC) in any of the states under review.1357 Thus, from a South African perspective, it may be 
argued that the Commentary suggests that article 4(3) should not be applied to trusts. The 
counter argument would be that the alternative tiebreaker (article 4(2)) which applies to 
individuals, cannot apply to a trust, because a trust simply is not an individual and the tests 
postulated in that article are inappropriate for trusts. Since trusts are “persons” and can be 
“resident” for purposes of the OECD MTC, one of the two tiebreakers must be applied to 
determine treaty residence in the case of dual residence and it is therefore submitted that 
article 4(3) is the most appropriate tiebreaker. 
In Canada, the Income Tax Act provides that a trust will be deemed to be an individual1358 
and the question arises whether article 4(2), the tiebreaker for individuals, should be 
applied. Usually a trust is, along with an individual, included in the definition of “person” in 
DTTs. According to Avery Jones et al, article 4(3) (that is, POEM) and not article 4(2), should 
therefore be applied to dual resident trusts.1359 If a trust is not included in the definition of 
“person” in the Canadian DTT, Avery Jones et al argue that the tests laid down in article 4(2) 
are inappropriate and therefore inapplicable to trustees and if that argument prevails, article 
4(3) should be applied.1360 
Looking at case law for guidance, in the United Kingdom case of Wensleydale’s Settlement 
Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners,1361 the second tiebreaker (that is POEM) 
contained in the DTT between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland was applied 
to the trustees in that case. The court gave no reasons for applying POEM as a tiebreaker. In 
Smallwood,1362 both the majority and the minority applied the second tiebreaker (that is, 
POEM) to determine the residence of the trustees for purposes of the DTT between the 
United Kingdom and Mauritius. Again the court gave no reasons for applying this second 
tiebreaker. However, it will be recalled that trustees of the trust were, consecutively, a 
Jersey firm, a Mauritian company and, lastly, Mr and Mrs Smallwood. Therefore, even 
though some of the trustees were individuals, the court did not apply the tiebreaker 
provision for individuals (article 4(2)), but rather article 4(3), and it may be deduced that that 
article is the appropriate tiebreaker provision to be applied in respect of trustees of a trust. 
In the Canadian RCI Trust case,1363 the court indicated that the second tiebreaker would 
                                                          
1356 See ch 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 respectively. 
1357 See ch 5.1 and 5.3 respectively. 
1358 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2). 
1359 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 67 and foontnote 8. 
1360 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 67. This point is criticised by Prebble (Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax 
Research 4). 
1361 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241. 
1362 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
1363 Robert MO Morris and Neville Leroy Smith Trustees of the RCI Trust v Minister of National Revenue 2009 FC 
434. 
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apply to a trust, although the court in that case declined to apply the tiebreaker.1364 In RCI 
Trust the DTT defined a person to include a trust,1365 thereby confirming the position taken 
by Avery Jones et al. 
Academic authors also suggest that the second tiebreaker (that is, POEM) should be applied. 
Baker,1366 Oliver and Harris,1367 Kessler,1368 and Edwardes-Ker1369 all suggest that article 4(3) 
should be applied to trusts. Avery Jones et al suggest that the second tiebreaker would be 
used in inter alia Canada and the United Kingdom.1370 Booth and Schwarz, commenting on 
the United Kingdom position, agree that dual residence may be resolved through article 
4(3).1371 Schwarz bases his view that the dual residence of a trust is addressed by article 4(3) 
on the fact that a trust is not an individual.1372 Academic authors commenting on the South 
African position agree that POEM will be used as the tiebreaker.1373 
It is submitted that South African courts will follow the precedent set by the courts in the 
states mentioned above and the opinion of academic authors, thereby applying the second 
tiebreaker provision (that is, POEM) to trusts.1374 However, in order to address the possible 
uncertainty created by the Commentary to article 4(3), it is suggested that South Africa 
should insert a reservation to the Commentary indicating that it will apply the POEM 
tiebreaker in relation to trusts. 
Further questions regarding the application of the tiebreaker provision to trustees are raised 
by Wheeler: 
“Does it apply to the trustees as such, or to all the trustees as a body of persons, or to 
trustees in their personal capacity?”1375 
In respect of the United Kingdom, where the questions raised by Wheeler may be relevant, 
Kessler provides a solution. He suggests that in terms of United Kingdom domestic tax law, 
the trustees (whether there is one or more than one) are regarded as a body of persons and 
that this “trustee-person” (to use Kessler’s term) is distinct from the persons who are the 
trustees. For treaty purposes it is the residence of this trustee-person that should be 
                                                          
1364 The case was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal (The Minister of National Revenue v. Robert MO 
Morris 2009 FCA 373) and overturned on a technical point. The judgement of the Federal Court of Appeal did 
not address the application of the residence tiebreaker in the relevant DTT.  
1365 Robert MO Morris and Neville Leroy Smith Trustees of the RCI Trust v Minister of National Revenue 2009 FC 
434 para 3. 
1366 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.16. 
1367 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 66. 
1368 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 230. 
1369 Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation 51.12. 
1370 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 67. 
1371 Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 134. 
1372 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 111. 
1373 Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 291; Oguttu Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The 
Case of South African Companies and Trusts 339. 
1374 It should be borne in mind that The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service 74 SATC 127 dealt with the application of POEM in terms of domestic legislation and cannot be used as 
authority for the view that in South Africa, POEM is the preferred tiebreaker in a treaty context.         
1375 Wheeler in Taxation of Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 2nd Symposium of International Tax Law 50. 
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determined and, naturally, the trustees’ personal capacity is irrelevant. It is submitted that 
reference to the United Kingdom domestic tax law is relevant in the present circumstances, 
as article 4(3) itself requires determination of liability in terms of domestic legislation. 
The advent of the Internet and the advance in communication means using electronic 
resources have significantly affected the application of POEM. It is no longer a given that a 
group of people will meet in one place to take a decision, because technology enables them 
to ‘meet’ electronically and take decisions, irrespective of where they are physically 
located.1376 It has also enabled senior management and boards to increase their mobility, 
making it difficult to tie effective management down to one place.1377 The same would hold 
true for the trustees of a trust and its effective management.1378 
In this paragraph a number of issues regarding the POEM tiebreaker will be addressed. First 
it will be examined whether a person’s domestic residence for part of the tax year may result 
in treaty residence in terms of article 4(3) for the whole tax year. Next the meaning of the 
term POEM in the OECD MTC will be discussed and, finally, the question of who exercised 
the POEM of a trust is addressed. 
6.4.2 Concurrent versus consecutive residence and the meaning of “residence” in terms of 
article 4(3) 
According to Schwarz a person can be dually resident in two contexts where the treaty will 
be required to resolve the matter. Firstly, a person may be concurrently continuously 
resident in two states where both states regard the person as a resident during the same 
period in terms of their domestic laws. Secondly, a person may be consecutively resident in 
two states, by moving residence from one state to another and therefore being resident in 
both states, but at different times. According to Schwarz, the residence of the taxpayer 
must, in the second case, be tested at the time the relevant income arises.1379 Hence the 
taxpayer will only be resident in one of the states at that point in time.1380 However, in the 
Smallwood-case, the Special Commissioners1381 decided that liability to tax under United 
Kingdom domestic law resulted in treaty residence in terms of article 4(1). In other words, 
under United Kingdom domestic law a person is liable to the relevant tax during a year of 
assessment, even though that person is only resident in the United Kingdom for a particular 
period during the year of assessment. The Special Commissioners held that liability which 
extended over the full year of assessment had to be equated to residence (for purposes of 
the treaty) for the year of assessment. This view was eventually confirmed on appeal when 
the court held: 
“The definition of ‘resident’ in Article 4(1) is expressly subject to Article 4(3) which 
therefore applies whenever the alienator is liable to taxation in both Contracting 
States in respect of the gain. Article 4(3), as I have explained, is focused on liability for 
                                                          
1376 Oguttu (2008) 41 Comparative and International LJ 80 89. 
1377 Oguttu (2008) 41 Comparative and International LJ 80 90. 
1378 Since the issue of the effect of electronic communication means on POEM is not limited to trusts and forms 
a field of study on its own, this point will not be further discussed in this dissertation. 
1379 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 14–200. 
1380 Smallwood v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2009] EWHC 777 (Ch) para 46. 
1381 Trevor Smallwood Trust v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (2008) Sp C 669. The 
Special Commissioners constitute the court of first instance. 
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tax regardless of the period of residence under national law which creates that liability. 
Looked at in this way it becomes meaningless and impermissible to draw a distinction 
between consecutive and concurrent periods of ‘residence’.”1382 
Kessler describes the judgement as “in part somewhat muddled”, but suggests the reasoning 
that the court could have followed to reach the same decision. He states that the Mauritian 
trustees were liable to tax in the United Kingdom during the period of Mauritian residence 
not by reason of theirs (that is, the Mauritian trustees’ residence), but because of another’s 
residence (that is, the Smallwoods, who were residents of the UK, but only became trustees 
subsequent to the Mauritian trustees). The court, however, viewed the trustees as a 
continuing body of persons, distinct from the individual trustees. It concluded that the 
trustees were residents in the United Kingdom during the Mauritian period, because they 
were liable to tax in the United Kingdom during the Mauritian period and they were liable by 
reason of the trustees’ (as a continuing body) residence in the subsequent UK period. The 
fact that the trustees did not know that “they” would become residents in the United 
Kingdom during the Mauritian period, was irrelevant. The court held that the matter of 
liability had to be decided retrospectively.1383 
6.4.3 The meaning of POEM in the OECD MTC 
6.4.3.1 The OECD Commentary on article 4(3) 
The term POEM was first introduced into the OECD MTC in 1963. However, prior to 2000 the 
Commentary provided little guidance on the meaning of the term.1384 In 2000 the following 
paragraph was added to the Commentary: 
“As a result of these considerations, the ‘place of effective management’ has been 
adopted as the preference criterion for persons other than individuals. The place of 
effective management is the place where key management and commercial decisions 
that are necessary for the conduct of the entity's business are in substance made. The 
place of effective management will ordinarily be the place where the most senior 
person or group of persons (for example a board of directors) makes its decisions, the 
place where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are determined; however, 
no definitive rule can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances must be 
examined to determine the place of effective management. An entity may have more 
than one place of management, but it can have only one place of effective 
management at any one time.”1385 
This paragraph in the Commentary was again amended in 2008 and it now reads as follows: 
“As a result of these considerations, the ‘place of effective management’ has been 
adopted as the preference criterion for persons other than individuals. The place of 
                                                          
1382 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 43. Cleave’s 
criticism of this point is set out in ch 6.3.2.2. 
1383 Kessler Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 218. 
1384 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 4B.16. For a discussion of the history of art 4(3) and the commentary thereon, see Attard in History 
of Tax Treaties The relevance of the OECD Documents for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties 203–228. 
1385 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4(3) para 24. 
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effective management is the place where key management and commercial decisions 
that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance 
made. All relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the place 
of effective management. An entity may have more than one place of management, 
but it can have only one place of effective management at any one time.” 
The differences between the 2000 and 2008 wording of the Commentary are indicated in the 
following paragraph: 
“As a result of these considerations, the ’place of effective management’ has been 
adopted as the preference criterion for persons other than individuals. The place of 
effective management is the place where key management and commercial decisions 
that are necessary for the conduct of the entity's business as a whole are in substance 
made. The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place where the most 
senior person or group of persons (for example a board of directors) makes its 
decisions, the place where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are 
determined; however, no definitive rule can be given and All relevant facts and 
circumstances must be examined to determine the place of effective management. An 
entity may have more than one place of management, but it can have only one place 
of effective management at any one time.” 
According to Sassville these amendments have the effect of supporting both the 
“management of the top-level executives” view and the “managed by the board of 
directors” view.1386 It is submitted that with the above amendments, the OECD suggests that 
a lower level of management (such as senior executives) as opposed to the highest level of 
management (such as a board of directors) can be responsible for the key management and 
commercial decisions of a business. The 2008 changes to the Commentary also saw the 
introduction of an alternative version of article 4(3) which counties may choose to adopt. 
The alternative provision states that if an entity is a resident of both contracting states, the 
competent authorities of the contracting states shall endeavour to determine by mutual 
agreement the contracting state of which such person shall be deemed to be a resident for 
the purposes of the Convention, having regard to a number of criteria, which includes its 
POEM. In the absence of such an agreement, the entity shall not be entitled to any relief or 
exemption from tax provided by the DTT except to the extent and in such manner as may be 
agreed upon by the competent authorities.1387 
6.4.3.2 Cases on the meaning of POEM 
In the United Kingdom case of Wensleydale’s Settlement Trustees v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners,1388 the court had to decide whether a trust’s POEM was in Ireland. In this 
case there were two trustees – one was the settlor’s solicitor in England and the other was 
                                                          
1386 Sassville in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 295. These views correspond with what 
SARS has called the “board-centric approach” and the “continental approach” (see ch 6.3.1.3.2). For criticism 
against these amendments, see Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 734–
736. 
1387 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4(3) para 24.1. 
1388 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241. This case will be discussed more fully in ch 
6.4.4. 
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the wife of a solicitor in Ireland. The trustees argued that, for purposes of the DTT between 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, the POEM of the trust was in Ireland. The court held that 
the word “effective” in the expression POEM implies “realistic positive management”. It 
added that the POEM is “where the shots are called”.1389 In the end, the court held that the 
POEM of the trust was not in Ireland. 
In Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes)1390 the High Court in the United Kingdom did not 
express an opinion on the meaning of POEM. However, it did strongly suggest that the POEM 
test in article 4(3) and the test of central management and control (the test for residence of 
certain companies in the United Kingdom domestic law) were the same, or would, on the 
facts before it, lead to the same result.1391 In that case, Mr and Mrs Wood held most of the 
shares in an operating company and they wished to dispose of those shares without 
incurring a large tax charge. They were advised by Price Waterhouse to embark on a scheme 
which involved the creation of certain offshore settlements. The trustees of these 
settlements incorporated a company (known as CIL) in the British Virgin Islands. Mr and Mrs 
Wood had transferred a number of shares in the operating company to a holding company, 
of which they were the only shareholders. Mr and Mrs Woods then transferred a number of 
shares in the holding company to CIL. CIL subsequently also acquired all the shares in a 
dormant Dutch company (known as Eulalia). ABN AMRO Trust Co was appointed as the only 
managing director of Eulalia. Within a few days, CIL sold its shares in the holding company to 
Eulalia. The purchase price was funded by a loan by CIL to Eulalia. After approximately three 
months, Eulalia sold its shares in the holding company to an outside purchaser. 
The revenue authority claimed that Eulalia was resident in the United Kingdom, which would 
have meant that Mr and Mrs Wood were still liable for capital gains tax on the sale of the 
shares in the holding company by CIL to Eulalia. The test for residence in the United Kingdom 
is that of central management and control and the court of first instance (the Special 
Commissioners) found that Eulalia’s central management and control was in the United 
Kingdom. The judgement was based on the following reasoning. The responsibility for the 
day-to-day management of Eulalia was with ABN AMRO, whose appointment was prompted 
by Price Waterhouse. There was no evidence that ABN AMRO had considered the price at 
which the shares in the holding company were purchased by Eulalia, nor did they receive any 
advice on the matter. However, Eulalia was purchasing the shares from its holding company 
and the purchase itself did not inevitably give rise to the conclusion that Eulalia had handed 
over central management and control to CIL. Eulalia’s only activities were the acquisition and 
sale of the shares in the holding company and matters related thereto. Although there were 
strong commercial reasons for Eulalia to sell the shares in the holding company to the 
outside purchaser, ABN AMRO did not really consider the terms of the sale and simply 
complied with Mr Wood’s wishes. The Special Commissioners further held that ABN AMRO’s 
failure to consider the terms of the purchase and sale of the shares in the holding company 
had the effect that the actual effective decision was not taken by ABN AMRO in 
Amsterdam.1392 
                                                          
1389 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241 para 7(2). 
1390 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26. 
1391 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1396. 
1392 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1407. 
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The decision of the Special Commissioners was overturned on appeal and when the revenue 
authority appealed that decision, the High Court again held in favour of the taxpayer. The 
High Court held that 
“[i]n seeking to determine where ‘central management and control’ of a company 
incorporated outside the United Kingdom lies, it is essential to recognise the 
distinction between cases where management and control of the company is exercised 
through its own constitutional organs (the board of directors or the general meeting) 
and cases where the functions of those constitutional organs are ‘usurped’ – in the 
sense that management and control is exercised independently of, or without regard 
to, those constitutional organs. And, in cases which fall within the former class, it is 
essential to recognise the distinction (in concept, at least) between the role of an 
‘outsider’ in proposing, advising and influencing the decisions which the constitutional 
organs take in fulfilling their functions and the role of an outsider who dictates the 
decisions which are to be taken. In that context an ‘outsider’ is a person who is not, 
himself, a participant in the formal process (a board meeting or a general meeting) 
through which the relevant constitutional organ fulfils its function.”1393 
The High Court therefore held that Eulalia was resident in the Netherlands. This decision was 
based on the fact that the directors of Eulalia were not bypassed and did not stand aside, 
since the representatives of the managing director signed or executed the documents. 
Therefore, in Eulalia’s case, the functions of the directors were not usurped, as referred to in 
the quotation above. Furthermore, the High Court found that the representatives of the 
managing director did indeed make a decision to enter into the agreements of sale and 
purchase. There was no evidence that Price Waterhouse dictated to ABM AMRO which 
decisions they were to make, although the court acknowledged that Price Waterhouse 
intended and expected AMN AMRO to make the decisions that they did. The court found 
that the flaw in the Special Commissioners’ approach was to treat the two crucial decisions 
taken by ABN AMRO (namely to purchase and sell the shares in the holding company) as if 
they were not effectively taken by the managing director exercising management and 
control. These two decisions were the only management that had to be done. The court 
further held that the fact that ABN AMRO did not have proper information, did not mean 
that the decision was any less a management decision. It stated that “[i]ll-informed or ill-
advised decisions taken in the management of a company remain management 
decisions”.1394 
It is submitted that it may be deduced from Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) that in 
entities in which very few transactions take place (as was the case with Eulalia), that 
conducting those few transactions will be regarded as management of the company.1395 
Furthermore, that if the relevant management organs of an entity actually take the 
management decisions, their functions are not usurped. The mere influence of advisors, 
such as Price Waterhouse, will not be regarded as dictating to an entity which decisions they 
                                                          
1393 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1410. 
1394 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1418. 
1395 The majority in Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 
stated at para 68 that “Wood v Holden reminds us that special vehicle companies (or, no doubt, special vehicle 
boards of trustees) which undertake very limited activities are not necessarily shorn of independent existence; 
indeed they would be ineffective for the purpose devised if they were”. 
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ought to make. It is submitted that these conclusions will apply equally in determining the 
POEM of an entity as the court strongly suggested that the tests for POEM and central 
management and control are the same. 
In the Smallwood case, the court held that if the POEM of the trust company (PMIL) had to 
be determined, the test in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) would have been appropriate. 
However, it was the POEM of the trustee(s), as a continuing body, that had to be 
determined. According to the court, the tax scheme was conceived in the United Kingdom by 
Mr Smallwood and his advisors and the different steps in the scheme were co-ordinated 
from the United Kingdom by the advisors. An integral part of the scheme was the 
exportation of the trust for a short period to Mauritius, only for it to be returned to the 
United Kingdom before the end of the tax year. The court therefore held that 
“[t]here was a scheme of management of this trust which went above and beyond the 
day to day management exercised by the trustees for the time being, and the control 
of it was located in the United Kingdom.”1396 
The court in Smallwood therefore clearly indicated that, in determining POEM, a higher level 
of management than day-to-day management should be used. 
In Laerstate BV v HMRC1397 the United Kingdom court found that the relevant company’s 
central management and control was in the United Kingdom. It therefore had to consider 
the DTT between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Regarding the meaning of 
POEM, the court quoted with approval a passage from the decision by the Special 
Commissioners in the Smallwood case and concluded that, having regard to the ordinary 
meaning of the words in their context and in the light of their object and purpose, the issue 
of POEM was approached as considering in which state the real management of the 
company is found.1398 The court found that the activities of one of the directors of the 
company, Mr Bock, were concerned with policy, strategic and management matters and that 
it therefore constituted the real top level management (or the realistic positive 
management) of the company. The other director, Mr Trapman, conducted only activities 
such as signing documents when told to do so and routine matters such as the accounts. 
Hence the court held that the POEM of the company was where Mr Bock’s activities took 
place, which was in London.1399 
In two South African cases, Oceanic Trust1400 and Tradehold,1401 the courts pronounced on 
the meaning of POEM, but in a domestic law context. It was argued above that the meaning 
of the term in domestic law is the same as the meaning of the term used in DTTs and on that 
basis these two decisions may still be useful in ascertaining the meaning of the term POEM 
in article 4(3). 
                                                          
1396 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 70. 
1397 Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC). 
1398 Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC) para 48. 
1399 Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC) para 50. 
1400 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1401 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
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In deciding the meaning of the term POEM, the court in Oceanic Trust1402 applied the test 
laid down by the Special Commissioners in the United Kingdom case of Smallwood.1403 This 
test, the court found, was as follows.1404 The POEM is the place where key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entities business are in 
substance made. The POEM will ordinarily be the place where the most senior group of 
persons (for example, a board of directors) makes its decision, where the actions to be taken 
by the entity as a whole are determined. However, no definite rule can be given and all 
relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the POEM of an entity. 
There may be more than one place of management, but only one POEM at any one time. 
Regarding Tradehold,1405 it will be recalled that Tradehold was an investment holding 
company incorporated in South Africa. Tradehold’s board resolved at a meeting in 
Luxembourg that all future board meetings would take place in Luxembourg. The court held 
that “[t]his had the effect that, as from [the date of the board meeting], Tradehold became 
effectively managed in Luxembourg”.1406 
From the case law it may be deduced that an entity is effectively managed by the highest 
level of management, that is, the place where the “shots are called”, or where the top level 
of management is exercised.1407 Usually, this level of management will be exercised by the 
board of directors in the case of a company, or by the trustees in the case of a trust. If, 
however, the top level management of an entity is usurped by another or if another person 
dictates to the board or the trustees what its decisions should be, it is that other person and 
not the board or the trustees that exercises effective management of the entity. 
6.4.3.3 General remarks regarding the meaning of POEM in the OECD MTC 
This part of the dissertation revisits a number of the cases that have already been discussed. 
Some repetition will therefore be inevitable. However, the relevant decisions are discussed 
again because they are also pertinent to this particular topic and any comments on them on 
the point must be made in the proper context. 
One of the main questions surrounding POEM is whether it should have a special 
meaning,1408 a particular treaty meaning or a domestic law meaning, in accordance with 
article 3(2) of the OECD MTC.1409 According to Harris and Oliver “[t]he Commentary to Article 
4(3) might suggest a special treaty meaning but it is so qualified that this is not clear”.1410 
                                                          
1402 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1403 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. This case is 
discussed in greater detail in ch 6.4.4. 
1404 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127 para 54. 
1405 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
1406 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 3. 
1407 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26; Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] 
STC (SCD) 241; Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA); 
Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC); The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
1408 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(4) provides that “[a] special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”. See also ch 4.3. 
1409 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 66. Regarding art 3(2) of the OECD MTC, see ch 5.2.6. 
1410 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 66. 
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Vogel states that the term POEM must be interpreted “autonomously”.1411 Hattingh also 
supports the use of a “common international meaning”.1412 
A further question relating to the meaning of POEM, is whether it has the same meaning as 
the term “central management and control”. Until 1988 and for United Kingdom domestic 
law purposes, a company’s residence was determined in accordance with the common law 
test of central management and control.1413 The test was first expounded in the case of De 
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe 1414 and has been consistently applied since then. The 
test centres on the highest level of decision-making1415 and was originally formulated as 
follows: 
“In applying the conception of residence to a company, we ought, I think, to proceed 
as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A company cannot eat or sleep, 
but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really 
keeps house and does business. … [A] company resides for purposes of income tax 
where its real business is carried on … . I regard that as the true rule, and the real 
business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides.”1416 
In Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) the court expressed the following view: 
“It is not clear – at least, not clear to me – whether the article 4(3) test differs in 
substance from the De Beers test; and, if the two tests are not, in substance, the same, 
I find it very difficult to see how, in the circumstances which the commissioners had to 
consider, they could lead to different answers.”1417 
In that case, the court did not make a finding on where the POEM of the relevant company 
was. The case was decided on the central management and control test, but the court, in 
effect, stated that it would have reached the same conclusion if the POEM test were applied. 
Even before that case was decided, some authors argued that POEM and central 
management are identical.1418 
Some authors, however, opine that central management and control is not the same as 
POEM. According to Harris and Oliver the two tests have different purposes and scope of 
operation.1419 Regarding the purpose of POEM, Harris and Oliver refers to the passage in the 
judgement of the Special Commissioners in Smallwood, where they stated: 
                                                          
1411 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 262. It is understood that “autonomous” meaning 
connotes the meaning of the treaty irrespective of the domestic law of the relevant states. See ch 4.3.1. 
1412 Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law 730. 
1413 The statutory test for residence is now contained in the Corporation Tax Act 2009 pt 2 ch 3 and provides 
that a company that is incorporated in the United Kingdom is deemed to be a resident there for purposes of 
that Act. Therefore, the central management and control test is no longer relevant for United Kingdom 
incorporated companies (Schwarz Booth & Schwarz: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation 139). 
1414 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe [1906] AC 455 (HL). 
1415 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 60. 
1416 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe [1906] AC 455 (HL) 458. 
1417 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1396. 
1418 Owen (2003) 4 BTR 296 305. Hattingh agrees, although his contribution was written after Wood’s case 
(Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law para 19.4.5.6). 
1419 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 67. 
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“[T]he two concepts serve entirely different purposes. CMC determines whether a 
company is resident in the United Kingdom or not; POEM is a tie-breaker the purpose 
of which is to resolve cases of dual residence by determining in which of two states it 
is to be found. CMC is essentially a one-country test; the purpose is not to decide 
where residence is situated, but whether or not it is situated in the United Kingdom 
… POEM, on the other hand, must be concerned with what happens in both states 
since its purpose is to resolve residence under domestic law in both states, caused 
for whatever reason, which could include incorporation in one state and 
management in the other, or different meanings of management applied in each 
state, or different interpretations of the same meaning of management applied in 
each state, or divided management.”1420 
The Court of Appeal in the Smallwood case was concerned only with the POEM of the 
relevant trust. In its minority judgement the court acknowledged that the purpose of the 
POEM test is effectively to decide between two rival claims to tax based on residence. 
However, it continued by confirming that the test adopted by the Court of Appeal in Wood v 
Holden (Inspector of Taxes) to determine where central management and control was 
exercised, was the correct one, also for the facts before it.1421 It is submitted that this 
minority judgement of the Court of Appeal confirmed the dictum in Wood v Holden 
(Inspector of Taxes) that central management and control and POEM are not easily 
distinguishable (even though the two tests may have different purposes). 
Regarding the scope of POEM, Harris and Oliver’s view is that a corporation may be centrally 
managed and controlled in more than one place. On the other hand, POEM of an entity can 
only be in one place.1422 They also state that the tax administration in the United Kingdom 
accepts that the two tests do not necessarily correspond: central management and control 
focuses on where strategic decisions are made, while POEM focuses on where the top-level 
decisions are formulated.1423 
According to Panayi the tests of central management and control and POEM are similar, but 
not identical, and they fulfil different functions. She suggests that the onus of proof required 
to satisfy each test may differ.1424 
6.4.4 Who exercises the effective management of a trust? 
In all of the jurisdictions considered in this dissertation, the management of the trust is in 
the hands of the trustees.1425 It should therefore follow that the POEM of a trust is, 
generally, exercised by its trustees. There may, however, be cases where a person other 
than the trustee, such as the settlor or a beneficiary, exercises the effective management of 
a trust. 
                                                          
1420 Trevor Smallwood Trust v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (2008) Sp C 669 paras 
111 and 112. This approach was confirmed in Laerstate BV v HMRC [2009] UKFIT 209 (TC) para 48. 
1421 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 61. 
1422 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 4(3) para 24. 
1423 Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 67. 
1424 Panayi in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law 848. 
1425 See ch 2.7. In ch 2 the term “administration” was used to refer to the conduct of the trust’s affairs. In this 
paragraph the term “management” is used in order to conform with the words used in the case law cited. It is 
intended that the terms “management” and “administration”, as used in ch 2, should have the same meaning. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
In the United Kingdom case of Wensleydale’s Settlement Trustees v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners1426 a settlor wished to set up an inter vivos trust in Ireland. The trustees were 
the settlor’s solicitor in England and the wife of a solicitor in Ireland. At issue in the case was 
whether a capital gain on the sale of shares could be taxed in the United Kingdom. The 
trustees of the trust (who were regarded in terms of United Kingdom legislation as a 
continuing body of persons and resident in the United Kingdom) argued that, for purposes of 
the DTT between the United Kingdom and Ireland, the trustees were resident only in Ireland, 
since the POEM of the trust was in Ireland. If they were correct, only Ireland could tax the 
relevant gain. The court found that the opening of the bank account did not constitute 
effective management. Even though the trustees took a resolution in Ireland to sell certain 
shares, the court held that the trustees were “handed property the disposal of which was 
being arranged in England” and that it was “unreal to suppose that they could reject the 
offer”.1427 Furthermore, the court found that the one trustee, the Irish solicitor’s wife, was “a 
trustee in name, rather than in reality”.1428 Moreover, the trustees were often pushed by the 
settlor to do what the settlor wanted them to do. On these facts, the court found that the 
POEM of the trust was not in Ireland.1429 
In the Smallwood case in the United Kingdom, the majority of the court held that the tax 
scheme in question was designed by Mr Smallwood and his advisors in the United Kingdom, 
and that they carefully co-ordinated every step of the implementation of the scheme from 
the United Kingdom.1430 The whole scheme was based on the fact that the trust would be 
temporarily exported to Mauritius and then returned to the United Kingdom for a brief 
period. This led the court to the conclusion that the POEM of the trustee, as a continuing 
body, was in the United Kingdom.1431 It can also be deduced that in the case of a trust, it is 
possible for a person other than the trustees to effectively manage a trust, although the 
court did not indicate on what basis this was possible.1432 
                                                          
1426 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241. 
1427 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241 para 7(2). 
1428 Wensleydale's Settlement Trustees v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 241 para 7(2). 
1429 For criticism on this case, see Zigmond (1996) 5 Untelrab and Wensleydale: Reflections on Company and 
Trust Residence 316. 
1430 Much criticism has been expressed against the case. See eg Lawrence (2011) 2 Smallwood: Part 2 – Poetic 
Justice? 77; Goldberg (2009) VIII GITC Review 1, Loomer (2009) 4 BTR 378 and Grundy (2008) VII GITC Review 1. 
1431 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 70. 
1432 Hattingh criticises the Special Commissioners’ decision on this point, but it is submitted that this criticism 
would equally apply to the decision by the Court of Appeal. He suggests that it should have been decided 
whether the Mauritian trustee was merely a pretence for KPMG and Mr Smallwood, who, de facto, exercised 
the powers of the trustees. In other words, the court should have asked whether Mr Smallwood and his 
advisors usurped the Mauritian trustee’s trusteeship. According to Hattingh the substance over form doctrine 
in South Africa is the appropriate legal basis to deal with such a simulation. As Hattingh correctly points out, 
the court in Smallwood found that all the relevant agreements were in fact what they purported to be and that 
there was no simulation. Hence the doctrine of substance over form cannot (at least in Smallwood) provide the 
basis for finding that someone other than the trustees managed the trust. Much uncertainty is created by the 
court’s failure to provide a legal basis for its conclusion (Hattingh in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties 
and EC Tax Law 748). Other courts have also suggested that the substance over form doctrine may be used in 
situations where a person other than the trustee has exercised the trustees’ powers. In Garron the Tax Court of 
Canada held that there was an unwritten agreement that the trustee would comply with the recommendations 
of the main beneficiaries and that the main beneficiaries understood this from the outset. This unwritten 
agreement was enforceable through the mechanism of a protector, who was entitled to replace the trustee 
(Garron v R 2009 TCC 450; 12 ITLR 79). It is submitted that the Tax Court’s decision that there was an unwritten 
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Importantly, the court seemed to accept (as did the Special Commissioners) that the day-to-
day management of the trust was exercised properly by the Mauritian trustee and that the 
Mauritian trustee took proper decisions when selling the relevant shares. It is submitted that 
the decision in Smallwood conflicts with that in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes). As 
explained more fully above, in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) the court urged a 
distinction between cases where the management of a company was completely usurped 
(that is, the board took no decisions and was completely sidestepped) and those in which 
the management was properly exercised by the company’s constitutional organs. In the case 
where the management was properly exercised, a further distinction had to be made, 
namely between influence on decisions and dictating of decisions.1433 Where a company’s 
management is usurped, or its decisions, although taken by its board, are dictated by 
another, it is not the board exercising the central management and control of the company. 
On the facts the court held, inter alia, that the directors of Eulalia were not bypassed – ABN 
AMRO did indeed make a decision to enter into the agreements of sale and purchase – and 
that Price Waterhouse did not dictate to ABM AMRO which decisions they were to make, 
although their influence was acknowledged. In Smallwood, the court acknowledged that 
PMIL took valid decisions to sell the shares in question. Therefore, as in Wood, the trustee’s 
management was not usurped. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the advisers in 
Smallwood dictated to PMIL what their decisions as trustees ought to have been. 
The majority in Smallwood tried to explain that the test in Wood was inappropriate because 
it was the POEM of the trustees as a continuing body that had to be determined and not the 
POEM of the trust company trustee (PMIL).1434 It is submitted that this explanation is 
unconvincing.1435 Why can the test in Wood not be applied to the management of the trust 
by the trustee? In all of the jurisdictions considered in this dissertation, the management of 
the trust is in the hands of the trustees. It will therefore be possible to establish whether the 
trustees have been sidestepped altogether, thereby usurping the trustees’ management of 
the trust. Whether advisors merely influenced the decision of the trustees in managing the 
trust, or whether advisors dictated to the trustees what their decisions should be, is a 
question of fact and can be ascertained in the same way as in the case of a company. In this 
regard the distinction drawn by Cleave between the different levels of residence of a 
corporate trustee seems helpful: 
“The residence of a corporate trustee carrying on business as trustee of a number of 
different trusts has to be considered on two levels. At the level of deciding whether to 
accept appointment in any particular trust and at what rate of remuneration and so 
forth, it is likely to have its central management and control in the state where it is 
registered and carries on business. On the other hand, in relation to the administration 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(but enforceable) agreement, suggests that the court applied the doctrine of substance over form. This point 
was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the appeal of the Garron case. The possibility of using 
the doctrine of substance over form (or perhaps, more correctly, the sham doctrine) to explain the result in 
Smallwood, Garron and even Oceanic Trust is an interesting idea and requires further research and analysis. 
One could even consider the possibility of “sham trusts” and the abuse of the trust form. However, these 
matters fall outside the scope of this dissertation.  
1433 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 1410. 
1434 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778 para 69. 
1435 For further criticism of this part of the judgement, see Cleave (2011) 6 BTR 705 714. 
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and decision-making in respect of particular transactions in the context of particular 
trusts, the answer may be quite different.”1436 
It is submitted that it is the second level referred to by Cleave, namely the management and 
decision-making in respect of a specific trust, that is relevant in determining the POEM of the 
trust (or the trustees as a continuing body) and that the test laid down in Wood can (and 
should) be applied to it. 
The decision in the South African Oceanic Trust case may be repeated briefly. The trust, 
SIMS, was established and registered in Mauritius and the law of Mauritius was to govern 
the administration of the settlement. The trustees were obliged to maintain their principal 
place of business at, and conduct their affairs from, premises in Mauritius. Its sole trustee 
was the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd, a company registered and incorporated in Mauritius. SIMS 
acted as captive reinsurer to MCubed Life Ltd, a South African registered company (and it is 
assumed, also a South African resident for tax purposes). The court adopted the test for 
POEM as set out in the Special Commissioners’ decision in Smallwood. On the facts before it, 
the court held that at least some of the key management decisions and at the very least 
some of the key commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of SIMS’s business were in 
substance made in South Africa.1437 
By implication, the court held that SIMS’s trustee (the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd) did not make all 
the key management and commercial decisions that were necessary for the conduct of 
SIMS’s business.1438 It was common cause that SIMS’s trustee, the Oceanic Trust Co Ltd, had 
no links to South Africa and that its director had never been to South Africa. If some of its 
key management and commercial decisions were made in South Africa, these could not have 
been made by the trustee. The court gave no indication of the basis on which these 
decisions were taken by a person other than the trustee and made no finding as to whom, in 
fact, made these decisions. 
In Fundy Settlement v Canada1439 the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced on the 
residence test of a trust for domestic law purposes and chose the central management and 
control test. Even though that case dealt with domestic law and central management and 
control, it is submitted that the case may still shed light on the question of who manages the 
trust for purposes of POEM in DTTs.1440 On the facts in Fundy Settlement the court held that 
the trusts were resident in Canada, where its central management and control was exercised 
by the main beneficiaries. The trustee had a restricted role, namely to provide administrative 
services, and had limited responsibility beyond that.1441 
                                                          
1436 Cleave (2011) 6 BTR 705 713. 
1437 The facts on which the court reached this decision were set out above. 
1438 Support for this view may be found in Muller Determining the Residence of a Trust: a South African Income 
Tax Perspective 257. 
1439 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520. 
1440 On the basis of the finding in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26 it is difficult to see 
how the two tests differ and, if they differ, whether they would lead to different results in a given set of facts. 
1441 Fundy Settlement v Canada 2012 SCC 14, [2012] 1 SCR 520 para 15. The facts which led the court to this 
conclusion are set out in an earlier paragraph. 
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In all of the cases referred to in this paragraph, the courts found that the effective 
management1442 of the trust was in the hands of persons other than the trustee. However, in 
all of the jurisdictions under discussion, only the trustees may manage a trust. How is it 
possible for the courts to find that effective management of the trust is in the hands of 
someone else than the trustee? The facts in the Oceanic Trust case may be used to illustrate 
this point. In that case the administration of the trust was governed by Mauritian law and 
one would assume that that law would apply to determine whether persons other than the 
trustee could make these kinds of decisions.1443 Assume, however, that the facts are the 
same and that South African trust law applies. As argued earlier,1444 in terms of South African 
law only the trustees of a trust may make the fundamental decisions regarding the trust. If 
the trustees were to abdicate their responsibility to take these types of decisions, the 
actions of the person who purported to act on behalf of the trust would be invalid. It is 
submitted that “key management and commercial decisions that [are] necessary for the 
conduct of SIMS’s business” would be regarded as fundamental decisions, which only the 
trustees could make. The trustees would therefore have been unable to delegate authority 
to the asset manager (or another person) to take these decisions and such delegation and 
subsequent actions would be invalid.1445 
The answer to the problem stated above may be found in an analogy with a similar problem 
found in company law cases. In these cases, the company may only act through certain 
organs, typically the board of directors. In Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock (Inspector of 
Taxes)1446 the taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a United Kingdom company. The 
taxpayer and three other co-subsidiary companies were incorporated in Kenya and the 
taxpayer made certain payments to the co-subsidiaries which it claimed as a deduction for 
tax purposes. The deduction could only be claimed if the co-subsidiaries were resident in the 
United Kingdom and carried on a trade wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. The 
management of the subsidiary companies was placed in the hands of their respective 
directors and, in terms of their articles of association, meetings of their boards of directors 
could only take place outside of the United Kingdom. However, these organs did not exercise 
central management and control of the relevant companies. Instead, central management 
and control of the subsidiaries was exercised by the board of the holding company in 
London, since the court found that the subsidiaries’ boards stood aside in both important 
and less important decisions and never purported to function as a board. Since management 
of the subsidiaries had been usurped by the holding company, it followed, so the court held, 
that the subsidiaries’ businesses were conducted “in a manner irregular, unauthorised and 
perhaps unlawful”.1447 The court held that it does not matter that the acts which prove that 
central management and control of the subsidiaries was in London, are irregular, 
unauthorised or unlawful. The court stated that the residence of the subsidiaries was 
                                                          
1442 Or in some cases the central management and control. 
1443 See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Greenacre 1936 NPD 225; 8 SATC 196 and a discussion of this 
case in ch 2.2.3. A discussion of Mauritian trust law falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
1444 See ch 2.2.6. 
1445 This argument applies the “second approach” referred to by Gutuza, namely scrutinising the trust deed and 
trust law to determine the person that is empowered to effectively manage the trust in terms of its rules 
(Gutuza (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 428). 
1446Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock (Inspector of Taxes) [1960] AC 351 (HL). 
1447 Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock (Inspector of Taxes) [1960] AC 351 (HL) 362. 
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determined by the solid facts, not by the terms of their constitutions, however imperative 
these may be.1448 
It may therefore be argued that, similar to companies, trusts that are managed by persons 
who are not authorised to do so, such as beneficiaries, settlors or advisors, will be held to be 
effectively managed by these persons. Therefore, even if trust instruments and trust law 
place the management of the trust in the hands of the trustee only and cause management 
acts exercised by another person to be void, these rules will not bar a court from holding 
that these persons actually exercised effective management of the trust. 
In conclusion, the case law reveals that often persons other than the trustees are held to be 
effectively managing a trust. It is submitted that the test laid down in Wood v Holden 
(Inspector of Taxes) which outlines the circumstances under which it will be held that a 
board of directors are not effectively managing a company, can and should be applied by 
analogy to trustees managing a trust. Adapting the test for trusts, it is submitted that a 
distinction should be made between (a) cases where effective management of the trust is 
exercised by its trustees, and (b) cases where the functions of the trustees are usurped, in 
the sense that management is exercised independently of, or without regard to, the 
trustees. In cases which fall within item (a), it is essential to recognise the distinction (in 
concept, at least) between (i) the role of an “outsider” in proposing, advising and influencing 
the decisions which the trustees take in fulfilling their functions, and (ii) the role of an 
outsider who dictates the decisions which are to be taken. In that context an “outsider” is a 
person who is not himself or herself a participant in the formal process (for example, a 
meeting of trustees) through which the trustees fulfil their function. Further guidance from 
Wood’s case should also be borne in mind. If only a few transactions are undertaken by the 
trustees, the conclusion of those transactions will constitute the management of the trust by 
the trustees; and even if decisions are taken by the trustees without full and detailed 
information available to them, these are still valid trustee decisions and the functions of the 
trustees have not been usurped. 
In Wensleydale, Smallwood and Fundy Settlement the trustees did indeed take the relevant 
decision and it cannot therefore be argued that these cases could fall within item (b) above, 
namely that the functions of the trustees were usurped. It may possibly be argued that 
Oceanic Trust falls within item (b), as the court, by implication, held that a person other than 
the trustee made some of the key management and commercial decisions. It must, however, 
be borne in mind that in that case very limited relief was applied for. The court did not 
pronounce on the merits of the assessment or the taxpayer’s objection. If, however, one 
accepts that persons other than the trustees took key management and commercial 
decisions for the trust, it is an example of a case where the trustees’ functions are usurped 
and where the effective management of the trust is not in the hands of the trustees, but in 
the hands of the “usurper”. As argued above, the fact that the “usurper’s” management of 
the trust may be irregular, unauthorised and perhaps unlawful, is irrelevant. 
Save for (possibly) Oceanic Trust, the other cases mentioned in this paragraph all fall within 
item (a) above, namely where effective management was exercised by the trustees. The 
                                                          
1448 Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock (Inspector of Taxes) [1960] AC 351 (HL) 363. 
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question then arises whether the relevant outsiders in each case (i) influenced or (ii) dictated 
the trustees’ decision. 
It is submitted that Wensleydale and Fundy Settlement fall within item (ii). In Wensleydale it 
was held that the settlor often pushed the trustees to do what he wanted them to do and 
that the one trustee was a trustee in name only, merely doing what she was told to do. In 
Fundy Settlement, the court found that there was an unwritten agreement that the trustee 
would comply with the recommendations of the main beneficiaries and that the unwritten 
agreement was enforceable through the mechanism of a protector. These cases therefore 
illustrate the point that where an outsider dictates to the trustees what their decisions 
should be, the trust is effectively managed by the outsider, and not by the trustees. 
It is submitted that the Smallwood case falls within item (i) and that in that case the advisors 
and settlor merely influenced the trustees’ decision and did not dictate to them. It is 
therefore submitted that the Smallwood case was decided wrongly on the facts. It is 
submitted that South African courts should follow the test set out above (which is based on 
the test laid down in Wood) in deciding who exercises the POEM of a trust. 
One final point should be made regarding the involvement of the settlor in the management 
of a trust in South Africa. It was argued earlier that where the trustees are subject to an 
unacceptable degree of control by the settlor, it may well indicate that the settlor never had 
the intention to create a trust in the first place, resulting in the invalidity of the trust.1449 If 
the trust is held to be invalid, it will have to be determined whether there is still a “trust” as 
defined in the Income Tax Act,1450 which can be regarded as a taxpayer and therefore a 
person for purposes of the relevant DTT. 
6.5 Conclusion 
6.5.1 General 
In order to qualify for the benefits of a DTT, a trust(ee) has to be regarded as a resident. 
Residency is also pertinent in the application of the distributive articles of the DTT. 
Article 4 of the OECD MTC determines residence for purposes of the DTT. This article 
requires, inter alia, that domestic law be applied to establish whether a person is liable to 
tax by reason of certain factors. The liable to tax requirement in article 4(1) is riddled with 
interpretational difficulties. A point that is clear, though, is that the OECD MTC does not 
require a resident of a state to be liable to tax on a specific item of income in order to claim 
treaty benefits regarding that income. As long as there is a general liability to tax and the 
person derives or receives income, the treaty will be applied, regardless of whether the 
person is actually taxed on that specific item of income. Who is the person whose liability to 
tax must be determined? By examining domestic law, it was concluded that in South Africa 
and Canada, the relevant person is the trust itself. In the United Kingdom, it is the trustees 
(as a body of persons) who are liable to tax. 
                                                          
1449 See ch 2.2.6. 
1450 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1. 
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6.5.2 Transparency and the “liable to tax” requirement 
Regarding transparency, guidance may be sought from the OECD Partnership Report (the 
other OECD Reports not being particularly helpful). It is generally accepted that if a state 
treats an entity as fiscally transparent, it is not liable to tax in that state and can therefore 
not be regarded as a resident of that state. There are different degrees of transparency and 
the degree of transparency influences whether an entity will be regarded as liable to tax 
(and therefore resident). Trusts that are completely transparent, or that are transparent, but 
have only reporting requirements, are not regarded as liable to tax. Thus, for example, in 
South Africa, vesting trusts and, in the United Kingdom and Canada, bare trusts, are 
completely transparent. Therefore in South Africa and Canada these trusts (and in the 
United Kingdom, the trustees of such a trust) will not be regarded as liable to tax and 
resident in the respective countries. 
More problematic are those entities that can be classified as partially transparent. Academic 
authors have differing views regarding the application of the liable to tax requirement to 
partially transparent entities. According to Easson, partially transparent trusts that are taxed 
on their undistributed income will not be treated as transparent. This will be the case even 
when the trust distributes all of its income during a particular year. According to Baker, 
trusts that are taxed on undistributed income would be liable to tax in relation to that 
income. In relation to the income that is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries only, the 
beneficiaries would be entitled to the benefits of the DTT. According to Lang, it is irrelevant 
that a trust is (partially) transparent; as long as there is a close enough connection to the 
particular state, it will be considered a resident there. Lang’s view is not supported by the 
majority of academic authors or the Partnership Report and is contrary to case law. It is 
therefore submitted that it should not be supported. The views of Edwardes-Ker and Koele 
are also criticised and can thus likewise not be supported. 
Examining the domestic law provisions of the relevant states regarding trusts, it was found 
that in South Africa in respect of trust income that is taxed in the hands of the trust, the trust 
will be regarded as liable to tax. In respect of income that is not retained in the trust, but 
distributed to the beneficiary and taxed at that level, it is arguable that a trust should not be 
regarded as liable to tax. However, since a trust need not be liable to tax on a specific item 
of income in order to claim treaty benefits regarding that income, it is submitted that a trust 
that is regarded as liable to tax on certain undistributed income, will also be regarded as 
liable to tax on all its undistributed income. In the case of a discretionary trust, it is 
submitted that the trust is, arguably, also liable to tax in those years in which all of its 
income is distributed. In the United Kingdom it seems clear that the trustees are liable to tax 
for purposes of article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. In Canada the trust will be regarded as liable to 
tax. 
Considering all of the views and the domestic tax law of the relevant states, it is submitted 
the more practical solution is that a trust that is taxed on undistributed income will be liable 
to tax in relation to that income. Regarding that portion of the income which is taxed in the 
hands of the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries resident in the relevant countries would be 
entitled to the benefits of the applicable conventions, to the extent that they are liable to 
tax on the income distributed to them. 
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If the income of a trust(ee) is deemed by legislation to be that of another person, it is 
submitted that such an attribution is ignored in determining whether the trust(ee) is liable to 
tax for purposes of article 4(1). 
6.5.3 The requirement “by reason of” certain criteria 
The words of article 4(1) “by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criteria of a similar nature” mean that there must be a causal relationship or some 
form of proximity between the grounds for taxation in a particular state and the listed 
criteria in article 4(1). The listed criteria furthermore connote comprehensive liability 
imposed by a state and any basis of taxation which is to be classified as a “criterion of a 
similar nature” should also involve comprehensive liability. 
6.5.4 Domestic law 
Because article 4(1) requires that the domestic law of the relevant state be applied, it was 
necessary to examine the laws of the applicable states that determine the residence of a 
trust. In South Africa a trust may be a resident because it was established or formed in South 
Africa, or because it has its POEM in South Africa. If, however, a trust is deemed to be a 
resident of another state because of the application of a DTT, it will not be regarded a 
resident for South African domestic law purposes. Regarding the first criterion, the preferred 
interpretation of the phrase “established or formed in South Africa” is “within South Africa’s 
borders”, but it is recommended that the legislature should clarify this by legislative 
amendment. Since inter vivos trusts are formed by way of a contract, the normal rules 
regarding the time and place where the contract is formed, will determine where the trust is 
formed. However, the parties may specify in their agreement when and where it will come 
into being, in which case the normal rules will not apply. The ECTA sets out the rules for the 
formation of agreements concluded by way of a data message. Thus trusts formed, for 
example, by way of e-mail messages, will be formed at the place and time as set out in that 
Act. Once again, however, the parties may stipulate in their agreement where the trust will 
be formed and then the provisions of ECTA will not apply. Testamentary trusts are formed at 
the place where the testator executes the will through which the trust is formed. Since a 
trust is not established or formed through the registration of the trust instrument, or the 
authorisation of the trustees by the Master, these formal acts by the Master are irrelevant in 
determining a trust’s residence. From the rules set out above, it is clear that the place of 
formation of a trust may be easily manipulated, or may be determined arbitrarily. A possible 
solution would be to amend the legislation to provide that a trust will be resident in South 
Africa if registration of the trust instrument and authorisation of trustees are required in 
terms of the Trust Property Control Act. However, oral trusts, which are not covered by the 
Act, would be excluded from such a solution. 
Trusts may also be resident in South Africa if their POEM is in South Africa. It is submitted 
that the term POEM in the South African Income Tax Act should take its meaning from the 
term POEM in South Africa’s DTTs. SARS’s view regarding the meaning of the term POEM, 
which focuses on the place where decisions are implemented and also on a lower level of 
management as set out in their Interpretation Note, is not followed in the case law. It is 
submitted that the POEM of a trust will be where the highest level of management is 
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exercised, which will usually be where the trustees take their decisions (although this will 
not always be the case). 
In the United Kingdom, the residence of trustees (as a body) is determined by legislation. If 
all the trustees are resident in the United Kingdom, the trustees (as a body) will be resident 
in the United Kingdom. If at least one trustee is a United Kingdom resident and at least one 
trustee is not a United Kingdom resident, the emphasis moves to the settlor. If in such a case 
certain conditions are met by the settlor, the trustees (as a body) will be regarded as 
resident in the United Kingdom. 
In Canada, the residence of a trust is determined by the central management and control 
test. A trust can also be deemed to be a resident of Canada in terms of the Income Tax Act, 
but case law suggests that a trust would not be liable to tax by reason of its residence for 
purposes of the relevant treaty. However, recent legislation now provides that trusts 
deemed to be resident in Canada for income tax purposes will also be resident for DTT 
purposes. 
In the Netherlands, very few trusts will be regarded as residents. A trust could be resident in 
the Netherlands if its POEM is in the Netherlands. 
In all of the states under consideration, it is possible to change the trust’s residence for 
domestic law purposes. 
6.5.5 The tiebreaker: POEM 
The tiebreaker provision of article 4 will be applied if both states regard the trust as resident 
in that state. After examining the OECD Commentary to article 4(3), the relevant case law 
and the opinions of academic authors, it was concluded that in all of the relevant states the 
tiebreaker in respect of persons other than individuals (that is, POEM) will be used in respect 
of trusts. 
In terms of the Smallwood case, no distinction should be drawn between concurrent and 
consecutive periods of residence in cases where domestic legislation deems a person to be 
liable to tax for the whole year, even though a person was resident in that state for only part 
of the year. The judgement has been criticised in this regard. 
Regarding the meaning of the term POEM, the OECD in 2008 amended its Commentary to 
article 4(3). The reference to the “most senior person or group of persons (for example a 
board of directors)” was deleted. The test formulated in the Commentary now simply refers 
to the place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the 
conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made. The Commentary further 
states that all the relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the 
POEM and that an entity can have only one POEM at a time. Case law in South Africa, the 
United Kingdom and Canada reveals that the courts regard an entity as effectively managed 
at the place where the highest level of management is exercised. Usually, this level of 
management is exercised by the trustees, but if the top level management of the trust is 
usurped by another or if another person dictates to the trustees what they should decide, it 
is that other person and not the trustees who exercises the effective management of the 
company. There are other uncertainties regarding the meaning of POEM. It is not clear 
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whether the term should have a special meaning, a particular treaty meaning or a domestic 
law meaning. Furthermore, there is no consensus on whether POEM and the central 
management and control test are the same. It is submitted that even though there might be 
some differences in the approach to the two tests, the tests will very often yield the same 
results on the facts of a particular case. 
In order to determine where the POEM of a trust (or the trustees) is located, it has to be 
decided who the person is that exercises its effective management. In terms of trust law, it is 
the trustees who manage the affairs of the trust and one would expect them to exercise the 
effective management of the trust. An examination of the case law reveals, however, that 
persons other than the trustees are often held to exercise the effective management of the 
trust. In this regard, it is proposed that the test in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) be 
adapted as follows to apply to trusts. A distinction should be made between cases where the 
functions of the trustees are usurped and cases where the trustees effectively manage the 
trust. The trustees’ functions will be usurped if a person other than the trustee exercises the 
management functions of the trustees, independently from them or without regard to them. 
If the trustees’ management of the trust is usurped, the “usurper’s” management of the 
trust will be irregular, unauthorised and perhaps unlawful. It is submitted, however, that this 
will be irrelevant in the determination of POEM. In cases where there is no usurpation, the 
effective management of the trust is exercised by the trustees. In such cases the influence of 
an outsider, such as an advisor, settlor or beneficiary, will not disturb the finding that the 
trustees exercise the effective management of the trust. If, however, the outsider dictates to 
the trustees what their decisions should be, it is the outsider, and not the trustees, who 
effectively manages the trust. It is furthermore submitted that the Smallwood case was 
decided incorrectly, in that on the facts of that case the outsiders did not usurp the functions 
of the trustees, nor did they dictate to the trustees the decisions that should have been 
taken. 
6.5.6 The residence of a trust: the different states 
Examining the residence of trusts for purposes of the OECD MTC on a country by country 
basis, the analysis reveals the following. In South Africa, it is the residence of the trust itself 
that has to be determined for purposes of article 4(1). Trusts that are completely 
transparent, or that are transparent, but have only reporting requirements (such as vesting 
trusts) will not be regarded as liable to tax. Examining the domestic law provisions regarding 
trusts in South Africa, it was concluded that in respect of trust income that is taxed in the 
hands of the trust, the trust will be regarded as liable to tax. In respect of income that is not 
retained in the trust, but distributed to the beneficiary, both the view that the trust is liable 
to tax and that it is not can be sustained. It is submitted that Baker’s view is the most 
practical in the case of partly transparent entities and it is recommended that his view be 
applied in South Africa. In terms of South African domestic law, a trust may be a resident 
because it was established or formed in South Africa, or because it has its POEM in South 
Africa. If, however, a trust is deemed to be a resident of another state because of the 
application of a DTT, it will not be regarded a resident for South African domestic law 
purposes. Regarding the meaning of POEM, case law in South Africa suggests that the courts 
regard an entity as effectively managed at the place where the highest level of management 
is exercised. Usually this level of management is exercised by the trustees, but if the top 
level management of the trust is usurped by another or if another person dictates to the 
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trustees what they should decide, it is that other person and not the trustees who exercises 
the effective management of the trust. It is submitted that this test (as proposed in Wood) 
should be followed in South Africa to determine who exercises the effective management of 
a trust. 
In the United Kingdom, it is the residence of the trustees (as a body) that has to be 
determined for purposes of article 4(1). Bare trusts are completely transparent and the 
trustees of such a trust will not be regarded as liable to tax and resident in the United 
Kingdom. It is clear that, in terms of the domestic law provisions regarding trusts in the 
United Kingdom, the trustees are liable to tax for purposes of article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. 
It is submitted that Baker’s view is the most practical in the case of partly transparent 
entities and it is recommended that his view be applied in the United Kingdom. In terms of 
the United Kingdom domestic law provisions, the residence of trustees (as a body) is 
determined by legislation. If all the trustees are resident in the United Kingdom, the trustees 
(as a body) will be resident in the United Kingdom. If at least one trustee is a United Kingdom 
resident and at least one trustee is not a United Kingdom resident, the emphasis moves to 
the settlor. If in such a case certain conditions are met by the settlor, the trustees (as a body) 
will be regarded as resident in the United Kingdom. Regarding the meaning of POEM, case 
law in the United Kingdom is to the same effect as that in South Africa. It is submitted that 
the decision in Smallwood was incorrect on the facts of that case and that, as suggested, the 
test in Wood as adapted for trusts should be applied. 
In Canada, it is the residence of the trust itself that has to be determined for purposes of 
article 4(1). In the case of bare trusts, which are completely transparent, these trusts will not 
be regarded as liable to tax and resident in Canada. Examining the domestic law pertaining 
to trusts in Canada, it is evident that the trust will be regarded as liable to tax. It is submitted 
that Baker’s view is the most practical in the case of partly transparent entities and it is 
recommended that his view be applied in Canada. Domestic law provides that the residence 
of a trust is determined by the central management and control test. A trust can also be 
deemed to be a resident of Canada in terms of the Income Tax Act, but case law suggests 
that a trust would not be liable to tax by reason of its residence for purposes of the relevant 
treaty. Regarding the meaning of POEM, case law in Canada is to the same effect as that in 
South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
Regarding the Netherlands, very few trusts (or trustees) will be regarded as resident in the 
Netherlands for domestic law purposes and, consequently, also for treaty purposes. If a 
trust(ee) can be resident in the Netherlands, the POEM test will be used to determine 
whether it is indeed resident in the Netherlands. Many trusts will also be regarded as APVs, 
which would mean that all the income of the trust will, generally speaking, be attributed to 
the settlor. Arguably, the attribution to the settlor will not influence the trust’s (trustees’) 
possible treaty residence. 
6.5.7 Closing remarks 
The question whether a trust is a resident for treaty purposes is a complex one, depending 
to a large extent on the domestic tax law treatment of the trust, but also on the facts 
surrounding the specific trust. Particularly the issue of partially transparent entities is 
complicated with divergent views being expressed on the topic. It is recommended that 
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South Africa create greater certainty in its tax treaties. This may be done by (a) including 
trusts in the definition of person; (b) including appropriate reservations in the Commentary; 
and (c) amending its domestic legislation in relation to trust residency. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Tax systems usually attribute income to a specific taxpayer. In other words, a specific item of 
income is linked to a specific taxpayer and taxed in his or her hands. Salom defines 
attribution as “the link between the subject and the object to be taxed”, but makes the point 
that a taxpayer to whom the income is attributed does not necessarily carry the tax 
burden.1451 
Wheeler provides three reasons for attributing income to a person: 
(a) The person that is liable to tax in relation to the income must be identified. 
(b) The person who is entitled to claim treaty benefits in respect of the income must be 
identified. 
(c) The person entitled to the double taxation relief (whether domestic relief, or in terms 
of a Double Taxation Treaty (DTT)) must be identified.1452 
Therefore, as Wheeler states: 
“[T]he attribution of income to a person is fundamental to the application of treaties; 
together with residence, it determines which treaty, if any, applies to an item of 
income.”1453 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention 
(OECD MTC) thus requires that there should be a connection between the item of income 
and a specific taxpayer.1454 According to Salom, the attribution of income to the resident 
claiming the treaty benefits is one of the conditions that must be met before a DTT can be 
applied.1455 The distributive articles of the OECD MTC use a variety of terms to denote the 
connection between an item of income and a person. For example, articles 10(1) and 11(1) 
use the term “paid to”, while articles 6(1) and 13(1) use the term “derived by”. Article 12 
uses the term “beneficially owned” and article 7(1) uses the term “profits of”.1456 It is this 
language used by the distributive rules that provides the requirement of the connection 
between the item of income and the taxpayer.1457 
                                                          
1451 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 394. 
1452 Wheeler in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Conflicts in the Attribution of Income to a Person 19. 
1453 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 477; Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 3. 
1454 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 296; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 255; Danon 
(2014) 68 BFIT 1 7. 
1455 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 399. 
1456 See Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 478 for a list of the attribution terminology used in the OECD MTC. 
1457 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 297; Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 399–400; Danon (2014) 68 
BFIT 1 7. 
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However, the OECD MTC itself does not contain any attribution principles.1458 According to 
Wheeler, the Commentary contains some references to the attribution issue. The 
Commentary on article 10 deals with the situation in which the source state of a disguised 
dividend is faced with the attribution of the dividend to two persons resident in other states 
and proposes that the mutual agreement procedure be invoked to resolve the matter.1459 
The Commentary on article 1 suggests that the attribution of income is left to the domestic 
law of each state and is therefore unaffected by a DTT,1460 but Wheeler doubts whether this 
paragraph is intended to apply outside the anti-avoidance context in which it was written. 
Article 17 and the Commentary on it accept that domestic law may attribute a performance 
fee directly to an individual, even if it is not paid to that individual. Wheeler infers from 
these statements in the Commentary that domestic law should be relied on to determine 
the attribution of income to a person.1461 Thus, attribution of income can be regarded as a 
matter for domestic law.1462 According to Danon it is prima facie arguable that by 
interpreting the words “paid to” or “derived by” (and the like) in accordance with article 3(2) 
of the OECD MTC,1463 states may rely on their domestic attribution rules.1464 
If each state relies on its domestic attribution rules, states may disagree on the attribution of 
an item of income and it may lead to them taxing the income in the hands of different 
persons. Furthermore, they may disagree on the person entitled to treaty benefits or the 
person entitled to claim double taxation relief.1465 Such a disagreement is known as a conflict 
of attribution. 
A conflict of attribution must be distinguished from a conflict in the classification of an 
entity. The latter entails that one state regards an entity as being of one kind, whereas the 
other state regards the same entity as of another kind. For example, one state may classify 
an entity as a partnership, whilst another may classify that same entity as a company, 
resulting in different tax treatment in the respective states.1466 The classification issue thus 
determines what the taxable entity should be,1467 whereas the attribution issue assumes 
that there are taxable persons, but is concerned with the rights and obligations that give rise 
to a tax liability.1468 
                                                          
1458 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 447; Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express 
Trusts with Particular References to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 296; Danon (2004) 32 
Intertax 210 para 2A; Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 3. 
1459 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 29 and 30. 
1460 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 1 para 22.1. 
1461 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 256.  
1462 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 487. 
1463 Article 3(2) provides that an undefined term will have the meaning under the tax laws (or if there is no such 
meaning in tax law, the meaning under any other law) of the state applying the DTT. If, however, the context 
requires otherwise, this domestic tax law meaning will not apply. For a more detailed discussion of this 
provision, see chs 5.2.1 and 5.2.6. 
1464 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 297. 
1465 Wheeler in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Conflicts in the Attribution of Income to a Person 20. 
1466 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 17. 
1467 See ch 5.6 for a discussion of the classification issue. 
1468 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 478; Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 41. 
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Moreover, the attribution of income should be distinguished from the liable to tax 
requirement in article 4(1) of the OECD MTC.1469 In terms of this article, a person will be 
regarded as a resident of a state if the person is, according to the laws of that state, liable to 
tax in it by reason of certain factors. As was pointed out earlier, the term liable to tax does 
not require that a person be liable to tax on a specific item of income in order to claim treaty 
benefits regarding that income. Provided that there is a general liability for tax and the 
person derives or receives income, the DTT will be applied, irrespective of whether the 
person is liable to tax on the specific item of income. Thus, the source state should as a first 
question determine whether a person is liable to tax (which may be a general liability to tax) 
and thereafter ascertain whether the particular item of income is attributed to that 
person.1470 
The wording of the OECD MTC (such as “paid to” or “derived by”) requires that a particular 
item of income be connected or attributed to the specific resident claiming the benefits of 
the DTT. Since the attribution of income is a matter for domestic law it is important to 
consider how each state will attribute the income arising to a trust. This chapter will 
therefore start with a brief review of the attribution of trust income in each of the relevant 
states discussed in this dissertation.1471 However, applying domestic attribution rules may 
lead to conflicts of attribution and therefore examples of conflicts of attribution involving 
trusts between the states relevant to this dissertation will be explored. For example, one 
state may attribute the relevant income to the trust (or the trustee) while the other state 
attributes the income to the beneficiary. Which party should then claim the benefits of the 
DTT? The view taken in this dissertation is that these conflicts should be resolved in DTTs. 
Hence, examples of possible solutions to these conflicts of attribution will be considered and 
the preferred solution will be applied to the examples discussed earlier. The chapter ends 
with a conclusion regarding conflicts of attribution involving trusts. 
7.2 Review of the attribution of trust income1472 
7.2.1 South Africa 
If, in a year of assessment, an ascertained beneficiary has a vested right to income, the 
income will be attributed to the beneficiary. If, in a given year, no beneficiary has a vested 
right to the income, the trust will be taxed on the income. The trust itself could therefore be 
a taxpayer, but if it is not taxed, the beneficiary will be taxed on the income.1473 If, however, 
any of the anti-avoidance provisions of section 7 apply, the person to whom the income is 
attributed in terms of that section will be taxed, and not the trust or the beneficiary.1474 
Generally, income retains its nature as it passes through a trust and the trust is a mere 
                                                          
1469 See ch 6.2.2 for a discussion of this requirement. 
1470 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 400. See also Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 7. 
1471 The taxation of trusts, which includes the issue of the attribution of income, was discussed in greater detail 
in ch 3. The aim of this paragraph is simply to recap, briefly, what was stated there and to highlight the 
appropriate points. 
1472 In this dissertation, income is described as “attributed” to a person when that person is, in terms of income 
tax laws, entitled to that income, in other words, that person is the person to whom the income is allocated for 
tax purposes. Income may therefore be attributed to a person, although that person does not carry the tax 
burden. 
1473 See chs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
1474 See ch 3.2.4. 
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conduit pipe. Income most likely does not retain its nature if it is accumulated by the trustee 
and distributed to beneficiaries in a later year.1475 
7.2.2 United Kingdom 
The trustees are, by legislation, together treated as if they were a single, distinct person.1476 
In general, a trustee of a discretionary trust will be taxed on discretionary and accumulated 
income arising to the trustee and also on the making of a discretionary payment of income 
to a beneficiary.1477 The beneficiary is liable to tax on the amount distributed to him or her 
by the trustee, but is given a credit for the taxes paid by the trustee.1478 Generally, in the 
case of a fixed trust, the trustee is liable to tax on his or her income.1479 The beneficiaries are 
also liable to tax on their income from the trust, but are given a credit for the tax paid by the 
trust.1480 In the case of a settlor-interested trust, where payments are made to the minor 
unmarried children of the settlor, or where the income from abroad legislation applies, the 
income is taxed in the hands of the settlor.1481 
7.2.3 Canada 
A trust is regarded as an individual for income tax purposes and is thus a taxpayer that may 
be liable to tax on its income.1482 Broadly speaking, a trust is taxed to the extent that the 
income is not taxed in the beneficiary’s hands. The trust may deduct the income that is taxed 
in the beneficiary’s hands, whilst the beneficiary is taxed on the amount deducted by the 
trust and payable to the beneficiary.1483 Under certain circumstances, the income is not 
taxed in the hands of the trust or the beneficiary, but is attributed to and taxed in the hands 
of the settlor.1484 
7.2.4 The Netherlands 
In general, the income of the trust will be taxed in the hands of the settlor, if the 
Afgezonderd Particulier Vermogen (APV) legislation is applicable.1485 
                                                          
1475 See ch 3.2.3. 
1476 See ch 3.3.1. 
1477 See ch 3.3.2.1. The relevant credit eliminates double taxation. 
1478 See ch 3.3.2.2.1. 
1479 See ch 3.3.3.1. 
1480 See ch 3.3.3.2. 
1481 See chs 3.3.4 to 3.3.6. 
1482 See ch 3.4.1. 
1483 See chs 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Even though the trust is granted a deduction for the income paid to the beneficiary, 
the income is firstly attributed to the trust. It will be recalled that foreign source income received by the trust, 
so designated by the trust and included in the income of the beneficiary, is deemed to be income from that 
foreign source in the hands of the beneficiary. However, this deeming provision is only relevant for the 
purposes of the foreign tax credit rules and it is therefore submitted that it is not relevant for purposes of the 
attribution question in general (see ch 3.4.4). If this submission is incorrect, then it is assumed here that the 
trust has not designated the foreign income, with the effect that the income will not retain its nature. This 
argument applies to all the examples below. 
1484 See ch 3.4.5. 
1485 See ch 3.5.2. 
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
In the case of a discretionary trust where the income is distributed to the beneficiaries in the 
same year, the income will be (a) taxed in the hands of the beneficiary in South Africa; (b) 
taxed in the trustee’s hands and the beneficiary’s hands in the United Kingdom, with the 
beneficiary being given a credit for the taxes paid by the trustee; (c) included in the trust’s 
income and again deducted, and ultimately included in the beneficiary’s income in Canada; 
and (d) taxed in the settlor’s hands in the Netherlands. 
In the case of a fixed trust, the same conclusions as above will be reached, save in the 
Netherlands, where a fixed trust will (possibly) not be regarded as an APV, with the result 
that the income will not be attributed to the settlor. 
Where the income is accumulated in a discretionary trust, it will be taxed in the hands of the 
trust in South Africa and Canada and in the hands of the trustee in the United Kingdom. If 
the trust is regarded as an APV, the income will be attributed to the settlor in the 
Netherlands. 
7.3 Examples 
In the examples below, conflicts of attribution involving trusts in the states regarded in this 
dissertation are discussed. In all of these examples it is assumed that a DTT worded exactly 
like the OECD MTC is used and not the actual treaty between the two relevant states. 
7.3.1 Income sourced in one state, but trust, trustee, beneficiaries and settlor resident in 
the other state 
In cases where income is sourced in one state (the “source state”), but the trust, trustee, 
beneficiaries and the settlor are all resident in the other state (the “resident state”), a 
conflict of attribution often poses no problems. Once the source state has determined that 
the party to whom it attributes the income is resident in the resident state, it will be obliged 
to reduce its tax claim in accordance with the treaty. 
Thus, it is submitted that where South Africa is the source state, it will be obliged to reduce 
its tax claim if the beneficiary (in the case of a vesting (fixed) trust or a discretionary trust 
that distributes all of its income to its beneficiaries during the relevant year) or the trust (in 
the the case of a discretionary trust that accumulates all its income during the relevant year) 
is resident in the resident state (the United Kingdom or Canada).1486 It is further submitted 
that even if South Africa were to take into account the fact that the United Kingdom 
attributes the income to both1487 the trustee1488 and the beneficiary1489 and that Canada 
                                                          
1486 It is highly unlikely that a trust will be regarded as resident in the Netherlands (see ch 6.3.4). 
1487 According to Wheeler (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 278), if double attribution (in other words 
the attribution of the same income to two persons) occurs within one state (as is the case with the trustee and 
beneficiary in the United Kingdom), it is obvious that a DTT concluded by that state should apply. She admits 
that it is less obvious which person should claim the treaty benefits and very tentatively suggests that in the 
case of trusts the beneficiary may be the correct claimant, based on the argument that only the beneficiary can 
be the beneficial owner. It is submitted that it would be very difficult to argue that either of the two persons to 
whom income is attributed cannot claim the treaty benefits. In the case where the other state (South Africa in 
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attributes the income to the trust (in the case of a discretionary trust that distributes all of 
its income to its beneficiaries during the relevant year or in the case of a vesting (fixed) 
trust), the point remains that all of these persons (trustee, beneficiary and the trust) are also 
resident in the relevant resident state. Hence, it may be argued that South Africa will be 
obliged to limit its taxing rights in accordance with the DTT.1490 
In cases where South Africa is the resident state and the income is, for example, sourced in 
the United Kingdom, the latter would have to determine whether the trustee (in the case of 
a discretionary trust that accumulates all of its income during the relevant year) or the 
trustee and the beneficiary (in the case of a vesting (fixed) trust and a discretionary trust 
that distributes all of its income during the relevant year) to whom (it is submitted) it 
attributes the income, is resident in South Africa. It is submitted that if the trustee (and 
beneficiary) is resident in South Africa, the United Kingdom would be obliged to reduce its 
tax claim in accordance with the DTT. Even if the United Kingdom were to take into account 
the fact that South Africa attributes the income to the trust (in the case of a discretionary 
trust that accumulates all of its income during the relevant year) and to the beneficiary (in 
the other cases), both the trust and the beneficiary would be resident in South Africa and it 
is therefore likely that the United Kingdom would have to reduce its tax claim. 
Notwithstanding what is stated in this paragraph, some problematic cases may be identified 
where the conflict of attribution between South Africa and the other states under discussion 
in this dissertation may lead to double taxation. Three examples of problematic cases are 
discussed below: 
7.3.1.1 Assume that a trust that is resident in South Africa receives income from Canada. 
The trust is either a discretionary trust and the income received by the trust is 
distributed to the South African resident beneficiaries during the same year in 
which it was derived by the trust,1491 or the trust is a vesting (fixed) trust with all the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this case) attributes the income to the beneficiary, it seems evident to choose the beneficiary, since that choice 
will, in effect, eliminate any conflict of attribution. 
1488 It will be recalled from ch 3.3.3.2 that if a beneficiary of a fixed trust is entitled to the income of an English 
law trust (and certain other jurisdictions called “Baker jurisdictions”), the trust itself is not the source of the 
income, but the underlying assets are. However, it is submitted that Reid's Trustee v IRC 14 TC 512 is authority 
for the proposition that the fact that income retains its nature (or does not retain its nature) is irrelevant in 
determining the trustee’s liability for taxation. In other words, the trustee will be liable to tax on income 
derived by it and it is irrelevant for purposes of determining the trustee’s liability whether the income retains 
its nature when it is passed on to the beneficiary. See also Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 39 62. 
1489 However, if the trust is a fixed trust and the income is mandated to the beneficiary, the income is not 
attributed to the trustee and it is only attributed to the beneficiary.  
1490 Canadian domestic law provides that the beneficiary may claim a credit for the foreign taxes paid by the 
Canadian resident trust in respect of its foreign source income (Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 
104(22); Brown in Topical Analysis para 4.3.2.2). Domestic law in the United Kingdom also allows beneficiaries 
to claim relief (see ch 3.3.2.2.2). 
1491 A practical problem may arise in a situation where the income is not immediately distributed to the 
beneficiaries, but only after some time has lapsed (eg six months), but the distribution still occurs within the 
relevant tax year. At the time that the relief is claimed it may be unknown (to the relevant revenue authorities 
and even the trustees, the trust and/or the beneficiaries) that the income will be distributed to the beneficiary 
during the particular year. It is submitted that the source state should, at the time that the trust (or trustee) 
claims the benefits of the DTT (that is, at the time that it is unknown to all parties that the distribution will be 
made) treat the situation as if the trust is accumulating the income. Should the trustees at that stage know that 
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beneficiaries resident in South Africa. South Africa attributes the income to the 
beneficiaries. It is submitted that Canada attributes the income sourced in Canada 
to the trust. Therefore a conflict of attribution will arise between South Africa and 
Canada. 
Applying the DTT, Canada will have to determine whether the payment was made 
to a resident of South Africa (namely the trust) in order to decide whether it will 
reduce its tax rate or refrain from taxing it. Canada may argue that the trust is not a 
resident of South Africa for purposes of the DTT and therefore not entitled to the 
benefits of the DTT.1492 In terms of this argument Canada will be able to tax the 
income in full, without providing a reduction in terms of the DTT. South Africa as 
the resident state will have to determine whether one of its residents (the 
beneficiary)1493 derived income from Canada, which that state may tax in 
accordance with the provisions of the DTT. South Africa will be able to argue that it 
is only liable to grant relief from double taxation in respect of the tax that Canada 
should have charged in terms of the DTT. Hence, only partial relief will be obtained. 
Therefore the conflict of attribution between South Africa and Canada will result in 
double taxation. 
7.3.1.2 A similar problem to the one described in 7.3.1.1 may arise between South Africa 
and the Netherlands. Assume that a trust that is resident in South Africa receives 
income from the Netherlands. The beneficiaries of the trust are resident in South 
Africa and have vested rights (a fixed interest) in the income. South Africa would 
attribute the income to the beneficiary. The Netherlands may attribute some of the 
income to the trust. It is submitted that in applying its domestic law, the 
Netherlands will tax the income in the hands of the trust and will then apply the 
DTT to determine whether it is obliged to reduce the tax levied. It will have to 
determine whether the income was paid to a resident of South Africa and may 
argue that the trust is not a resident of South Africa for purposes of the DTT1494 and 
that it is, consequently, not obliged to reduce its tax claim. South Africa, as the 
resident state, will have to determine whether one of its residents (the 
beneficiary)1495 derived income from the Netherlands, which that state may tax in 
accordance with the provisions of the DTT. South Africa will be able to argue that it 
is only liable to grant relief from double taxation in respect of the tax that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the income will be distributed to the beneficiaries in due course, the situation may have to be treated 
differently.  
1492 It was concluded in ch 6.2.2.3.2 that a vesting trust is not liable to tax and therefore not a resident for DTT 
purposes. Furthermore, although there are differing views, it was submitted in ch 6.2.2.3.3 that, in the case of 
partially transparent entities, the beneficiaries would be entitled to the benefits of the DTT, in respect of that 
portion of the income which is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries. Therefore, if in a particular year the 
income of a South African resident trust is distributed to the South African resident beneficiary, the beneficiary 
would be regarded as liable to tax in respect of that income. The trust would only be regarded as liable to tax in 
respect of the accumulated portion of the trust income. Therefore, if all the trust income for the year is 
distributed to the beneficiaries, it is the beneficiaries and not the trust that would be regarded as liable to tax 
and therefore resident for purposes of the DTT. 
1493 The trust will not have derived income. 
1494 It was concluded in ch 6.2.2.3.2 that a vesting trust is not liable to tax and therefore not a resident for DTT 
purposes. 
1495 The trust will not have derived income. 
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Netherlands should have charged in terms of the DTT. Hence, only partial relief will 
be obtained. Therefore the conflict of attribution between South Africa and the 
Netherlands will result in double taxation. 
7.3.1.3 Assume that a discretionary trust that is resident in South Africa receives income 
from the Netherlands. The income received by the trust is either distributed during 
the relevant year, or not distributed (in other words, it is accumulated) to the South 
African resident beneficiaries. South Africa would attribute the income to the trust 
(if it is accumulated) or the beneficiary (if it is distributed), but the Netherlands 
would probably attribute the income to the settlor, who is assumed to be resident 
in South Africa. Therefore a conflict of attribution will arise between South Africa 
and the Netherlands. 
In applying its domestic law, the Netherlands will most likely regard the income as 
paid to the settlor, a South African resident, and reduce its taxes accordingly in 
terms of the DTT. South Africa, on the other hand, may argue that it is not obliged 
to grant relief for double taxation, since the Netherlands did not levy tax in 
accordance with the DTT, because the income was not paid to or derived by the 
settlor in terms of South African law. Thus the conflict of attribution will result in 
double taxation. 
7.3.2 Income attributed to another 
All of the states discussed in this dissertation have rules which attribute the trust income to 
another person (typically the settlor)1496 under certain circumstances. In an earlier chapter it 
was ascertained that these states attribute the income to the settlor under broadly similar 
circumstances, the exceptions being the Netherlands (that almost invariably attribute trust 
income to the settlor where the APV regime applies) and South Africa (which, additionally, 
attributes income to the settlor if, broadly speaking, the beneficiary’s receipt of the income 
is delayed until the happening of an event stipulated by the settlor). Furthermore, South 
Africa and the United Kingdom attribute income to the settlor when a resident settlor 
transfers assets to a non-resident trust and certain requirements are met.1497 This latter case 
will be discussed below as an example of how this type of attribution provision may lead to a 
conflict of attribution resulting in double taxation. 
However, before that is done, the position where both states attribute the income to the 
settlor has to be considered. Wheeler questions whether the DTT applies to the settlor in 
respect of the trust income where both states attribute the income to the settlor. She argues 
that there might be a treaty attribution rule (based on the ownership of the income rather 
than the obligation to pay tax) that applies independently of the domestic law attribution of 
the two states.1498 If Wheeler’s argument is correct, it would imply that the settlor (who is 
                                                          
1496 In the examples that follow, the settlor is used as the person to whom the income is attributed. Although 
income is not always attributed to the settlor, it is most often the case. It is submitted that if income is 
attributed to a person other than the settlor, the arguments advanced in these examples could be applied with 
the necessary adjustments. However, the Netherlands almost invariably attributes the income to the settlor. If 
South Africa attributes the income to another person, a conflict of attribution will arise. 
1497 See ch 3.6. 
1498 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 279. 
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not the owner of the income, but is liable to tax on the income in both states) will not be 
able to rely on the DTT. Danon, on the other hand, is of the view that the source state would 
regard the income as being paid to or derived by a resident of the resident state (the settlor) 
and would, therefore, reduce its tax claim. He concludes that double taxation of the income 
would therefore be avoided.1499 
If Danon’s view is followed, only those cases in which South Africa attributes income to the 
settlor, but the other relevant states do not, will result in a conflict of attribution. The 
application of section 7(8)1500 is used as an example of such an attribution rule. Assume that 
income is derived from a Canadian source1501 and the trust is resident in Canada.1502 The 
settlor is assumed to be resident in South Africa and has donated an asset to the trust that 
generates the relevant Canadian source income. Both in the case of a discretionary trust 
(irrespective of whether it distributes or accumulates the income during the relevant year) 
and a vesting (fixed) trust, South Africa will most likely attribute the income to the settlor 
(on the basis that the requirements of section 7(8) have been met). If Canada applies its own 
domestic tax law, it will probably attribute the income to the trust. 
It is submitted that Canada will not consider the DTT as applicable, since it is merely taxing 
Canadian source income paid to a Canadian resident (the trust). However, South Africa will 
attribute the income, in terms of s 7(8) of the Income Tax Act to the settlor who is resident 
in South Africa. Thus a conflict of attribution will occur. 
7.3.3 Other selected examples 
7.3.3.1 Assume that a vesting trust is resident in Canada. It receives income from a 
Canadian source to which a beneficiary, resident in South Africa, has a vested right. 
Canada, as the source state, will apply its domestic law and, it is submitted, 
attribute the income to the trust. Canada will be able to argue that the DTT with 
South Africa does not apply, since the trust is a Canadian resident and receives 
income from a Canadian source.1503 From a South African point of view, the 
beneficiary will be regarded as liable to tax on the trust income. Therefore the same 
                                                          
1499 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 306–307. 
1500 It will be recalled that the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 7(8) provides that where, by reason of or in 
consequence of any donation, settlement or other disposition made by any resident, any amount is received by 
or accrued to any person (such as a trust) who is not a resident, which would have constituted income had that 
person been a resident, there shall be included in the income of that resident so much of that amount as is 
attributable to that donation, settlement or other disposition (see ch 3.2.4). 
1501 If South Africa is the resident state (that is, the trust is resident in South Africa), s 7(8) does not apply. See 
ch 3.2.4 and 3.2.2. According to Jooste, s 7(8) also applies in respect of income from a South African source 
(Jooste (2002) Acta Juridica 186 188). 
1502 The United Kingdom position is not discussed here as it is assumed that both states will apply their relevant 
legislation, namely s 7(8) in the case of South Africa and the transfer of assets abroad legislation in the United 
Kingdom. Although the scope of the legislation differs (see ch 3.6), it is assumed for purposes of this example 
that the circumstances are thus that both provisions apply. Since it is highly unlikely that a trust will be 
regarded as resident in the Netherlands (see ch 6.3.4), the conflicts of attribution between South Africa and the 
Netherlands (to the extent that conflicts will arise) are not discussed any further. 
1503 Canada will, however, charge a withholding tax on the payment of the amount to the non-resident 
beneficiary. This is ignored for purposes of this example. 
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trust income will be taxed in Canada in the hands of the trust and in South Africa in 
the hands of the beneficiary due to the conflict of attribution. 
7.3.3.2 Assume that a discretionary trust is resident in Canada. It receives income from a 
South African source. The trustee decides to accumulate the income and none of 
the income is therefore distributed to the beneficiary who is resident in the 
Netherlands. The settlor is also resident in the Netherlands. 
In applying its domestic law, South Africa will attribute the income to the trust. It is 
submitted that in terms of Canadian domestic law, the income will also be 
attributed to the trust. Since the trust is resident in Canada, South Africa will be 
obliged to limit its taxing rights in accordance with the DTT. It is submitted that 
Canada will be obliged to grant relief from double taxation to the trust, since it 
derived the income which South Africa was entitled to tax in accordance with the 
DTT. No conflict of attribution will arise. 
In the Netherlands, the settlor will probably be liable to tax on the income earned 
by the Canadian trust. South Africa, as the source state, will be able to argue that 
the income was not paid to or derived by the settlor and that the DTT between 
South Africa and the Netherlands should therefore not apply.1504 Hence a conflict of 
attribution will arise, which will result in the same income being taxed in South 
Africa or Canada and in the Netherlands. 
7.3.3.3 Assume that a vesting (fixed) trust is resident in Canada. The trust receives income 
from a South African source. There are two beneficiaries with vested (fixed) rigths 
to the income. Beneficiary one is resident in Canada and beneficiary two is resident 
in South Africa. 
If South Africa applies its domestic law, it will attribute the income to the respective 
beneficiaries. Since beneficiary one is a resident of Canada, South Africa will regard 
his or her portion of the income as paid to a resident of Canada and therefore South 
Africa will probably be obliged to limit its taxing rights in accordance with the DTT in 
respect of that portion. South Africa may argue that it is entitled to tax beneficiary 
two in full on his or her portion of the income, since beneficiary two is a South 
African resident and that he or she is being taxed on the basis of his or her 
residence. If Canada applies its domestic law, it may regard the full amount (both 
beneficiary one and two’s portions) as paid to the trust. Canada, as the resident 
state will have to decide whether or not to grant relief from double taxation. If the 
trust were to apply for such relief, Canada could argue that it is only obliged to 
grant relief for taxes levied by South Africa in accordance with the DTT and that 
South Africa’s taxation of beneficiary two was not in accordance with the treaty. 
Canada could probably refuse to grant relief to beneficiary one, as beneficiary one 
did not derive income in accordance with Canada’s domestic law. Hence, a conflict 
of attribution will occur. 
                                                          
1504 See also Wheeler, who argues that a state faced with a claim to treaty benefits from two states could 
answer it with the technical objection that income can be paid to or received by only one person at a time 
(Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 277). 
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7.4 Possible solutions to conflicts of attribution 
7.4.1 Should conflicts of attribution be resolved? 
According to Wheeler the attribution of income should be left to domestic law. A DTT, on 
the other hand, regulates the interface between the two states’ tax systems and is, 
therefore, the ideal instrument to deal with conflicts of attribution.1505 
Danon, however, emphasises the distinction between juridical and economic double 
taxation.1506 A conflict of attribution does not, strictly speaking, fall within the definition of 
juridical double taxation, because two different taxpayers are taxed. However, Danon argues 
that a conflict of attribution can be distinguished from other forms of economic double 
taxation (such as the taxation of corporate profits and dividends), since a conflict of 
attribution entails the simultaneous taxation of the same income in the hands of two 
persons, because the tax authorities of the two states allocate the income differently. In the 
case of corporate profits and dividends, two persons are taxed in succession on income that 
passes from one person to another and it is clear from the OECD MTC that this form of 
economic double taxation is not intended to be removed. Furthermore, an attribution 
conflict can also be distinguished from another example of economic double taxation, 
namely the adjustment of a non-arm’s length transfer price in terms of article 9(1) and a 
corresponding adjustment in terms of article 9(2). According to Danon, article 9 deals with a 
“residence-residence” conflict because the two legally independent enterprises are both 
regarded as resident in their respective states. Article 9 thus aims to resolve economic 
double taxation where the same profits are taxed in the hands of two associated enterprises, 
each resident in one of the contracting states. A conflict of attribution, on the other hand, 
involves a “residence-source” conflict because both the state of source and the state of 
residence want to tax.1507 
Danon refers to the dissenting view of Lang, who concludes that a conflict of attribution 
should not be eliminated as it does not fall within article 9 of the OECD MTC.1508 Salom does 
not agree with Lang’s opinion, as it fails to take into account the distinction between 
conflicts where a source state and a residence state are involved and a conflict in which two 
residence states are involved. As article 9 only deals with residence-residence conflicts, no 
conclusion should be drawn regarding a source-residence conflict.1509 
As pointed out earlier, the OECD MTC does not stipulate to whom the income should be 
attributed. Salom points out that it would, therefore, be strange to argue that the 
distributive rules nevertheless require the income to be attributed to the same person by 
the two contracting states. She further argues that article 4(1) of the OECD MTC would 
                                                          
1505 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 487. 
1506 Juridical double taxation is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the 
same taxpayer in respect of the same taxable income. Economic double taxation is the imposition of 
comparable taxes by two or more states on different taxpayers in respect of the same taxable income (Larking 
IBFD International Tax Glossary 134). 
1507 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 309–310; Danon (2004) 32 Intertax 210 para 3A. 
1508 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 310. 
1509 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 402. 
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become meaningless if the source state could refuse to apply a DTT, because, under its own 
law, the income is not attributed to the other state’s residents.1510 
Referring to the objective of DTTs, namely to avoid double taxation, Salom further argues 
that the OECD MTC cannot be interpreted in a way that would leave all forms of economic 
double taxation unresolved.1511 
It is submitted that the arguments presented by Danon, Wheeler and Salom are convincing 
and therefore conflicts of attribution should be resolved. A number of possible solutions 
have been suggested. Some of these are examined in turn below. 
7.4.2 Approach similar to that of the Partnership Report 
A solution advocated by Danon entails that the principles of the Partnership Report1512 
should be adapted and applied1513 to conflicts of attribution involving trusts. His argument 
starts by considering the literal meaning of the terms “paid to” and “derived by” and the like 
and concludes that the text of the distributive rules “does not reveal that these provisions 
only apply where the contracting States’ internal law attribute the relevant item of income 
to the same taxpayer. Rather, these articles solely regulate the allocation of taxing rights 
between the two jurisdictions”.1514 Therefore, based on the wording of the provisions, the 
distributive rules will apply, even if the income is taxed in the hands of different taxpayers. 
According to Danon, this interpretation is supported if the context of the DTT as well as the 
object and purpose of the distributive rules are considered. He argues that it should not be 
inferred from the Commentary, which suggests that only juridical double taxation are dealt 
with in the OECD MTC, that conflicts of attribution fall outside the scope of the OECD 
MTC.1515 
He therefore suggests that the terms “paid to” and “derived by” and the like should not be 
interpreted in accordance with their domestic law meaning, but should rather be given an 
autonomous meaning. In terms of article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, he argues that a meaning 
based on the context of the OECD MTC should be given to these terms.1516 Two possible 
contextual meanings are identified. The first is the meaning based on trust law. In terms of 
this meaning, income is “paid to” or “derived by” a beneficiary with a vested right to income 
(whether the beneficiary has a vested right ab initio or through the exercise by the trustee of 
his or her discretion in favour of the beneficiary during the relevant tax year). In all other 
cases the income would be “paid to” or “derived by” the trustee. However, he prefers the 
                                                          
1510 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 402. 
1511 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 402. 
1512 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships. 
1513 With one exception which is discussed in ch 7.5.4.1. 
1514 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 311. 
1515 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 311–314. 
1516 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 314–315. 
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second meaning, because the first meaning (based on trust law) does not resolve a conflict 
of attribution where the income is attributed to the settlor.1517 
The second meaning is based on the solution suggested for conflicts of classification of 
partnerships contained in the Partnership Report. According to Danon, if these solutions 
correctly reflect the contextual meaning of the terms “paid to” or “derived by”, they may be 
applied to trusts.1518 The solution provided by the Partnership Report entails, in principle, 
that 
“the source State, in applying the Convention where partnerships are involved, 
should take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention is to 
be applied, the way in which an item of income arising in its jurisdiction is treated in 
the jurisdiction of the taxpayer claiming the benefits of the treaty as a resident. If 
that State ’flows through’ the income to the partner, then the partner should be 
considered liable to tax and entitled to the benefits of the Convention of the State of 
which he is a resident”.1519 
Danon argues that, in terms of the Partnership Report, a state of source should regard an 
item of income as “paid to” or “derived by” a resident of the other contracting state if this 
latter state attributes the item of income to the person claiming the DTT benefits as a 
resident.1520 Danon critically analyses the Partnership Report’s solution and concludes that 
this Report “codifies the appropriate contextual interpretation of the term ‘paid to/derived 
by’ contained in the distributive rules”.1521 He thus infers that if an item of income arises in 
the state of source, it should be regarded as “paid to” or “derived by” a resident of the other 
contracting state, if the latter state attributes the income to this resident for fiscal purposes. 
Furthermore, he opines that there is no reason why this solution cannot be applied to 
conflicts of attribution involving trusts.1522 
Wheeler describes the possibility of using the solution offered by the Partnership Report 
(namely, giving the prerogative to the residence state) in respect of conflicts of attribution, 
                                                          
1517 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 315–316. 
1518 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 317. Therefore, although there is a difference between 
conflicts of classification and conflicts of attribution, Danon is of the view that the issues posed by both 
problems are very similar. 
1519 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 53. See also Commentary on 
the OECD MTC art 1 para 6.3. 
1520 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 317. 
1521 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 323. Danon does not, however, agree with the exception 
contained in example 16 in para 124 of the OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships, on the basis that this approach is inconsistent with the principle (see ch 7.5.4.1). See also Danon 
(2014) 68 BFIT 1 11. 
1522 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 323. Salom seems to support Danon’s view that the solution 
in the Partnership Report reflects the correct interpretation of the OECD MTC and that this solution can be 
applied to other cases of conflicts of attribution, which would include trusts (Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 403–
404). See also Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 12. 
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as “attractive”.1523 However, she points out that the source state may not always be willing 
to accept the resident state’s attribution, especially if the attribution is not based on well-
known bases of attribution. Moreover, she argues that there is a qualitative difference 
between a conflict of attribution and a conflict of classification. Regarding classification, each 
state has to decide whether it wishes to tax an accumulation of persons (whether individuals 
or business structures) or assets as a taxable person under domestic law. Therefore, only 
one end of the treaty relationship is involved and therefore only the state imposing the 
liability should determine this point. However, the attribution of income deals with the 
direction of flow of income and involves the two points at each end of the flow. Therefore, 
determining the direction of the flow should not be determined by only one state (the 
resident state).1524 
Steindl and Stianstny argue that the solution provided in the Partnership Report should be 
able to provide a solution in tax avoidance situations. However, they conclude that, from a 
policy perspective, “it does not seem to be an appropriate tool to combat tax avoidance”.1525 
7.4.3 Tiebreaker 
Wheeler offers what she admits to be a new departure, namely that a tiebreaker clause be 
inserted into DTTs to resolve the competing attribution rules of the two states.1526 Such a 
tiebreaker would consist of “a hierarchy of connections between a person and income to 
determine which attribution takes priority”.1527 She concedes that this solution would only 
operate within one bilateral DTT, whereas attribution conflicts often cause triangular 
situations. However, she argues that the solution should not be dismissed for that reason 
alone as it is an inevitable result of applying a bilateral DTT to a multilateral world. She 
concludes that, although it is not perfect, this solution shows some promise.1528 
7.4.4 Attribution according to source state 
In determining its withholding tax rate, the state of source should be allowed to determine 
to whom the income is attributed. The resident state will attribute the income at the stage 
when it decides whether it will grant a tax credit or a tax exemption. Although this solution is 
simple, it does not solve the double taxation involved in certain situations and, according to 
Salom, should therefore not be supported.1529 However, this approach finds support from 
Steindl and Stiastny who argue that from a policy perspective, it is an appropriate measure 
to resolve conflicts of income allocation and, in addition, it combats tax avoidance.1530 
                                                          
1523 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 260. Wheeler also discusses the possibility of using the solution 
contained in the Partnership Report in respect of characterisation as a solution in respect of attribution 
conflicts. However, she dismisses this solution as clearly not capable of dealing with conflicts of attribution. 
1524 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 260–261. 
1525 Steindl and Stiastny (2014) 68 BFIT 112 113. 
1526 Wheeler (2005) 59 BFIT 477 488. 
1527 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 265. 
1528 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 265. 
1529 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 403. 
1530 Steindl and Stiastny (2014) 68 BFIT 112 114. 
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7.4.5 Autonomous attribution 
It has been suggested that the words in each of the distributive provisions of the OECD MTC 
(for example “paid to”) should be interpreted, so that it may be determined to whom the 
income should be attributed. Salom counters this view by arguing that the relevant words in 
each of the distributive articles do not establish to whom income should be attributed.1531 
7.4.6 Conclusion 
From the above, it may be deduced that only two of the proposed solutions are feasible:1532 
the application of the solution in the Partnership Report or the addition of a tiebreaker to 
the OECD MTC. The latter of these two solutions would involve an amendment to the OECD 
MTC and its further discussion therefore falls outside the scope of this dissertation. In the 
following paragraph the solution offered in the Partnership Report will be applied to the 
conflicts of attribution in respect of trusts in which South Africa may be involved and which 
were identified above. 
7.5 Application of the approach similar to that of the Partnership Report to trusts 
Before the solution similar to the one suggested in the Partnership Report is applied to the 
examples discussed above, a point regarding the methodology involved in such application 
should be considered. Hattingh, writing in the context of the application of DTTs to 
partnerships, asserts that such application can be very complex in circumstances where the 
tax and/or legal treatment of the partnership as a transparent or opaque entity differs 
between the two states that are parties to the DTT. He therefore suggests that a clear and 
consistent methodology be applied. The first step would be to establish the nature of the tax 
treatment under the two domestic tax systems. Thereafter, the focus shifts to the DTT to 
determine whether it changes the result that was reached when the two domestic tax 
systems were applied. Hattingh provides the steps to be followed in respect of a specific set 
of facts, but concludes that the best methodology is to start “from the source state 
perspective to establish any restrictions on its taxing rights, and working towards the 
residence country’s obligations under a Tax Treaty”.1533 Using this methodology, the solution 
similar to the one suggested in the Partnership Report will now be applied to the examples 
discussed above in which there was a conflict of attribution. 
7.5.1 Income sourced in one state, but trust, trustee, beneficiaries and settlor resident in 
the other state 
7.5.1.1 Assume that a trust that is resident in South Africa receives income from Canada. 
The trust is either a discretionary trust that distributes the income to the 
                                                          
1531 Salom (2011) 65 BFIT 394 402. 
1532 Although there is some support for the solution that involves using the source state’s attribution, this 
solution is not applied further, as this solution is not supported by the OECD. The OECD has clearly endorsed 
the solution proposed by the Partnership Report by incorporating its findings into the Commentary on the 
OECD MTC. 
1533 Hattingh (2010) 127 SALJ 38 49–50. 
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beneficiary during the same year or a vesting (fixed) trust. The beneficiary is 
resident in South Africa.1534 
It is submitted that Canada will apply its domestic law and attribute the income to 
the trust, which is resident in South Africa. It is then required to apply the DTT to 
determine whether it should restrict its taxing rights. It may then take into account, 
as part of the factual context, that South Africa attributes the income to the 
beneficiary and, accordingly, apply the DTT to regard the income as being paid to or 
derived by the beneficiary (the person to whom the resident state attributes the 
income). Hence, it is submitted, the conflict of attribution will be eliminated. 
7.5.1.2 Assume that a vesting (fixed) trust that is resident in South Africa receives income 
from the Netherlands. The beneficiary is resident in South Africa.1535 
In applying its domestic law, it is submitted that the Netherlands will attribute some 
of the income to the trust (doelvermogen). The Netherlands will then consider the 
provisions of the DTT to determine whether it must reduce its tax claim. If it takes 
the attribution of the income by South Africa to the beneficiary into account as part 
of the factual context, the Netherlands would most likely consider the income as 
paid to or derived by the beneficiary, thereby eliminating the conflict of attribution. 
7.5.1.3 Assume that a trust that is resident in South Africa receives income from the 
Netherlands.1536 The trust is a discretionary trust that either distributes the income 
to the beneficiary during the same year or accumulates the income in the hands of 
the trust. The beneficiary and the settlor is resident in South Africa.1537 
It is submitted that the Netherlands will apply its domestic law and attribute the 
income to the settlor. It may then consider the provisions of the DTT to determine 
whether it is obliged to reduce its tax claim. In applying the DTT, it may take into 
account, as part of the factual context, that South Africa attributes the income to 
the beneficiary (in the case of distribution) or the trust (in the case of 
accumulation). It may be argued that the Netherlands will, accordingly, regard the 
income as paid to or derived by the beneficiary or the trust, respectively, since the 
resident state attributes the income to the beneficiary or the trust. Hence, it is 
submitted that the conflict will be eliminated. 
                                                          
1534 This example corresponds with example 7.3.1.1. 
1535 This example corresponds with examples 7.3.1.2. 
1536 The Netherlands has entered an observation to the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD MTC in relation to 
partnerships. The observation reads as follows: “The Netherlands will adhere to the conclusions on the 
application of the Convention to partnerships incorporated in the Commentary on Article 1 and in the 
Commentary on the other relevant provisions of the Convention only, and to the extent to which it is explicitly 
so confirmed in a specific tax treaty, as a result of mutual agreement between competent authorities as meant 
in Article 25 of the Convention or as unilateral policy.” To the extent that the Netherlands does not adhere to 
the conclusions on the application of the DTT to partnerships in the Commentary, the solution suggested in 
these examples (7.5.1.2 and 7.5.1.3) will not apply.  
1537 This example corresponds with example 7.3.1.3. 
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7.5.2 Income attributed to settlor 
Assume that income is received from a Canadian source by a trust that is resident in Canada. 
The trust is either a discretionary trust (irrespective of whether it accumulates or distributes 
the income) or a vesting (fixed) trust. The settlor is resident in South Africa and all the other 
requirements of section 7(8) of the Income Tax act have been met.1538 
It is submitted that Canada will attribute the income to the trust in terms of its domestic law. 
South Africa, on the other hand, will attribute the income to the settlor in accordance with 
its domestic law. In terms of the majority view in the Partnership Report, it may be argued 
that Canada will not be obliged to limit its taxing rights as a result of the DTT. Thus it is 
submitted that the Partnership Report will not eliminate the double taxation resulting from 
the attribution conflict.1539 
7.5.3 Other selected examples 
7.5.3.1 Assume that a vesting (fixed) trust is resident in Canada. It receives income from a 
Canadian source to which a beneficiary, resident in South Africa, has a vested 
right.1540 
It is argued above that Canada will attribute the income to the trust. Canada may 
argue that the DTT with South Africa does not apply, since the trust is a Canadian 
resident and receives income from a Canadian source. South Africa will attribute the 
income to the beneficiary. According to the majority view in the Partnership Report, 
the source state (Canada) is not required to take into account the treatment of the 
income in the resident state (South Africa) in this situation, as it is expected to do 
throughout the rest of the Partnership Report. The majority was of the view that 
the situation involves a purely domestic matter and its taxing rights cannot be 
limited in terms of the DTT.1541 Hence, it is submitted that the resulting double 
taxation due to the difference in attribution is not eliminated by the Partnership 
Report. The majority’s view was incorporated into the Commentary dealing with 
this point.1542 
The minority was of the view that, even in the above situation, the source state 
(Canada) should follow the principle set out in the rest of the Partnership Report: 
that is, to take into account that South Africa attributes the income to the 
beneficiary. According to their view, Canada would, therefore, be obliged to limit its 
                                                          
1538 This example corresponds with example 7.3.2. 
1539 See example 7.5.3.1 where the views of the majority and minority in the Partnership Report are discussed 
more fully. 
1540 This example corresponds with example 7.3.3.1. 
1541 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 131. 
1542 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 1 para 6.1 reads as follows: “One issue is the effect that the application 
of the provisions of the Convention to a partnership can have on the taxation of the partners. Where a 
partnership is treated as a resident of a Contracting State, the provisions of the Convention that restrict the 
other Contracting State’s right to tax the partnership on its income do not apply to restrict that other State’s 
right to tax the partners who are its own residents on their share of the income of the partnership. Some states 
may wish to include in their conventions a provision that expressly confirms a Contracting State’s right to tax 
resident partners on their share of the income of a partnership that is treated as a resident of the other State.” 
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taxing rights. It is submitted that this view resolves the conflict of attribution and 
eliminates the double taxation which would otherwise ensue.1543 
Danon opines that the view of the majority should be rejected on the ground of 
inconsistency. He therefore supports the view of the minority.1544 Although the 
majority’s (and Danon’s) view is to be preferred, it is submitted that if a court 
attaches much weight to the Commentary it will probably follow the majority’s 
view, resulting in the conflict of attribution being left unresolved. As set out earlier, 
the Canadian courts attach an important role to the OECD Commentary as part of 
the interpretation process1545 and it is submitted that the Canadian court will 
probably follow the Commentary on this point. 
7.5.3.2 Assume that a discretionary trust is resident in Canada. It receives income from a 
South African source. The trustee decides to accumulate the income and none of 
the income is therefore distributed to the beneficiary, who is resident in the 
Netherlands. 
The DTT between South Africa and Canada applies and it is submitted that South 
Africa (which attributes the income to the trust) will be obliged to reduce its tax 
claim, while Canada (which also attributes the income to the trust) will be obliged 
to grant double taxation relief to the trust.1546 
It is most likely that the Netherlands will attribute the income received by the 
Canadian trust to the settlor. In terms of the Partnership Report, South Africa would 
be obliged to take into account the fact that the Netherlands attributes the income 
to the settlor and therefore regard the income as paid to or derived by the settlor 
for purposes of the DTT between South Africa and the Netherlands. The effect is 
thus that both treaties would apply and that South Africa’s taxing rights would be 
restricted in terms of both treaties. The lowest amount of tax allowed under the 
two treaties should be used to satisfy South Africa’s obligation.1547 
7.5.3.3 A vesting (fixed) trust resident in Canada receives income from South Africa. 
Beneficiary one is resident in Canada and beneficiary two is resident in South 
Africa.1548 
                                                          
1543 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 132. 
1544 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 322–323. See also Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 9. 
1545 See ch 4.3.4. 
1546 This example corresponds with example 7.3.3.2. 
1547 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships paras 73–74. Wheeler raises the 
concern that double attribution caused by anti-avoidance legislation, which leads to a claim for double treaty 
relief, might be too generous by the source state. She concludes, however, that it would be impossible to 
distinguish the causes of double attribution. She argues that double attribution in cross-border situations can 
be divided into two constellations. In one of these constellations the income is sourced from a third state and 
there are two states that each attributes the income to a resident of theirs. This constellation is similar to the 
factual situation in the example under discussion. Wheeler states that the source state must make a choice 
between the two attributions (and gives an example of a French case in which this was done) or giving benefits 
under two treaties (Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 278). 
1548 This example corresponds with example 7.3.3.3. 
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It is submitted that in terms of the majority view in the Partnership Report,1549 
South Africa will be entitled to tax beneficiary two, since it is taxing him or her on 
the basis of residence. South Africa will, however, be obliged to grant relief from 
double taxation to beneficiary two, thereby minimizing double taxation.1550 The 
majority’s view was incorporated into the Commentary dealing with this point.1551 
If the minority view1552 were to apply, it may be argued that South Africa would be 
obliged to take into account that Canada attributes the income to the trust. 
Accordingly, South Africa would be obliged to limit its taxing rigths in accordance 
with the DTT and Canada will be obliged to grant relief from double taxation to the 
trust. Hence the conflict of attribution will be avoided, with the result that double 
taxation will be eliminated. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The attribution of income involves the connection between an item of income and a specific 
taxpayer. One of the conditions for the application of the OECD MTC is that income must be 
attributed to a taxpayer. The various distributive rules in the OECD MTC use different words 
to connote this attribution. Yet, the OECD MTC itself does not contain any attribution 
principles and it is left to the domestic law of each state to determine how income will be 
attributed to taxpayers. Because these rules can differ from one state to another, conflicts of 
attribution can arise. 
The majority of academic authors agree that conflicts of attribution should be resolved. One 
of the ways to solve conflicts of attribution is through the application of the principles 
contained in the Partnership Report. The main principle of the Report entails that the source 
state should take into account the way in which an item of income is treated in the resident 
state. It has been argued that this solution can also be applied to trusts, with the result that 
the state of source of an item should regard it as “paid to” or “derived by” a resident of the 
other contracting state (whether it be the trust, the trustee, the beneficiary or the settlor), if 
the latter state attributes the income to this resident for fiscal purposes. 
Various examples of attribution conflicts between South Africa and the other relevant states 
discussed in this dissertation were given in this chapter. In relatively simple fact patterns, for 
instance, where the trust, trustee, beneficiary and settlor are resident in the same state, but 
income is received from another state, conflicts of attribution are often unproblematic. 
However, as the examples discussed in this dissertation illustrate, even under these 
circumstances conflicts of attribution may lead to double taxation. Further examples, which 
still used relatively uncomplicated fact patterns, but which are often found in trust 
structures, were also used to illustrate how conflicts of attribution can lead to double 
taxation. 
                                                          
1549 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 127. 
1550 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 129. However, Danon is of 
the view that South Africa’s obligation to provide relief from double taxation in these circumstances is limited 
to partnerships and cannot be applied to trusts, presumably because the trust cannot be viewed as the 
beneficiary’s permanent establishment (Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 9). 
1551 See example 7.5.3.1. 
1552 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 126. 
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It is submitted that the conflicts of attribution found in the examples discussed in this 
dissertation were caused by (a) the different treatment by states of trusts for tax purposes, 
namely either as transparent or opaque1553 and (b) states’ specific attribution rules that 
attribute the income to the settlor.1554 
Many of these conflicts of attribution1555 can be solved if the solution set out in the 
Partnership Report is applied to the trusts and participants to the trusts in question. 
Although the examples used in this chapter contain fairly simple fact patterns, it is submitted 
that they illustrate that the solution suggested in the Partnership Report can be applied to 
resolve conflicts of attribution involving trusts. Although this approach will not solve all the 
conflicts of attribution involving trusts (as was illustrated, for instance, in examples 7.5.4 and 
7.5.5.1),1556 it is consistent with the solution already used in respect of partnerships (which is 
endorsed by the OECD). It is therefore submitted that, in practice, the Partnership Report 
should be used as guidance to resolve conflicts of attribution in relation to trusts, including 
in instances where more complex fact patterns may be encountered. In this regard, the use 
of a clear methodology is supported. 
  
                                                          
1553 See examples 7.3.1.1 and 7.3.1.2 and 7.3.3.3. 
1554 See examples 7.3.1.3, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3.2. 
1555 If the minority view in the Partnership Report is adopted in examples 7.5.2, 7.5.3.1 and 7.5.3.3 the conflicts 
of attribution will also be resolved by the application of the Partnership Report.  
1556 See also Danon (2014) 68 BFIT 1 10–11. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Articles 10, 111557 and 121558 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC), which deal with dividends, interest and 
royalties, respectively, use the term beneficial owner as part of the requirement for relief in 
terms of the article. For example, articles 10(1) and (2) of the OECD MTC read as follows: 
“(1) Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
(2) However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the 
company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that 
State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other 
Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a 
company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per 
cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends; 
(b) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases. 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle 
the mode of application of these limitations. This paragraph shall not affect the 
taxation of the company in respect of the profits out of which the dividends are paid.” 
In all three of the articles, a resident may only qualify for relief if that resident is also the 
beneficial owner1559 of the relevant income. Trusts (or trustees) claiming relief in terms of 
these provisions would therefore have to show that they are the beneficial owners of the 
relevant income. 
The requirement that the resident claiming relief is also the beneficial owner was inserted 
into the text of all three of the articles in 1977.1560 The purpose of inserting the provision 
was to curb treaty shopping.1561 The term beneficial ownership is not defined in the OECD 
                                                          
1557 Articles 11(1) and (2) read as follows: “(1) Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of 
the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. (2) However, such interest may also be taxed in 
the Contracting State in which it arises and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of 
the interest is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed 10 per cent of the 
gross amount of the interest. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement 
settle the mode of application of this limitation.” 
1558 Article 12(1) reads as follows: “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident 
of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State”. 
1559 In this dissertation the terms beneficial owner and beneficial ownership are used interchangeably as it is 
submitted that these terms mean the same thing. This view is shared by Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax 
Treaties 75 76. Strictly speaking beneficial ownership is not a term, but a concept. However, the word “term” 
was used in other parts of this dissertation (eg ch 5) in relation to other words in the OECD MTC and, for the 
sake of consistency and convenience, this is continued in relation to beneficial ownership. 
1560 The term was, however, used in earlier treaties (Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 28). 
1561 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 10B–09; Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 561; Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke 
on International Tax para 9.1. Treaty shopping is defined as follows: “Treaty shopping has been described as 
the situation where a person who is not entitled to the benefits of a treaty makes use – in the widest meaning 
of the word – of an individual or of a legal person in order to obtain those treaty benefits that are not available 
directly” (Larking IBFD International Tax Glossary 426). However, according to Schwarz the purpose of the 
introduction of the beneficial ownership concept is obscure (Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 309). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
249 
MTC or in the Commentary and it is rarely defined in actual tax treaties.1562 However, the 
meaning of the term has been uncertain right from the start.1563 Until recently, there were 
no documents (other than the official OECD material, such as the OECD MTC, Commentary 
and Reports) available to indicate the intended meaning of the term and very little to 
indicate why this term was chosen.1564 However, according to Du Toit, certain recently 
released OECD material indicates that “[a]t the very least, though, there is strong evidence 
that the OECD borrowed the notion of beneficial ownership from the common law states to 
be used as a treaty concept and there does not appear to be any evidence negating such a 
view”.1565 Vann has studied these materials extensively and argues that Working Party 27 
(who was responsible for the introduction of the term) intended to address only the 
question of agents and nominees. It never intended to address the problems of conduit and 
holding companies and the attribution of income.1566 Furthermore, by studying the reports 
by Working Party 21 (which dealt with abuse of treaties), Vann concludes that there is no 
historical justification for the view that beneficial ownership deals with conduit 
companies.1567 
The most important reason for the disagreement regarding the meaning of the term is that it 
is used in Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) between states with different legal systems, for 
example, between common law and civil law states. The term is well-known in common law 
states, but less familiar in civil law states.1568 Yet, even in common law states there seems to 
be no conclusive and settled definition of the term.1569 
It should be borne in mind that in a DTT context, the beneficial owner test is applied by the 
state of source, according to that state’s law, since it is the state of source that has to decide 
whether treaty benefits should be granted.1570 In this regard, if South Africa or Canada is the 
source state, it will have to consider whether a trust, that claims relief in terms of a DTT, will 
be regarded as the beneficial owner.1571 If the United Kingdom is the state of source, it will 
have to determine whether the trustee, claiming relief in terms of a DTT, can be regarded as 
the beneficial owner. In general, neither the trustee, nor the trust is taxable in the 
Netherlands and therefore the beneficial owner requirement will not be applied to either of 
these in the Netherlands. 
The meaning of the term beneficial ownership has elicited much debate over the years and 
many authors have commented on its meaning. The purpose of the discussion in this chapter 
is primarily to ascertain whether a trust (or trustee) may be regarded as a beneficial owner. 
This will be done against the background of an overview of the existing views and case law 
on the meaning of the term. The chapter starts off by considering some of the difficulties 
                                                          
1562 Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 44. 
1563 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 27; Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital 10B–09; Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 60. 
1564 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 29; Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts 
with Particular References to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 327. 
1565 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 503. 
1566 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 19. 
1567 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 26. 
1568 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 500. 
1569 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 502. 
1570 Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 76. In the same vein, see Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 80. 
1571 The trust is regarded as a taxpayer in both South Africa and Canada. See chs 3.2.1, 3.4.1 and 6.2.2.2. 
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surrounding the interpretation of the term, the prime question being whether a domestic 
law meaning or a meaning in accordance with the context of the DTT should be attached to 
the term. Next, the OECD Commentary on the meaning of the term is discussed, followed by 
an examination of the eminent cases pronouncing on its meaning. The views of academic 
authors are also briefly discussed. An analysis of these sources shows that there are a 
number of views regarding the meaning of the term: One view is that only agents and 
nominees are excluded from the beneficial ownership concept. Another view is that other 
entities should also be excluded from the beneficial owner concept, but the question then 
becomes how to determine which other entities should be excluded. In this regard, one view 
focusses on the attributes of ownership (or some of these attributes). Another view states 
that the term excludes any conduit which, although it is the formal owner, has very narrow 
powers which render it a mere fiduciary or administrator. It is furthermore uncertain 
whether the practical (or economic) effect of the transaction should be taken into account, 
or only the parties’ legal obligations. A further view holds that the beneficial ownership 
requirement functions as a broad anti-avoidance tool and should be interpreted accordingly. 
Once these views have been considered, the focus shifts to trusts, starting with a review of 
the opinions of academic authors on whether a trust (or a trustee) can be a beneficial 
owner. Following certain selected passages from case law dealing specifically with trusts (or 
trustees) and the beneficial ownership requirement, the OECD’s revised proposals for the 
amendment of the Commentary in relation to trusts and beneficial ownership are discussed. 
These perspectives are used to formulate a view on whether a trust(ee) may be regarded as 
the beneficial owner for purposes of a DTT. 
8.2 Difficulties surrounding the interpretation of beneficial ownership 
8.2.1 Domestic law meaning or meaning in accordance with the context of the DTT? 
The starting point of the debate on the meaning of beneficial ownership is whether it is to be 
accorded a particular treaty meaning, or whether its meaning is to be determined in terms 
of domestic law, in accordance with article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. The provisions of article 
3(2) were discussed earlier in this dissertation.1572 It is, however, convenient to repeat the 
text of that provision: 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any 
term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the 
meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the 
taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of 
that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State.” 
The article therefore provides that an undefined term will have the meaning under the tax 
laws (or if there is no such meaning in tax law, the meaning under any other law) of the state 
applying the treaty. If, however, the context requires otherwise, this domestic tax law 
meaning will not apply. 
Assuming for the moment that the domestic law meaning of the state applying the treaty 
should be applied, a question that arises is whether a state that does not use the term in its 
                                                          
1572 See ch 5.2.6. 
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domestic law, may define that term; or whether a state that does use the term in its 
domestic law, may expand that term. This question therefore asks whether states may use 
the term beneficial ownership to legislate their own anti-avoidance rules.1573 Academic 
authors disagree on whether domestic anti-avoidance legislation may be applied to DTTs.1574 
The OECD in its Commentary states that domestic anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic 
domestic rules for determining which facts give rise to tax liability. As these rules are not 
addressed in DTTs, they are not affected by DTTs. The OECD therefore maintains that there 
is no conflict between domestic anti-avoidance legislation and tax treaties.1575 The 
Commentary does, however, point out that countries should carefully observe the specific 
obligations enshrined in DTTs to relieve double taxation as long as there is no clear evidence 
that the treaties are being abused.1576 In the new proposed Commentary on beneficial 
ownership in articles 10, 11 and 12, it is stated that other ways of addressing conduit 
company and treaty shopping situations, such as anti-abuse provisions in treaties, general 
anti-abuse rules and substance over form or economic substance approaches, may be used 
in addition to the beneficial ownership requirement. The beneficial ownership requirement 
should not be seen as restricting these approaches in any way.1577 
Oliver raises a number of arguments to support his view that the domestic law meaning of 
the term should not be used:1578 
(a) The term beneficial ownership is used in a number of places throughout articles 10, 11 
and 12 and not only in sub-article 1. Because the term is used in several different ways 
in the same article, it is arguable that it was recognised that using a variety of domestic 
interpretations would be unproductive. 
(b) The Commentary provide some indication of what is meant by the term and it is 
possible that the domestic law meaning may not correspond with indications in the 
Commentary. 
(c) Some states do not have a meaning for the term beneficial owner and it is unlikely that 
the drafters of the OECD MTC would have been unaware of the fact that in some 
situations the term may have no meaning at all. 
(d) If both contracting states have a meaning for the term, these meanings may differ, 
resulting a dispute as to whether a person is a beneficial owner. 
(e) A different part of the Commentary to article 11 states that in the OECD references to 
domestic laws should as far as possible be avoided. 
                                                          
1573 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 43. 
1574 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 44. 
1575 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 1 para 22.1. 
1576 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 1 para 22.2. 
1577 OECD OECD Model Tax Convention: Revised Proposal Concerning the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 proposed new Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12.5. These proposals are 
dealt with in ch 8.3. 
1578 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 47–49. 
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(f) The term beneficial owner was understood by the drafters to prevent, to some extent 
at least, treaty shopping. That again suggests the desire, the need and the intention to 
have a uniform understanding of what the term means. 
(g) The term enterprise is also undefined, but the Commentary makes it clear that the 
domestic law meaning should be used. This is contrasted to the term beneficial owner 
where the Commentary is silent on the use of the domestic law meaning, the inference 
being that the term is intended to have a treaty meaning and not a domestic law 
meaning. 
Baker agrees that the domestic law meaning of the term should not be used and supports 
the use of an international fiscal meaning.1579 Vogel also argues that the domestic law of the 
state applying the treaty cannot be used to interpret the term because none of the national 
systems which he considered offer a precise definition of the term. The term should 
therefore be “interpreted with reference to the context of the treaty, and particularly with a 
view to the purpose pursued by the restriction”.1580 It has, indeed, been stated that it is 
widely accepted that the term should be interpreted in the context of DTTs (and therefore 
not in terms of domestic law).1581 
Du Toit contends that in cases where the term does not form part of the domestic law of 
both contracting states, the domestic law meaning cannot be applied in terms of article 3(2). 
However, where the term forms part of the domestic law of both states, the domestic law 
meaning can, arguably, be applied. Nevertheless, even in these cases, it may be argued that 
the term should be given an international fiscal meaning, because the term has its genesis in 
DTTs and, thus, the context requires that the domestic law meaning should not apply. He 
adds that it may not make a big difference whether the domestic law of the states that use 
this term or the international meaning is applied, since the two meanings may be similar.1582 
The current OECD Commentary, which states that the term is not used in a narrow technical 
sense, but that it should rather be understood in its context and in light of the object and 
purposes of the Convention, suggests that an international fiscal meaning should be 
used.1583 The OECD’s proposed amendments to the Commentary on beneficial ownership 
also indicate that the domestic law meaning should be disregarded and that an 
interpretation in accordance with the context of the DTT should be followed.1584 
                                                          
1579 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 10B–13–10B–14. 
1580 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 562. 
1581 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 329. Other academic authors who support the use of an 
international fiscal meaning (as opposed to a domestic tax law meaning) include Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 
70; Jezzi (2010) 64 BFIT 253 254; Danon (2011) 65 BFIT 437 438; De Broe International Tax Planning and 
Prevention of Abuse: A Study under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law In Relation to Conduit and Base 
Companies 662–675; Oguttu (2007) XL CILSA 237 251 and Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 75. 
However, Schwarz is of the view that the domestic law meaning of the term should be applied, at least where 
United Kingdom tax is concerned (Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 310). 
1582 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 177–178. 
1583 Eg Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12.1. Danon (2011) 65 BFIT 437 438. 
1584 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 701. 
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Case law also indicates that an international fiscal meaning should be attached to the term. 
In the United Kingdom case of Indofood, the court confirmed the view that the term 
beneficial ownership should be given “an international fiscal meaning not derived from the 
domestic laws of contracting states”.1585 From the Canadian decision in Alberta Power (2000) 
Inc v Her Majesty the Queen the impression is gained that there is no distinction between 
the meaning of beneficial ownership in terms of domestic legislation and in terms of a 
DTT.1586 In the Canadian Prévost decision, the court stated that its formulation was in 
accordance with the OECD Commentary and the Conduit Companies Report.1587 It is 
submitted that this statement indicates the court’s intention to use an international fiscal 
meaning, rather than a domestic law meaning.1588 According to Smit,1589 the Netherlands 
Supreme Court interpreted the term beneficial owner in an autonomous fashion in the 
“market maker” case.1590 
The following paragraphs survey the view of each of the states discussed in this dissertation 
regarding the question whether the domestic law meaning or the international fiscal 
meaning of the term should be used. For the sake of completeness, the domestic law 
meaning, if any, in the relevant states is briefly outlined. 
8.2.1.1 South Africa 
There is no South African case dealing specifically with the meaning of the term in a DTT.1591 
Furthermore, the term is not defined in any of the treaties entered into by South Africa. For 
these reasons, Du Toit and Hattingh suggest that “for purposes of determining the meaning 
of beneficial ownership for purposes of double tax conventions to which South Africa is a 
party the international tax language meaning of the term should be adopted”.1592 Olivier and 
Honiball agree, stating that South Africa, by concluding DTTs containing the term, knowing 
that no domestic tax law meaning exists, intended that an international fiscal meaning must 
apply.1593 
Regarding the meaning of the term in South African domestic law, the first point to 
recognise is that South Africa is regarded as a mixed legal system, not a common law 
system.1594 Hence, the concept of beneficial ownership, as found in states with a common 
law system, is not embedded in the South African legal system.1595 It is therefore necessary 
                                                          
1585 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 42. This point 
was supported by a Danish case (Hansen et al (2013) 67 BFIT 192 para 3.2). According to Baker, the court in the 
Indofood case was considering the meaning of beneficial owner as applicable to all states, and not just to 
Indonesia (Baker in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 32). 
1586 Alberta Power (2000) Ltd v Her Majesty the Queen 2009 TCC 412 para 67. 
1587 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 14. 
1588 Some authors claim that it is not clear whether the court adopted a domestic law meaning, some sort of 
internationally accepted meaning or a combination of both (De Broe et al (2011) 65 BFIT 375 388). Others state 
that the court applied the meaning under Canadian law (Arnold in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 48).  
1589 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 65. 
1590 Hoge Raad 6 April 1994 No 28 638 BNB 1994/217. This case is often referred to as the “market maker” 
case.  
1591 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.1. 
1592 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.4. 
1593 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 548. 
1594 See ch 2.2.4. 
1595 Olivier and Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 543. 
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to examine specific areas of the law (statute and cases) to determine whether the concept of 
beneficial ownership has a meaning in South African law. 
From a trust law perspective, it is important to note again that the dual ownership concept 
does not form part of South African law. The trustees are the legal owners of the trust 
property, but they have no beneficial interest in it. They are, however, bound to hold and 
apply the trust property for the benefit of a person(s) or for some other purpose. The terms 
beneficial owner and legal owner are sometimes used in relation to a beneficiary and trustee 
respectively,1596 but it is submitted that these terms are used to explain the relationship 
between the parties and not to describe different types of ownership.1597 It seems as though 
Du Toit and Hattingh support this point when they state that the distinction between legal 
and beneficial ownership in a trust context is “a description of the legal situation”, but that 
the parties’ legal rights and duties (and therefore the legal consequences) are not 
determined by the use of these terms, but rather by the relevant trust deed.1598 
Du Toit and Hattingh also examine the use of the term beneficial owner in cases1599 dealing 
with the procedural enforcement of the rights of principals of nominee shareholders. These 
principals are sometimes referred to as beneficial owners of the shares. The authors state 
that: 
“The conclusion to be drawn from the authorities is that the legal consequences of 
using beneficial ownership in the descriptive sense encountered in Ocean Commodities 
and Oakland Nominees is only procedural in nature. At most, one can say that a 
‘beneficial owner’ of shares have a quasi vindicatory action in law that operates 
against not only the nominee and the company in which the shares are held by the 
nominee, but also against third parties that seek to claim entitlement to those shares. 
And this is really the only similarity with a real right that one can identify. It is clear 
from the court’s reasoning that, apart from the procedural rights of a shareholder that 
makes use of a nominee, the description of ‘beneficial owner of shares’ designate only 
a binary situation because it ‘denote[s] the person in whom, as between himself and 
the registered shareholder, the benefit of the bundle of rights constituting the share 
vests’. In all other relevant respects, one must conclude that beneficial ownership is 
only a description of situations involving personal rights and has no independent legal 
meaning.”1600 
The authors further examine South African tax statutes in order to determine whether a 
South African meaning of the term can be found. Although the Securities Transfer Tax Act 
refers to the term, it is not defined in that Act. The Uncertified Securities Tax Act, which did 
contain a definition of the term, has been repealed. Therefore, these two statutes cannot be 
of assistance in determining the meaning of the term. The Income Tax Act now contains a 
definition of the term beneficial owner for purposes of the dividends tax. It reads that the 
beneficial owner “means the person entitled to the benefit of the dividend attaching to a 
                                                          
1596 See eg Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd 2007 2 SA 570 (SCA). 
1597 See ch 2.2.4 for a detailed discussion of the ownership of trust assets.  
1598 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.10. 
1599 Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) and Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A). 
1600 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax par 9.10. 
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share”.1601 According to Du Toit and Hattingh,1602 it may be argued that this definition has no 
effect on treaties that were concluded prior to the introduction of the dividends tax and that 
contain an article 3(2) patterned on the pre-1995 version of that article in the OECD MTC. 
The pre-1995 version of that article did not refer to the domestic law at the time that the 
DTT is applied and it is often argued (but not universally accepted) that in such a case, the 
domestic law meaning of the term at the time that the treaty was entered into should 
apply.1603 These authors also argue that it would be undesirable for the definition of 
beneficial owner, for the dividends tax purposes, to be used in relation to dividends under 
the treaty, whilst other definitions are used in relation to interest and royalties under the 
same treaty.1604 This point is reinforced if one takes into account that the provision 
containing the dividends tax definition specifically states that it applies only to the part of 
the Income Tax Act relating to the dividends tax.1605 
The Companies Act does not use the term beneficial owner. Rather, it uses the term 
“beneficial interest” and provides that, to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise, a company’s issued securities may be held by, and 
registered in the name of, one person for the beneficial interest of another person.1606 The 
Companies Act defines the term “beneficial interest” as follows: 
“[W]hen used in relation to a company’s securities, [it] means the right or entitlement 
of a person, through ownership, agreement, relationship or otherwise, alone or 
together with another person to  – 
(a) receive or participate in any distribution in respect of the company’s securities; 
(b) exercise or cause to be exercised, in the ordinary course, any or all of the rights 
attaching to the company’s securities; or 
(c) dispose or direct the disposition of the company’s securities, or any part of a 
distribution in respect of the securities, 
but does not include any interest held by a person in a unit trust or collective 
investment scheme in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Act, 2002 (Act No. 
45 of 2002).”1607 
In addition, the Companies Act lists a number of circumstances under which a person will be 
regarded as having a beneficial interest in a security of a public company.1608 Certain 
disclosure requirements are imposed in respect of securities in which a beneficial interest is 
held1609 and other matters are regulated.1610 
                                                          
1601 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 64D. 
1602 The authors made their comments before the dividends tax came into force, but it is submitted that their 
comments are still valid as the definition of beneficial owner was not amended since their comments were 
made and the structure of the tax did not change substantially either. 
1603 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.11. 
1604 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.13. 
1605 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 64D. Support for this argument may be found in Olivier and Honiball 
International Tax: a South African Perspective 544. These authors state that the concept of beneficial owner is 
not generally found in statute law despite the inclusion of a definition for purposes of the dividends tax. 
1606 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 56(1). 
1607 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1. 
1608 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 56(2); Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 251. 
1609 Companies Act 71 of 2008 ss 56(3)–(7). 
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It is submitted that the definition in the Companies Act cannot be considered the South 
African domestic law meaning of the term for purposes of applying an article such as article 
3(2) of the OECD MTC. The obvious formal point to make is that the terms (beneficial owner 
and beneficial interest) are not identical and may indicate that the beneficial owner concept 
does not form part of the South African Companies Act. A stronger argument is that the 
Companies Act itself states that the definition of beneficial interest applies only for the 
purposes of that Act. In situations in which the Companies Act does not apply, for example, 
where there are no securities involved (such as a back-to-back loan, or a royalty structure) 
the definition will not apply and even if it is applied, may be very difficult to apply sensibly. 
Furthermore, the definition in the Companies Act clearly relates to the beneficial interest in 
a security and not the beneficial interest in the income from the share (that is, the dividend). 
In addition, the point made by Du Toit and Hattingh in respect of DTTs patterned on the pre-
1995 OECD Model, applies equally to the Companies Act definition. 
From the above it is concluded that there is no meaning in South African law that may be 
used for purposes of a domestic law meaning of the term as required by article 3(2) of the 
OECD MTC. If this conclusion is correct, then, applying Du Toit’s view that where the term 
does not form part of the domestic law of both contracting states, the domestic law 
meaning cannot be applied in terms of article 3(2), it may be argued that an international 
fiscal meaning will always be applied in treaties to which South Africa is a party. 
8.2.1.2 United Kingdom 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is of the view that the meaning of beneficial 
ownership “is not limited to the meaning that it might have under the domestic law of a 
state (such as in the context of UK trust law), rather in the context of treaties it should be 
given an ‘international fiscal meaning’”.1611 It is also submitted that the Indofood1612 
decision, confirming that an international fiscal meaning should be given to the term, will 
have strong persuasive value in the United Kingdom. However, Schwarz argues that this 
decision was based on what an Indonesian tax court would have decided in circumstances 
where there was no legal meaning of the term and that the court therefore “had no choice 
but to rely on international interpretative techniques”.1613 
Relying on the Indofood case, HMRC states that if a person does not have the full privilege to 
directly benefit from the income, he or she must be under an obligation to pass that income 
on to another person. This obligation might be found in legal documents, but also by looking 
at the commercial and practical substance of an arrangement. All aspects of an arrangement 
should therefore be examined and not just its legal form. If an obligation to pass income on 
exists, it is irrelevant that the character of the income has changed. Furthermore, the fact 
that income is not passed on immediately, does not indicate that the recipient is the 
beneficial owner. When considering whether there is an obligation to pass on an item of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1610 Eg Companies Act 71 of 2008 ss 56(8)–(11) 
1611 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs International Manual para INTM504030. 
1612 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158. This case is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
1613 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 310–311. 
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income, it should be borne in mind that the obligation must be specific to the payment 
received.1614 
Du Toit and Hattingh quote the following passages from the case law in the United Kingdom 
to sum up the meaning of the term in the United Kingdom.1615 
In Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd the court held that 
“the concept of legal ownership of property, which did not carry with it the right of the 
owner to enjoy the fruits of it or dispose of it for his own benefit, owed its origin to the 
Court of Chancery. The archetype is the trust. The ‘legal ownership’ of the trust 
property is in the trustee, but he holds it not for his own benefit but for the benefit of 
the cestui que trustent or beneficiaries. On the creation of a trust in the strict sense as 
it was developed by equity the full ownership in the trust property was split into two 
constituent elements, which became vested in different persons: the ‘legal ownership’ 
in the trustee, and what came to be called the ‘beneficial ownership’ in the cestui que 
trust.”1616 
In Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) the court stated that beneficial 
ownership meant 
“[a]n ownership which is not merely the legal ownership by the mere fact of being on 
the register but the right at least to some extent to deal with the property as your 
own.”1617 
Regarding beneficial ownership, it was stated in J Sainsbury plc v O’Connor (Inspector of 
Taxes): 
“It means ownership for your own benefit as opposed to ownership as trustee for 
another. It exists either where there is no division of legal and beneficial ownership or 
where legal ownership is vested in one person and the beneficial ownership … in 
another.”1618 
Other authors1619 refer also to Parway Estates Ltd v IRC,1620 where a purchaser of shares in 
an unconditional contract for the sale of shares was held to be the equitable owner of the 
shares after the execution of the contract, but before completion thereof. In English Sewing 
Cotton Company Ltd v IRC1621 the court held that a mortgagor remained the beneficial owner 
of the mortgaged property. 
After considering the relevant case law, Roland concludes as follows regarding the meaning 
of beneficial ownership in the United Kingdom: 
                                                          
1614 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs International Manual para INTM504030. 
1615 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.5. 
1616 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1975] STC 345 HL 349. 
1617 Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) (1968) 45 TC 112 CA 132–133. 
1618 J Sainsbury plc v O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) [1991] STC 318 CA 330. 
1619 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 314–315 and Rowland (1997) 3 BTR 178 184–185. 
1620 Parway Estates Ltd v IRC (1958) 45 TC 135. 
1621 English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd v IRC [1947] 1 All ER 679. 
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“It is reasonably clear that this is the bundle of rights required to allow enjoyment of 
an asset by the owner but falling short of, or distinct from, legal title. It is generally 
where the real value in an asset lies even though a transfer of the legal title will be 
required in some cases for official recognition of ownership. It is less clear whether 
beneficial ownership is the same as equitable ownership.”1622 
8.2.1.3 Canada 
It is submitted that the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, in Prévost, by stating that its 
formulation of the beneficial ownership test was in accordance with the OECD Commentary 
and the Conduit Companies Report,1623 indicates the court’s intention to use an international 
fiscal meaning, rather than a domestic law meaning. 
The Income Tax Act1624 does not define the term beneficial ownership, a point acknowledged 
by the Federal Court of Appeal in Prévost.1625 According to some authors, there is no 
domestic tax law meaning of the term.1626 Brown argues convincingly that the terms 
beneficial owner, beneficial ownership or beneficially owned may have multiple meanings in 
the Income Tax Act, or the meaning may change depending on the provision at issue.1627 
Brender states that there is no consensus on the meaning of beneficial ownership in 
common law.1628 
In Alberta Power (2000) Ltd v Her Majesty the Queen,1629 the court cited a number of cases 
pronouncing on the meaning of beneficial ownership. For example, in Williams v R1630 the 
court stated that the term should be given its ordinary meaning consistent with the scheme 
of the Act and quoted the dictionary meaning of the term. In Larose (M) v MNR the court 
held the meaning of the term to be as follows: 
“A property is deemed to be beneficially owned when one person assesses the three 
attributes of the ownership of property (usus, fructus, abusus) or when a property is 
subject to a usufruct, an emphyteutic lease or a servitude.”1631 
Du Toit refers to a number of court cases to illustrate the meaning of the term in Canadian 
law: 
“Couture C.J. in Fortin & Moreau Inc. c. Ministre du Revenu national, describes the 
beneficial owner of property as the one to whom ownership belongs subsequent to a 
transaction (when the purchaser has all incidents of title, such as possession, use and 
risk, although legal title may remain in the vendor as security), but who will receive 
title to the property at a later date. According to Marceau J.A. in Mount Royal/Walsh 
                                                          
1622 Rowland (1997) 3 BTR 178 186. 
1623 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 14. 
1624 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1. 
1625 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 8. 
1626 Bernstein (2011) 63 Thoughts on the OECD Discussion Paper on Beneficial Ownership 49 49. 
1627 Brown (2003) 51 Canadian Tax Journal 402  
1628 Brender (2003) 51 Canadian Tax Journal 311 315. 
1629 Alberta Power (2000) Ltd v Her Majesty the Queen 2009 TCC 412. 
1630 Williams v R 2005 TCC 558. 
1631 Larose (M) v MNR [1992] 2 CTC 2339. 
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Inc. v Ship ‘Jensin Star’ et al, the expression ‘beneficial owner’ serves to include 
someone who stands behind the registered owner in situations where the latter 
functions merely as an intermediary, like a trustee, a legal representative, or an 
agent.”1632 
In terms of these cases, the attributes of ownership determine who the beneficial owner is. 
Furthermore, these cases suggest that a trustee will not usually be regarded as the beneficial 
owner. 
8.2.1.4 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands government is of the view that beneficial ownership should be given a 
meaning in terms of domestic law.1633 This may be contrasted to the view expressed by Smit 
that the Dutch Supreme Court in the “market maker” case1634 interpreted the term in an 
autonomous fashion, because it referred neither to domestic law, nor to the relevant 
Commentary.1635 
Since 2001, the Wet op de dividendbelasting contains a negative definition of the term 
beneficial owner.1636 The definition is summarised by Smit as follows: 
“The receiver of the dividends cannot be regarded as the beneficial owner if the 
following conditions are met: 
- the recipient of the dividends entered into a set of transaction with the original 
shareholder; 
- as part of a sequence of transactions whereby the original shareholder receives 
proceeds replacing the dividends; 
- the recipient of the dividends is entitled to a reduced rate of Netherlands 
dividend withholding tax, i.e. is in an improved Netherlands dividend withholding 
tax position; and 
                                                          
1632 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 129–130. Original footnotes were omitted 
in this quotation. 
1633 De Broe et al (2011) 65 BFIT 375 388. 
1634 Hoge Raad 6 April 1994 No 28 638 BNB 1994/217. 
1635 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 65. 
1636 Wet op de dividendbelasting 1965 s 4(7) reads as follows: “Voor het achterwege laten van de inhouding van 
dividendbelasting ingevolge dit artikel, een teruggaaf van dividendbelasting ingevolge artikel 10, alsmede het 
achterwege laten dan wel een vermindering of teruggaaf van dividendbelasting ingevolge de Belastingregeling 
voor het Koninkrijk, de Belastingregeling voor het land Nederland of een door Nederland gesloten verdrag ter 
voorkoming van dubbele belasting, wordt niet als uiteindelijk gerechtigde beschouwd degene die in samenhang 
met de genoten opbrengst een tegenprestatie heeft verricht als onderdeel van een samenstel van transacties 
waarbij aannemelijk is dat: a. de opbrengst geheel of gedeeltelijk direct of indirect ten goede is gekomen aan: 1. 
een natuurlijke persoon of een rechtspersoon ten aanzien van wie inhouding niet achterwege mag blijven, 
terwijl dit ten aanzien van degene die de tegenprestatie heeft verricht wel mag, of 2. een natuurlijke persoon of 
rechtspersoon die in mindere mate gerechtigd is tot vermindering of teruggaaf van dividendbelasting dan 
degene die de tegenprestatie heeft verricht; en b. deze natuurlijke persoon of rechtspersoon een positie in 
aandelen, winstbewijzen of geldleningen als bedoeld in artikel 10, eerste lid, onderdeel d, van de Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting 1969 op directe of indirecte wijze behoudt of verkrijgt die vergelijkbaar is met zijn 
positie in soortgelijke aandelen, winstbewijzen of geldleningen voorafgaand aan het moment waarop het 
samenstel van transacties een aanvang heeft genomen.” 
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- the original shareholder (directly or indirectly) hold or acquires an interest in the 
distributing entity that is equal or almost entirely equal to the interest it held 
before the set of transactions.”1637 
However, Van Weeghel and De Boer question whether a Dutch court will apply this statutory 
definition of beneficial owner in a dividend stripping situation, because DTTs in the 
Netherlands supersede domestic laws that are in contravention of the treaty provisions.1638 
This sentiment is echoed by Smit.1639 
The “market maker” case suggests that if a person has the free disposal of the income and 
does not act as agent or nominee for another, that person will be the beneficial owner for 
purposes of a DTT.1640 It is disputed in the academic literature whether this case restricts the 
beneficial owner concept to agents and nominees (that is, a strict interpretation) or whether 
it may also include other relationships as well (that is, a more economic approach).1641 In any 
event, if the statutory definition of beneficial owner were to apply to the facts of the 
“market maker” case, the stockbroker would not have qualified as the beneficial owner.1642 
8.2.2 Other difficulties 
It is uncertain whether the term serves as an attribution rule or as an anti-avoidance rule. In 
articles 10 and 11 the term is used as an anti-avoidance rule, but in article 12 it is used as an 
attribution rule. It is an open question whether the term will have different functions in 
different articles, or whether the term simply performs both functions in article 12.1643 
Articles 10 and 11 use the words “paid to” and “derived by” in addition to the term 
beneficial owner. The question that arises is whether a treaty claimant must show that 
income was both paid to (or derived by) him or her and that he or she is the beneficial 
owner. It could even be argued that it is enough for him or her to show that he or she is the 
beneficial owner1644 
8.3 The OECD Commentary on the meaning of beneficial ownership 
In 1977, when the beneficial ownership requirement was added, the Commentary provided 
that “the limitation of tax in the State of source is not available when an intermediary, such 
as an agent or nominee, is interposed between the beneficiary and the payer, unless the 
beneficial owner is a resident of the other Contracting State”. 
The Conduit Companies Report in 1986 elaborated on the meaning of the term, stating that: 
                                                          
1637 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 74. 
1638 Van Weeghel and De Boer (2006) 60 BFIT 358 364. 
1639 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 74–75. 
1640 Hoge Raad 6 April 1994 No 28 638 BNB 1994/217. This case is discussed in greater detail in ch 8.4. 
1641 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 66. 
1642 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 74. He adds that the statutory definition is much broader in 
scope than the one given by the Dutch Supreme Court. 
1643 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 257. 
1644 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 257–258. In a different contribution Wheeler opines that “The role 
of the beneficial ownership concept is clearer; it is not an attribution rule as such, but has the function of 
denying treaty benefits to persons whose connection with the income is not substantial enough” (Wheeler in 
Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: Conflicts in the Attribution of Income to a Person 57). 
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“[t]he Commentaries mention the case of a nominee or agent. The provisions would, 
however, apply also to other cases where a person enters into contracts or takes over 
obligations under which he has a similar function to those of a nominee or an agent. 
Thus a conduit company can normally not be regarded as the beneficial owner if, 
though the formal owner of certain assets, it has very narrow powers which render it a 
mere fiduciary or an administrator acting on account of the interested parties (most 
likely the shareholders of the conduit company).”1645 
Du Toit questions the role and place of this report in the interpretation of the meaning of 
the term beneficial owner, as this report was only adopted almost ten years after the 
inclusion of the term in the OECD MTC. However, he comments that the significance of the 
report lies in the extension of the persons excluded as beneficial owners, to the formal 
owners of assets, who have very narrow powers that would reduce them to mere fiduciaries 
or administrators acting on account of the interested parties.1646 Considering the whole of 
the Conduit Companies Report, Collier avers that there seemed, at that stage, “to be no wish 
or attempt to interpret the beneficial ownership test as having a broad anti-treaty shopping 
function”.1647 
The current wording of the Commentary, which was inserted in 2003, reads as follows: 
“12. The requirement of beneficial ownership was introduced in paragraph 2 of Article 
10 to clarify the meaning of the words ‘paid … to a resident’ as they are used in 
paragraph 1 of the Article. It makes plain that the State of source is not obliged to give 
up taxing rights over dividend income merely because that income was immediately 
received by a resident of a State with which the State of source had concluded a 
convention. The term beneficial owner is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, 
it should be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the 
Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
and avoidance. 
12.1 Where an item of income is received by a resident of a Contracting State acting in 
the capacity of agent or nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose 
of the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption merely on 
                                                          
1645 OECD Double Tax Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies para 14(b). Other OECD Reports also use 
the term beneficial owner. The Partnership Report briefly discusses whether certain partnerships will be 
beneficial owners (The OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships paras 54, 61, 
65, 71, 73 and 126) and the CIV Report discusses beneficial ownership in the context of collective investment 
vehicles (OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment 
vehicles paras 31–52). According to Collier neither of these reports add much to clarify the meaning of 
beneficial ownership (Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 689–692). This point is supported by the absence of these two 
reports from Du Toit’s summary of events that are considered as important developments with regard to the 
meaning of beneficial ownership (Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500). However, Vann points out that the Partnership 
Report used the beneficial ownership concept to try to resolve conflicts of attribution. He adds that this was 
never the purpose of the beneficial ownership concept and that a solution to the problem could have been 
reached without reference to beneficial ownership (Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research 
Paper 31). Regarding the CIV Report, Vann points out that if the proposals contained in the Report are to be 
regarded as a general test for beneficial ownership, it could lead to “silly” results (Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law 
School: Legal Studies Research Paper 33). 
1646 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 503. See also Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 688 and Jezzi (2010) 64 BFIT 253 253. 
1647 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 688. 
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account of the status of the immediate recipient of the income as a resident of the 
other Contracting State. The immediate recipient of the income in this situation 
qualifies as a resident but no potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that 
status since the recipient is not treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in 
the State of residence. It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of 
a Contracting State, otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply 
acts as a conduit for another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income 
concerned. For these reasons, the report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled 
‘Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies’ concludes that a 
conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the 
formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in 
relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account 
of the interested parties.”1648 
Commenting on the above passage in the Commentary, Du Toit and Hattingh point out that 
it is unclear what is meant by “conduit”. Furthermore, the Commentary does not describe 
the criteria to determine whether a “benefit” has been received or what the “practical 
matters” are which are to be considered.1649 Du Toit and Hattingh add that the reference to 
“as a practical matter” did not appear in the Commentary before 2003, nor in the Conduit 
Companies Report. They regard this phrase as important as it relates to “whether beneficial 
ownership is a legal as opposed to a practical or substance test”.1650 Panayi has no doubts 
that the Commentary follows a “substance over form” approach, using an economic test.1651 
Smit also views the Commentary as supporting a broader, economic interpretation of the 
term.1652 However, Collier queries whether the 2003 amendment to the Commentary 
introduced a “materially different standard”. He argues that the introduction of an economic 
test would have required a clearer explanation, in the light of the wording of the 
Commentary as it read before and, furthermore, that a wide economic test would have 
rendered the references to “nominee” and “agent” irrelevant.1653 Ward states that the 
interpretation suggested in the Commentary may be contrary to the Vienna Convention, 
which provides that the “ordinary meaning” of words should be determined and not the 
intention of the parties.1654 
According to Du Toit and Hattingh, the statement in the Commentary that the term should 
be interpreted in light of the object and purposes of the Convention, which include the 
prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance, is also new.1655 It has been suggested that the 
                                                          
1648 Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12–12.1. The Commentary on art 10 is used as an example here, 
although arts 11 and 12 contain similar commentary. 
1649 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 690. 
1650 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.5. 
1651 Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 45. 
1652 Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 60. 
1653 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 690. 
1654 Ward Access to Tax Treaty Benefits: Research Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of 
International Taxation 9. 
1655 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax 9.5; Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 690; Duff in Beneficial 
Ownership: Recent Trends 1 and Smit in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 60. 
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OECD, through the change in the Commentary, expanded the meaning of beneficial 
ownership to address an unspecified anti-avoidance concern.1656 
Vann argues that the Commentary tries to use the object and purpose of a DTT to combine 
agents/nominees and conduit companies, but that the policy behind each of these differs. 
More specifically, he argues that the policy behind conduit companies would, on a strict 
view, require that no juristic person could ever be a beneficial owner, since all juristic 
persons act as a conduit for individuals who ultimately receive the benefit of the income. 
This view would entail that beneficial ownership be interpreted to mean the ultimate 
economic owner, but that this had never been the intended meaning of the term. He 
continues: 
“The remedy which immediately follows taken out of the conduit company report does 
not match the policy asserted as it is much narrower in effect, similarly as for the 
different policy asserted in the conduit companies report. The problem of linking 
broad policies with tests that are much narrower in operation is that readers may 
come away with different messages which clearly is what has happened. In particular 
tax administrations seem to have focused on the asserted policy, not the much 
narrower test applicable to conduits.”1657 
The United Kingdom court in Indofood1658 and the Canadian court in Prévost1659 referred to 
this version of the Commentary, even though the actual DTTs relevant in those cases were 
entered into before these amendments to the Commentary were introducted.1660 
In April 2011 the OECD released a discussion document regarding the meaning of beneficial 
ownership in the OECD MTC1661 and, after receiving comments on the document, released a 
revised proposal in October 2012.1662 The proposed amendments to the Commentary on 
article 10 are included in an annexure to this chapter. 
Commenting on these proposed changes, Collier indicates that the OECD is signalling with its 
proposed amendments in paragraph 12.1 that, applying article 3(2), a treaty-based 
interpretation of the term should be followed, rather than an interpretation based on the 
relevant domestic law.1663 Danon commends the proposed amendments to article 12.4, 
saying that it confirms that the test of beneficial ownership should be based solely on the 
ownership attributes of the recipient of the income. However, he argues that the reference 
to the recipient’s right to use and enjoy the income is misleading. He contends that the 
                                                          
1656 Watson and Baum (2012) 60 Canadian Tax Journal 149 152. 
1657 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 30. 
1658 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158. This case is discussed 
in greater detail in ch 8.4. 
1659 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57. This case is discussed in greater detail in ch 8.4. 
1660 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 504. 
1661 OECD Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion 
Draft . 
1662 OECD OECD Model Tax Convention: Revised Proposal Concerning the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 . The OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs invited comment on this revised proposal by 15 
December 2012. These comments have been published, but the OECD has not released any further documents. 
1663 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 701. Although Collier’s comments are based on the April 2011 draft, it is submitted 
that these comments hold true for the October 2012 draft as well. 
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element of control over the attribution of income, and not the use and enjoyment thereof, is 
the crucial test. He therefore suggests that the latter element should be deleted from the 
definition of beneficial owner.1664 He also criticises the proposal for its failure to adequately 
address the issue of income attributed to a person for tax purposes, but who may not have 
any ownership attributes.1665 
What does one conclude from the review of the OECD’s Commentary regarding beneficial 
ownership? The Commentary has certainly been expanded from the one sentence added in 
1977 and it seems that the meaning that the OECD attaches to the term has expanded along 
with it. For example, the Commentary did not initially indicate whether the domestic law 
meaning or the international fiscal meaning of the term should be used. Now especially the 
proposed Commentary suggests strongly that an international fiscal meaning should be 
used. What has remained constant, though, is that agents and nominees do not qualify as 
beneficial owners. The prominent cases on beneficial owner have referred to the OECD 
Commentary, indicating the importance of the Commentary in determining the meaning of 
the term. It is submitted that the Commentary offers an international fiscal meaning of the 
term. Whether the courts will apply such a meaning, depends on the view that a court takes 
of the role and status of the Commentary. 
8.4 Case law on the meaning of beneficial ownership 
Du Toit suggests that the main issue regarding the meaning of beneficial ownership is 
whether a legal, as opposed to a factual or economic substance test, should be applied.1666 
This question should be borne in mind when the central cases on the meaning of beneficial 
ownership are discussed.1667 
                                                          
1664 Danon (2011) 65 BFIT 437 439. Although Danon’s comments were made on the OECD’s April 2011 
Discussion Draft, it is submitted that those referred to in this dissertation are equally relevant to the October 
2012 version.  
1665 Danon (2011) 65 BFIT 437 440. 
1666 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 501. 
1667 There have been other cases regarding beneficial ownership than the ones discussed in this dissertation. Du 
Toit and Hattingh list a number of these decisions, but are of the view that the Hoge Raad’s decision discussed 
in this paragraph, Indofood and Prévost are the most important decisions regarding the meaning of the term 
(Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.6). In a separate contribution Du Toit again highlights 
these cases as the most influential, stating that “[i]n the search for a uniform international tax meaning 
preference should be given to cases where there was a proper analysis of the meaning of the term, where all 
the facts were clear and where the decision of the court was not tainted by domestic tax law considerations”  
(Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 501). Since the publication of Du Toit and Hattingh’s contribution, the Velcro case 
has been decided in Canada. The case is important for the same reasons that the Prévost case is important (see 
footnote128) and because it confirms the test laid down in Prévost. The High Court in India recently handed 
down judgement in Tata Industries v Deputy Director of International Tax (Mumbai) 2011 No 38 of 2010. 
According to Arnold, this case is simply an example of an agent or nominee not being the beneficial owner of 
the relevant income (Arnold (2011) 65 BFIT 555 para 2) and is therefore not discussed here. According to 
Hansen et al (Hansen et al (2013) 67 BFIT 192 para 1), there are currently ten cases on beneficial ownership 
before the Danish courts. Two of these have been finalised (DK ǾL 20 Dec 2011 SKM 2012 121and DK LK 1 Nov 
2010 SKM 2010 729). These two cases were decided on the basis that a prerequisite for the application of the 
beneficial ownership requirement is that the relevant payments be made to persons in third-party countries. In 
these cases, the payments were not made to persons in third-party countries, but rather the payment was 
made back to a party from whom funds were received, in other words “downstream”. These two cases seem to 
be based on rather unique facts and are therefore not discussed in this dissertation. Since the other eight 
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In the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad1668 in 1994 had to decide whether a stockbroker, who 
was resident in the United Kingdom, was the beneficial owner of dividends for purposes of 
the DTT between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The stockbroker purchased 
dividend coupons in Royal Dutch Oil (a Dutch resident company), but not the underlying 
shares, after the dividends had been declared, but before they had been paid. The 
stockbroker argued that he qualified for the reduced treaty withholding tax rate, but the 
Dutch tax authorities disagreed, stating that the stockbroker was not the beneficial owner of 
the dividends. The Hoge Raad held that the stockbroker became the owner of the dividend 
coupons when he purchased them. The Court assumed that after the purchase, the 
stockbroker had free disposal of the dividend coupons and, upon cashing them, also had free 
disposal of the distributions received and that the stockbroker, when cashing the coupons, 
did not act as agent or nominee. The Hoge Raad therefore held that the stockbroker was the 
beneficial owner of the dividends. 
According to Du Toit and Hattingh, it should be noted that the court “focused on the rights in 
respect of the coupons and payment to conclude that the taxpayer was the beneficial owner 
of the dividends because he could freely deal with both the coupons and payment”. 
Furthermore, the court concentrated only on deciding the beneficial ownership question and 
did not apply any other test (for example, whether or not the sole reason for the scheme 
was to obtain a tax benefit).1669 
The United Kingdom case of Indofood1670 is of great importance internationally in the 
interpretation of the term beneficial owner.1671 It will be noticed immediately that the case 
is a civil matter and not between the tax authorities of a country and a taxpayer. In this case 
a company incorporated in Indonesia (the “Parent Guarantor”) wanted to raise capital by the 
issue of loan notes on the international market. The parent guarantor would, however, have 
been liable for a twenty per cent withholding tax on interest payable to the noteholders. To 
make use of the lower withholding tax rate (ten per cent) on interest in terms of the DTT 
between Indonesia and Mauritius, it was decided to incorporate a wholly-owned subsidiary 
in Mauritius (the “Issuer”), who would issue the loan notes and then on-lend the capital to 
the parent guarantor. JP Morgan Chase Bank (the “Trustee”), the defendant in the matter, 
was appointed as the trustee for the noteholders and the paying agent. During the loan 
period, the Indonesian government cancelled the DTT with Mauritius. In terms of the 
agreements between the parties, the notes could be redeemed earlier than the agreed date 
if the parent guarantor became liable to tax in excess of the ten per cent for which the 
Indonesia-Mauritius DTT provided. However, the notes could be redeemed earlier only if the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Danish cases are still pending before the High Court (although the National Tax Tribunal have ruled on the 
cases), they will not be discussed in this dissertation. 
1668 Hoge Raad 6 April 1994 No 28 638 BNB 1994/217. This case is often referred to as the “market maker 
case”. 
1669 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.6.1. See also Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 504. 
1670 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158. 
1671 According to Du Toit, this case is of importance, because it highlights the question whether the test for 
beneficial ownership is a legal test (that is, based on legal rights) or a practical matter (namely, that amounts 
are in fact paid in the absence of a legal obligation). Furthermore, the case also involves a back-to-back loan 
structure, one of the circumstances in which the term beneficial ownership is regarded as particularly 
problematic. The case is not, however, a case on English law (where a domestic law meaning of beneficial 
ownership exists) and importance should therefore not for that reason be attached to the case (Du Toit (2010) 
64 BFIT 500 505).  
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obligation to pay the higher tax rate could not be avoided by the issuer, taking reasonable 
measures available to it. After the cancellation of the relevant DTT, the issuer gave notice to 
the trustee that it would redeem the notes early.1672 However, the trustee alleged that there 
were reasonable measures available to the issuer to avoid the higher tax rate. This involved 
the interposition of a company incorporated in the Netherlands (Newco) between the 
parent guarantor and the issuer. Thus, the issuer would assign its obligations under the loan 
(from the issuer to the parent guarantor) to Newco and enter into a new loan agreement 
with Newco. The trustee argued that in terms of the DTT between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, the withholding tax on interest payable by the parent guarantor to the Dutch 
Newco would be reduced to ten per cent. 
The court had to decide whether this proposed restructuring would reduce the withholding 
tax rate to ten per cent or less and, if so, whether it was reasonable for the parent 
guarantor/issuer to adopt this measure. In deciding the first question, the court had to 
determine, inter alia, whether Newco was the beneficial owner of the interest that would be 
payable to it by the parent guarantor. This question had to be decided in terms of 
Indonesian law. 
In answering this question, the court quoted from the book by Baker referred to below and 
the OECD Commentary.1673 The court held that the fact that neither the issuer nor Newco 
was or would be a trustee, agent or nominee for the noteholders in relation to the interest 
receivable from the parent guarantor, was not conclusive. The absence of any entitlement of 
a noteholder to security over or right to call for the interest receivable from the parent 
guarantor was not conclusive either. The court confirmed that the term beneficial owner 
should not be given a meaning derived from the domestic laws of the contracting states, but 
rather an international fiscal meaning. The court held that beneficial ownership is 
incompatible with that of the formal owner, who does not have the full privilege to directly 
benefit from the income.1674 The issuer, or Newco, if interposed, did not have such a 
privilege, as it was obliged to use the interest received from the parent guarantor to pay the 
trustee (or the issuer, if Newco was interposed) and could not find income from any other 
source.1675 The court further stated that the term beneficial owner should not be limited to 
such a legal and technical approach, but that the substance of the matter should rather be 
considered. In this regard the court held that in practical and commercial terms, the issuer 
(and Newco) would be bound to pay to the trustee that which it received from the parent 
guarantor and that it was impossible for the issuer (or Newco) to derive any benefit from the 
interest paid to it by the parent guarantor.1676 The court decided that this conclusion was 
consistent with the purpose and object of the relevant DTTs.1677 Thus the interposition of 
Newco was not a measure available to the issuer. 
                                                          
1672 At that time both the interest and exchange rates had moved against the parent guarantor to such an 
extent that it was in the commercial interest of the parent guarantor, but not the noteholders, that the loan 
notes should be redeemed as soon as possible. 
1673 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 34–38. 
1674 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 42. 
1675 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 43. 
1676 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 44. 
1677 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 para 45. 
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Du Toit and Hattingh question the significance of this case, given its unique facts and other 
peculiarities.1678 They also criticise the judgement on the basis that the court, after applying 
a legal test, continued to apply an economic substance test. Applying the legal test, the court 
found that the issuer, or Newco, was obliged to pay over the interest received from the 
parent guarantor to the trustee and according to the authors this is where the court ought 
to have stopped. The authors suggest that by applying the second leg,1679 the court 
overstepped the mark, with the risk that ordinary commercial transactions may be caught by 
this test. They further imply that the blatant treaty shopping structure used in this case may 
be the key to understanding the decision.1680 Du Toit implies that the case may have been 
correctly decided based on the application of the legal test and that there was no need for 
the court to apply a practical matter test.1681 Baker adds that that it is not clear whether the 
legal test or the substance-of-the-matter test would each, by itself, deprive the recipient of 
beneficial ownership.1682 
Du Toit also criticises the case for its reliance on the Commentary, without providing a legal 
basis for such reliance. He adds that the court ought to have justified why it referred to 
Commentary that were inserted into the OECD MTC after the relevant treaty was entered 
into, particularly if the addition changed the interpretation reflected in the Commentary 
(which was, arguably, the case here).1683 
In Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc1684 the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal had to 
decide whether a Netherlands company, Prévost Holding, was the beneficial owner of a 
dividend paid to it by its wholly-owned subsidiary, Prévost Car Inc, a company resident in 
Canada. Prévost Holding paid essentially the same amount to its two shareholders, Volvo 
(resident in Sweden) and Henleys (resident in the United Kingdom). Prévost Holding had no 
office, nor employees, in the Netherlands. If Prévost Holding were the beneficial owner of 
the dividend paid to it by Prévost Car Inc, the tax rate which Prévost Car Inc had to withhold, 
would be reduced from 25 per cent to five per cent by virtue of the DTT between Canada 
and the Netherlands. 
The court agreed with the court a quo’s decision that the term beneficial owner means “the 
person who receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the 
risk and control of the dividend he or she received”.1685 The court also approved the 
following extract of the court a quo’s judgement, saying that it captured the essence of the 
beneficial ownership concept: 
                                                          
1678 However, in a separate contribution Du Toit holds the view that it is an important case, despite its 
peculiarities (Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 505).  
1679 Namely, that as a practical matter, the Issuer (or Newco) was bound to pay over the amount that it had 
received from the Parent Guarantor to the trustee. 
1680 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.6.2. 
1681 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 506. 
1682 Baker in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 32. 
1683 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 505. 
1684 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57. Du Toit and Hattingh regard this case as the most 
significant, as it contains a detailed analysis of the matter, and was decided in a country that utilises both 
common law and civil law, as well as the English and French languages (Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on 
International Tax para 9.6.3). 
1685 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 13. 
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“Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of a nominee, one 
looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is acting or for whom the 
nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate entities are concerned, one does 
not pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another person 
and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put through it as 
conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else's behalf pursuant to that person's 
instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for 
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for 
clients.”1686 
The court rejected the argument that the beneficial owner is “the person who can, in fact, 
ultimately benefit from the dividend”, saying that the word “can” opens a myriad of 
possibilities which would undermine the relative degree of certainty and stability created by 
DTTs. It continued: 
“The Crown, it seems to me, is asking the Court to adopt a pejorative view of holding 
companies which neither Canadian domestic law, the international community nor the 
Canadian government through the process of objection, have adopted.”1687 
On the facts the court concluded that Prévost Holding was not an agent, mandatary or 
nominee of Volvo and Henleys. Furthermore, Prévost Holding was not a conduit for Volvo 
and Henleys and there was no premeditated or automatic dividend flow through to Volvo 
and Henleys. The shareholders’ agreement between Henleys and Volvo provided that not 
less than 80 per cent of the profits of Prévost Car Inc and Prévost Holding would be 
distributed to its shareholders. However, Prévost Holding was not a party to the 
shareholders’ agreement and neither Henleys nor Volvo could enforce the shareholders’ 
agreement against Prévost Holding. Prévost Holding’s deed of incorporation did not oblige it 
to declare a dividend. Prévost Holding was the registered owner of the Prévost Car Inc 
shares, paid for those shares and owned them. When dividends were received by Prévost 
Holding in respect of shares it owns, the dividends were the property of Prévost Holding and 
were available to its creditors, if any, until such time as the management board declared a 
dividend and the dividend was approved by the shareholders.1688 
According to Du Toit and Hattingh, the definition of beneficial ownership given in this case 
can be regarded as an international fiscal meaning. The test formulated in Prévost, which 
refers to the person who holds all the attributes of ownership (possession, use, risk and 
control), is contrasted to that formulated by Du Toit, which refers to the person whose 
ownership attributes outweigh those of any other person.1689 The authors suggest that the 
court’s formulation may be an attempt to reconcile the common law and civil law concepts 
of ownership, in order to find a commonly accepted meaning of beneficial ownership. They 
also question why the term ownership (instead of beneficial ownership) is then not used, if 
all the attributes of ownership are required. The authors further point out that the court in 
Prévost applied a legal test, rather than a “practical matter” test, as was done in 
                                                          
1686 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 13. 
1687 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 15. 
1688 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 16. 
1689 Du Toit’s view is referred to in greater detail in ch 8.5. 
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Indofood.1690 This was despite the fact that the court in Prévost accepted the 2003 version of 
the Commentary, which introduced the “as a practical matter” test and the approach to 
interpretation which takes a tax avoidance purpose into account. Du Toit doubts whether 
the court actually applied these two principles in its decision.1691 Arnold is of the view that 
the Prévost case makes sense from a policy and practical perspective. He argues that the 
reduced treaty withholding tax rate of five per cent is lower than the rates agreed in other 
treaties and that the Canadian government must have realised that it would make 
Netherlands holding companies an attractive vehicle in which to house Canadian 
investments. Furthermore, the Canadian treaty negotiators must have known that the 
Netherlands provided a preferential tax regime for holding companies and that Netherlands 
holding companies are widely used in international tax planning. Yet the government did not 
insist on any specific clause in the treaty to prevent treaty shopping. Hence, he argues that 
the case is in accordance with Canada’s tax treaty policy at the time that the relevant treaty 
was entered into.1692 
In Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen1693 the Tax Court of Canada applied the test 
laid down in Prévost. The facts were that VCI, a Canadian resident company, manufactured 
and sold fastening products. VCI was licensed to use the Velcro brands and technology in 
Canada by VIBV and in return paid a royalty to VIBV. VIBV at all times remained the owner of 
the Velcro brands and technology. VIBV was initially a resident of the Netherlands and for a 
number of years VCI deducted the withholding tax on the royalties at a reduced rate in 
accordance with the DTT between Canada and the Netherlands. A reorganisation of the 
Velcro group of companies occurred, which saw the residence of VIBV moving to the 
Netherlands Antilles. There is no DTT between Canada and the Netherlands Antilles and on 
the day after the reorganisation, VIBV assigned its rights and obligations under the licence 
agreement with VCI to VHBV, a company resident in the Netherlands. VCI thus paid the 
royalties to VHBV and continued to deduct the withholding tax at the reduced treaty rate, 
which at first was ten per cent, but was later reduced to zero per cent. The royalty payment 
by VCI to VHBV was based on a percentage of the net sale of products. The consideration for 
the assignment of the rights in terms of the assignment agreements, which VHBV had to pay 
to VIBV, was 90 per cent of the net sales of products and it had to be paid to VIBV within 30 
days of receipt of the royalties from VCI. 
The issue before the court was whether VHBV was the beneficial owner of the royalties and 
therefore entitled to the benefit of the reduced withholding tax rate in terms of the DTT. The 
court referred to the OECD MTC, on which the relevant DTT was based, and to the Conduit 
Companies Report.1694 It furthermore quoted extensively from the Prévost case, adopting 
the test for beneficial ownership from that case quoted above. The court then formulated 
the test to be applied, based on Prévost, as follows: 
                                                          
1690 Du Toit and Hattingh in Silke on International Tax para 9.6.3. See also Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 507. 
1691 Du Toit (2010) 64 BFIT 500 504. 
1692 Arnold in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 43. 
1693 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57. 
1694 OECD Double Tax Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies. 
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“[O]ne must determine who has received the payments for his/her own use and 
enjoyment and assumed the risk and control of the payment he/she received. Here the 
focus is on the attributes of ownership of the payment/item to be considered.”1695 
It held that in terms of the Prévost case there were really four elements to the attribution of 
beneficial ownership, namely (a) possession; (b) use; (c) risk; and (d) control.1696 These words 
were to be given their ordinary meanings and the court considered the dictionary meaning 
of each of these words. The court found the word possession to mean “having or holding 
property in one’s power” or “the exercise of dominion over property”.1697 The word use 
referred to “the application or employment of something: a long continued possession or 
employment of a thing for which it is adapted”.1698 By risk was meant “the chance of injury, 
damage or loss” or “liability for injury, damage or loss that occurs”. Reference here would be 
to economic loss.1699 Control meant “to exercise power or influence over”.1700 The court 
determined that the relevant licencing and assignment agreements had to be looked at, to 
determine who had the possession, use, risk and control of royalties.1701 
On the facts, the court found that VHBV had three main activities, namely (a) holding shares 
in subsidiaries; (b) providing lending services to subsidiaries; and (c) managing royalty 
streams. The reason for the assignment by VIBV to VHBV was to transfer the management of 
the royalty streams to VHBV.1702 VHBV intermingled the royalties received from VCI with its 
other funds and used it for a variety of VHBI’s purposes and at VHBI’s own discretion. The 
funds were not segregated and then paid over to VIBV. Rather, it was transferred to various 
other accounts, sometimes changed to other currencies and used to fund VHBV’s general 
activities. VHBV had sole possession and control over the accounts in which the royalties 
were paid and they earned the interest while the money was in their accounts. There was 
nothing in the relevant agreements that prevented VHBV from using the money for their 
own purposes. VHBV assumed the currency risk involved and the royalties were at VHBV’s 
creditors’ disposal. In short, the court found the possession, use, risk and control of the 
funds to be with VHBV. Furthermore, the court held that 
“there was no predetermined flow of funds. What there is, is a contractual obligation 
by VHBV to pay to VIBV a certain amount of monies within a specified time frame. 
These monies are not necessarily identified as specific monies, they may be identified 
as a percentage of a certain amount received by VHBV from VCI, but there is no 
automated flow of specific monies because of the discretion of VHBV with respect to 
the use of these monies.”1703 
The court referred to the Canadian domestic law meaning of the word agent and 
determined that VHBV was not VIBV’s agent. The court further held that VHBV was not a 
nominee or conduit for VIBV. VHBV had some discretion as to the use or application of the 
                                                          
1695 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 27. 
1696 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 29. 
1697 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 35. 
1698 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 36. 
1699 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 39. 
1700 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 41. 
1701 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 29. 
1702 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 paras 31 and 32. 
1703 Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57 para 45. 
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funds and therefore did not meet the test laid down in the Prévost case to be considered a 
conduit. The court therefore held that VHBV was the beneficial owner of the royalties in 
question. 
Arnold has criticised the Velcro case, stating that the reasons for holding that VHBV was the 
beneficial owner, were not convincing. He argues that the beneficial ownership concept is 
not very meaningful if all that is required is that the amounts received are intermingled with 
other funds. He argues that, on the facts, VHBV’s powers were very narrow (as the test for a 
conduit company is formulated in the OECD Commentary) and that it should not have been 
regarded as the beneficial owner. He also argues that the court’s finding that the amount 
received by VHBV were not the same as that paid by them to VIBV and that VHBV had the 
discretionary use of ten per cent of the funds received, was based on a misunderstanding of 
the facts.1704 
The Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal recently pronounced on the meaning of beneficial 
ownership in a DTT context.1705 The facts in the case were that a bank, resident in Denmark, 
entered into a number of total return swap transactions in respect of the shares in several 
Swiss companies. In terms of these transactions, the Danish bank was obliged to pay to the 
counterparty the increase in value and the dividend paid in respect of the shares. In 
exchange, the counterparty had to pay interest (at LIBOR1706 plus a margin) to the Danish 
Bank. In order to hedge their risk, the Danish bank purchased shares in the relevant Swiss 
companies. Therefore, although the Danish bank was obliged to pay the increase in value 
and the dividend to the counterparty, it received the same, because it was the owner of the 
shares in terms of the hedge. 
The dividends paid in respect of the shares were subject to a 35 per cent withholding tax and 
the Danish bank applied for a refund on the basis of the DTT between Switzerland and 
Denmark. In terms of this DTT dividends paid by a company resident in Switzerland to a 
person resident in Denmark may be taxed only in Denmark. It will be noticed immediately 
that the relevant provision, which formed part of a treaty entered into before the 1977 
introduction of the beneficial ownership requirement in the OECD MTC, contained no 
beneficial ownership requirement. 
The Federal Administrative Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to decide whether beneficial 
ownership was an implicit requirement in a provision in which it is not expressly 
mentioned.1707 It held that if beneficial ownership were a requirement of the relevant DTT, 
the Danish bank was the beneficial owner. In coming to its decision, the Federal 
Administrative Tribunal held that “[b]eneficial ownership is a ‘substance over form’ 
                                                          
1704 Arnold (2012) 66 BFIT 323 para 2 and Arnold in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 46–47. 
1705 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010. According to Arnold, the case is of importance for 
situations in which a party is obliged to pay an amount of dividends, interest or royalties to another and a 
discussion of the case is therefore included in this dissertation (Arnold (2012) 66 BFIT 323 para 2). 
1706 LIBOR has been described as follows: “The London inter-bank offered rate, or LIBOR, may broadly be 
defined as the rate at which banks within the London market lend funds to each other for specified maturities. 
LIBOR is in effect a way of measuring the cost to a bank of raising funds from the market in order to on-lend. It 
is sometimes used as a benchmark for a safe harbor rate of interest.” (Larking IBFD International Tax Glossary 
250).  
1707 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 3.3.2. 
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approach based on the underlying economic reality rather than the (civil law) form …”.1708 It 
further held that beneficial ownership was a prerequisite for treaty entitlement, which 
concentrates on the scope of the taxpayers’ powers to decide on the use of investment 
income.1709 The court stated that if a person is obliged to pass income on to another, it 
indicates a limitation on that person’s power to decide on the use of the income. Either a 
contractual obligation or a de facto duty to pass the income on may limit the power to 
decide how the income should be used. The court also highlighted the assumption of risk as 
a possible indication of beneficial ownership. However, subjective factors, such as the 
intention of abuse, should be disregarded in determining beneficial ownership. An 
assessment of beneficial ownership is to be made at the time at which the income is paid.1710 
On the facts the court found that there was no legal obligation on the Danish bank to pass 
the dividends on to its counterparty. The court also found that there was no de facto 
obligation to pass on the dividends, based on the facts that (a) the Danish bank was obliged 
to pay an amount equal to the dividends to the counterparty irrespective of whether it 
received the dividends; and (b) the Danish bank was free to decide, independently of the 
swap contracts, whether to buy the shares in question and to receive the dividends.1711 The 
court acknowledged that the risk that no dividend would be declared was borne by the 
counterparty, but decided that this point did not preclude the Danish bank from being the 
beneficial owner, as the bank hedged the transaction of its own accord.1712 
It is submitted that the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal applied an economic test, 
rather than a legal test, in deciding the beneficial ownership question in this case. The 
court’s judgement was based not only on the Danish bank’s legal obligations, but also its de 
facto obligations. The court therefore looked at the economic substance rather than the 
legal form of the transaction. 
To conclude regarding the meaning of the term in case law, the court in Indofood held that 
the absence of the relationship of trustee, agent or nominee is not conclusive in determining 
beneficial ownership. Furthermore, it held that the formal owner, who does not have the full 
privilege to directly benefit from the income, is not the beneficial owner. The court 
continued that the term beneficial owner should not be limited to such a legal and technical 
approach, but rather that the substance of the matter should be considered. In Prévost the 
court held that the beneficial owner is the person who receives the dividends for his or her 
own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she received. 
The court furthermore held that the corporate veil of a corporation is not pierced unless the 
corporation is a conduit for another person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or 
application of funds put through it as conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else's behalf 
pursuant to that person's instructions without any right to do other than what that person 
instructs it. The court in Velcro essentially confirmed the test laid down in Prévost. From the 
decision of the Hoge Raad it can be deduced that a person who has free disposal of the 
income in question and who is not an agent or nominee, is the beneficial owner. The Swiss 
                                                          
1708 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 3.4.1. The court used the English expression 
“substance over form” in the original text. 
1709 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 3.4.1. 
1710 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 3.4.2. 
1711 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 6.2.1. 
1712 A.A/S v Federal Tax Administration A-6537/2010 para 6.2.2. 
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Federal Administrative Tribunal applied a practical, rather than a legal, test to determine 
beneficial ownership. It found that if a person’s power to decide on the use of the relevant 
income was limited, either through a legal or de facto obligation, that person could not be 
regarded as the beneficial owner. 
It is submitted that one can deduce the following from the case law: 
(a) The absence of the relationship of trustee, agent or nominee is not conclusive to 
determine beneficial ownership. 
(b) The attributes of ownership, namely possession, use and enjoyment, risk and control, 
will be investigated and the person who holds all these attributes will be considered 
the beneficial owner of the income. 
(c) An entity will not be regarded as a beneficial owner if it has absolutely no discretion as 
to the use or application of funds put through it as conduit, or has agreed to act on 
someone else's behalf pursuant to that person's instructions without any right to do 
other than what that person instructs it. 
(d) In applying these tests, some courts apply a legal test only, in other words, these 
courts only consider legally binding rights and obligations.  Other courts apply a 
practical test (also referred to as an “economic test” or a “substance over form test”) 
only, or in addition to the legal test, to determine whether a person may dispose of 
income. 
(e) The motive to avoid tax does not determine beneficial ownership. 
8.5 Views of academic authors on the meaning of beneficial ownership 
As stated above, Oliver argues that the domestic law meaning of the term should not apply, 
but that a particular treaty meaning should rather be used. He then suggests that there are 
three meanings to beneficial ownership that should be considered:1713 
(a) The domestic law meaning in the common law states, imported into the OECD MTC as 
a universal meaning. It is argued that this meaning is the following: “The beneficial 
owner is the person whose ownership attributes outweigh those of any other 
person.”1714 
                                                          
1713 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 53 and further. It should be noted that this article was based on a previous version 
of the Commentary. 
1714 Oliver (2001) 1 BTR 27 56. This meaning was expressed by Du Toit in his doctoral dissertation: “The term 
was taken from the common law states and incorporated into the OECD Model. The term is not known in the 
domestic law of states other than the common law states. It can properly be classified as international tax 
language. It is not defined in the OECD Model. No OECD member state has expressed either a reservation or an 
observation as to its meaning in the OECD Model. The meaning of beneficial owner at the source that it was 
taken from, that is, the common law states, should therefore be taken as the starting point for the 
investigation of its international tax meaning in those bilateral tax treaties which have adopted the wording of 
the OECD Model. This meaning should then be modified, if necessary, in the context of the treaty and in the 
light of its object and purpose. This whole process of interpretation should be in accordance with the steps as 
prescribed by the Vienna Convention. By applying the reasoning and steps as described above, the following 
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(b)  A definition which excludes agents and nominees. 
(c) The person to whom the income is attributable for tax purposes, under the law of the 
residence state or the source state. 
Du Toit rejects meaning (b) above, because the words “such as” were used in front of 
“agent” and “nominee” in the 1977 version of the Commentary. The words “such as” 
indicated that that “agent” and “nominee” are mere examples of intermediaries that are 
excluded as beneficial owners.1715 Commenting on the wording of the Conduit Companies 
Report (which was subsequently incorporated into the Commentary in 2003), Du Toit states 
that the passage confirms that beneficial ownership goes further than merely excluding 
agents and nominees.1716 
Baker, agreeing that the domestic law meaning of the term should not be applied, but rather 
the international fiscal meaning, suggests, based on the OECD’s latest Commentary, that the 
term beneficial ownership excludes from the benefit of articles 10, 11 and 12: 
“(a) mere nominees or agents, who are not treated as owners of the income in their 
country of residence; 
(b) any other conduit who, though the formal owner of the income, has very narrow 
powers over the income which render the conduit a mere fiduciary or administrator of 
the income on behalf of the beneficial owner.”1717 
Vogel describes the beneficial ownership test as follows: 
“Treaty benefits should not be granted with a view to a formal title to dividend, 
interest or royalties, but to the ‘real’ title. In other words, the old dispute of ‘form 
versus substance’ should be decided in favour of ‘substance’…. The ‘substance’ of the 
right to receive certain yields has a dual aspect. The first is the right to decide whether 
or not a yield should be realized – i.e. whether the capital or other assets should be 
used or made available for use; the second is the right to dispose of the yield. 
Ownership is merely formal, if the owner is fettered in regard to both aspects either in 
law or in fact. On the other hand, recourse to the treaty is justified – i.e. is not 
improper – if he who is entitled under private law is free to wield at least one of the 
powers referred to. Hence the ‘beneficial owner’ is he who is free to decide (1) 
whether or not the capital or other assets should be used or made available for use by 
others or (2) on how the yields therefrom should be used or (3) both.”1718 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
answer is reached: The beneficial owner is the person whose ownership attributes outweigh those of any other 
person.” (Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 20–21).  
1715 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 216. 
1716 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 218. 
1717 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital para 10B–14. 
1718 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 562. 
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Vogel’s view, which focuses on the aspect of control, is criticised by Du Toit. He asks who will 
be regarded as beneficial owner if the powers (1) and (2) described by Vogel are in different 
persons.1719 
According to Danon, a beneficial owner is 
“the person who legally, economically or factually has the power to control the 
attribution of the income. This definition differs essentially from the common law 
meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ in that it does not require that the recipient of the 
income be able to enjoy the economic benefits of the item received. Moreover, it is 
submitted that this meaning remains perfectly in line with the OECD Commentary and 
Conduit Report. Indeed it excludes agents, nominees and conduit entities with narrow 
powers on the ground that these persons are not in a position to control the 
attribution of the income (being legally, economically or factually bound by die 
instructions of their principal, shareholders, participants, creditors, etc.).”1720 
According to Panayi, the beneficial ownership test laid down in Indofood is too narrow. 
Furthermore, she argues that the focus of the beneficial ownership test should not be on 
where the money ends up, but whether the person who receives the money actually 
conducted an activity which generated the money. Thus, she argues that the test for 
beneficial ownership, based on the Indofood decision, should be whether a person is legally 
and economically entitled to the income through having earned or generated it in some real 
way. She views the risk factor as important to determine beneficial ownership. That is, does 
the ultimate recipient run the risk of ever not receiving the income?1721 
Vann suggests that beneficial ownership should entail the following: 
“In terms of principle, it is suggested that the OECD distinguish two cases in relation to 
beneficial ownership. First, if the country of residence of the person to whom the 
income is paid does not attribute it to that person, that person will not be the 
beneficial owner of the income. Secondly, if the country of residence does attribute 
the income to that person, that person will not be treated as the beneficial owner of 
the income in only a very limited number of situations. The preferred approach would 
be to return to the simple ‘agent or nominee’ test of the 1977 Commentary. 
If it is considered necessary in the light of subsequent OECD developments to go 
further to include certain conduit situations, the crucial point should be that a person 
is not the beneficial owner of income to which the person is legally entitled and to 
whom the income is attributed for tax purposes if the person has no control over its 
application due to an immediate and legally enforceable obligation to pass the income 
on to another person. Only obligations attaching to specific items of income should 
prevent the person subject to the obligation from being the beneficial owner of the 
income received; obligations affecting a basket of various items of income should not 
have this effect if the person subject to the obligation is able to decide which incoming 
                                                          
1719 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 149. 
1720 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 340. 
1721 Panayi Double Taxation, Tax treaties, Treaty-shopping and the European Community 49. 
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item of income will be used to satisfy which obligation. Further, it should be made 
clear that if a person is entitled to retain the income for use as the person decides, that 
person is the beneficial owner even though at some future time that income is likely to 
be paid over to a third person (which will be the case for virtually all income received 
by a legal entity). As was noted in the conduit company report from which this kind of 
extension originates, it will have little impact on treaty shopping and the question 
arises whether the uncertainty created by such an extension is worth the small impact 
on treaty shopping.”1722 
Reimer suggests that the beneficial owner should be identified by applying two criteria, each 
of which contains certain sub-criteria. The first criterion is the examination of the payment 
and the causa for the payment. As sub-criteria, Reimer suggests that (a) the period before 
the payment be scrutinised (for example, does the later recipient of the payment have a 
claim even before the payment is made, or is the payment due to another, who then 
requests a bypass from the payor); (b) the person who bears the risk of non-payment and 
currency be identified; and (c) the period after the payment be scrutinised (for example, can 
the person retain the payment and use it for discretionary purposes, or is there an obligation 
to forward the payment). The second criterion is the income-generating object. According to 
Reimer, if the recipient has a special relationship to the asset, it is a strong indicator that 
that person is the beneficial owner. As sub-criteria, he proposes (a) the acknowledgement of 
a split between the asset and the yields associated with the asset where such a split may 
economically be justified (for example, if a quid pro quo is given); (b) that in the absence of 
such a split, the economic owner of the asset be identified as an indication of the beneficial 
owner, (he proposes that the economic owner be identified by applying the functional 
analysis in terms of article 7(2) of the OECD MTC); (c) the activities associated with the asset 
be examined (for example the human activities involved in the creation of an asset); and (d) 
if a person shares the risks associated with an asset, it is an indicator that that person is the 
beneficial owner. He adds that no single criterion may be absolute to determine beneficial 
ownership, but rather, it is the interplay between the criteria which provides an answer in 
determining who the beneficial owner is.1723 
8.6 Can a trust (or a trustee) be a beneficial owner? 
8.6.1 The views of academic authors 
According to Baker it is clear that a trustee can be regarded as a beneficial owner as long as 
he does not act as a mere nominee or agent or have such narrow powers as to be rendered 
a mere fiduciary.1724 
Vogel asserts that if a trustee has the power to decide whether or not the capital or other 
assets should be used or made available for use by others, or how the yields therefrom 
should be used, or both, the trustee will be regarded as the beneficial owner.1725 
                                                          
1722 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 35–36. 
1723 Reimer in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 257–263. 
1724 Baker Double Taxation Conventions: a Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 10B–14. 
1725 Vogel et al Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 562. 
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A contrary view is held by Du Toit. He contends that, because a trustee does not exercise his 
or her powers of control over the income for his or her own benefit (but rather for the 
benefit of the beneficiary), the trustee cannot be the beneficial owner.1726 He also views a 
trustee as an example of an intermediary, akin to an agent and a nominee, with the 
consequence that a trustee cannot be the beneficial owner of income.1727 
Danon takes issue with Du Toit’s view that a trustee is akin to an agent and a nominee. He 
argues that a trustee is independent of beneficiaries and settlors and sometimes has a very 
broad discretion in the management of trust assets. In contrast, agents and nominees are 
described as “inanimate tools in the hands of their principal”. Accordingly, there is a 
difference between a trustee, on the one hand, and an agent and a nominee, on the 
other.1728 Since a trustee is not an agent or a nominee, there is prima facie nothing to 
prevent a trustee from being a beneficial owner for DTT purposes.1729 Danon further argues 
that the purpose of the beneficial ownership requirement is to combat treaty shopping. 
Hence, he argues, the ownership attributes which allow this goal to be achieved should be 
identified. In his view, the power to control the attribution of income is the most important 
ownership attribute, since no one would enter into a treaty shopping arrangement without 
the power to control the interposed vehicle to ensure the transfer of the income to him or 
her. He therefore argues that the right to enjoy the economic benefits of the income is not 
decisive. Thus, the fact that a recipient does not use his or her power of control for his or her 
own benefit is not critical.1730 In applying the control test to trusts, Danon distinguishes 
between different types of trusts.1731 Where income is attributed to the trust, but the 
trustees have no discretion whether or to whom the income should be distributed, the 
trustees will not be regarded as the beneficial owners, as they have no control over the 
attribution to the beneficiary. A typical example is a vesting trust in which the trustees are 
obliged to distribute income to a beneficiary and the beneficiary may enforce such a 
right.1732 Where income is attributed to a trust, but the trustees have a discretion to 
accumulate the income and in fact do so, the trust will be regarded as the beneficial owner 
of the income, since the beneficiaries cannot legally compel the trustees to distribute the 
income to them. 
Prebble notes that a trustee is not “an intermediary such as an agent or nominee”, as is 
required by the wording used by the 1977 Commentary. Agents and nominees have no 
relevant status independent of their principals, whereas trustees have functions which are 
                                                          
1726 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 149. 
1727 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 216. 
1728 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 334. 
1729 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 333. 
1730 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 335–340. 
1731 Danon Switzerland's Direct and International Taxation of Private Express Trusts with Particular References 
to US, Canadian and New Zealand Trust Taxation 340–343. The types of trusts discussed by Danon have been 
adapted for purposes of this dissertation. Danon discusses specific types of Canadian trusts. This dissertation 
seeks to apply the principles discussed in Danon’s work to other trusts as well, in an attempt to make the 
discussion more general. 
1732 According to Danon, if a trustee is obliged to distribute income during a particular year, but may choose the 
beneficiary from a given class, the trustee will still not be regarded as the beneficial owner. 
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independent of their beneficiaries and settlors.1733 On this point Prebble and Danon are in 
agreement. Prebble avers that by 1977, the question of whether a trustee could be regarded 
as a beneficial owner were well known and that the omission of the term trustee from the 
formulation which included agent and nominee, was not accidental.1734 He further contends 
that the statement in the 2003 version of the Commentary, that the term beneficial owner 
“is not used in a narrow technical sense”, indicates that at least some trustees may be 
beneficial owners, since the only “narrow technical sense” comes from the common law of 
trusts.1735 He reinforces this point by arguing that by 2003, Du Toit’s view that the term 
beneficial ownership was taken from the common law countries and used in international 
fiscal language, had gained support. The inclusion of the point that the term was not used in 
its narrow technical sense can only refer to its sense in trust law and is therefore telling.1736 
Prebble further argues that some trustees are taxed on foreign sourced income and should 
therefore qualify as beneficial owners and obtain relief. The argument asserts that if these 
trustees qualify as beneficial owners, all trustees should qualify as beneficial owners.1737 He 
furthermore maintains that the French1738 version of the term, bénéficiare éffectif, includes a 
trustee and that the French and English versions of the term should be afforded the same 
meaning.1739 
Prebble furthermore suggests that the Indofood case, laying down a “substance over form” 
test, where mere conduits are ignored, indicated that a trustee may not be regarded as the 
beneficial owner. However, he counters this argument by distinguishing the Indofood case 
from a trust situation, stating that a trustee is not a mere conduit.1740 
Avery Jones et al interpret the passage contained in the Conduit Companies Report,1741 
referring to other conduits with very narrow powers (which render them a mere fiduciary or 
administrator acting on account of interested parties) to indicate that the beneficiary of a 
vesting trust will be the beneficial owner of the income. They state that this passage does 
not solve the question in relation to accumulation trusts.1742 Further in their report, Avery 
Jones et al indicate that at least some countries, notably Canada, will regard a trustee of 
accumulation trusts as the beneficial owner under certain circumstances. Their view is that 
in the United Kingdom, the trustee will not be regarded as the beneficial owner, based on 
domestic law.1743 
Vann approaches the issue from a historical perspective. He concludes that prior to the 
introduction of the term in the OECD MTC, common law countries agreed that the trustees 
of accumulation trusts were beneficial owners if they were taxed on the income, thereby 
                                                          
1733 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 201. 
1734 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 203. 
1735 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 201. Essentially the same argument is made in Prebble (2008) VIII 
Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 78. 
1736 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 204. 
1737 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 205–206 and Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 78. 
1738 English and French are the two official languages of the OECD MTC and both carry equal authority. 
1739 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 206 and Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 79. 
1740 Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 79–80. 
1741 Which was later incorporated in the Commentary. 
1742 Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 70. 
1743 Eg Avery Jones (1989) 3 BTR 65 76. 
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rejecting a trust law meaning of the term.1744 He analyses the report of the Working Party1745 
responsible for the introduction of the term into the OECD and concludes that: 
“they did not think that payment to a resident who was merely an agent was a 
problem, thus implying a concept of real ownership throughout the Model (though, as 
they had noted in their earlier report, there were administrative issues in such cases). 
They saw the problem as being related to trustees and even then only in some states. 
While the trust situation has now been introduced, the discussion seems to be dealing 
with cases where the beneficiary is immediately entitled to the income, not with 
accumulation trusts.”1746 
Schwarz suggests that where the term beneficial owner is inserted in treaties, the intention 
is to distinguish between beneficial and legal owners. He also implies that in treaties 
containing the term, a trustee will not be able to claim treaty benefits.1747 
8.6.2 The case law 
In Indofood the court applied, in addition to the legal test, also a practical (or substance over 
form) test. The court held that, practically speaking, the issuer (and Newco) would be 
obliged to pay on to the trustee the amount received from the parent guarantor and that it 
was impossible for the issuer (or Newco) to derive any benefit from the interest received 
from the parent guarantor. Applying this test to trusts, it would be hard to argue that a trust 
(or trustee) derives any benefit from payment that it receives, because these payments are, 
by definition, for the benefit of its beneficiaries.1748 
In the Tax Court of Canada’s judgement in the Prévost case, the position of trusts was used 
as an example of a person who holds property for the benefit of another. The court stated 
that: 
“[t]he trustee is the legal owner but does not personally enjoy the attributes of 
ownership, possession, use, risk and control. The trustee is holding the property for 
someone else and that, ultimately, it is that someone else who has the use, risk and 
control of the property.” 1749 
The court then formulated the test for beneficial ownership, which was eventually approved 
by the Federal Court of Appeal,1750 as follows: 
“In my view the ‘beneficial owner’ of dividends is the person who receives the 
dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of 
the dividend he or she received. The person who is beneficial owner of the dividend is 
the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. In short the 
                                                          
1744 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 13. 
1745 Working Party 27. See Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 14. 
1746 Vann (2012) 66 Sydney Law School: Legal Studies Research Paper 17. 
1747 Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 310. 
1748 However, see Prebble (2008) VIII Trusts and Tax Treaties 75 79–80 discussed in ch 8.6.1. 
1749 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2008 TCC 231 para 98. 
1750 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 para 13 and para 14. 
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dividend is for the owner’s own benefit and this person is not accountable to anyone 
for how he or she deals with the dividend income.”1751 
From these passages in the Prévost case, it can be inferred that a trustee cannot be the 
benecficial owner of income for treaty purposes, as the trustee does not, generally, hold the 
property for his or her own benefit and, consequently, does not personally enjoy all the 
attributes of ownership. This inference accords with the view held by Du Toit.1752 
8.6.3 OECD revised proposals: October 2012 
If the proposal is included in the Commentary, it will, for the first time, address the issue of 
trusts in relation to beneficial ownership. The Commentary1753 will then stipulate that the 
term was never intended to refer to any technical meaning that it could have had under the 
domestic law of a specific country and that it is not used in the narrow technical sense that 
the trust law of many common law countries uses. A footnote1754 expands on this statement 
by giving an example: Where the trustees of a discretionary trust do not distribute dividends 
earned during a given period, these trustees, acting in their capacity as such (or the trust, if 
recognised as a separate taxpayer), could constitute the beneficial owners of such income 
for the purposes of article 10, even if they are not the beneficial owners under the relevant 
trust law.1755 
This part of the Commentary is therefore explicit that the term does not have the same 
meaning in DTTs as it has under the trust law of common law states. It also gives an example 
of where a trust (or trustee) can be regarded as the beneficial owner. The fact that a 
discretionary trust that accumulates income in a given period is used as an example, means 
that there may be other circumstances under which a trust (or the trustee) may also be 
regarded as beneficial owner. It is submitted that the more general paragraphs regarding the 
meaning of beneficial ownership should therefore be applied to determine whether a 
specific trust (or the trustee) could be regarded as a beneficial owner. This issue will be 
further explored below. 
The proposed Commentary will retain the statements regarding agents and nominees not 
qualifying as beneficial owners, as well as the statements regarding conduits who, although 
formal owners, have such narrow powers that it render them mere fiduciaries or 
administrators, acting on account of the interested parties.1756 As under the current 
Commentary (that is, the 2003 Commentary), it is important to note that in none of the 
states discussed in this dissertation will a trust (or trustee) be regarded as an agent or 
nominee of the beneficiaries or the settlor.1757 Thus, it remains to be considered whether a 
trust can be regarded as a conduit acting as a fiduciary or administrator. As under the 
                                                          
1751 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen 2008 TCC 231 para 100. 
1752 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 149. See ch 8.6.1. 
1753 The proposed Commentary on art 10 is used as an example again. Similar Commentary is proposed for arts 
11 and 12. 
1754 Danon criticises the proposed Commentary because the position of trusts is discussed in a footnote and not 
in the main text. In fact, he proposes that a separate section on the application of the OECD MTC to trusts be 
incorporated in the Commentary to article 1 (Danon (2011) 65 BFIT 437 440). 
1755 Proposed Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12.1. 
1756 Proposed Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12.2 and 12.3. 
1757 See ch 2.7. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
281 
current Commentary, the proposed Commentary refers to the Conduit Companies Report 
and uses the words “conduit company”. Consequently, the question arises whether a trust 
(or the trustee), which is not a company, can be regarded as a conduit. It is submitted that 
the answer must be in the affirmative. Both the article and the Commentary (current and 
proposed) refer to a “resident of a Contracting state”. It was argued elsewhere that a trust 
(or the trustee) can often be regarded as “residents” for purposes of the OECD MTC.1758 If a 
trust (or trustee) is regarded as a resident, it would be able to act as a conduit. From a policy 
perspective, it would not make sense to exclude a trust (or trustee) as it would be easy to 
circumvent the beneficial owner requirement by using a trust rather than a company, 
especially now that the proposed Commentary explicitly states that a trust (or the trustee) 
can be a beneficial owner. Therefore, it is submitted that if the trustees of a trust have very 
limited powers, it should be investigated whether they could be regarded as mere 
conduits.1759 
The proposed Commentary1760 further states that an agent, a nominee and a conduit 
company acting as a fiduciary or administrator, are examples of persons who are not 
beneficial owners. The reason it provides is that in these cases the recipient’s right to use 
and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the 
payment received to another person. Although the Commentary acknowledges that the 
obligation will usually be found in legal documents, it may also be deduced from facts and 
circumstances. It adds, however, that the obligation must be related to the payment 
received and gives a number of examples of payments that would be considered unrelated 
to the payment received. 
It is submitted that the proposed Commentary now makes it clear that only a contractual or 
legal obligation to pass on the relevant payment may be considered. Even though these may 
not be expressed in a legal document, the facts and circumstances may only be used to show 
that a contractual or legal obligation exists. The substance over form or economic test 
proposed in Indofood and accepted by certain authors, is therefore not supported in the 
proposed Commentary. 
In relation to trusts, the proposed Commentary would therefore mean that if the trust (or 
trustee) has the obligation to pass the income on to a beneficiary, the trust(ee) will not be 
regarded as the beneficial owner of the income, since the trust’s (or trustee’s) right to use 
and enjoy the income is constrained by the obligation. Therefore, in the case of a vesting 
trust, the trustees are obliged to distribute the income to the beneficiaries and the 
beneficiaries have enforceable rights against the trustees to do so.1761 Hence a vesting trust 
(or its trustee) cannot, in terms of this proposed Commentary, be regarded as the beneficial 
owner of the income. If the trustee of a discretionary trust decides to distribute income to a 
specific beneficiary during the relevant tax year, the trustee will be obliged to pass the 
income to the beneficiary, the beneficiary obtaining an enforceable right against the 
                                                          
1758 See ch 5. 
1759 This view is supported by Baker, who suggests that under the current Commentary, a trustee can be a 
beneficial owner as long as he does not, inter alia, have such narrow powers as to be rendered a mere fiduciary 
(see ch 8.1.6). 
1760 Proposed Commentary on the OECD MTC art 10 para 12.4. 
1761 See ch 2.2.4 (South Africa), 2.3.3.1 (England), 2.3.3.2 (Scotland), 2.4.4.1 (the rest of Canada) and 2.4.4.2 
(Québec) for a discussion of the rights of beneficiaries in a vesting (or fixed) trust. 
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trustee.1762 Hence, the trust will, after the exercise by the trustee of his or her discretion, not 
be regarded as the beneficial owner of the income.1763 If a trust accumulates the income, the 
beneficiaries in a discretionary trust have no rights to force the trustee to pay the income to 
them and, therefore, the trust will be regarded as the beneficial owner of the income. If, 
after a number of years, the trustee decides to vest the income in a beneficiary, it is 
submitted that the trust will not cease to be the beneficial owner of the income. Two 
reasons may be advanced for this proposition: First, the income will not retain its character 
and will become part of the trust’s capital.1764 Second, there “seems to be a general 
expectation that a treaty can be applied as the income is paid out of the source state”.1765 
If a letter of wishes is not legally binding, but it is invariably followed by the trustee, resulting 
in the trustee distributing the income in accordance with the letter of wishes, one may ask 
whether the letter of wishes can constitute the facts and circumstances that indicate that 
the trustee is obliged to distribute the income. 
An example of where a court may consider a trust to be a mere fiduciary or administrator 
with very narrow powers, because it is obliged to pass the income on to a beneficiary, may 
be found in two South African cases on the taxation of trusts. In Armstrong1766 the taxpayer 
(the beneficiary) was entitled to receive 2 000 pounds per annum from the trust and the 
balance of the trust income was to be distributed to the taxpayer’s daughters. During the 
relevant year of assessment, the trust received income in the form of dividends, interest and 
rent. The taxpayer disclosed her income of 2 000 pounds as consisting partly of dividends 
and partly of interest and rent, but the revenue authorities denied her the exemption in 
respect of dividends. The court first referred to a simple case where the trustee derived only 
dividend income and only one beneficiary was entitled to all of the income from the trust. 
The court ruled that in such a case the trustee was a mere “conduit pipe” and that the 
beneficiary derived the income from the company. The court also referred to the beneficiary 
                                                          
1762 See ch 2.2.4 (South Africa), 2.3.3.1 (England), 2.3.3.2 (Scotland), 2.4.4.1 (the rest of Canada) and 2.4.4.2 
(Québec) for a discussion of the rights of beneficiaries in a discretionary trust. 
1763 No practical problem will arise if the trustee exercises his or her discretion to distribute income to a 
beneficiary immediately or very soon after the trustee receives the income. However, a practical problem may 
arise if the trustee receives the income from the source state and decides to distribute the income to the 
beneficiary within the same tax year, but only after some time as lapsed. Eg, the trustee decides to distribute 
the income to the beneficiary six months after it has received the income from the source state. The 
beneficiary will have an enforceable right against the trustee for the payment of the amount and, eg in South 
Africa, the income will be taxed in the beneficiary’s hands and retain its nature. In theory, the trust is therefore 
not the beneficial owner in terms of the Commentary. However, at the time that the source state has to 
determine whether the trust is the beneficial owner (that is, when the payment is made), it is unknown that 
the trustee will exercise his or her discretion in favour of the beneficiary. Under these circumstances, the 
source state will probably treat the trust as the beneficial owner, similar to the situation in which the trust 
accumulates the income. The practical difficulty may be less acute in states which require the taxpayer to 
reclaim the withholding tax afterwards. The practical problem is also eliminated if the preferred view, which is 
set out in ch 8.6.4, is followed. 
1764 Authority for this proposition is as follows: in South Africa the obiter statement in Rosen (Secretary for 
Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A) 190–191); in the United Kingdom, trustees may accumulate income 
and pay it out to beneficiaries as capital, provided that they have power to do so (Kessler Taxation of Non-
Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 1072); in Canada income that is not paid to a beneficiary is taxed in the 
trust and when it is subsequently paid to a beneficiary, it forms part of the capital of the trust (Hogg et al 
Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law 550). 
1765 Wheeler (2011) 3 World Tax Journal 247 345. 
1766 Armstrong v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1938 AD 343; 10 SATC 1. 
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as “beneficially entitled” to the income.1767 The reasoning adopted in the simple case also 
applied to the more complex facts of the case and therefore the taxpayer was entitled to the 
exemption in respect of dividends. 
In Rosen,1768 the court, commenting on the Armstrong case, stated: 
“The principle rests upon sound and robust common sense; for, by treating the 
intervening trustee as a mere administrative conduit-pipe, it has regard to the 
substance rather than the form of the distribution and receipt of the dividends.”1769 
(own emphasis) 
Later in the judgement, the court made its famous obiter statement, which reads as follows: 
“It suffices to say that the trust deed may itself entitle or oblige the trustee to 
administer the dividends in such a way that he is not a mere conduit-pipe for passing 
them on to the beneficiary, that in his hands their source as dividends can no longer be 
identified or they otherwise lose their character and identity as dividends, and that the 
beneficiary is thus entitled to receive mere trust income in contradistinction to the 
benefit of the dividend rights in terms of the above crucial phrase. Thus, a trust deed 
may endow the trustee with a discretion to pass on dividends to the beneficiary or to 
retain and accumulate them. If he decides on the latter, I think (but express no firm 
view) that the dividends might then lose their identity and character as dividends, so 
that, if they are subsequently paid out to the beneficiary, they might possibly no longer 
be dividends in his hands, for the conduit-pipe had turned itself off at the relevant 
time. But if he decides on the former, i.e. to pass the dividends on to the beneficiary, 
the condition suspending the beneficiary’s entitlement thereto is fulfilled, and they 
would constitute dividends in his hands in the same way as if he had been originally 
entitled to them unconditionally under the trust deed, i.e. as if the conduit pipe had 
always been open.”1770 
It may be inferred from these cases that in South Africa a trust is regarded as a “mere 
administrative conduit-pipe” (to use the phrase from Rosen in the previous quote) in cases 
where a beneficiary has a vested right to income in a specific year of assessment.1771 In other 
words, in the case of a beneficiary with a vested right to income, the trust may well, in terms 
of South African law, be regarded as a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of 
the beneficiary. Consequently, such a trust will not be regarded as the beneficial owner of 
                                                          
1767 Armstrong v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1938 AD 343; 10 SATC 1 349. 
1768 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A). 
1769 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A) 188. 
1770 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A) 190–191. 
1771 Regarding the meaning of “vested right”, see ch 2.2.4. A beneficiary may have the vested right to income in 
a specific year because the beneficiary always had such a right, which would typically be specified in the trust 
deed. A beneficiary may also have the vested right to income in a specific year because the trustees exercised 
their discretion in favour of the beneficiary during that year. If trustees exercise their discretion in favour of a 
beneficiary, its effect would depend on the terms of the trust deed and the decision of the trustees. The 
trustees could decide to distribute an amount to a beneficiary only in that particular year of assessment, or 
they could decide that from then on the particular income stream would always be distributed to the 
beneficiary. In the latter case, the beneficiary will, from that year onwards, have a vested right to the income 
stream. 
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the income in terms of the proposed (and current) Commentary. If, however, the conduit-
pipe turns itself off, that is, the trustees decide to accumulate the income during the year of 
assessment, the trust will not be a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the 
beneficiary and will, consequently, be regarded as the beneficial owner. 
If the proposal is included in the Commentary, it would mean that the Commentary on the 
relevant articles would change substantially. Will these amendments to the Commentary 
influence a court’s interpretation of a treaty entered into before the adoption of the 
proposed amendments? At least in one place, the Commentary states that the term was 
never intended to have the meaning that it has in the trust law of the common law states. 
Will this statement carry more authority in interpreting earlier treaties, since it purports to 
give the “initial” meaning of the term? Surely the role and status of the Commentary and a 
court’s ability to rely on Commentary added to the OECD MTC at a later date than the date 
that a specific treaty was entered into will become extremely important matters for a court 
to consider.1772 To the extent that the Commentary conflicts with existing case law, which a 
court may refer to, the weight attached to each will have to be determined. 
8.6.4 Conclusion regarding the question whether a trust can be a beneficial owner 
A trust (or the trustee) is not an agent or nominee for the beneficiaries and cannot, on this 
basis, be disqualified as a beneficial owner.1773 According to case law and the OECD 
Commentary, the absence of an agent or nominee relationship does not, however, in itself 
mean that the beneficial ownership requirement is met. The further meaning of the term 
beneficial owner (that is, other than excluding agents and nominees) should therefore be 
determined to decide whether a trust(ee) could qualify. 
The current (that is, 2003) Commentary reads that the term is not used in a narrow technical 
sense1774 and according to Prebble this means that the term is not used in the sense used by 
the trust law of common law countries.1775 The proposed Commentary makes this point 
clear by stating that the term never intended to refer to any technical meaning that it could 
have had under the domestic law of a specific country and that it is not used in the narrow 
technical sense that the trust law of many common law countries use. It also includes the 
example of a trust being a beneficial owner. The current and proposed Commentary 
therefore stand in sharp contrast to the view held by Du Toit and expressed in Prévost, 
namely that the trustee, who does not hold the trust property for his or her own benefit 
and, therefore, does not personally enjoy all the attributes of ownership, cannot be the 
beneficial owner. 
It is submitted that a court’s view regarding the role of the Commentary will influence its 
decision. If it adopts an ambulatory approach and is of the view that the proposed 
Commentary is merely to clarify the meaning that the term previously had, and it attaches 
more value to the Commentary than to, for example, foreign case law, it may well take the 
view that the trust law meaning of the term was not the meaning intended by the parties to 
the DTT. In a country like South Africa, where the role and status of the Commentary is still 
                                                          
1772 See ch 4.3. 
1773 However, see Du Toit’s contrary view discussed in ch 8.6.1. 
1774 Commentary on the OECD MTC article 10 para 12. 
1775 Prebble (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 9. 
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unclear, but the court is obliged to consider foreign precedent, it will be difficult to predict 
which of the two views a court will follow. It will be interesting to see whether any of the 
countries considered in this dissertation note a reservation against the proposed 
Commentary (if it is adopted). A reservation may indicate that a country prefers the view 
that the trust law meaning of the term should apply, with the result that a trust(ee) cannot 
be regarded as the beneficial owner of income for purposes of a DTT. It is submitted that, if a 
court decides to follow the proposed Commentary in relation to the “technical meaning” of 
the term, it should also follow the rest of the Commentary in determining whether a trust 
can be a beneficial owner. 
In deciding which view a court will take, it may be tempting to argue that the decision in 
Prévost and Du Toit’s view are based on the trust law meaning of the term in common law, 
namely that a trustee, as legal owner, is not the beneficial owner of the trust property. 
Consequently, in South Africa, where there is no such distinction and where the trustee is 
the owner of the trust property, the decision in Prévost and Du Toit’s view should not be 
followed. However, it should be borne in mind that the decision in Prévost and Du Toit’s 
view are not based solely on the division of ownership found in common law trusts. Rather, 
it is based also on the fact that the trustee does not hold the trust property for his or her 
own benefit, but for the benefit of the beneficiaries. This feature of a trust lies at the heart 
of trust law in South Africa.1776 Thus, the reasoning in Prévost and Du Toit’s contribution will 
apply equally to trusts subject to South African law. 
It is submitted that, in order to determine whether a trust can be the beneficial owner, a 
South African court should investigate where the attributes of ownership (identified in 
Prévost and Velcro as possession, use, risk and control) lie in each case. The court in Velcro 
attributed the ordinary meaning of the word to each of these attributes and it is submitted 
that these meanings may be used to assess whether a trust holds the relevant ownership 
attribute.1777 
It is clear that in most cases the trustee will have possession1778 of the income as the trustee 
usually receives and holds the income. In cases where the trustee accumulates income, it is 
evident that he or she also possesses the income. However, even in cases where the income 
is distributed to the beneficiaries soon after it was received by the trustee, it can be argued 
that the trustee had possession of the income. This is illustrated by the Velcro case, where 
VHBV were to pay an amount over to VIBV within 30 days after receipt of the royalties from 
VCI. VHBV was held to be the beneficial owner of the income. 
In cases where the trustee may decide whether or not and to whom the income will be 
distributed, it may also be said that he or she has control1779 over the income. An example of 
such a trust would be a South African discretionary trust, where the trustees may decide 
from year to year whether any distributions will be made and to which of the beneficiaries 
the distribution will be made. Therefore, even in a year in which the trustees decide to 
distribute all of the relevant income, they will still have control over the income, as they 
                                                          
1776 See ch 2.2.4. 
1777 For ease of reference, the meaning attached to each attribute in the Velcro case is repeated here and is 
referred to as the Velcro meaning. 
1778 Velcro meaning: “having or holding property in one’s power” or “the exercise of dominion over property”. 
1779 Velcro meaning: “to exercise power or influence over”. 
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have the power to decide whether and to whom it will be distributed. In the case of a 
vesting trust, the trustees have no control over the income, as they are bound to hand it 
over to the beneficiaries as stipulated in the trust deed. 
Risk1780 as an attribute of ownership requires careful consideration. The meaning attached to 
the term in Velcro refers to the chance of or liability for injury, damage or economic loss. 
From a South African trust law perspective, it is important to note that only beneficiaries 
with a vested right to income are entitled to claim distribution of the income from the 
trustees. Discretionary beneficiaries, on the other hand, only have conditional rights against 
the trustee and it is only when (and if) the trustee exercises his or her discretion in favour of 
a beneficiary that the beneficiary becomes entitled to claim distribution of the income.1781 
Therefore, discretionary beneficiaries do not know whether and if they will receive income 
from the trust in a specific year, until the trustee has exercised his or her discretion. When 
the discretion is exercised in favour of a beneficiary, that beneficiary acquires a vested right 
to the income. It is, therefore, submitted that a discretionary beneficiary does not carry any 
risk in relation to the income, because he or she has no unconditional right to the income. 
The risk is carried by the trust.1782 In a vesting trust the risk associated with the income lies in 
the hands of the beneficiary. 
Regarding use1783 as an ownership attribute, the formulation of the meaning adopted by the 
court in Velcro did not refer to use being for the trustee’s own benefit. However, the court in 
Prévost formulated the test as follows: “the person who receives the dividends for his or her 
own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she received” 
(own emphasis). The court in Velcro derived the four attributes of ownership referred to 
above (namely possession, use, risk and control) from the judgement in Prévost. It is 
submitted that the attribute of use entails not only the employment or application of 
income, as suggested in Velcro, but also the enjoyment thereof. If read in this way, a person 
will only possess the use attribute of ownership if it is used and enjoyed for his or her own 
benefit. As stated earlier, a trustee rarely1784 holds income for his or her own benefit and 
will, accordingly, not be able to claim this ownership attribute. 
The test for beneficial ownership formulated in Prévost (and confirmed in Velcro) refers to 
the person who holds all the attributes of ownership. Thus, in terms of the Prévost test and 
applying South African law, a trust would never be regarded as the beneficial owner of 
income. However, Du Toit’s formulation of the test entails that the person whose ownership 
                                                          
1780 Velcro meaning: “’the chance of injury, damage or loss’ or ‘liability for injury, damage or loss that occurs’. 
Reference here would be to economic loss.” 
1781 See ch 2.2.4. 
1782 It is submitted that since a trust can be regarded as a person and a resident for purposes of a DTT (and 
because a trust is a person for domestic tax purposes), it has to be assessed whether the trust, and not the 
trustee, carries the risk associated with the income.  
1783 Velcro meaning: “the application or employment of something: a long continued possession or 
employment of a thing for which it is adapted.” 
1784 In the case where a trustee is also a beneficiary of a trust, the trustee holds the income for his or her own 
benefit as beneficiary. However, in South Africa, a person can never be the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of 
a trust (see ch 2.2.4). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
287 
attributes outweigh those of all others, will be regarded as the beneficial owner.1785 
Regarding the meaning of outweigh, Du Toit opines as follows: 
“Based on the case law above it seems fair to conclude that it is not so much a case of 
holding the biggest number of attributes but more a case of holding the biggest 
weight. Both the issues of the identificiation of the ownership attributes and 
determing who holds the biggest weight, depend on the specific circumstances …”1786 
Therefore, if Du Toit’s view is followed, the different attributes of ownership should be 
weighed up against each other. In terms of the analysis above, three attributes will be held 
by the trust and one by the beneficiaries in the case of a discretionary trust. In the case of a 
vesting trust, only one attribute will be held by the trust and the others by the beneficiaries. 
Danon1787 is of the view that the power to control the attribution of income is the most 
important ownership attribute. He argues that the fact that a trustee does not use and enjoy 
the income for his or her own benefit is not decisive.1788 If this view is followed, it seems that 
the scales would tip in favour of the trust as beneficial owner in the case of a discretionary 
trust, but that the beneficiaries would be the beneficial owners in the case of a vesting trust. 
Thus, if one started by considering which person holds the relevant ownership attributes, 
the line of reasoning outlined above (using Du Toit and Danon’s views) would have to be 
followed through to conclude that a trust (or the trustee) will, in the case of a discretionary 
trust, be regarded as the beneficial owner of the income for DTT purposes. If this reasoning 
is applied, the same conclusion as that set out in the proposed Commentary is reached in 
respect of discretionary trusts that accumulate income. However, if the proposed 
Commentary is applied to trusts that distribute income in the same year in which it is 
acquired, the conclusion was reached that these trusts are not the beneficial owners of the 
income for DTT purposes. The difference between the two views lies in the fact that, in 
terms of the proposed Commentary, the trustee is (after the exercise of his or her discretion) 
obliged to pay the income to the beneficiary. If, however, it is borne in mind that the trustee 
has control over whether or not they will create this obligation, it is submitted that the 
argument outlined above (using Du Toit and Danon’s views) is the preferred one.1789 
8.7 Conclusion 
8.7.1 General 
The meaning of the term beneficial owner has been uncertain from the time that it was 
incorporated in the OECD MTC. Many authors have expressed an opinion regarding the 
meaning of the term. Most of them agree that the term should not be interpreted in 
                                                          
1785 See ch 8.5. 
1786 Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 201. 
1787 See ch 8.6.1. 
1788 Schwarz holds a contrary view, namely that beneficial ownership has nothing to do with control and that 
beneficial enjoyment is an important feature of beneficial ownership. His view is based on the United Kingdom 
domestic law meaning of the term beneficial owner (Schwarz Schwarz on Tax Treaties 314). 
1789 The practical problem (encountered when a trustee of a discretionary trust decides to distribute income to 
a beneficiary within the same tax year, but after some time has lapsed) which arises when the proposed 
Commentary is applied will not occur if the argument based on the most important ownership attributes is 
followed. 
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accordance with domestic law, but that an international fiscal meaning should be attached 
to it. Case law, such as Indofood, supports this point and the Commentary and proposed 
Commentary also indicate that the international fiscal meaning should be followed. 
In South Africa, academic authors are of the view that a domestic meaning should not be 
attached to the term and that no sensible domestic law meaning can be found in domestic 
law which could be used for purposes of a DTT. It is submitted that the courts in the United 
Kingdom and Canada will favour the use of an international fiscal meaning of the term. The 
only state considered in this study to rely on a domestic law meaning of the term is the 
Netherlands. 
The OECD’s Commentary on the meaning of the term was very limited when the term was 
first incorporated into the OECD MTC. After the Conduit Companies Report, the 
Commentary was expanded in 2003 and according to some commentators this expansion 
not only changed the meaning of the term, but also increased the uncertainty surrounding 
the meaning of the term.1790 The proposed Commentary aims to clarify the interpretation 
that should be given to the term in the context of the OECD MTC.1791 Whether this aim will 
be achieved, remains to be seen. Prominent cases, such as Indofood and Prévost, have 
referred to the OECD Commentary, indicating its importance in the interpretation of the 
term. It is submitted that the OECD Commentary offers an international fiscal meaning to 
the term beneficial owner. The weight that a court will attach to this meaning will depend on 
its view regarding the status and role of the Commentary. 
The case law on beneficial ownership has increased in recent years, signalling that the 
meaning of the term is an important issue in interpreting DTTs. The leading cases suggest 
that the absence of an agent or nominee relationship does not conclude the beneficial 
owner question. Furthermore, the cases look to the person who has all the attributes of 
ownership to determine who the beneficial owner is. The courts will consider an entity to be 
a mere conduit only if it has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put 
through it, or if it has agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that person’s 
instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs. In applying these 
tests, some courts apply a legal test only, in other words, only the parties’ rights and 
obligations are considered. Other courts apply a substance over form or practical matter or 
economic test, either on its own, or in addition to the legal test. Courts agree that the 
motive to avoid tax is not a factor which should be taken into account to determine the 
beneficial owner of income. 
Academic authors have expressed differing views on the meaning of beneficial ownership. 
Some authors’ views are focussed on the agent or nominee roles and conduit company 
approach set out in the OECD Commentary, while other authors focus on the attributes of 
ownership. 
                                                          
1790 Collier (2011) 6 BTR 684 690. 
1791 OECD Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion 
Draft 2. 
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8.7.2 Can a trust be the beneficial owner of income? 
Regarding the question of whether a trust (or trustee) can be the beneficial owner of 
income, most academic authors agree that at least some trusts (or its trustee) may be 
beneficial owners. Case law, on the other hand, suggests that a trust (or trustee) cannot be a 
beneficial owner, as income is not held for the benefit of the trust (or trustee), but for the 
benefit of the beneficiary. 
The OECD’s revised proposals make it clear that the trust law meaning of the term, as used 
in common law states, is not the intended meaning of the term in the OECD MTC. It 
furthermore explicitly states that a trust (or trustee) may be the beneficial owner of income 
for purposes of a DTT and gives an example of where this may occur. Regarding the further 
point made in the proposed Commentary, it is to be noted that in none of the states under 
consideration in this dissertation will a trust (or the trustee) be regarded as an agent or a 
nominee of the beneficiaries. It is submitted that a trust (or trustee) could be regarded as a 
conduit and it should therefore be investigated whether a trust has very narrow powers 
which render the trust (or trustee) a mere administrator or fiduciary. If the trust’s (or 
trustee’s) right to use and enjoy the income is constrained by a contractual or legal right to 
pass the income on to another, it will not be regarded as the beneficial owner. Consequently 
it is submitted that in the case of vesting trusts or some discretionary trusts in which the 
trustee distributes the income to the beneficiaries in the same tax year that the income 
flowed into the trust, the trust will not be regarded as the beneficial owner. It is further 
submitted that if the trustee accumulates the income (and irrespective of whether it is 
distributed in a later year), the trust may be regarded as the beneficial owner of the income. 
The case law and the OECD Commentary therefore seem to be in conflict and it is submitted 
that the court’s view of the role and status of each in the interpretation of actual treaties will 
be decisive in determining which view is followed. 
It is submitted that in order to determine whether a trust can be the beneficial owner, a 
South African court should inquire which attributes of ownership the trust holds. In the case 
of a vesting trust, only the attribute of possession will be in the hands of the trust and then 
only until it is paid over to the beneficiary.1792 In the case of a discretionary trust, the 
attributes of possession, control and risk rest in the hands of the trust, but the attribute of 
use is in the hands of the beneficiary. Case law would demand that all of the ownership 
attributes be held by the trust before it can be regarded as the beneficial owner, but 
academic authors suggest that these attributes should be weighed in each case and that the 
attribute of control carries the most weight in the trust scenario. According to this view, a 
discretionary trust would hold the biggest weight of ownership attributes and therefore be 
regarded as the beneficial owner. The opposite would be true in the case of a vesting trust. It 
is submitted that this view is the preferred one and should be applied by a South African 
court. Such an argument also corresponds with the conclusion reached by applying the 
proposed Commentary in respect of discretionary trusts that accumulate income (but not for 
all trusts which distribute income in the same year in which it was acquired). 
                                                          
1792 It is submitted that it is irrelevant whether this time period is short or long. 
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8.7.3 The different states 
Academic authors opine that a domestic meaning should not be attached to the term 
beneficial owner and that no workable domestic law meaning can be found which could be 
used for purposes of a DTT. It is submitted that South Africa should apply a test for beneficial 
ownership based on the person whose ownership attributes outweigh those of others. 
According to this view, in the case of a vesting trust, the beneficiaries will be the beneficial 
owners and in the case of a discretionary trust, the trust will be the beneficial owner. 
In the United Kingdom, if the domestic law meaning of the term is applied, the trustee will 
not be regarded as the beneficial owner, but rather the beneficiary. If, however, a court 
follows an international fiscal meaning (as, it is submitted, it should) and if it follows 
Indofood, the trustee will not be regarded as the beneficial owner. If, however, sufficient 
weight is attached to the Commentary, or if the court is persuaded by the argument based 
on the weighing up of ownership attributes set forth above, it may regard the trustee as 
beneficial owner. 
If the Canadian courts apply a domestic law meaning to the term beneficial owner, a trustee 
will not be regarded as the beneficial owner. The courts in Canada will also be bound (or 
might be persuaded) by the decision in Prévost. In terms of that decision a trust will not be 
regarded as the beneficial owner of income. It, therefore, seems unlikely that in Canada a 
trust will be regarded as the beneficial owner of income. 
The Netherlands will apply its domestic law definition of beneficial owner to the relevant 
income. 
8.7.4 Closing remarks 
No consensus exists regarding the meaning of the term beneficial owner and it is difficult to 
reconcile the views of academic authors, case law and the OECD as set forth in the 
Commentary. However, it is submitted that an argument can be made that a discretionary 
trust should be regarded as the beneficial owner of income, at least in circumstances in 
which the income is accumulated. 
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Annexure to Chapter 8 
Proposed amendments to the Commentary on article 10 
The quote below indicates the proposed amendments to the Commentary on article 10 
(similar amendments being proposed for the Commentary to articles 11 and 12) and also 
indicates the amendments made in reaction to the comments received on the first draft 
(that is, the April 2011 draft): 
“3. Replace paragraphs 12 to 12.2 of the Commentary on Article 10 by the following: 
12. The requirement of beneficial owner was introduced in paragraph 2 of Article 10 to 
clarify the meaning of the words “paid … to a resident” as they are used in paragraph 1 
of the Article. It makes plain that the State of source is not obliged to give up taxing 
rights over dividend income merely because that income was immediately received by 
paid direct to a resident of a State with which the State of source had concluded a 
convention. [The rest of the paragraph has been moved to new paragraph 12.1.] 
12.1 Since the term ‘beneficial owner’ was added to address potential difficulties 
arising from the use of the words ‘paid to … a resident’ in paragraph 1, it was 
intended to be interpreted in this context and not to refer to any technical meaning 
that it could have had under the domestic law of a specific country (in fact, when it 
was added to the paragraph, the term did not have a precise meaning in the law of 
many countries). The term ‘beneficial owner’ is therefore not used in a narrow 
technical sense (such as the meaning that it has under the trust law of many common 
law countries1), rather, it should be understood in its context, in particular in relation 
to the words ‘paid … to a resident’, and in light of the object and purposes of the 
Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
and avoidance. This does not mean, however, that the domestic law meaning of 
“beneficial owner” is automatically irrelevant for the interpretation of that term in 
the context of the Article: that domestic law meaning is applicable to the extent that 
it is consistent with the general guidance included in this Commentary. 
_____________________ 
[Footnote to paragraph 12.1] 
1. For example, where the trustees of a discretionary trust do not distribute dividends 
earned during a given period, these trustees, acting in their capacity as such (or the 
trust, if recognised as a separate taxpayer), could constitute the beneficial owners of 
such income for the purposes of Article 10 even if they are not the beneficial owners 
under the relevant trust law notwithstanding that the relevant trust law might 
distinguish between legal and beneficial ownership. 
12.12 Where an item of income is received by paid to a resident of a Contracting State 
acting in the capacity of agent or nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption merely 
on account of the status of the immediate direct recipient of the income as a resident 
of the other Contracting State. The immediate direct recipient of the income in this 
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situation qualifies as a resident but no potential double taxation arises as a 
consequence of that status since the recipient is not treated as the owner of the 
income for tax purposes in the State of residence. [The rest of the paragraph has been 
moved to new paragraph 12.3.] 
12.3 It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention 
for the State of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a Contracting 
State, otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply acts as a 
conduit for another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income concerned. 
For these reasons, the report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled ‘Double 
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies’1 concludes that a conduit 
company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the formal 
owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation to 
the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the 
interested parties. 
_____________________ 
[Footnote to paragraph 12.3] 
1. Reproduced at page R(6)-1 of Volume II of the full-length loose-leaf version of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. 
12.4 In these various examples (agent, nominee, conduit company acting as a 
fiduciary or administrator), the recipient of the dividend is not the ‘beneficial owner’ 
because that recipient’s right to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained that 
recipient does not have the full right to use and enjoy the dividend that it receives 
and this dividend is not its own; the powers of that recipient over that dividend are 
indeed constrained in that the recipient is obliged (because of a contractual, fiduciary 
or other duty) to pass the payment received to another person. The recipient of a 
dividend is the “beneficial owner” of that dividend where he has the full right to use 
and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on 
the payment received to another person. Such an obligation will normally derive 
from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on the basis of facts 
and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly does not have the 
full right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal 
obligation to pass on the payment received to another person. This type of obligation 
must be related to the payment received; it would therefore not include contractual 
or legal obligations unrelated to the payment received even if those obligations 
could effectively result in the recipient using the payment received to satisfy those 
obligations. Examples of such unrelated obligations are those unrelated obligations 
that the recipient may have as a debtor or as a party to financial transactions or 
typical distribution obligations of pension schemes and of collective investment 
vehicles entitled to treaty benefits under the principles of paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 of 
the Commentary on Article 1. Where the recipient of a dividend does have the right 
to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to 
pass on the payment received to another person, the recipient is the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of that dividend. It should also be noted that Article 10 refers to the beneficial 
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owner of a dividend as opposed to the owner of the shares, which may be different in 
some cases. ;also, the use and enjoyment of a dividend must be distinguished from 
the legal ownership, as well as the use and enjoyment, of the shares on which the 
dividend is paid. 
12.5 The fact that the recipient of a dividend is considered to be the beneficial owner 
of that dividend does not mean, however, that the limitation of tax provided for by 
paragraph 2 must automatically be granted. This limitation of tax should not be 
granted in cases of abuse of this provision (see also paragraphs 17 and 22 below). As 
explained in the section on ‘Improper use of the Convention’ in the Commentary on 
Article 1, there are many ways of addressing conduit company and, more generally, 
treaty shopping situations. These include specific treaty anti-abuse provisions in 
treaties, general anti-abuse rules and substance-over-form or economic substance 
approaches. Whilst the concept of ’beneficial owner’ deals with some forms of tax 
avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass 
on the dividend to someone else), it does not deal with other cases of treaty 
shopping and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the 
application of other approaches to addressing such cases. 
12.6 The above explanations concerning the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ make it 
clear that the meaning given to this term in the context of the Article must be 
distinguished from the different meaning that has been given to that term in the 
context of other instruments1 that concern the determination of the persons 
(typically the individuals) that exercise ultimate control over entities or assets. That 
different meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ cannot be applied in the context of the 
Article. Indeed, that meaning, which refers to natural persons (i.e. individuals), 
cannot be reconciled with the express wording of subparagraph 2 (a), which refers to 
the situation where a company is the beneficial owner of a dividend. Since, I In the 
context of Article 10, the term ‘beneficial owner’ is intended to address difficulties 
arising from the use of the words ‘paid to’ in relation to dividends, rather than 
difficulties related to the ownership of the shares of the company paying these 
dividends. For that reason, it would be inappropriate, in the context of that Article, to 
consider a meaning developed in order to refer to the individuals who exercise 
‘ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement’.2 
_____________________ 
[Footnotes to paragraph 12.6] 
1. See, for example, Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation – The 
FATF Recommendations (OECD-FATF, Paris, 2012), the Glossary to the Financial 
Action Task Force’s Forty Recommendations (http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236930_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.html#3427
6864) which sets forth in detail the international anti-money laundering standard 
and which includes the following definition of beneficial owner (at page 109): ‘the 
natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on 
whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons 
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who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.’ 
Similarly, the 2001 report of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 
‘Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes’ (OECD, Paris, 
2001), http://publications.oecd.org/acrobatebook/2101131E.PDF, at page 14, 
defines beneficial ownership as follows (at page 14): 
In this Report, ‘beneficial ownership’ refers to ultimate beneficial ownership or 
interest by a natural person. In some situations, uncovering the beneficial owner may 
involve piercing through various intermediary entities and/or individuals until the 
true owner who is a natural person is found. With respect to corporations, ownership 
is held by shareholders or members. In partnerships, interests are held by general 
and limited partners. In trusts and foundations, beneficial ownership refers to 
beneficiaries, which may also include the settlor or founder. 
2. See the Financial Action Task Force’s definition quoted in the previous note. 
Glossary to the Financial Action Task Force’s Forty Recommendations 
(http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236930_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.html#3427
6864). 
12.72 Subject to other conditions imposed by the Article, the limitation of tax in the State of 
source remains available when an intermediary, such as an agent or nominee located in a 
Contracting State or in a third State, is interposed between the beneficiary and the payer but 
the beneficial owner is a resident of the other Contracting State (the text of the Model was 
amended in 1995 and in [year of next update] to clarify this point, which has been the 
consistent position of all Mmember countries). States which wish to make this more explicit 
are free to do so during bilateral negotiations.”1793 
  
                                                          
1793 OECD OECD Model Tax Convention: Revised Proposal Concerning the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 17–20. 
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9.1 Introduction 
The question posed at the start of this dissertation is how a court would interpret and apply 
certain critical provisions of a Double Taxation Treaty (DTT) to a trust, assuming that South 
Africa is a party to the DTT and that the DTT is patterned on the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC). In this chapter the 
findings and recommendations of the dissertation are compiled in an attempt to answer the 
question posed above. Finally, the findings are used in a number of examples, to illustrate 
how these findings may be applied. 
9.2 Nature and key features of a trust 
It is not feasible to study the taxation of trusts and the way in which trusts are to be treated 
in terms of international treaties (like the OECD MTC) without having regard to the law 
applicable to trusts and, especially, their nature. The dissertation therefore started off by 
considering the legal position of trusts in South Africa, the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
Netherlands. In the case of the United Kingdom, a distinction was made between England 
and Scotland and in the case of Canada, the distinction was between the rest of Canada and 
Québec. Regarding the Netherlands, it was acknowledged that the English law trust is not 
traditionally found in Dutch law and that certain trust-like institutions fulfil the role 
performed by the trust in other jurisdictions. However, the Netherlands acceded to The 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (“The Hague 
Convention on Trusts”)1794 and is therefore obliged to recognise trusts created in other 
jurisdictions.1795 Although the chapter as a whole serves as a background to the rest of the 
dissertation, there are a number of aspects regarding trusts that are particularly important 
for purposes of this dissertation. These aspects influence the treatment of trusts for tax 
purposes, not only in a particular state’s domestic legislation, but also at a DTT level. 
Most significantly, a trust is not regarded as a juristic person in any of the above 
jurisdictions.1796 Despite this, a trust is regarded as a taxable entity in South Africa1797 and 
Canada1798 by legislation. In the United Kingdom, the trustees are regarded as a single 
person for income tax purposes, distinct from the persons who are the trustees from time to 
time.1799 
Furthermore, in all the jurisdictions discussed in this dissertation (except Québec) the 
trustees are the owners of the trust assets.1800 In England and the rest of Canada, the 
trustees are the legal owners of the trust property. The beneficiaries in vested trusts have 
equitable or beneficial ownership, whilst beneficiaries in discretionary trusts have a 
proprietary interest in the wider sense or a “quasi-property interest”.1801 No such split in 
ownership is known in South Africa, Scotland or Québec. The beneficiaries of trusts in South 
                                                          
1794 Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition . 
1795 See ch 2.5. 
1796 See ch 2.7. 
1797 See chs 2.2.3, 3.2.1 and 5.4. 
1798 See chs 3.4.1 and 5.2.4 
1799 See chs 3.3.1, 5.2.3, 5.5 and 6.2.2.2. 
1800 See ch 2.7. 
1801 See chs 2.3.3.1 (England) and 2.4.4.1 (Canada). 
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Africa and Scotland do not have any form of ownership in the trust property.1802 Instead they 
have personal rights against the trustee.1803 In South Africa, England,1804 Scotland1805 and the 
rest of Canada,1806 the trust assets form a separate estate or patrimony in the hands of the 
trustees and are safe from the trustees’ personal creditors. Trustees are also under a duty to 
keep trust assets separate from their own assets. 
In none of the states considered in this dissertation is a trust equated to an agent. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that a trustee is not an agent of either the settlor or the 
beneficiary in any of these states.1807 
It is also important to note that all of the jurisdictions discussed in this dissertation recognise 
the difference between vesting (or fixed) trusts and discretionary trusts1808 and that the 
rights of the beneficiaries under each of these two types of trusts are different.1809 This 
distinction is significant, since most states under consideration treat these types of trusts 
differently for tax purposes and it is submitted that these types of trusts will also be treated 
differently for purposes of a DTT modelled on the OECD MTC. 
In all of the relevant jurisdictions, the administration of the trust is in the hands of the 
trustee. In South Africa, England and the rest of Canada the trustees may delegate some of 
their less vital functions, but not the more important ones. In Québec delegation of general 
administration or exercise of a discretionary power may take place, but only to co-trustees. 
In Scotland an agent may be appointed, if appropriate.1810 
It is submitted that these aspects of trust law, in particular, are essential considerations in 
applying the OECD MTC to trusts. These aspects determine, or at least influence, the issues 
that are considered in this dissertation, namely whether a trust (or trustee) will be regarded 
as a person, a resident or a beneficial owner for purposes of the OECD MTC. 
9.3 The taxation of trusts 
A further vital part of the framework of this dissertation is to ascertain how each of the 
states tax trusts. Although all of the states follow the same basic taxation policy, namely that 
income flowing through a trust should be taxed only once, the states use different 
mechanisms to achieve this aim.1811 South Africa uses mainly an initial choice system, which 
entails that, as income arises, a choice is made whether to tax the beneficiary or the trust. 
The choice is based on whether the beneficiary has a vested or contingent right to the 
income.1812 Significantly, in South Africa, the trust itself is a person for tax purposes and 
                                                          
1802 However, in the South African bewind trust the beneficiary is the owner of the assets, but this type of trust 
is excluded from the scope of this dissertation. 
1803 See chs 2.2.4 (South Africa), 2.3.3.2 (Scotland) and 2.4.4.2 (Québec). 
1804 See ch 2.3.3.1. 
1805 See ch 2.3.3.2. 
1806 See ch 2.4.4.1. 
1807 See ch 2.7. 
1808 The exception is Québec where the Civil Code is silent on this issue. 
1809 See chs 2.2.4 (South Africa), 2.3.3.1 (England), 2.3.3.2 (Scotland) and 2.4.4.1 (Canada).  
1810 See ch 2.7. 
1811 See ch 3.1. 
1812 See ch 3.2.2. 
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therefore liable to tax as a taxpayer. The United Kingdom predominantly uses the credit 
method, which involves that both the trustee and the beneficiary are taxed on the income, 
but the beneficiary is granted a credit for the taxes paid by the trustee.1813 In the United 
Kingdom, it is the trustee that is regarded as a distinct person for tax purposes. In Canada, 
primarily the deduction method is used, which means that although income is taxed in the 
hands of the trust and distributions are again taxed in the hands of the beneficiary, the trust 
is granted a deduction for the amount distributed to the beneficiary. According to the 
Canadian Income Tax Act,1814 a trust is deemed to be an individual and the trust itself is 
therefore liable to tax.1815 The Netherlands introduced the concept of afgezonderd 
particulier vermogen (APV) in 2010. Most discretionary trusts will be classified as APVs, with 
the result that all the income of the APV is taxed in the hands of the settlor.1816 
It should be noted that all of the states considered in this dissertation tax discretionary trusts 
differently from vesting (or fixed) trusts. The rights of the beneficiaries, determined 
according to trust law principles, are therefore crucial in determining how the trust and 
other role players are to be taxed. Tax avoidance is also uppermost in the minds of the 
taxing authorities in all of these states, as they all have anti-avoidance legislation specifically 
aimed at curbing avoidance through the use of trusts and all these states use high tax rates 
in respect of trusts.1817 Generally, in none of the states considered in this dissertation are 
trusts subject to the same tax treatment as individuals or companies and a unique regime is 
usually enacted to deal with the taxation of trusts.1818 
The way in which each state imposes tax on trusts is governed by the policy decisions made 
by that state. These choices influence the way in which each state will apply DTTs modelled 
on the OECD MTC to trusts. More specifically, how the domestic tax law of a particular state 
taxes trusts (or trustees), will determine whether it will be regarded as a person or a resident 
for purposes of the DTT or whether it could possibly be regarded as the beneficial owner of 
income. Furthermore, domestic tax law regulates the attribution of income for DTT 
purposes. It is submitted that policy makers should bear in mind the effect that their choices 
regarding domestic taxation of trusts has on the treatment of trusts under DTTs. This point is 
especially pertinent for South Africa, where policies are still in the process of being brought 
into line with South Africa’s re-emergence into the global economy. 
9.4 The interpretation and status of tax treaties 
To further contextualise the discussion regarding the application of the selected provisions 
of the OECD MTC to trusts, the way in which each state interprets DTTs entered into by it 
and the status afforded to DTTs in each state were investigated. Many of the matters that 
have been dealt with in the other states under discussion still remain unresolved in South 
Africa. Thus, although it is clear that South Africa is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),1819 it is unclear whether the provisions of this 
                                                          
1813 See ch 3.3.7. 
1814 Income Tax Act RSC 1985 (5th supp) ch 1 s 104(2). 
1815 See ch 3.4.7. 
1816 See ch 3.5.2. 
1817 See ch 3.6. 
1818 See ch 5.3. 
1819 The Vienna Convention contains rules regarding the interpretation of treaties. 
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Convention form part of South African law as customary international law. The other 
relevant states are all signatories to the Vienna Convention.1820 In South Africa the courts’ 
reliance on the OECD Commentary is erratic. Sometimes, even though there is relevant 
Commentary or OECD reports, these are not referred to in judgements. In other cases where 
the OECD MTC or the Commentary is mentioned, the basis on which this is done is not 
stated.1821 It is submitted that neither section 232 nor section 233 of the Constitution1822 
provides a basis to refer to the OECD MTC or the Commentary, as neither of these latter 
instruments is international law.1823 In the other relevant states, the courts have indicated 
that the Commentary plays an important role in the interpretation of DTTs.1824 Although it is 
not stated clearly by the courts, an examination of the judgements shows that South African 
courts generally attribute an autonomous treaty meaning to the wording of a DTT.1825 In the 
other three states, the courts have explicitly stated that they will apply an autonomous 
treaty meaning. 
Furthermore, there are differing opinions regarding the process by which DTTs become part 
of South African law. Moreover, it is not yet settled whether a DTT outranks the other 
provisions of the Income Tax Act.1826 At least three views can be identified from the cases, 
namely that (a) the Income Tax Act must prevail, (b) a DTT modifies domestic law and will 
apply in preference to domestic law in the case of conflict, and (c) the legislation and treaty 
rank equally and any conflict must be resolved by the application of the principles of 
statutory interpretation and superseding legislation. Although the view set out in (c) is 
preferred, it is submitted that the view set out in (b) will probably be followed by the courts 
in relation to DTTs.1827 
It is hoped that the South African courts will take notice of the uncertainty surrounding the 
basis on which courts may refer to the Commentary and the status of South Africa’s tax 
treaties and provide guidance on these points. The courts or the legislature have done so in 
the other states under discussion. 
9.5 Is the trust a person for purposes of the OECD MTC? 
A state applying a DTT based on the OECD MTC will have to determine, inter alia, whether a 
trust (or trustee) is a person or a resident and the beneficial owner of the income (if 
relevant). In addition, it will have to determine whether the income is attributed to the trust 
(or trustee). If any of these requirements is not met, the trust (or trustee) cannot rely on the 
DTT. 
Regarding the first of these requirements, namely that the trust (or the trustee) must be a 
person, the OECD seems to indicate, in its Collective Investment Schemes Report,1828 that if a 
trust (or trustee) is treated as a taxpayer in the state in which it is established, it should be 
                                                          
1820 See ch 4.3.1. 
1821 See ch 4.3.2.2. 
1822 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
1823 See ch 4.3.2.1. 
1824 See chs 4.3.3 (United Kingdom); 4.3.4 (Canada) and 4.3.5 (the Netherlands). 
1825 See ch 4.3.2.2. 
1826 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
1827 See chs 4.4.1 and 4.5. 
1828 OECD R(24). The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles. 
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regarded as a person. However, no reasons are provided for this view, save to say that as a 
matter of policy, such trusts should be regarded as persons.1829 In this dissertation, the 
relevant provisions of the OECD MTC were therefore analysed to determine whether a trust 
(or trustee) can be regarded as a person in each of the states discussed herein. 
Based on the wording of the OECD MTC, it was established that a trust (or trustee) may 
qualify as a person if it falls within any one of the following criteria: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) any other body of persons; 
(c) any body corporate; 
(d) an entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes; or 
(e) the ordinary meaning of the term person.1830 
In South Africa, the trust is neither an individual, nor a body corporate. In relation to the 
question whether a trust could be a body of persons, it was concluded that if the domestic 
law meaning of the term were to apply,1831 a trust would not be regarded as a body of 
persons in terms of case law, but a trustee could.1832 If, in terms of article 3(2) of the OECD 
MTC, the context requires that the domestic law meaning be disregarded and the ordinary 
meaning of the term be applied, the trust will still not be regarded as a body of persons, but 
the trustee will. If, under these circumstances, an international fiscal meaning were to be 
attached to this term, one was (hesitantly) offered in this dissertation, but it was concluded 
that arguing that a trust is a person because it falls within the international fiscal meaning, 
cannot be done with much confidence.1833 It was ascertained that the phrase “an entity that 
is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” means entities that are treated like juristic 
persons under the tax laws of any of the contracting states. A trust (or trustee) is not treated 
like a juristic person in terms of South African tax law and can therefore not be a person in 
terms of this criterion.1834 The only criterion in terms of which a trust can be regarded as a 
person is the ordinary meaning of the term. If the domestic law meaning of the term is used 
to complete the definition of the term person, a trust will be regarded as a person, because 
the South African Income Tax Act includes a trust in its definition of the term person.1835 It is 
recommended that, to place the matter beyond any doubt, South Africa should routinely 
include a trust specifically in the definition of person in the DTTs concluded with other 
countries.1836 
Applying the same criteria to the United Kingdom, it was concluded that a trust is not a 
person, but that the trustee is. In Canada, both the trust and the trustee will be regarded as 
                                                          
1829 See ch 5.1. 
1830 See ch 5.1. 
1831 Via art 3(s) of the OECD MTC. 
1832 See ch 5.2.2. 
1833 See ch 5.2.6. 
1834 See ch 5.3. 
1835 See ch 5.4. 
1836 See ch 5.7. 
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persons. Although it is doubtful, the trustees of a trust might be regarded as a body of 
persons and therefore a person in the Netherlands.1837 
9.6 The residence of a trust for purposes of the OECD MTC 
Regarding the second requirement, namely that the trust (or trustee) be regarded as a 
resident, the provisions of article 4(1) are of the utmost importance. Only if a trust (or 
trustee) is liable to tax by reason of the listed criteria in terms of the domestic law of the 
state, will it be a resident of that state. Since residence is determined by domestic law, it was 
deduced that each state’s domestic law should be used to determine whether it is the trust 
or the trustee that can be resident in that state. It was concluded that in South Africa and 
Canada, the relevant person who is liable to tax in terms of domestic law is the trust itself, 
while in the United Kingdom, it is the trustees, as a body, that is liable to tax in terms of 
domestic law. It is therefore the trust in South Africa and Canada and the trustees (as a 
body) in the United Kingdom, who are persons for purposes of article 1 and whose residence 
should be determined for purposes of article 4(1).1838 
If a state treats an entity as fiscally transparent, it is not liable to tax and therefore cannot be 
regarded as a resident of a contracting state.1839 Certain degrees of transparency were noted 
and the question was raised as to the degree of transparency that was required for an entity 
to be regarded as either transparent or opaque. It was argued that trusts (or trustees) that 
are completely transparent (whether or not they have certain reporting requirements) are 
not liable to tax and can therefore not be residents of the particular state. A trust (or 
trustee) that is completely opaque is liable to tax and can therefore be regarded as a 
resident for DTT purposes.1840 The more difficult case is that of a partially transparent trust 
(or trustee). After considering the domestic taxation of a trust (or trustee) in the relevant 
states, it was concluded that there is merit in regarding a partially transparent trust (or 
trustee) as liable to tax, even in circumstances where all its income is distributed. However, 
the following approach is preferred, because it is more practical: a trust (or trustee) that is 
taxed on undistributed income, is liable to tax in relation to that income. Regarding that 
portion of the income that is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries 
resident in the relevant countries are entitled to the benefits of the applicable conventions, 
to the extent that they are liable to tax on the income distributed to them.1841 
The fact that anti-avoidance legislation attributes the trust income to another person, does 
not influence the trust’s (or trustee’s) liability to tax.1842 
The words “by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion 
of a similar nature” in article 4(1) were interpreted in the Canadian case of Crown Forest 
Industries Ltd v The Queen.1843 According to this case there should be a causal link or some 
relationship of proximity between the grounds for tax liability in a state and the criteria 
                                                          
1837 See ch 5.7. 
1838 See ch 6.2.2.2. 
1839 See ch 6.2.2.3.1. 
1840 See ch 6.2.2.3.2. 
1841 See ch 6.2.2.3.3. 
1842 See ch 6.2.2.4. 
1843 Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802. 
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enumerated in article 4(1). The case furthermore indicates that the listed criteria connote 
comprehensive liability imposed by a state and that any basis of taxation which is to be 
classified as a “criterion of a similar nature” should also involve comprehensive liability and 
not just source-based taxation. The Crown Forest Industries case may provide guidance to a 
South African court if it were asked to interpret similar words in one of South Africa’s DTTs. 
In relation to trusts it is relevant whether the criterion of “established or formed” (one of the 
grounds on which a trust will be resident in terms of South African domestic law) will be 
regarded as of a similar nature to the other criteria enumerated in article 4(1). Although 
there are differing views in the academic literature, it was argued in this dissertation, based 
on the decision in Crown Forest Industries, that the view that this criterion is of a similar 
nature (since it leads to comprehensive taxation) is to be preferred. It was argued that, in 
any event, the criterion of “established or formed” merely indicates that a trust is resident in 
South Africa and that residence is one of the criteria listed in article 4(1). However, to put 
the matter beyond doubt, it may be advisable for South Africa to enter a reservation to 
article 4 to indicate that it will apply the criterion of “established or formed” in relation to 
trusts.1844 
Since article 4(1) requires that residence be determined in accordance with domestic law, it 
was examined how the residence of a trust(ee) is determined in terms of the domestic law 
of each of the states discussed in this dissertation. South Africa uses two alternative criteria 
to establish a trust’s residence.1845 One of these criteria is “established or formed in the 
Republic”. There are at least two ways to interpret this phrase, with strong arguments in 
favour of both. The interpretation preferred in this dissertation is that a trust is established 
or formed in South Africa if it is established or formed within South Africa’s borders, but it is 
recommended that the legislation be amended to clarify this point.1846 
In academic literature there is a debate regarding the time when an inter vivos trust is 
formed or established for purposes of the definition of “resident” in the South African 
Income Tax Act. The preferred view is that a trust is established or formed on the date that 
the settlor and trustee sign the trust deed (or enter into an oral agreement), irrespective of 
the date on which the beneficiary accepts. Although it is submitted that the arguments in 
favour of the other view is not as convincing, it is recommended that the legislation be 
amended to clarify this point. Since an inter vivos trust is created by way of a contract, the 
rules on the place of formation of a contract (both for an electronic contract and one in the 
more traditional paper form) were examined. In respect of electronic contracts it was 
concluded that the default rule in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act1847 
regarding the place of formation may result in uncertainties when the place of formation of 
a trust has to be determined. It was therefore recommended that parties should stipulate in 
a trust instrument that is sent electronically exactly where the agreement will be 
concluded.1848 
                                                          
1844 See ch 6.2.3. 
1845 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 1 definition of “resident”. 
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A testamentary trust is usually formed at the date of the testator’s death and it is submitted 
that it is formed at the place where the testator executes the will by which the trust is 
formed. 
A trust is not “established” or “formed” through the registration of the trust instrument, or 
the authorisation of the trustees by the Master. These formal acts by the Master are, 
consequently, irrelevant in determining a trust’s residence.1849 
It seems that if the rules on the formation of trusts are applied in order to determine their 
residence, the place of “formation” or “establishment” may be either arbitrary or easily 
manipulated. One answer would be to amend the Income Tax Act in such a way that a trust 
will be resident in South Africa if registration of the trust instrument and authorisation of 
trustees are required in terms of the Trust Property Control Act.1850 However, this solution 
would not apply to oral trusts which are not covered by that Act.1851 
The other criterion used to determine whether a trust is resident in South Africa in terms of 
its domestic law is that of place of effective management (POEM). There are many 
uncertainties regarding the meaning of the term POEM. For example, it is uncertain whether 
the term POEM in the Income Tax Act bears the same meaning as the term used in article 
4(3) of the OECD MTC. This dissertation supports the view that the terms do have the same 
meaning in that the meaning in terms of South Africa’s DTTs (which are based on the OECD 
MTC) informs the meaning of the term in the Income Tax Act.1852 It is also uncertain what 
the South African Revenue Service’s view is regarding the meaning of POEM.1853 What is 
certain, though, is that its view is not law and therefore not binding on the taxpayers or the 
courts. Academic authors have also offered differing views regarding the meaning of POEM. 
Some guidance is provided by the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold Ltd1854 and The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service1855 cases. It can be deduced from these cases that the place of decision 
making, and not the place where decisions are implemented, is relevant in determining the 
POEM. Furthermore, both cases indicate that the top level of management is the level of 
management relevant to determine POEM. In these respects it is submitted that the South 
African domestic law meaning of the term POEM corresponds in broad terms to the position 
set out in the OECD Commentary to article 4(3).1856 
Applying these cases to trusts, it is submitted that the top level of management is usually 
exercised by the trustees. If the trustees do indeed exercise the effective management of 
the trust, it is the place where they take their decisions that will determine the POEM of the 
trust. The facts may, however, indicate that the effective management of the trust is not 
exercised by the trustees, in which case it is the place where the person that effectively 
                                                          
1849 See ch 6.3.1.2.2. 
1850 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
1851 See ch 6.3.1.2.2. 
1852 See ch 6.3.1.3.1. 
1853 See ch 6.3.1.3.2. 
1854 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
1855 The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 74 SATC 127. 
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manages the trust takes the decisions that will be relevant in determining the trust’s 
POEM.1857 
In the United Kingdom, the residence of the trustees as a body is regulated by legislation.1858 
In Canada, recent case law established firmly that the central management and control test 
should be applied to trusts.1859 The Canadian Income Tax Act deems a trust to be a Canadian 
resident under certain circumstances and a recent amendment to legislation now ensures 
that such a trust is also resident in Canada for DTT purposes.1860 It is furthermore submitted 
that it is highly unlikely that a trust will be regarded as resident in the Netherlands in terms 
of the Dutch domestic law.1861 
Article 4(3) of the OECD MTC uses POEM as the tiebreaker to determine the residence, for 
DTT purposes, of a person other than an individual. It is submitted that South Africa should 
apply the POEM test as the tiebreaker to resolve the residence of trusts for DTT purposes, 
thereby following the precedent set by international case law and the majority academic 
opinion. However, in order to address the possible uncertainty created by the Commentary 
to article 4(3), it is suggested that South Africa should insert a reservation to the 
Commentary, indicating that it will apply the POEM tiebreaker in relation to trusts.1862 
Concerning the meaning of the term POEM in article 4(3) of the OECD MTC, the Commentary 
indicates that it is the place where key management and commercial decisions necessary for 
the conduct of the entity's business as a whole are in substance made. It is submitted that by 
the amendment of the Commentary in 2008, the OECD suggested that a lower level of 
management (such as senior executives) as opposed to the highest level of management 
(such as a board of directors) can be responsible for the key management and commercial 
decisions of a business.1863 The case law reveals that an entity is effectively managed by the 
highest level of management, that is, the place where the “shots are called”, or where the 
top level of management is exercised. Usually, this level of management will be exercised by 
the board of directors in the case of a company, or by the trustee in the case of a trust.1864 
However, case law reveals that the effective management of a trust is often not exercised by 
the trustee of a trust. Yet, in all of the jurisdictions under discussion, in terms of trust law, 
only the trustees may manage a trust. A similar problem is encountered in situations 
involving companies, where a company can only act through certain organs, typically the 
board of directors. In Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock (Inspector of Taxes)1865 the court 
held that it was irrelevant that the acts, which prove where central management and control 
is exercised, are irregular, unauthorised or unlawful. The residence of a company is 
determined by facts, not by the terms of its constitution. It is submitted that the same 
reasoning should be applied to trusts. Thus, even if trust instruments and trust law state that 
                                                          
1857 See ch 6.3.1.3.4. 
1858 See ch 6.3.2.1. 
1859 See ch 6.3.3.1. 
1860 See ch 6.3.3.2. 
1861 See ch 6.3.4. 
1862 See ch 6.4.1. 
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1864 See ch 6.4.3.2. 
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only the trustee may manage (or administer) a trust, other persons (such as beneficiaries or 
advisors) may be held to be effectively managing the trust.1866 
It is submitted that the test laid down in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes),1867 which 
outlines the circumstances under which it will be held that a board of directors are not 
effectively managing a company, can and should be applied by analogy to trustees managing 
a trust. Adapting the test for trusts, it is submitted that a distinction should be made 
between (a) cases where effective management of the trust is exercised by its trustees, and 
(b) cases where the functions of the trustees are usurped, in the sense that management is 
exercised independently of, or without regard to, the trustees. In cases which fall within 
item (a), it is essential to recognise the distinction (in concept, at least) between (i) the role 
of an “outsider” in proposing, advising and influencing the decisions which the trustees take 
in fulfilling their functions, and (ii) the role of an outsider who dictates the decisions which 
are to be taken. In that context an “outsider” is a person who is not himself or herself a 
participant in the formal process (for example, a meeting of trustees) through which the 
trustees fulfil their function.1868 Further guidance from Wood’s case should also be borne in 
mind. If only a few transactions are undertaken by the trustees, the conclusion of those 
transactions will constitute the management of the trust by the trustees. Even if decisions 
are taken by the trustees without full and detailed information available to them, these are 
still valid trustee decisions and the functions of the trustees have not been usurped.1869 
The decision in Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood1870 
cannot be supported and it is submitted that the court’s explanation of the reason why the 
test laid down in Wood is inappropriate, is unconvincing. Moreover, it is submitted that the 
Smallwood case was decided incorrectly on the facts in that the advisors and the settlor did 
not dictate to the trustees what their decisions should have been, but rather that the 
advisors and the settlor merely influenced the trustees’ decisions.1871 
9.7 Attribution of income to a trust 
A further requirement for the application of a DTT (patterned on the OECD MTC) to a trust 
(or trustee) is that income must be attributed to the trust (trustee). The OECD MTC uses 
several terms in its distributive rules to denote the connection between an item of income 
and a person. Yet the OECD MTC itself does not contain any attribution principles, leading 
academics to the conclusion that the attribution of income can be regarded as a matter for 
domestic law. However, the application of domestic attribution rules may lead to conflicts of 
attribution between two state parties to a DTT.1872 It is submitted that the solution 
suggested in the OECD’s report entitled The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention 
to Partnerships (the Partnership Report),1873 which is aimed at solving conflicts of 
classification, may be applied in respect of conflicts of attribution with regard to trusts. The 
                                                          
1866 See ch 6.4.4. 
1867 Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWCA Civ 26. 
1868 See ch 6.4.4. 
1869 See ch 6.4.3.2. 
1870 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood [2010] EWCA Civ 778. 
1871 See ch 6.4.4. 
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solution suggested in the Partnership Report is that the state of source should take into 
account, as part of the factual context, the way in which the item of income is treated in the 
residence state of the person claiming the benefits of the DTT and that the state of source 
should follow this treatment.1874 A number of examples of conflicts of attribution involving 
trusts between the states studied in this dissertation were given.1875 Many of these conflicts 
could be resolved, using the solution of the Partnership Report.1876 
9.8 Beneficial ownership and the trust 
The last requirement for the application of a DTT (patterned on the OECD MTC) to trusts that 
was considered in this dissertation is beneficial ownership, a term used in certain articles of 
the OECD MTC. The meaning of the term is controversial. For example, it is not clear 
whether a domestic law meaning or an international fiscal meaning should be attached to 
this term when interpreting a DTT, although the latter seems to be the more accepted 
view.1877 Furthermore, it is not clear whether a purely legal test or a more economic (or 
substance over form) test should be applied when establishing beneficial ownership.1878 
Academic authors have also offered many divergent views regarding the meaning of the 
term.1879 The OECD Commentary on the meaning of the term beneficial owner has expanded 
over the period since its introduction in 1977 and, it is submitted, the meaning that the 
OECD attaches to the term has expanded with it. In the latest round, the OECD has issued a 
discussion draft and later a revised proposal containing proposed changes to the 
Commentary, in an attempt to clarify the meaning of the term. The eminent international 
cases on beneficial ownership have referred to the OECD Commentary, indicating the 
importance of the Commentary in determining the meaning of the term. It is submitted that 
the Commentary offers an international fiscal meaning of the term, a point underlined by 
the proposed changes.1880 
Court cases from around the world may provide some guidance regarding the meaning of 
the term beneficial owner. These cases reveal that the absence of an agent, trustee or 
nominee relationship is not conclusive to determine beneficial ownership. Prominence is 
given to the attributes of ownership (possession, use and enjoyment, risk and control) and 
the person who holds all these attributes will be considered the beneficial owner of the 
income. If an entity has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put 
through it as conduit, or if it has agreed to act on someone else's behalf pursuant to that 
person's instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it to do, it 
will not be regarded as the beneficial owner. However, the courts differ in the way in which 
they apply these tests. Some courts consider only legally binding rights and obligations, 
while others adopt a practical (or economic or substance over form) approach, or a 
combination of the two.1881 
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The main purpose of the discussion on beneficial ownership was to ascertain whether a trust 
(or trustee) may be regarded as a beneficial owner for purposes of a DTT based on the OECD 
MTC. Case law seems to suggest that it cannot,1882 but some academic authors indicate that, 
at least under certain circumstances, a trust (or trustee) may be regarded as the beneficial 
owner (although other academics disagree).1883 The OECD’s revised proposal for the 
amendment of the Commentary is the strongest indication yet from the OECD that a trust 
(or trustee) could be a beneficial owner. It even provides an example in which a 
discretionary trust that accumulates the relevant income is held to be the beneficial owner. 
Since the discretionary trust that accumulates income is only an example of a trust that may 
be a beneficial owner, the other provisions of the Commentary were also analysed to 
determine when a trust will be regarded as a beneficial owner. Although it is accepted that 
in none of the states discussed in this dissertation will a trust (or trustee) be regarded as an 
agent or nominee of the beneficiaries or the settlor, the absence of an agency or nominee 
relationship is not conclusive to determine beneficial ownership. Under the proposed 
Commentary, it is submitted that a trust (or trustee) will not be a beneficial owner if its right 
to use and enjoy the income received is constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to 
pass on the payment to a beneficiary. Thus it was deduced that in the case of a vesting trust 
and in some cases where the trustees exercise their discretion in favour of a beneficiary 
during the year in which the income was received, the trust (or trustee) will not be regarded 
as the beneficial owner in terms of the Commentary. It is submitted that in terms of the 
proposed Commentary, if a discretionary trust accumulates the income, the trust (or 
trustee) will be regarded as the beneficial owner of the income even if, after a number of 
years, the trustee decides to vest the income in a beneficiary.1884 
Whether the courts will apply the meaning offered by the OECD MTC, depends on the view 
that a court takes of the role and status of the Commentary. In South Africa the role and 
status of the Commentary are still unclear, but the court is constitutionally required to 
consider foreign precedent. It is therefore difficult to predict which of the two views a court 
will follow, but it is submitted that in order to determine whether a trust can be the 
beneficial owner, a South African court should investigate where the attributes of ownership 
(identified in the Canadian cases as possession, use, risk and control) lie in each case. It is 
further submitted that, from a South African perspective, in the case of a discretionary trust, 
the attributes of possession, risk and control lie with the trust, but the attribute of use lies 
with the beneficiary. In the case of a vesting trust, only the attribute of possession lies with 
the trust, while the attributes of use, risk and control lie with the beneficiaries.1885 
The test for beneficial ownership formulated in the Canadian case of Her Majesty the Queen 
v Prévost Car Inc1886 case (and confirmed in Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty the Queen1887 
case) refers to the person who holds all the attributes of ownership. Thus, in terms of the 
Prévost test and applying South African law, a trust would never be regarded as the 
beneficial owner of income. However, Du Toit regards the beneficial owner as the person 
whose ownership attributes outweigh those of all others. Danon views the power to control 
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the attribution of income as the most important ownership attribute. Using the views of 
these academic authors, it is therefore submitted that a discretionary trust may be the 
beneficial owner of income, since it holds three out of the four attributes of ownership 
(including control). In the case of a vesting trust, only one attribute (not control) lies with the 
trust and it is therefore submitted that it cannot be a beneficial owner. If this reasoning is 
applied, the same conclusion as that set out in the proposed Commentary is reached in 
respect of most types of trusts.1888 
9.9 The trust and the OECD MTC from a South African perspective 
For the sake of convenience, the view that a court should take when applying a DTT 
modelled on the OECD MTC to South African trusts (according to this dissertation), is 
summarised in this paragraph. It is submitted that a court, when applying a DTT patterned 
on the OECD MTC to a South African trust: 
(a) Will regard the trust itself as the relevant taxpayer. 
(b) Will regard the trust as a person. 
(c) Will regard the trust itself as liable to tax in South Africa if it is a discretionary trust that 
accumulates all its income during the relevant year. It will not be regarded as liable to 
tax (and therefore not a resident for purposes of the DTT) if it is a vesting trust and all 
the income received by the trust is therefore vested in the hands of the beneficiary. If 
a discretionary trust accumulates part of its income and distributes the rest (or if it 
distributes all of its income during the relevant year), the trust is liable to tax in 
relation to the income that it accumulates, but, in relation to that portion of the 
income that is distributed to the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries resident in the 
relevant countries are entitled to the benefits of the applicable conventions, to the 
extent that they are liable to tax on the income distributed to them. 
(d) Should follow the case of Crown Forest Industries1889 in interpreting the words “by 
reason of” in article 4(1) of the OECD MTC. 
(e) Will apply the POEM test set out in article 4(3) of the OECD MTC in determining the 
residence of a trust for treaty purposes. In this regard it is submitted that a trust is 
usually effectively managed by its trustee and it is the place where the trustee takes 
his or her decisions that will be relevant in determining the trust’s POEM. If the facts 
suggest that a trust is not effectively managed by its trustee, it is submitted that the 
test laid down in Wood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes)1890 should be adapted and 
applied to determine whether the trustee effectively managed the trust. 
(f) May apply the solution suggested in the Partnership Report to conflicts of attribution 
involving trusts. 
(g) Should consider whether the trust holds the greatest weight of ownership attributes in 
order to determine whether a trust is the beneficial owner of income. 
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9.10 Examples 
Some practical examples, which were described in chapter 1, will illustrate how South Africa 
will apply a treaty based on the OECD MTC to a trust (in accordance with the principles set 
out in this dissertation).1891 For the sake of convenience, the facts are repeated here. In all of 
these examples, assume that the relevant DTT follows the wording of the OECD MTC and not 
the wording of the actual treaty between the two states. 
9.10.1 Assume that an inter vivos trust instrument is signed in South Africa between the 
settlor and the trustees. Assume further that the settlor and trustees agree that 
South African law will apply to their agreement. The trustees are all Canadian 
residents. They fulfil their duties as trustees in Canada and all trustee meetings take 
place in Canada. The trust receives income from a South African source. 
In both South Africa and Canada, the trust itself is a taxpayer and the trust itself will 
be regarded as a person for purposes of the OECD MTC. 
South Africa will have to determine whether the trust is resident in South Africa. 
Since the trust was established or formed in South Africa (because the trust 
instrument was signed in South Africa), it will be regarded as a South African 
resident in terms of the Income Tax Act. In terms of Canadian domestic law, the 
trust will be regarded as having its central management and control in Canada 
(since the trustees fulfil all their duties there and all trustee meetings take place in 
Canada). Since both states regard the trust as resident, the tiebreaker in article 4(3) 
of the DTT will be applied. Hence, the POEM of the trust will have to be determined. 
It seems obvious that the POEM of the trust is in Canada and it will therefore be 
regarded as resident in Canada for DTT purposes. Accordingly, the trust will not be 
regarded as resident in South Africa for domestic law purposes. 
(a) Assume that the same trust is either a vesting trust or a discretionary trust 
that distributes all of its income to its beneficiaries during the relevant year. 
Applying Canadian tax law, it is submitted that the trust is liable to tax in 
Canada and therefore resident in Canada for purposes of the DTT. Canada will 
probably also attribute the income to the trust. South Africa will attribute the 
income to the beneficiaries in terms of its domestic law. 
(b) If the beneficiaries are resident in Canada, it is submitted that the solution in 
the Partnership Report will oblige South Africa to take into consideration, as 
part of the factual context, that Canada attributes the income to the trust. It 
may therefore be argued that South Africa will have to regard the income as 
“paid to” or “derived by” the trust and hence no conflict of attribution will 
arise. 
If applicable, South Africa will have to determine whether the trust is the 
beneficial owner of the income. In the case of a vesting trust it is unlikely that 
the trust’s ownership attributes will outweigh that of any other person and it 
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is therefore doubtful whether the trust will be the beneficial owner of the 
income. In the case of a discretionary trust, however, the ownership 
attributes of the trust will probably outweigh those of any other person and, 
consequently, it is submitted that the discretionary trust will be regarded as 
the beneficial owner of the income. 
In the case of a discretionary trust that distributes its income during the 
relevant year, it is argued that South Africa will therefore reduce its tax claim 
in accordance with the treaty. 
(c) If the beneficiaries are resident in South Africa, the majority view in the 
Partnership Report will allow South Africa to tax the beneficiaries on the 
income received from the trust without reducing its tax claim in terms of the 
DTT. 
(d) If one assumes that the trust is a discretionary trust that accumulates its 
income, it will be regarded as liable to tax and therefore resident in Canada. 
Both Canada and South Africa will attribute the income to the trust and no 
conflict of attribution will arise. If beneficial ownership is a requirement, it is 
submitted that South Africa will view the trust as the beneficial owner, based 
on the fact that the trust’s ownership attributes outweigh those of any other 
person. 
(e) If the facts remain the same as in (d), but it is further assumed that the settlor 
is resident in the Netherlands, the Netherlands will probably tax the settlor on 
the income earned by the Canadian trust. The solution in the Partnership 
Report will oblige South Africa to take into account the fact that the 
Netherlands attributes the income to the settlor and therefore regard the 
income as paid to or derived by the settlor for purposes of the DTT between 
South Africa and the Netherlands. It is submitted that the effect is thus that 
both the DTT between South Africa and Canada and the DTT between South 
Africa and the Netherlands would apply. South Africa’s taxing rights would 
thus be restricted in terms of both treaties. The lowest amount of tax allowed 
under the two treaties should be used to satisfy South Africa’s obligation.1892 
9.10.2 Assume that a trust is resident in South Africa in terms of South African domestic 
law and in terms of the relevant DTT. The trust receives income from Canada. 
It is submitted that both South Africa and Canada will view the trust as a person. 
Both states will also regard the trust itself as a taxpayer. 
(a) Assume that the trust is either a vesting trust or a discretionary trust that 
distributes all of its income to its beneficiary during the relevant year. The 
beneficiary is resident in South Africa. 
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Canada will most likely not regard the trust as resident in South Africa, since it 
is not liable to tax in terms of South African domestic tax legislation. However, 
applying the solution set out in the Partnership Report, Canada may take into 
account the fact that South Africa attributes the income to the beneficiary. 
The beneficiary is a resident of South Africa and liable to tax in South Africa. If 
the beneficial ownership requirement is applicable, It is submitted that 
Canada will be bound to the test laid down by its courts, so that the person 
who claims to be the beneficial owner will have to hold all the attributes of 
ownership. Whether Canada will view the beneficiary of a trust to be the 
beneficial owner of the income received by the trust in this instance was not 
examined in this dissertation (only the South African position was discussed), 
but it is likely, based on the decision in Prévost, that Canada will regard the 
beneficiary as the beneficial owner of the income. If this is the case, Canada 
will, arguably, be obliged to reduce its tax claim in accordance with the DTT. 
South Africa, as the residence state, will have to grant relief from double 
taxation to the beneficiaries. 
(b) Assume that the trust is a discretionary trust that accumulates all its income 
during the relevant year. The beneficiary is resident in South Africa. 
South Africa will tax the income in the trust’s hands and the trust will 
therefore be regarded as liable to tax for purposes of article 4(1) of the OECD 
MTC. Canada will probably attribute the income to the trust, as will South 
Africa. Therefore no conflict of attribution will arise. Canada will have to 
decide whether the trust will be regarded as the beneficial owner of the 
income. If it is regarded as such, it is submitted that Canada will have to 
reduce its tax claim in accordance with the DTT and South Africa will grant 
relief from double taxation. If Canada does not regard the trust as the 
beneficial owner, South Africa will only provide partial relief from double 
taxation. 
9.10.3 Assume that the trustee of a vesting trust (and the trust itself) is resident in the 
United Kingdom. The trust receives income from a South African source, which the 
trustee mandates to the beneficiary. 
(a) If it is assumed that the beneficiary is resident in the United Kingdom, he or 
she will be liable to tax in the United Kingdom by reason of his or her 
residence and therefore also resident in the United Kingdom for treaty 
purposes. It is submitted that the United Kingdom attributes the income to 
the beneficiary in terms of its domestic law. South Africa will also attribute the 
income to the beneficiary by virtue of its domestic law and therefore no 
conflict of attribution will arise. South Africa will regard the beneficiary as the 
beneficial owner of the income, since the beneficiary’s ownership attributes 
outweigh those of the trust (or trustee). 
(b) If it is assumed that the beneficiary is resident in Canada, he or she will also be 
regarded as a resident in Canada for treaty purposes. South Africa will 
attribute the income to the beneficiary, who is resident in Canada. However, 
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in terms of the Partnership Report, South Africa may take into consideration 
that Canada (it is submitted) attributes the income to the trust, which is 
resident in the United Kingdom. South Africa is therefore not obliged to grant 
the benefits of the DTT between South Africa and Canada in respect of the 
income.1893 
9.11  Closing remarks 
Trusts are very versatile and flexible institutions and they can be used for a multitude of 
purposes. Their activities and transactions often span different jurisdictions, bringing with it 
the risk of international double taxation. Many of the states where trusts are known and 
used, enter into DTTs to mitigate the effect of double taxation. However, the application of 
DTTs to trusts is relatively unexplored territory. Especially in South Africa, many of the issues 
in relation to the application of DTTs to trusts, that have been addressed in other states, 
have not been contended with adequately. It is hoped that the legislature, treaty negotiators 
and the judiciary will take note of these uncertainties and address them in an appropriate 
manner. It is therefore hoped that this dissertation has made their task easier, by making a 
start in charting some of the features of a small part of the unexplored territory. 
Certainly, there are many issues that still need to be addressed in future research. It is hoped 
that the OECD will fulfil its promise to draft a report on the application of the OECD MTC to 
trusts.1894 Such a report will no doubt enhance the harmonisation and clarification which the 
OECD MTC seeks to achieve. 
  
                                                          
1893 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 51. 
1894 OECD The Application of The OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships para 1. 
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